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- 1. Joint Operational Warfighting Joint Operating Concept
- 9. The conditions of war and of the battlespace, and the forms of the adversaries, have changed... Like creatures in nature, we must adapt to the new environment if we are to continue to dominate... Evolving Threat EstablishedThreat Current Paradigm Proposed Paradigm The Paradigm
- 12. Joint Operational Warfighting ADAPTABILITY SYNERGY OPPORTUNISM Warfighting Culture Distributed Operations Unified Battlespace Adaptive Command
- 13. Warfighting Culture The Concept
- 14. Joint Operational Warfighting ADAPTABILITY SYNERGY OPPORTUNISM Distributed Operations Unified Battlespace Adaptive Command Warfighting Culture
- 19. The Cornerstones of JOW The Concept
- 20. Joint Operational Warfighting ADAPTABILITY SYNERGY OPPORTUNISM Warfighting Culture Distributed Operations Unified Battlespace Adaptive Command
- 21. Unified Battlespace “ I shall proceed from the simple to the complex. But in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together.” – Carl von Clausewitz
- 22. Unified Battlespace A concept for understanding the operating environment, in its totality
- 27. Unified Battlespace Tactical Influence Deter Compel Coerce Defeat Influence Deter Compel Coerce Defeat D I M E P E M S I I Influence Deter Compel Coerce Defeat Strategic Operational A system of nodes and networks
- 28. Joint Operational Warfighting ADAPTABILITY SYNERGY OPPORTUNISM Warfighting Culture Distributed Operations Unified Battlespace Adaptive Command
- 29. “ War is the realm of uncertainty; Three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.” – Carl von Clausewitz Adaptive Command
- 30. A concept for commanding forces within the complex and uncertain environment of the Battlespace, in order to lead Distributed Operations. Adaptive Command
- 35. Joint Operational Warfighting ADAPTABILITY SYNERGY OPPORTUNISM Warfighting Culture Distributed Operations Unified Battlespace Adaptive Command
- 36. “ Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness.” – Sun Tzu Distributed Operations
- 37. A concept for the employment of full joint capabilities throughout the battlespace, aided by Adaptive Command, and an appreciation of the Unified Battlespace. Distributed Operations
- 38. Distributed Operations Information Fire Maneuver Component Elements Operations
- 40. A Distributed System… Distributed Operations
- 41. Emergent Qualities The Concept
- 42. Emergent Qualities Enhanced … Synergy Opportunism Adaptability
- 43. Synergy “ One whose upper and lower ranks have the same desires will be victorious.” – Sun Tzu Emergent Qualities
- 44. Adaptability “ Improvise, Adapt, Overcome.” – Military Adage Emergent Qualities
- 45. Opportunism “ The victorious army first realizes the conditions for victory, and then seeks to engage in battle.” – Sun Tzu Emergent Qualities
- 47. Joint Operational Warfighting ADAPTABILITY SYNERGY OPPORTUNISM Warfighting Culture Distributed Operations Unified Battlespace Adaptive Command
- 52. Joint Operational Warfighting Joint Operational Warfighting
Hinweis der Redaktion
- The problem set for the US military will grow in the near future, and will require a change in the military paradigm to address this growth. The threat will now be from many other directions than what is thought traditional, but the old threat from hostile nation-states will not disappear; this requires that the military be ready to engage an enemy who possesses a classic mechanized force, or the newer enemy who hides in the “dark places” and does not respect the old rules of war. The problem set for the engagement of the new non-state, non-traditional threat can be stated fairly easily. The growing population of the 3 rd world, who are for the most part trapped under incompetent and brutal governments and who are unable to achieve the standard of living of the 1 st world (due to numerous factors). Coupled with their awareness of Western “luxury”, due to worldwide media distribution, this will cause friction between the haves and have-nots, just as it has throughout human history. Their states will be collapsing under the load of the population and will be unable to provide even basic services; they will require ever-increasing resources to provide for their growing numbers but will be mired in increasing poverty due to a lack of resource extraction and distribution capabilities. This will exacerbate any religious/ethnic/tribal schisms within the population, and will increase jealousy and hatred of the 1 st world for perceived interference or manipulation of their conditions, or for not “sharing the wealth”.
- Both the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the 2001 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) acknowledge that we cannot and will not know precisely where and when America’s interests will be threatened or when America will come under attack. We can predict trends, but cannot predict events. We can identify threats, but cannot know where or when America or its allies will be attacked. We should try to avoid surprise, but also learn to expect it. Adapting to surprise – adapting quickly and decisively- must therefore be a capability we will incorporate throughout our National Defense Strategy. 1 An objective of the QDR was to shift the basis of defense planning from the old “threat-based” model to a “capabilities – based” model for the future. This capabilities-based model focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than on whom the adversary might be or where a war might occur. “ These capabilities are likely to include terrorism, cyber warfare, advanced surface-to-air missile defense systems, anti-space weapons and weapons of mass destruction, among others. Their use is likely to have as its aim delaying, disrupting, damaging or destroying the military capabilities of the U.S. , its allies or friends.” 2 The U.S. must identify the capabilities required to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve the objectives. These new capabilities are in addition to retaining key current capabilities, such as the capabilities to fight large conventional wars in distant theaters. 1 QDR report, Sept. 30, 2001, pg iii 2 Defense Planning Guidance FY 2003-2007, dated Aug 2001(UNCLAS paragraph)
- This is a transition slide. Transition from describing what HAS changed to what NEEDS to change. The old or current warfighting paradigm must adapt and change to the new environment and threats.