3. „Armed Force‟ as a Reflection of the Age
Nomadic
(Hunter/gatherer) Agrarian society Industrial society
Age
„Arms‟ Bare Hands+ Cold Hot
Energy Human Mechanical Thermal
Unit Clan Settlement City Nation-State
Post-industrial society:
Information and knowledge age
Age
Arms ?
Energy ?
Unit ? [..., networks, cities, societies, individuals,…]
4. STRONG in the 21st Century:
STRategic Orientation and Navigation Guidance
Strategic Orientation Strategic Navigation
1 Performance
indicators
External (design/collect)
Analysis Strategic portfolio
analysis 2
Strategic
Foresight boundary Strategic Act CD&E
direction
conditions Capa- Eco-
Policy
bility system
options
options options
Internal
Analysis
Decide
1 – Strategic learning
Strategic Risk Assessment
2 – Strategic feedback loop
Value for Money Analysis
5. Trend 1 – (A bit) more „serious‟ strategic analysis
… but differentially so
Strategic Orientation Strategic Navigation
1 Performance
indicators
External (design/collect)
Analysis Strategic portfolio
analysis 2
Strategic
Foresight boundary Strategic Act CD&E
direction
conditions Capa- Eco-
Policy
bility system
options
options options
Internal
Analysis
Decide
1 – Strategic learning
Strategic Risk Assessment
2 – Strategic feedback loop
Value for Money Analysis
6. Trend 1 – (A bit) more „serious‟ strategic analysis
Personal and notional drawings!
Strategic Strategic
Strategic
Operational Operational
Tactical Tactical
US Europe Europe
(Best case) (Typical case)
7. Foresight and Defence Planning
A Short History
I
n
Fore- Point Parameterized Foresight s
Risk/Uncertainty Meta-Foresight
casting Scenarios scenarios i
g
h
t
Teleological Multi-scenario Robust „FAR‟ First
planning
Planning (1-on-1) planning planning principles
from “plan and pray” to “sense and respond”
9. 10 trends
1. Foresight for defense (still?) going strong
2. More balance between time horizons
3. Towards whole-of-government/society
4. Diversification of types of foresight
5. Diversification of foresight tools/methods
6. From foresight 1.0 to 2.0 to 3.0
7. Towards better actioning of foresight
8. More balance between outside-in/inside-out
9. Towards new foresight products
10. Trend 1 – Interest in foresight (still?) growing
11. Trend 2 – Better Balance between Planning Horizons:
Away from Presentism?
Personal and notional estimates !!!
P High
L
A
N
N
I
N
Medium
G
Defence Planning-
E
F
Horizons:
F • current
O
Low • medium-term
R • long-term
T 60s 70s 80s 90s 00s 10s
YEAR
12. Trend 3 – Towards whole-of-government (slowly)
Integrated
security
Whole-of-
foresight
Society
Internal security
Whole-of-
Government
Stovepiped Whole-of- Whole-of-
Government Society
External security
13. Planning for National Security –
The Dutch Model (2007)
Foresight Risk assessment Capabilities planning
Process 1. Government-wide analysis 2. Strategic planning 3. Follow-up
Policy
A. Strategic B. Horizon- Required Current
foresight scanning capabilies capabiliities
C. National Planning
Risk
risk- assumpt
prioritization Measures
assessment ions
B. Thematic in-depth
foresight Capabilities gap
Legislation
Report Report Report National -
Work
Product strategic themes and Threat Risk programme
Capability
foresight scenarios picture Assessment requirements
tasks and
Cabinet Cabinet capabilities Cabinet decides
Decision- decides on selects on capabilities
themes for priorities on to be
making thematic basis of strengthened
in-depth national risk through normal
analyses assessment budget system
15. Government-Wide National Risk
Assessment- – Assessing likelihood
Hazards
Class Quantitative (%) Qualitative description of danger
A < 0,05 Highly improbable
B 0.05 – 0.5 Improbable
C 0.5 – 5 Possible
D 5 – 50 Probable
E 50 – 100 Highly probable
Dangers
Class Qualitative description of danger
A No concrete indication, and event is thought to be inconceivable
B No concrete indication, but event is conceivable
C No concrete indication, but event is conceivable
D Event is thought to be quite probable
E Concrete indication event will occur
19. Trend 4 – Diversification of types of foresight
Strategic security After Paul Davis
planning
(Deep(ening?))
Risk
Uncertainty
planning
Type of
Operational Contingency
planning planning
Risk planning Uncertainty planning
Planning Foresight
Broader foresight
No-surprises
future
Point-scenarios
toolbox ‘The Black Swan’
Pinciple
Optimization Robustness FRANKness First principles
20. Trend 5 - Diversification of foresight methods
21. HCSS „flares‟: 8 different angles …
…along (at least) three dimensions
Level of Abstraction
High
Very abstract
Low
Very concrete Long Short
Timehorizon
Quantitative
Qualitative
Research method
23. Online expertforum
• What do you see as the major
risks to national and international
stability and security in the
Risks coming 5-15 years?
• International
• National
Relevance • Criteria
• Driving forces
• Actors
Elaboration • Regions
24.
25. TRADITIONAL ARMS RACE - CONCEPTUAL VIEW
Sensitivity of opposing
arms production B
Bias in estimating Time to perceive
opposing arms B arms opposing arms B
+ +
+ Estimated -
opposing arms A
+
+
Arms B
Desired arms A
+
-
+ +
+
New arms under Estimated Estimated New arms under
development A domestic arms A domestic arms B development B
+ +
+
+ -
Arms A Desired arms B
+
Estimated
opposing arms B
-
+ +
Time to perceive arms Bias in estimating
opposing arms A opposing arms A
Sensitivity of opposing
arms production A
26. Trend 6 – Towards Foresight 3.0
Foresight 1.0 Foresight 2.0 Foresight 3.0
Connecting people /
Prima Donna Networks of (remarkable) people Connecting visions
27. Meta-fore – Etymology and Meaning
Meta- fore
Μετα-φορά Fore-sight
A
(metaphora)
n G
c r
i e fore sight
e e μεταφέρω (metapherō)
n k “„I transfer, apply‟” ME, probably
t translation of
Latin „providentia‟
μετά (meta), φέρω (pherō),
“above, beyond‟” “„I bear, carry‟”
Meta-analysis of existing foresight exercises
Without pre-conceived (ideological, methodological, cultural,…)
notions
(Attempt to) carry the field of foresight beyond its current status
28. Metafore C6+2 protocol
“Command and
Control‟
Conceptualize
Collect
Code
Cogitate
Commit to
paper
Communicate
32. Global parameters - Overview
1 2 3 4 5
Actors Blocs of States Pairs of States State and non-state vs. non-state State vs. non-state Non-state vs. non-state Actors
Aim Physical degradation Obtain/retain/occupy Political/economic degradation Stabilize Survive Aim
Definition War Militarized interstate disputes Tensions between non-state actors Political/economic tensions Between individuals Definition
Distinctiveness Low Leans low Medium Leans high High Distinctiveness
Domain Traditional Dimensions Modern military dimensions Political Economic Human Terrain Domain
Extensiveness Global Regional Sub-regional National Domestic Extensiveness
Impetus Data Interest Value Relationship Structural Impetus
Length Years Months Days Hours Minutes Length
Means Physical Political Economic Electronic/Cyber Information/ Psychological Means
Pace Low Leans low Medium Leans high High Pace
Salience Low Leans low Medium Leans high High Salience
36
1 2 3 4 5
33. Parameters – Values across Languages
1 2 3 4 5
Actors Blocs of States Pairs of States State and non-state vs. non-state State vs. non-state Non-state vs. non-state Actors
Aim Physical degradation Obtain/retain/occupy Political/economic degradation Stabilize Survive Aim
Definition War Militarized interstate disputes Tensions between non-state actors Political/economic tensions Between individuals Definition
Distinctiveness Low Leans low Medium Leans high High Distinctiveness
Domain Traditional Dimensions Modern military dimensions Political Economic Human Terrain Domain
Extensiveness Global Regional Sub-regional National Domestic Extensiveness
Impetus Data Interest Value Relationship Structural Impetus
Length Years Months Days Hours Minutes Length
Means Physical Political Economic Electronic/Cyber Information/ Psychological Means
Pace Low Leans low Medium Leans high High Pace
Salience Low Leans low Medium Leans high High Salience
1 2 3 4 5
38. Trend 7 – More focus on non-‟known knowns‟ (1/2)
Unknowns
Knowns Knowns Unknowns
„Lesser and included‟ A few point scenarios
„Wise Prediction‟/ (Point-)Scenario-planning/
Big gambler Scenario-gambling
39. Trend 7 – More focus on non-‟known knowns‟ (2/2)
40. Trend 8 – „Anchoring‟ foresight
“it is all too easy to overestimate the effects of
these exercises, particularly when you consider
the rhetoric surrounding some of them. Closer
examination shows that their impact on research
and innovation systems is typically rather
marginal, and they tend to lead to incremental,
evolutionary changes, often at the edges.”
Mapping Foresight. Revealing how Europe and other world regions navigate
into the future. EFMN, November 2009
41. Trend 9 – more „inside-out‟ foresight
The butterfly-model
general
to-
semadyson
security
Outside-in integratie
Inside-out
security -
to-
themes/caps
43. Trend 9 – More „inside-out‟ foresight
vision
outside-in inside-out
future
future me’s what are we (/do we want to be) good at?
environments =>
capabilities
integration
44. Trend 9 – More „inside-out‟ foresight
vision
outside-in inside-out
future future me’s what are / do
environments => we want to be
capabilities good at?
integration
(future) capability requirements - DOTMLPFI
Portfolio – portfolio of capabilities and policies
Portfolio – portfolio of capabilities and policies
One of the big (underappreciated) stovepipes in our defence planning systems is the timehorizon-stovepipe (current (operational) planning vs. Medium-term planning vs. Long-term planning). During the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath, most capabilities planning went into medium-term planning (since no real operations were taking place). As OPTEMPO started picking up in the post-Cold War period, most planning resources were invested in current (operational) planning, mostly at the expense of both other planning horizons. Recent shocks (financial crisis) may trigger renewed interest in longer-term planning. We want to emphasize here that the main advantages of long-term planning (and the principal reason to take it more seriously than we do today) is that it allows one to relax some of the main assumptions that are generally accepted at any given moment in time and to think more ‘out of the box’ (also in terms of solutions).
Australia, France, UK
The items that the cabinet takes out of the (meta-)foresight are then subjected to a government-wide analytical exercise we call the National Risk Assessment. This exercise yields a matrix that indicates the rlativel likelihood and impact of those items for Dutch national security.
This was the 2008 National Risk Assessment matrix that was presented to the Cabinet in May 2008 and then forwarded to Parliament and made public.
Uitwerking van indicatoren die inzichtgeven of een ‘event’ zichvoortzet in een ‘trend’Hoe bepaal je in welke richting de wereld zich in het scenarioframework beweegt?Waarde zit in over enkelejarenditherhalen and kijken hoe de blod
(Meta-) analysisBandwidth (general distribution of findings)‘Robust’ findings (where there seems to be more consensus)(Interesting) weak findings – closer look at some (interesting) outliers (plausible, internally coherent foresight views that for some reason are (currently a minority view)‘Holes’ – are there any views ‘missing’ (e.g. findings from other foresight work we’ve done (cite!!!), own thinking, etc.) ‘Trends’ – analyze the findings across times: are there any views that seem to be receding or ascending? [This may also include other things such as patterns (are certain views more typical for certain types of sources (e.g. think tanks vs. government); for certain regions (certain views more dominant in certain regions), etc.)‘So what’ – what does all of this mean? How do we interpret this? What does the meta-analysis mean? (what do we ‘know’/’not know’)What does it mean for strategic planning? (‘translation’)
Traditional (pre-industrial) model: autocratic/‘heroic’ leadership – the strategic ‘leader’ (‘prince’, ‘commander’, ‘leader of a firm’) collects (and hoards) all the key information, plots a course and ‘steers’ his organization in that direction
Industrial-model: ‘leader’ surrounds himself with staffs with some division of labor (and specialization). Increasingly ‘staffs’ also become co-responsible for orientation (certainly WITHIN their own stovepipes) AND navigation (still mostly just execution with SOME leeway – supported/supporting commander/mission command)[add zig-zags]
Post-industrial model: two big changes:Nature of organization changes: more network-centric ecosystem-like (don’t be a star, be a galaxy)Nature of ‘Strong’ changes: no longer need/smart to condense/converge orientation to a single point (-prediction) and then to plot a ‘single’ course and steer (‘command and control’) the organization in that directionBetter/smarter to contemplate multiple futures (multi-perspective AND through the network/ecosystem), NOT condense/converge, NOT plot a single course but instead instill FRRANKness, develop and pursue a ‘bushy strategic tree) (ALSO through the network/ecosystem), and ‘sense (as a network/ecosystem) and respond (as a network/ecosystem)’