1. © GOLOS Association
www.golos.org

2. Kazan. March 4th 2012. Presidential election. Precinct 127
(there was a video clip in the initial version of the Power Point
presentation. See the clip on the next page.)

3. Kazan. March 4th 2012. Presidential election. Precinct 127
(there was the second video clip in the initial version of the Power Point
presentation. See the second clip on the next page.)

4. The official web
site of the
Central Election
Commission
(CEC) of the
Russian
Federation

5. The official web
site of the
Central Election
Commission
(CEC) of the
Russian
Federation

6. A quick search of “Irina Komarova” on the Web gives…

7. The lowest result of the United Russia party among all Russia’s regions
The elections in the
region are organized
in full compliance
with the law

8. Productive relationships with civic
observers

9. Even the hairsplitting
GOLOS association
couldn’t deny the unusual
fairness of the elections in
the Yaroslav region.

10. The head of the
regional
election
commission is
leaving his
position.
Actually the
respondent of
Gazeta.Ru close to the
Yaroslav
administration states
that Mr. Baburkin
wasn’t involved in
large scale
falsifications during
voting for the State
Duma deputies and
had a good reputation
among opposition.

11. 1. To reward the staff who violates the
law
2. To get rid of those who DON’T
1. Creating obstacles for civic
observers
2. Preventing the complaining about
falsification by ordinary citizens in
the court

12. The distribution of precincts by
turnout (Different elections,
Moscow)
The distribution
of precincts by
turnout in
Lithuania
(Presidential
elections,1997)
The distribution of
precincts by turnout
(Bundestag, Berlin,
2009)
The same type of
distribution. (Poland,
2nd round of the
Presidential elections,
2005)

13. The distribution of parties’ results
were very suspicious as well.
Especially, those of the United
Russia party.

14. Mr. Dmitry Oreshkin offered to organize
intensive observation on each 5th or
10th polling station.
Carl Friedrich Gauss couldn’t have
been more pleased because…

15. Proceedings of the
National Academy of
Sciences of the United
States of America
Field experiment
estimate of electoral
fraud in Russian
parliamentary elections
Ruben Enikolopova,
Vasily Korovkina,
Maria Petrovaa,
Konstantin Sonina,
Alexei Zakharov

16. Moscow. 2012. The presidential
election. The total control by the
citizens had dramatically changed the
official data.

17. Moscow. 2012. The
presidential election. The
total control by the
citizens had dramatically
changed the official data.

19. 1. The elections of Mr. Putin showed
that the State Duma lacks the
legitimacy.
2. Gauss adherents utterly defeated
the believers in “Hidden Variables”

20. The metaphor of aerosurveying and
reconnaissance squad.

21. Photo of the ballot box bottom at the
precinct #17.2 in Armenia (by Lena
Nazarian) and the position of this
precinct at the diagram.

22. A unique case of the total civic
control of the local elections in the
town of Kasimov (see documentary
by M. Muskevich “Observer Power”)
* Вертикальная ось – процент
партий (т.е. должно быть пятно
вытянутое по горизонтали)

23. The distortion of the
distribution in Kasimov
caused by verified
falsifications is
corresponding with the
distortion in other
regions (city of Moscow)
* Вертикальная ось – процент
партий (т.е. должно быть пятно
вытянутое по горизонтали)

24. Unlike to the previous years, the civic
observation gained real force and
began to influence final results through
fraud prevention.
The authorities saw it as a real danger
to their power and launched The
Counterattack.
1. Constant discrediting of civic observation.
2. Tightening the rules of observation.
3. Introduction of “professional” precinct
commissions for 5 year term.
4. Persecution (and now prosecution) of
GOLOS association and other observer
movements.
5. To be continued…