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A multilayer framework
proposal to catch data
      exfiltration
        Puneet Sharma
Agenda
 Introduction to the problem
   What is data exfiltration?
   Why is it more difficult to catch than regular network based intrusions?

 Hardware based Trojans
   Huawei case
   Greek phone tapping case

 Software based trojans
   Rootkits

 Proposed approach
   Multiple stacks/layered detection
   Parameters to watch

 Challenges
What is data exfiltration?
 Unauthorized extraction of data from a system
 Can be locally or remotely initiated
 Is hard to catch because:
   May leave no fingerprint
   Insider attack
   Can go at great lengths to hide itself using kernel level
     device drivers
Hardware based trojans
 Use cases:
   Huawei case
   Greek phone tapping case
 Special challenges in catching HW Trojans
   Special circuits with an extremely small footprint
   Most come shipped with their own software
   Most circuit based testing methods too expensive and
    impractical to check for each possible circuit flow
Rootkits and other Trojans
 Device driver way to get in
 Kernel mode access
 Can hide processes
 Can auto run on restart
 Stuxnet: the most famous example
Multi layered approach
                    • Hidden processes
                    • New hardware insertion event
Application layer   • New device driver registration




                    • Change in outgoing packet patterns
 Network layer      • Connection to an unknown address




                    • Change in the power consumption patterns
                    • Change in the instruction set patterns
Hardware layer
Justification for a multi
           stacked solution
 No such thing as the perfect defense
 Idea is to make it really hard for the attacker to avoid
  detection

 Certain techniques on the network and application
  layer are state of the art, just never used together

 Sophisticated hardware Trojans not just sections of
  mala fide circuits, but come with their own custom
  software
Parameters to monitor
 New Hardware detection
 New device driver registration
 Sudden increase in packet size going out
 Type of data going out
 Key file hashes being changed
Parameters to monitor
 Memory traces
 CPU utilization
 Hidden processes
 Power pattern changes
 Instruction set pattern changes
Relevance of parameters
              matrix
Parameter/Alar      Ways to monitor       reliable   reliable     reliable
m                                         on its     with a few   with many
                                          own?       other        other
                                                     alarms?      alarms?
New hardware        lsusb, udevd,         No         Yes          Yes
detection           udevadm, lshw
New device          Lspci, lsmod,         No         Yes          Yes
driver detection    modprobe
Increase in         Wire shark, tcpdump   No         Yes          Yes
outgoing packet
size
Change in type      Wireshark, tcpdump    No         No           Yes
of data going out
Change in file      tripwire              No         Yes          Yes
hashes
Relevance of parameters
               matrix
Parameter/Alar    Ways to monitor        reliable   reliable   reliable
m                                        on its     with a     with many
                                         own?       few        other
                                                    other      alarms?
                                                    alarms?
Memory traces     /proc file system      No         No         Yes

CPU utilization   mpstat, top, sysstat   No         No         Yes

Hidden            unhide, proc/exe       Yes        Yes        Yes
processes
Power pattern                            Yes        Yes        Yes
changes
Instruction set                          Yes        Yes        Yes
changes
Challenges
 Most Metasploit exploits on windows
 Exploits to test all alarms/parameters
 Creating a hardware exploit which involves minimum user
  interaction
 Detecting the system parameters on windows
Thank you

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Thesis proposal

  • 1. A multilayer framework proposal to catch data exfiltration Puneet Sharma
  • 2. Agenda  Introduction to the problem  What is data exfiltration?  Why is it more difficult to catch than regular network based intrusions?  Hardware based Trojans  Huawei case  Greek phone tapping case  Software based trojans  Rootkits  Proposed approach  Multiple stacks/layered detection  Parameters to watch  Challenges
  • 3. What is data exfiltration?  Unauthorized extraction of data from a system  Can be locally or remotely initiated  Is hard to catch because:  May leave no fingerprint  Insider attack  Can go at great lengths to hide itself using kernel level device drivers
  • 4. Hardware based trojans  Use cases:  Huawei case  Greek phone tapping case  Special challenges in catching HW Trojans  Special circuits with an extremely small footprint  Most come shipped with their own software  Most circuit based testing methods too expensive and impractical to check for each possible circuit flow
  • 5. Rootkits and other Trojans  Device driver way to get in  Kernel mode access  Can hide processes  Can auto run on restart  Stuxnet: the most famous example
  • 6. Multi layered approach • Hidden processes • New hardware insertion event Application layer • New device driver registration • Change in outgoing packet patterns Network layer • Connection to an unknown address • Change in the power consumption patterns • Change in the instruction set patterns Hardware layer
  • 7. Justification for a multi stacked solution  No such thing as the perfect defense  Idea is to make it really hard for the attacker to avoid detection  Certain techniques on the network and application layer are state of the art, just never used together  Sophisticated hardware Trojans not just sections of mala fide circuits, but come with their own custom software
  • 8. Parameters to monitor  New Hardware detection  New device driver registration  Sudden increase in packet size going out  Type of data going out  Key file hashes being changed
  • 9. Parameters to monitor  Memory traces  CPU utilization  Hidden processes  Power pattern changes  Instruction set pattern changes
  • 10. Relevance of parameters matrix Parameter/Alar Ways to monitor reliable reliable reliable m on its with a few with many own? other other alarms? alarms? New hardware lsusb, udevd, No Yes Yes detection udevadm, lshw New device Lspci, lsmod, No Yes Yes driver detection modprobe Increase in Wire shark, tcpdump No Yes Yes outgoing packet size Change in type Wireshark, tcpdump No No Yes of data going out Change in file tripwire No Yes Yes hashes
  • 11. Relevance of parameters matrix Parameter/Alar Ways to monitor reliable reliable reliable m on its with a with many own? few other other alarms? alarms? Memory traces /proc file system No No Yes CPU utilization mpstat, top, sysstat No No Yes Hidden unhide, proc/exe Yes Yes Yes processes Power pattern Yes Yes Yes changes Instruction set Yes Yes Yes changes
  • 12. Challenges  Most Metasploit exploits on windows  Exploits to test all alarms/parameters  Creating a hardware exploit which involves minimum user interaction  Detecting the system parameters on windows