1. DEVASTATING FIRE AT INDIAN
OIL CORPORATION OIL DEPOT
(JAIPUR - 2009)
Presented by :
ANKIT KHICHARIYA (09)
KARAN KARNWAL () MANISH SANGWAN ()
RAHUL AGARWAL (38) SAMEER SHARMA (46)

3. THE INCIDENT
• Date : 29th October, 2009
• Time : 1830 to 1930 hrs
• Operation :
Transfer of Petrol from
tank No. 401 C to
M/S BPCL through pipeline

4. THE FACILITY
• Receives petroleum products (Class A & Class B type ) including
Kerosene, Petrol & Diesel from Baroda refinery
• The terminal has 11 tanks with an aggregate storage capacity of more than
1 lakh kilolitres.
Storage Capacity Tentative
Closing Stock
Product Capacity (as on
29.10.2009)
Petrol 60,000 KL 17,810 KL
Diesel 40,000 KL 39,966 KL
Kerosene 13,500 KL 2099 KL
Interface - 2809 KL

5. How It Started ?
• At around 5:50 pm tank No. 401 A (5500 KL of Petrol) was
being lined up for transfer of product to nearby BPCL facility.
• The outlet was provided with three valves in series
• MOV (Motor Operated Valve)
• Hammer Blind valve
• HOV (Hand Operated Valve)

6. • At 1810 pm on Oct. 29, 2009 the spillage of MS started
• Till 1930 pm Leakage of highly inflammable petrol about 1000
tons took place
• It resulted in formation of vapour cloud, which according to a
computer simulated model of such an incident turned out to be
around 15 – 20 Tons.
• At 1930 pm presumably a Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) took
place in the vicinity of the terminal and thereafter all the 11
tanks caught fire in a series and continued to burn for next five
days.
• The fire continued till 0600 hrs on Nov. 11, 2009.

7. Possible Scenarios
Scenario - I
• MOV was in open condition before the start of
hammer blind reversal job
Scenario – I
• MOV opened accidentally when the blind was being
reversed

8. Probable Cause
• Immediate Cause:
• Non – observance of normal safety procedure
Standard Operating Sequence Likely Sequence
1. Ensure MOV and HOV are closed 1. MOV opened first.
2. Reverse the position of Hammer Blind Valve 2. Hammer Blind Valve opened
3. Open the HOV 3. Leakage started.
4.Open MOV (initially inching operation to
establish no leakage from Hammer Blind Valve
body)
• The hammer blind was not closed properly which allowed the petrol to
come out in large quantity through the opening of the hammer blind.

9. Root Cause:
• Absence of site specific written operating procedures
• The safety audit report conducted by in-house experts of the company in
February 2009 was SILENT about the ABSENCE OF SITE SPECIFIC
SOP in the installation.
• Absence of leak stopping devices from a remote location
• The audit team also observed that “emergency and disaster management plan”
are well defined but FAILED to indicate that this plan DOES NOT CONSIDER A
MAJOR MS LEAK resulting in a large vapour cloud and the measures needed to
deal with it.
• Insufficient understanding of hazards, risks and consequences
• The Disaster Management Plan (DMP) booklet was undated and
appeared to be generalized and not specific to the site.

10. Source of Ignition
Trevor Kletz, the renowned safety professional has said “the
vapour cloud formed does not worry about the source of
ignition; it will get it from anywhere”.
• The ignition energy required to ignite the vapour cloud is quite
low (~ 0.2 mj)
• Probable source inside the terminal :
• Electrical apparatus like lamp post, friction of material or any other
electrical equipment or vehicle.
• Probable source outside terminal:
• Spark during starting a vehicle
• Spark from other industries

11. Consequences of Incident
• 6 consecutive Explosion
• Intensity of First Explosion was 2.3 on the Richter Scale.
• Fire in 11 storage tanks
• 11 Personnel Died
• 150 personnel seriously injured
• Pollution in Environment
• 5,00,000 people shifted to safe location

12. Consequences of Incident
• Production in surrounding Industries affected
• Power cut losses to other Industries
• Cracks developed in the Houses close to depot
• Student living in nearby hostels taken to safer place
• Education in Schools & Colleges closed for several days
• About 30 establishments located around the terminal have
been severely damaged in the incident.

13. Major Losses
• Repairing cost of damaged houses Rs. 5
Crore
• 60, 000 KL Petroleum products consumed
in fire
• Estimated loss Rs. 280 Crores

14. Impact on Environment
• Huge quantity of Carbon Monoxide (CO), Carbon
dioxide (CO2), Nitrous Oxide (NO2), Sulphur Oxides
and un-burnt hydrocarbons (smoke) escaped into the
environment.
• Respiratory problems to people residing in the nearby
areas.
• Smoke also hit agriculture in the surrounding villages
which supply vegetables and food grain to Jaipur.

15. Fire Protection Measures
• All the tanks were provided with Medium Velocity Water
Spray (MVWS) System and foam protection system as a fire
protection measure as per the norms of Oil Industry Safety
Directorate (OISD)
• Water storage tanks – 02 Nos – of 24, 60,000 litres capacity
each
• Fire water pumps – 05 Nos – of 113.89 M3/Hr capacity each.
All were diesel driven pumps
• Jockey Pumps – 2 Nos – of electrical driven and capacity
2.78 litres/min
• Foam storage tank - 10,000 Litres
• Fire water network in the entire terminal
• Foam pourer system for all tanks
• Water sprinkler system
• Hydrants and Monitors

16. Shortcomings in Fire Fighting Systems
• Only diesel driven pumps were available
• Water cum foam monitor was not available on the Fire
• water network
• Cooling water system did not work, which added the
risk of fire on the other tanks
• Foam system of the first tank also did not work from
where evaporating the flammable mixture
• Inter tank distance was not followed

17. Shortcomings in Fire Fighting Systems
• Location of Fire Water Pump House was very near to the
tank farm area
• Portable or fixed type Gas detection system was not
available
• Condition monitoring system was not available
• Personal Protective Equipments like B A set, Face Mask,
Fire Entry suit was not available.
• No trained officer was deployed.
• No policy for deputing a trained fire officer.
• Lack of effective co-ordination.

18. LESSONS
• Implementation of applicable Codes & Standards .
• Fire adequacy study to be done for installations.
• Work Permit System should be strictly followed.
• Intensive Operational & Fire Safety Training to be
organized at per level of employees at installations.
• Green Belt around the Hazardous Industry required to be
developed.
• Training on use of PPE by the operational staff & Fire
Services personnel.
• Analysis of any fire incident and overcome the lapses.

19. LESSONS
• Effective co-ordination monitoring system to be
implemented.
• Gas/vapour detectors required to be installed in the
sensitive locations, leakage prone areas.
• Testing of Fire Safety Systems as per regulation should be
mandatory, Third party inspection may be incorporated.
• Control of such incident should be in the hand of the
professional people

20. SNAPSHOTS of the incident

24. Thank You