2014 #sitnl Mobile Security Bug Parade

Mobile Security Bug Parade
Frank Köhntopp
November 2014

WhoAmI
frank.koehntopp@sap.com
I work in SAP’s Products & Innovation Group, in the Security Validation Team
– Perform independent security assessments on our products from a customer’s point of view
– Assess product security quality and integration aspects of security under real-world conditions
– Find security vulnerabilities before shipment
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 2

Mobile Security
Why do we need to talk?
http://media.kaspersky.com/en/IT_Security_Risks_Survey_2014_Global_report.pdf
http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=17358

Mobile Security
The attack surface

Old school security
Testing at the end of development
Development
of
functionality
Static Analysis
Dynamic Analysis
Penetration Testing
Customer Testing

Automated Security Testing
Helpful, but not enough
Static
Analysis
Dynamic
Analysis
Architecture
Flaws
TOP 10 Software Security Design Flaws
• Earn or give, but never assume, trust
• Use an authentication mechanism that cannot
be bypassed or tampered with
• Authorize after you authenticate
• Strictly separate data and control instructions
• Define an approach that ensures all data are
explicitly validated
• Use cryptography correctly
• Identify sensitive data and how they should be
handled
• Always consider the users
• Understand how integrating external
components changes your attack surface
• Be flexible when considering future changes to
objects and actors
http://cybersecurity.ieee.org/center-for-secure-design.html

Old school security
Welcome to 2014
Broken
Application
Bad People

Old school security
Magic Crypto Fairy Dust
• Shamir’s Law: Crypto is bypassed,
not penetrated
https://www.flickr.com/photos/chelseamcnamara/4058966236

Open Source
Free != Secure

Geers‘s Law
Any security technology whose
effectiveness can’t be empirically
determined is indistinguishable from
blind luck — Dan Geer

Bug Parade
Stuff we found in SAP and Partner Products
(Don‘t worry – it‘s all fixed now…)

Connecting to the server
SSL for beginners

Don’t let the users make security decisions
They’re not particularly good at it…

Flaws in login mechanisms
30 years in, password handling is still difficult…
OK button can only be
pressed if password is correct
== endless retries
Issues we found in several apps:
 No password complexity – “qqqqqqqq”
 Unlimited retries
 No lock on device lock
 Password change w/o old password
 Hints on logon errors

Storing the password
Local storage is not the best idea

Don’t trust the client
They’re all liars!

Sending the password to the server

Inventing your own cryptography
Those people thinking cryptography is hard? They’re right, actually…

Developers *love* log files!
Subtitle

Too much information
No need to be overly specific
http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list.
php?vendor_id=45&product_id=887&version_id=89269&page=1&hasexp=0&opdos=0&opec=0&opov=0&opcsrf=0&opgpriv=0&opsqli=0&opxss=0
&opdirt=0&opmemc=0&ophttprs=0&opbyp=0&opfileinc=0&opginf=0&cvssscoremin=0&cvssscoremax=0&year=0&month=0&cweid=0&order=3&trc=3
3&sha=f2380b70216e338e4fcf75882a55606c6b46cddc

Red Flags
Favourite development quotes
„But why would anybody do that…?“
„On the server we store the password encrypted with 2048 bits“
„It‘s BASE64 encrypted“

What SAP does
Help developers avoid bugs & flaws
Understand
Risk & Threats
Build it securely
Abuse, try to break
&
verify
React

How do do security the right way
 Consider the full solution
 Do Architecture Risk Analysis
 Defense in depth != do/buy EVERYTHING
 Each activity must add value in the context of the threat model
 Let your technology stack guide you, not a checklist
 It’s the only thing that works – think continuous delivery

2014 #sitnl Mobile Security Bug Parade

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2014 #sitnl Mobile Security Bug Parade