1. Innovating for Defeat:
Regressions in Military Affairs Generated by the Impact of
Strategic Culture on Military Innovation
By: Robert C. Castel
Supervised by: Prof. Uri Bar-Joseph
A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE
“DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY”
University of Haifa
Faculty of Social Sciences
School of Political Sciences
February, 2012
Recommended by: _________________ Date: ___________________
(Advisor)
Approved by: _____________________ Date: ___________________
(Chairman of Ph.D. Committee)
I

2. Innovating for Defeat:
Regressions in Military Affairs Generated by the Impact of
Strategic Culture on Military Innovation
Robert C. Castel
Abstract
The research of military change in general and the research of military
innovation in particular are characterized by a prevailing tendency of seeing
military change as a unidirectional phenomenon, equating implicitly or explicitly
change with progress. With most of the research interest directed at the rate of the
change (setting partisans of Military Revolutions and Revolutions in Military
Affairs against those who regard it as mostly evolutionary), its direction has
hitherto received little attention. However, history seems to suggest that change is
not always unidirectional, and military innovation can, under certain conditions,
generate regressions. This study seeks to understand and explain why and under
what conditions military innovations generate regressive outcomes. By answering
this question I will attempt to challenge the prevailing unidirectional perspective,
propose a more accurate and more refined typology of the dynamics of military
change, and offer new insights about the possible dangers of certain innovatory
practices.
V

3. Given the multiple goals of the research, a two- tiered research design was
selected. Built on case study methodology, the first tier offers a collection of
descriptive cases, while the second tier is built around the structured-focused
comparison of two major cases studies, containing several building block cases. In
order to establish the correlation between the main variables, John Stuart Mill's
method of comparison of most similar cases was used. The discovery of causal
chains, conditions and causal mechanisms was facilitated by the use of the process
tracing method. Last, recognizing the inherent limitations of case study research,
extensive use was made of within-case comparisons, comparisons to synchronic
cases and counterfactual analysis.
The findings of this research indicate that regressive innovations are not an
uncommon phenomenon, nor are they limited to a certain level of conflict, nation,
historical era etc. The evaluation of the explanatory power of the existing schools
of thought suggests that structural-realist explanations are not very useful for
explicating regressive innovations. Second, by applying societal explanations to the
problem it was found that this study's empirical findings challenge the existing
model, turning its logic on its head. Third, organizational explanations were found
not very effective in explaining historical cases, predating bureaucracies and civil-
military relations in their modern sense. Finally, it was the explanation based on
strategic culture, belonging to the less developed cultural approach that was found
most effective in explaining regressive innovations. The analysis of the two major
cases compared seems to confirm my research hypothesis that military innovations
may generate regressive outcomes whenever strategic culture contains core
elements (values, beliefs, norms etc.) that are conflicting with military
effectiveness.
VI

4. The contributions of this study to the research of military innovation are
several. First, by drawing attention to a hitherto neglected phenomenon, that of
regressive innovation, it offers a more accurate and more refined perspective on
military innovation. Second, by developing and diversifying the existing typology
of the possible outcomes of military innovation, it opens further ground for more
research. Third, it draws attention to the coexistence and co-evolution of several
competing strategic cultures in the same country and to the ways in which their
complex interactions influence military innovation. It also emphasizes the
disproportionate sensitivity of strategic level innovations to the influences of
strategic culture(s). On the practical level, it seeks to prompt decision makers to
re-think the significance of strategic culture(s) in which the emerging innovation is
nested. It also urges them to confront the fact that innovation is not necessarily
synonymous with an increase in military effectiveness and that it is perfectly
possible for a country to innovate itself into defeat.
VII