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Basic Points
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!




November 18, 2011



Published by Coxe Advisors LLP

Distributed by BMO Capital Markets
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                                            BMO Capital Markets Disclosures
         Company Name               Stock Ticker     Disclosures                  Company Name               Stock Ticker     Disclosures
Apple                               AAPL                   2             Fannie Mae                          FNMAO.OB
Banco Santander                     SAN                                  Freddie Mac                         FMCC.OB
Bank of America                     BAC                                  Goldman Sachs                       GS                    3, 4
Cisco Systems                       CSCO                   2             JPMorgan Chase                      JPM                    1
Citigroup                           C                      1             Nasdaq                              NDAQ                   2
ConocoPhillips                      COP                                  Societe Generale                    GLE.PA
Credit Suisse                       CS                                   TransCanada                         TRP                    1
Deutsche Bank                       DB                                   UBS                                 UBS
Enbridge                            ENB                  1, 3, 4
(1) BMO Capital Markets or its affiliates owns 1% or more of any class of common equity securities of the company.
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Don Coxe
THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL




It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!




November 18, 2011


published by
Coxe Advisors LLP
Chicago, IL
THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!
November 18, 2011



Coxe Advisors LLP.
Author:                                         Donald Coxe               312-461-5365
                                                dc@coxeadvisors.com
Editor:                                         Angela Trudeau            604-929-8791
                                                at@coxeadvisors.com
190 South LaSalle Street, 4th Floor
Chicago, Illinois USA 60603

Basic Points is published exclusively for BMO Financial Group and distributed by BMO Capital Markets Equity Research
for clients of BMO Capital Markets, BMO Nesbitt Burns, BMO Harris Private Banking and Harris Private Bank.
BMO Capital Markets Equity Research
Manager, Publishing:                            Monica Shin
                                                monica.shin@bmo.com
Desktop Publishing and                          Anna Goduco
Distribution Coordinator                        anna.goduco@bmo.com
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!
OVERVIEW
Too many equity investors are getting sick of the stock market. Glowing
corporate earnings don't seem to matter anymore, and the market is subject
to absurdly wide price swings. Many American equity investors who are
pulling money out of their mutual funds are telling advisors they think the
stock market must be rigged.

The seemingly endless pattern of risk-on risk-off days in European and North
American stocks which scares investors originates from the Wagnerian-scale
drama of the existential crisis of the euro, and the problems of European
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, American banks.

These dramas play out against the backdrop of growing fears of a new global
recession, which could, some analysts fear, be at least as challenging as its
predecessor, because governments have exhausted their bailout funds.

We are not convinced that a North American recession is inevitable and, in
any case, we doubt that its severity would approach 2008 levels. Zero interest
rates and record deficits should be good cushions.

This month we explain why investors should indeed be worried about those
badly-managed Wall Street and European banks in the light of the collapse
of their asset pricing models.

But we suggest that those endless crises in the eurozone could very likely
trigger a policy response that would dramatically improve the outlook for
European banks—and stocks generally.

We also consider the implications of the politicization of the Keystone
application in a broader context of debates on US energy policies. The Canadian
government and much of the Canadian oil industry were surprisingly naive
about Keystone's chances, actually believing that environmental issues were
the only barriers to an Obama OK.

We are leaving our Asset Mix recommendations unchanged.




                                                                                  November 2011   1
2   November 2011   THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

The wise Northrop Frye once told students of a trans-continental trip he had
taken in the observation car of a train. He noted that passengers could choose
seats that faced forward or backward. This was a option not available to the
pioneers who came by foot, horseback or canoe. They had to look ahead.
                                                                                         ...the men who run
He said that those train passengers who looked backwards were reflecting
                                                                                       big US and European
on where they had been, and that this was, on balance, a better strategy
                                                                                       banks are collectively
than looking ahead, because one could gradually build one's understanding
                                                                                           the most publicly
about the land—and the nation—without trying to peer ahead to what
                                                                                      controversial segment
would come next.
                                                                                            of Big Business...
We are going to follow Frye's precept by beginning with two pages of charts
about where we have been. We want clients to reflect on how ghastly the
performance of the [non-Canadian] bank stocks has been.

While musing on these horror stories of failures and bailouts, clients should
also be reflecting on the fact that the men who run big US and European banks
are collectively the most publicly controversial segment of Big Business in
claiming that they deserve to be paid more than they earn. Really? Were they
football or baseball coaches with such disastrous records, they'd have been
ridiculed and fired. Bizarrely, they have managed to elicit support from many
naive conservatives who drink the Kool-Aid that Wall Street is composed of
capitalist giants beset by leftist political Lilliputians. Even in the midst of the
worst crash since 1929, they insisted that their bonuses had to be paid or
they might decamp to....

No one seemed to ask where they could go with their blown-up risk models.

Zimbabwe?




                                                                                           November 2011     3
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

Citigroup (C)                                                                                              Bank of America (BA)
January 1, 1986 to November 17, 2011                                                                       January 1, 1985 to November 17, 2011
600                                                                                                        60

500                                                                                                        50

400                                                                                                        40

300                                                                                                        30

200                                                                                                        20

100                                                                                                        10
                                                                                                                                                                                                    6.83
                                                                                                   31.59
     0                                                                                                      0
     Jan-86    Jan-89   Jan-92     Jan-95     Jan-98     Jan-01     Jan-04     Jan-07    Jan-10             Jan-85       Jan-88    Jan-91   Jan-94   Jan-97   Jan-00   Jan-03   Jan-06   Jan-09



Goldman Sachs (GS)                                                                                         Banco Santander (SAN)
May 1, 1999 to November 17, 2011                                                                           January 1, 1985 to November 17, 2011
250                                                                                                        16
225                                                                                                        14
200                                                                                                        12
175                                                                                                        10
150                                                                                                         8
125                                                                                                         6                                                                                       6.18
100                                                                                                         4
                                                                                                   92.35
    75                                                                                                      2
    50                                                                                                      0
    May-99    Nov-00    May-02     Nov-03      May-05    Nov-06      May-08    Nov-09    May-11             Jan-85       Jan-88    Jan-91   Jan-94   Jan-97   Jan-00   Jan-03   Jan-06    Jan-09



Deutsche Bank (DB)                                                                                         UBS (UBS)
January 1, 1985 to November 17, 2011                                                                       January 1, 1985 to November 17, 2011
120                                                                                                        80
                                                                                                           70
100
                                                                                                           60
    80
                                                                                                           50
    60                                                                                                     40
                                                                                                           30
    40
                                                                                                   30.35   20
    20
                                                                                                           10                                                                                      11.21
     0                                                                                                      0
     Jan-85   Jan-88    Jan-91    Jan-94     Jan-97    Jan-00     Jan-03   Jan-06   Jan-09                  Jan-85       Jan-88    Jan-91   Jan-94   Jan-97   Jan-00   Jan-03   Jan-06   Jan-09



Societe Generale (GLE)                                                                                     Credit Suisse (CS)
January 1, 1987 to November 17, 2011                                                                       January 1, 1985 to November 17, 2011
160                                                                                                        100
140
                                                                                                            80
120
100                                                                                                         60
    80
    60                                                                                                      40

    40                                                                                                                                                                                             25.60
                                                                                                            20
    20                                                                                             21.10
     0                                                                                                          0
     Jan-87    Jan-90    Jan-93     Jan-96     Jan-99     Jan-02      Jan-05    Jan-08    Jan-11                Jan-85    Jan-88   Jan-91   Jan-94   Jan-97   Jan-00   Jan-03   Jan-06   Jan-09




4             November 2011                                     THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
It looks as if the Big Banks could be in a Triple Waterfall collapse formation
that would force further assistance.

We are frequently asked when the next Triple Waterfall would arrive. As
discussed in our book1, financial markets of the last three decades of the
                                                                                          ...the herd of
past millennium were driven by three Triple Waterfall rises and crashes—
                                                                                  Too Big to Fail banks
commodities in the 70s, Japan in the 80s, and technology in 90s.
                                                                                    should have been
Each of these convulsions sucked in vast amounts of capital on the way up and                   culled...
became a source of funds for the next mania on the way down. The housing
bubble which inflated the Big Bank Bubble sucked in far more capital than
its predecessors, because a 60% rise in house prices at a time of shrinking or
vanishing down payments imposed monstrous demands on debt markets.
The Greenspan Put obliged, as did so many central banks abroad.

We have no doubt that, had governments not intervened during the 2008 crash
with gigantic bailouts, unbelievably cheap money, and extremely generous
guarantees on deposits, the past decade would have been defined by a crash
of 1929 proportions in which many American and European banks would
have been wiped out. That would have been a rather sudden Triple Waterfall,
but the collateral damage from letting so many wretchedly-managed banks
fail simultaneously would have been catastrophic.

Nevertheless, the herd of Too Big to Fail banks should have been culled,
thereby freeing up liquidity and capital for well-managed organizations. We
have long wondered why Lehman was the last to go. Reading Ron Suskind's
perceptive account of the Obama Administration (The Confidence Men), we
were interested to learn that President Obama issued orders to let Citigroup go
bust. This was, to us, a remarkably wise decision, and our respect for Obama
rose on reading it. Regrettably, Obama didn't follow up to ensure compliance.
Mr. Geithner somehow never got around to implementing those orders, and
Citi has lived on, a sickly multi-strategy hedge fund masquerading as a bank.
Was it saved because Robert Rubin had been collecting fees totaling more
than $100 million for dispensing strategic advice—including increasing the
bank's leverage during the later stages of the bubble?




1
    The New Reality of Wall Street, 2003, McGraw Hill.




                                                                                      November 2011     5
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                         KBW US Bank Stock Index (BKX)
                         October 1, 1992 to November 17, 2011
                         140

                         120
The big bankers of
                         100
Wall Street and Europe
are, it would seem,       80

modern Bourbons,          60
who have forgotten        40                                                                       37.30
nothing [about their
                          20
boom-built bonuses]
and learned nothing         0
[about the perils of       Sep-92 Oct-94 Nov-96 Dec-98 Jan-01 Feb-03 Mar-05 Apr-07 May-09 Jun-11

physics-based risk
models and excess
leverage].               This chart of the history of the BKX shows Leg One taking the Big Banks up
                         roughly 200% to the Long-Term Capital crisis, which produced a swift 45%
                         crash; this was halted by the Greenspan Put, which continued to pump in
                         liquidity, taking them back to their peaks in a long sideways move, followed
                         by a retrenchment. Then came the second Greenspan Put taking them to a new
                         peak during the real estate bubble which took them to a peak that was 300%
                         above the 1995 lows. The entire rallying process consumed 12 years—two to
                         three years longer than the rallies of the previous Triple Waterfalls.

                         An optimist would argue that the 2008-09 crash ended the banks' equivalent
                         of a Triple Waterfall crash, which means they had been sufficiently punished
                         for their sins against capitalism and, thus cleansed, were ready to resume their
                         industry's historic role in economic expansion: less leverage, more lending,
                         reduced risks, and more contribution to economic progress.

                         Sadly, this never happened. The big bankers of Wall Street and Europe are,
                         it would seem, modern Bourbons, who have forgotten nothing [about their
                         boom-built bonuses] and learned nothing [about the perils of physics-based
                         risk models and excess leverage].




6    November 2011       THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
Like the Bourbons, they lost their heads, if only metaphorically. In the earlier
case, there was never a question of showering more wealth on King Louis and
Marie Antoinette in hope that they would clean up their acts and strengthen
the French economy. However one might disparage the Jacobins, they weren't
naïve.                                                                                                  Like the Bourbons,
                                                                                                     they lost their heads...
What about those earlier Triple Waterfalls?

Commodities remain in a long-term bull market that shows scant signs of
the excesses of the 1970s. Even gold, which is frequently cited as being in
bubble mode, is merely catching up to long-term monetary expansion. (Its
price multiplied 22 times in the Seventies mania.)

Gold ($/oz) vs. Currency in Circulation* ($billion)
January 1, 1998 to November 17, 2011
1,900                                                                                        1,100
                                                                                             1,050
1,700
                                                                                             1,000
                                                     Last      1,052.15
1,500                                                1 Wk chng +6.79                         950
1,300                                                                                        900
                                                                                             850
1,100                                                                                        800
  900                                                                                        750
                                                                                             700
  700                                                                                        650
  500                                                                   Last      1,721.00   600
                                                                        1 Wk chng –67.68
                                                                                             550
  300
                                                                                             500
  100                                                                                        450
     1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

                              Gold ($/oz)       Currency in Circulation ($billions)

*source: Federal Reserve
Chart courtesy of Meridian Macro Research (info@meridianmacro.com)


Japan, to our disappointment, remains in its Triple Waterfall mode 21 years
after the crash began. As the Olympus scandal now reveals, investors are
not convinced that Japanese businesses have been able to shrug off either
the corruption of the yakuza (the Japanese mafia) or the nation's disastrous
demography.




                                                                                                          November 2011     7
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                          As an industry, Technology has survived Nasdaq’s Triple Waterfall collapse,
                          and has remained an engine of global growth, although investors who held
                          onto such 1990s darlings as Cisco may not be consoled. Google wasn't public
                          at the peak and Apple was not the company in 2000 that it would become
"In the 1880s, total UK   with the 2nd Jobs incarnation.
bank assets were equal
to 5% of GDP. At the      Cisco (CSCO)
bubble peak they were     January 1, 1991 to November 17, 2011
500%..."
                          80
                          70
                          60
                          50
                          40
                          30
                          20
                                                                                                     18.53
                          10
                           0
                           Nov-91 Nov-93 Nov-95 Nov-97 Nov-99 Nov-01 Nov-03 Nov-05 Nov-07 Nov-09 Nov-11



                          The perceptive Tony Jackson wrote in The Financial Times (Nov. 6, 2011)
                          about a speech delivered by Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England, "that
                          most of the harmful developments in finance in the last century came from
                          the banks' ‘desire to break their balance sheet chains’."

                               "In the 1880s, total UK bank assets were equal to 5% of GDP. At
                               the bubble peak they were 500%. As to consolidation, the assets of
                               the UK's three biggest banks at the start of the 20th Century
                               were 7% of GDP. By the end of it they were 75% and by 2007—
                               astonishingly—200%. Leverage climbed from 3 - 4 times in the
                               19th Century to 30 times in the bubble. And return on equity—
                               unsurprisingly—went from modest single figures to 30% at the
                               peak."

                          We all know what happened next.




8    November 2011        THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
Have the Big, Bad, Bonused Bailout Banks (hereinafter called B5) learned
from their near-death experience?

Apparently not.

The bonus fixation that has driven the desire for excess leverage is part of                        ...in the case of UBS,
Wall Street's self-spawned DNA. After the crash, not only did Merrill Lynch                          bonuses were paid
pay their fallen "stars" based on phantom earnings that ignored losses on                         from a pool that had
subprimes, but in the case of UBS, bonuses were paid from a pool that had                       been totally drained by
been totally drained by rogue trader fraud.                                                         rogue trader fraud.

Bonus promises for bankers are, it would appear, like excessive pension
promises for unionized government employees created by deals for union
support for politicians in elections: they must be honored even when they
are funded from over-greedy investment projections, and by imploded capital
asset risk models.

Not all big banks are run to enrich insiders with returns from perilously high
leverage and dubious investments: the index of Canadian bank stocks reveals
an industry that has continued its long tradition of behaving itself, thereby
dramatically outperforming its counterparts in the US and Europe:

S&P/TSX Canadian Bank Stocks vs. KBW US Bank Index (BKX)
June 1, 2002 to November 17, 2011

250

200
                                                                                       175.73
150

100

  50                                                                                   -45.48

   0
   May-02     Jul-03    Sep-04     Nov-05     Jan-07   Mar-08   May-09   Jul-10   Sep-11

                 S&P/TSX Canadian Bank Stocks               KBW US Bank Index (BKX)

Source: S&P/TSX Bank Stocks; GICS, Industry Group




                                                                                                      November 2011     9
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                         No Canadian bank went bust in the Depression, so it was no surprise that
                         all the Canadian banks came through the worst banking crash since the
                         Thirties in solid condition. Credit good management, constrained leverage,
                         and supervision by the Bank of Canada under its great governors in the past
...the occupiers of      decade—David Dodge and Mark Carney. That Mr. Carney was recently chosen
Zuccotti Park...tap      to lead the global Financial Standards Board (replacing Mario Draghi who
into rage that the       moved to the European Central Bank) should be reassuring to investors—
banks who were the       and a spit in the eye for JPMorgan Chase's CEO, Jamie Dimon, who had
biggest private sector   assailed him in Washington weeks before. Mr. Dimon is one of those big
causes of the crash      bankers whose public displays of arrogance helped spawn the Occupy Wall
and recession show       Street demonstrations. Although the occupiers of Zuccotti Park are leaderless,
little remorse and       undisciplined and largely incoherent in their demands, they tap into rage
little willingness to    that the banks who were the biggest private sector causes of the crash and
accept constraints on    recession show little remorse and little willingness to accept constraints on
their leverage and       their leverage and proprietary trading. (One TV clip showed some signs they
proprietary trading.     were holding, including one that impressed us: "Bring Back Glass-Steagall.")
                         The demonstrators should also, of course, be targeting Barney Frank and his
                         politically-correct Fannie Mae allies, who probably deserve as much of the
                         blame as the banks for the housing collapse, but that is a complicated story
                         to explain, and the mainstream media have certainly not chosen to cite the
                         catastrophic misdeeds of politicians they favor.




10    November 2011      THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
The Eurozone Crisis—and the Banks
Since May, we have been warning that the Basel banking version of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model was obsolete and misleading—and could trigger
a new collapse.                                                                            ...the G-20 Meeting—
The Dexia collapse is a form of financial sick joke: a major financial institution           held on the site of the
that passed the European Banking Authority's supposedly-demanding stress                     famed Film Festival,
test with flying colors in July thereupon vaporized within weeks. Imagine                   (but might have been
someone dying of cancer who had taken out a $10 million term life insurance              better held in a morgue)
policy at a reduced premium for exceptional health two months earlier. Would
the insurer and its reinsurer continue to retain the examining doctor?

The proximate cause of the Dexia demise was the worsening of the Greek
crisis at a time the prices for outstanding debt of other PIIGS—most notably
Italy—were weakening. As this is written, despite at least €70 billion of ECB
purchases, the benchmark ten-year Italian government bond yields 7.04%—a
scary 5.25% more than German bunds, and 3.38% more than French bonds—
whose yield spread above bunds has been also been widening recently. (By
way of comparison, Treasurys yield 2% and Canadas yield 2.13%.)

Italy's outstanding debt—120% of GDP—is the world's third-largest, and
it must roll over more than €200 billion next year—let alone finance its
growing fiscal deficit. Spanish yields have also been climbing sharply and are
now 6.29%. The market is convinced that Italian yields are unsustainable,
and is getting rapidly becoming panicky about Spain's.

At the G-20 Meeting—held on the site of the famed Film Festival, (but might
have been better held in a morgue), Silvio Berlusconi was in fine form for
the role of Harlequin in a Commedia Dell' Arte farce. He airily dismissed talks
of an Italian debt crisis, saying he had turned down an IMF loan, as being
unnecessary. He said the plunging price of Italian bonds was "Yesterday's
story, the restaurants are full, it is difficult to reserve a seat on a plane...I can't
see another figure on the Italian scene capable of representing Italy on the
international stage."




                                                                                                November 2011   11
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                      Despite that (probably accurate) self-assessment, he lost his parliamentary
                      majority in a vote on Nov. 8th, and got the hook from Stage Left. He is replaced
                      by Mario Monti, a non-elected technocrat, with a glowing resume who began
                      his political career as a Communist. He announced a Cabinet composed of
...no external        other technocrats—no elected politicians. (Plato would have approved of an
conclave could        all-guardian government with no voter input.) A bank portfolio manager
humiliate Greece as   prepared to take a big bet on Italian bonds based on the belief that the
dramatically as its   Italian parliament and population will submit to Monti's medicines for
own bureaucrats,      more than a few months probably shouldn't even be managing his or her
union leaders and     own money—let alone anyone else's.
tax-dodging rich
                      Meanwhile, where the eurocrisis began, another leader has fallen. George
have...
                      Papandreou is gone.

                      Nothing became Papandreou in his premiership as the leaving of it: he
                      tried to give the voters a chance to ratify the Draconic terms of the nation’s
                      bailout.

                      We were sorry the EU banned that resort to democracy. The terms of the rescue
                      package have been denounced as "humiliating" for Greece, but no external
                      conclave could humiliate Greece as dramatically as its own bureaucrats,
                      union leaders and tax-dodging rich have during the many months that little
                      Greece has been making big waves in global markets.

                      What really upset Sarkozy, Merkel, et al. was the idea of putting terms of a
                      eurodeal to the voters. The euro was a confection of the elites and they have
                      been congratulating each other for years on its wondrous qualities. It was only
                      put to the electorate of a few members—not including the Germans—and
                      barely survived. The members of the eurozone ruling class tend to be more
                      comfortable with each other—despite personal rivalries—than with their
                      voters. They graduate from the best universities and are virtually unanimous
                      that the route to repealing Europe's bloody past is with supranational
                      institutions that, through one-time constitution-style agreements, are placed
                      permanently above and beyond the direct control of voters.

                      Prior to the "make or break" euro meetings of October 25th, one of the
                      officials justified the bailout plan by expostulating, "We cannot make war on
                      the nation of Plato."




12   November 2011    THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
Plato, it will be recalled, abandoned Athens for Sicily, where he tried to make
the regime of a local dictator the demonstration of his views on Guardians and
the Cave. The project failed dismally, and Greece only got good government
briefly during the reign of Alexander the Great—a Macedonian. It has had
little—if any—experience with wise government since 323 B.C. A proposed            Greece only got good
€120 billion bailout 2,334 years later that is justified on the basis of helping      government briefly
Plato's heirs could only be conceived by an eurocrat who would never think           during the reign of
of putting the proposal to a vote of his own nationals.                           Alexander the Great—
                                                                                         a Macedonian.
But the fact that this emotional resort to Platonic philosophy was adduced
in the midst of a modern crisis set us to thinking about the importance of
philosophy in the Continental leaders' learning.

They have all studied the same philosophers, albeit with natural national
predispositions to their own great minds. Descartes' cool, geometric logic
was at the root of French socialist Jacques Delors' design of the euro: a
perfectly-designed currency with no provision for exits, like the succession
of perfectly-drafted French constitutions, which in practice have only been
amended by the Paris mob. Rousseau's concept of the supremacy of the
General Will untrammeled by popular elections on fixed schedules therefore
has enormous appeal for the new European aristocracy.

The classic liberalism of the Scottish and English philosophers and
economists—Berkeley, Hume, Smith, Locke, Ricardo and Mill—has had only
modest influence with the Continental elites, where the French philosophes—
such as Voltaire, Rousseau, and Condorcet, and more recently, Durkheim,
and the German schools of Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer and Hegel are
studied intensively.

Angela Merkel emerged from that dramatic eurocrisis meeting of Oct. 26 as
the leader of the eurozone, outlasting all the male elitists in a marathon that
extended to 3 a.m. Her triumph triggered a gigantic global stock market rally,
driven (as we learned later), mostly by short-covering.

We wondered whether her own philosophic training was crucial. Raised in the
most Marxist of the Eastern European Soviet dictatorships, she would have
been taught Hegel's "great waltz" dialectic, which had been incorporated
by Marx and Lenin into Communist dogma. If so, she might have taken
the euro regime and rules as the Thesis, the Greek rebellion against it as the
Antithesis, and sought to achieve a Synthesis with the 50% haircut on the
value of Greece's outstanding bonds as the price of a new, durable euro.




                                                                                       November 2011   13
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                           Crucial to this synthesis was—and is—a rule that a Hegelian might admire:
                           a decree that slashing the value of Greece's bonds shall not be deemed a
                           "credit event" that would automatically trigger the many billions in credit
                           default swaps (CDS). Since these instruments were never part of the design
If a 50% slash in          of the euro or euro bond markets, they must not be allowed to dictate the
principal value is not a   terms of any new synthesis.
credit event—what is?
                           This bold concept has doubtless been a shock to holders of CDS—Greek and
                           otherwise. If a 50% slash in principal value is not a credit event—what is?

                           This ruling creates big winners and big losers. That apparently leaves it to
                           investors to try to find out which banks were big writers of Greek CDS and
                           which banks were big buyers.

                           KBW European Large-Cap Banking Index (KEBI)
                           January 1, 2005 to November 17, 2011
                           90
                           80
                           70
                           60
                           50
                           40
                           30
                           20                                                                                 18.46
                           10
                            Jan-05   Nov-05    Sep-06   Jul-07   May-08   Mar-09   Jan-10   Nov-10   Sep-11



                           The KEBI chart of the large European banks shows that they broke through
                           their 200-day moving average on the downside for good in January 2008 and
                           have failed to rally back close to it since the crash. They are down 76% from
                           their 2007 highs, outdistancing the BKX, which is down by two-thirds.

                           Some investors tell us that the US banks are considerably stronger than their
                           European counterparts. Based on the record of Dexia and earlier collapses
                           of European banks within weeks of passing stress tests, that argument has
                           appeal.




14    November 2011        THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
European banks collectively have four times the assets of their American
counterparts—but, malheureusement, do not have four times their tangible
net equity. That huge trans-Atlantic asset variation comes from the difference
in savings habits of the two continents. American savings rates were near-
zero in the years pre-crash, while Europeans have had relatively stronger             Wall Street, where the
savings rates. Also, Europeans are far more inclined to save through banks            physics PhDs (turned
than Americans. That helps to explain why Europe—notably Germany—is                    financial alchemists)
so overbanked compared to the US.                                                       converted leadpipe
                                                                                            losers into gold.
That disparity worked out disastrously for European banks during the
force-fed US housing bubble. The past decade was the first time the American
economy experienced the full effect of collapse in US fertility rates. As fertility
rates fell from approximately 2 babies per female during the Seventies and
Eighties to 1.4 or less, the result was that the number of first-time jobholders
and homebuyers was drastically reduced during the "noughts." Europe
experienced the same demographic collapse, but its governments did not,
like Washington, introduce stringent rules for banks that forced banks to
make loans to minorities somewhat commensurate with the volume of
loans they were making to whites. Barney Frank was the leader in Congress
in demanding strict enforcement of these rules.

Regional banks which plunged into the origination of dubious loans found
that Wall Street and Washington were eager to take them off the banks' hands.
Through complex derivatives, the Street achieved the miracle of AAA ratings
even when significant portions of the loans in the product were to borrowers
who—if they actually existed and were not in jail, (requirements which were
not always enforced during the manic years)—were unlikely to be able to
service the debts when the music stopped, as the dancing man, Citigroup’s
Chuck Prince, so memorably framed it. Angelo Mozilo of Countrywide
Financial, and a long list of brand-new upstart lenders eagerly arranged the
deals and sent them to Wall Street, where the physics PhDs (turned financial
alchemists) converted leadpipe losers into gold.

To an astounding degree, they peddled them to European banks. When the
housing bubble burst, the fallout was a TransAtlantic disaster.




                                                                                           November 2011   15
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                          As Michael Lewis records in Vanity Fair, German bankers bought the CDOs
                          because they were AAA-rated, and "we thought America was a rules-based
                          society." (Germany is, of course, the quintessential rules-based society.)
                          Wall Street was, in a way, a rules-based society. As Nassim Taleb explained
...the term "legacy       (when we shared a platform in 2007), the Street was relying on terribly
assets" to describe       unrealistic risk models, managed by arrogant fools who knew physics and
rotting remnants of the   mathematics but almost nothing about finance. This would lead, he said, to
past binge based on       a crash that might recall 1929. He was exulting because a journal devoted to
investment models...      statistics (The American Statistician, August 2007) had just devoted an entire
is of a piece with such   issue to attacking him and defending the models.
Victorian euphemisms
                          The Basel version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model decreed that AAA-rated
as "nightsoil" for the
                          mortgage derivatives required no allocations of the [scarce] capital of
contents of bedpans.
                          European banks. Result: before the eurobanks began to lose on sovereign
                          PIIGS debt, they were already ailing from the effects of overexposure to
                          putrid products backed by American real estate.

                          According to The Wall Street Journal, "Sixteen top European banks are holding
                          a total of about €386 billion ($532 billion) of potentially suspect credit
                          market and real estate assets.....more than the €339 billion of Greek, Irish,
                          Italian, Portuguese and Spanish government debt that those same banks were
                          holding at the end of last year....European banks, on average, have roughly
                          halved their stockpiles of legacy assets since 2007...meanwhile the top three
                          US banks, Bank of America, Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase have slashed
                          such assets by well over 80% over a similar period."

                          We had not previously heard the term "legacy assets" to describe rotting
                          remnants of the past binge based on investment models. It is of a piece
                          with such Victorian euphemisms as "nightsoil" for the contents of bedpans.
                          The Victorians lacked complex mathematical models, and they made no
                          bets on bedpans. Today's badly-performing banks lack bedpans, but they're
                          swimming in perfumed portfolios excreted by mathematical models. This is
                          called progress.




16   November 2011        THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
One possible benefit of the "legacies" of the misplaced enthusiasms of
European banks for American subprime paper could be that the European
Central Bank—now under the leadership of Mario Draghi—will be swift
to continue cutting the competitively skyhigh rates imposed by previous
management under Jean-Claude Trichet.                                                     [M. Trichet] was an
                                                                                   inflation-fighting central
M. Trichet may have been the world's most obdurate inflation fighter. The
                                                                                         banker who put his
ECB, unlike the Fed and many other central banks—has only one mandate—
                                                                                     American counterparts
fighting inflation. With rising commodity prices driving up costs of food
                                                                                                   to shame.
and fuels, M. Trichet drove ECB rates to levels infinitely higher than Ben
Bernanke's zero-level prices. (Dr. Bernanke is seemingly pleased to be giving
his money away free: he is promising to continue this largesse at least until
2014. That will mean six years of free money. Who can tell the long-term
effect of consuming financial heroin on such a scale?)

M. Trichet actually raised his rate twice this year at a time eurozone economies
were visibly sagging. He pronounced that his record as an inflation fighter
was better than the Bundesbank's. He proudly characterized his performance
as "Impeccable! Impeccable!"

We agree. He was an inflation-fighting central banker who put his American
counterparts to shame. The euro's rise in value on his watch accurately reflects
his impeccable inflation credentials. He managed to make a global store of
value out of a dubious theory.

His enthusiastic self-appraisal was his swan song, as M. Draghi was already
in the waiting room. He dropped the Trichet rate 25 bp his first day on the
job.

As grim as the outlook for peripheral bonds may be, contagion is spreading
across eurozone non-German bonds since the decision to reject the payouts
under Greek CDS was announced. According to Gillian Tett of the Financial
Times, American banks may have issued a half-trillion dollars’ worth of such
paper. What investors in eurobonds now face is the prospect of problems
across the zone. As more and more economies face recession, this process is
elevating their debt costs.

When will the Germans face the fact that they can’t remain obdurate when
all their supposedly strong partners are facing financing problems?




                                                                                           November 2011   17
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                        American Banks
                        With the exception of Wall Street, American banks seem to have made some
                        financial progress since 2008.
So why do bank stocks   Their stock prices have underperformed the S&P but have recently been
look bleak?             outperforming the big banks represented in the BKX.

                        The S&P—which includes bank stocks—is up roughly 25% in that time.
                        KBW US Bank Index (BKX) vs. KBW US Regional Banking Index ETF (KRE)
                        January 1, 2011 to November 17, 2011
                         10


                          0


                        -10
                                                                                                         -13.14
                        -20


                        -30                                                                              -28.59


                        -40
                          Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11

                                   KBW US Regional Banking Index ETF (KRE)    KBW US Bank Index (BKX)


                        So why do bank stocks look bleak?

                        The answer, of course, is that they couldn't lay off all their suspect real estate
                        loan exposure on Wall Street, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or the Federal Home
                        Loan Bank, (although the taxpayers are down $170 billion and counting on
                        Fan and Fred). It will be recalled that when the Bush Administration finally
                        became concerned about F&F in 2007, and tried to rein them in, Barney Frank
                        led a successful Congressional campaign to protect them from interference
                        by the Fed or the Comptroller.

                        Collectively, the regional banks had large exposure to Fannie and Freddie
                        preferred shares. They loved those tax-exempt dividends.

                        Until there were no dividends...although Fannie and Freddie continue to pay
                        their bosses big bonuses.

                        Depending on the location of the regional banks, their biggest problem is
                        commercial real estate. They may not have any complex real estate derivatives
                        on their books, but they are saddled with piles of debt on vacant stores and
                        shuttered warehouses, and large exposure to municipal bonds of varying
                        quality.

18   November 2011      THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
That is one reason why we have been so concerned about the sickly KRE.
With the Wall Street banks, we know that most of their problems come from
derivatives they can't sell and egos they can’t control. Result: so much of Wall
Street debt trades at a discount, and their shares sell at discounts to net asset
value.                                                                               With the Wall Street
                                                                                         banks, we know
An unwary investor who saw that a bank's shares and debts were selling at a
                                                                                        that most of their
sizable discount to stated net asset value might assume that the bank's bosses
                                                                                    problems come from
wouldn't be getting bonuses.
                                                                                    derivatives they can't
In capitalist theory, executive pay is for value-creating performance of a kind        sell and egos they
that drives share prices to large premiums over book value—and makes their                   can’t control.
outstanding debts rise in value at a time of zero interest rates from Gentle
Ben Bernanke.

The bosses of those B5 banks, who are long on greed and short on shame,
dodge capitalist principles they find inconvenient for setting their own
compensation. They assume that, when their debts trade at discounts, that
reduces their debts and therefore generates earnings, which beget bonuses.

Nearly one-half of some of the big banks' recently-reported earnings came from
the declining market value of their debt. Not the repayment of debt, mind
you—merely the bid price of their paper.

The regional banks' bosses don't get those Wall Street benefits, because so
little of their debt trades actively. Their bosses are old-fashioned enough to
believe that they'd like to see their debt trade at a premium to par value.

The problem is that until more of those vacant shopping centers and homes
find lessees or buyers, the regionals will be struggling. The regionals are
also worried about their exposure to debt from subprime state and local
governments—like Illinois, California and Harrisburg.

One bright spot for some local banks: among the best-run of the regionals
are banks that have maintained high exposure to Treasurys. Since Treasurys
have been a superb investment this year, some of these banks must have
benefited greatly—providing that they didn't confine themselves to the front
end of the curve.

We'll stick to our long-stated view that the KRE will give the signal that the
economy is really on its way back when it solidly outperforms both the S&P and
the BKX at a time of rallying equity prices.

At the moment, the KRE is treading water—and winter is coming.




                                                                                        November 2011    19
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                        What Happens to Investment Risk Perceptions
                        With Italy Joining Greece in the Calculations?
                        We believe investors should make the following assumptions:
Somehow, this must
stop.                   1. The fight to keep Greece within the eurozone has been so intense because the
                           prospect of a sudden Grecian exit would unleash chaos across the zone.
Stein’s Law says that
it will.                    Greek individuals and companies would rush to withdraw funds from
                            Greek banks, and bank lending would come to a standstill. (Already,
                            there is evidence that some Greeks are frightened: bank deposits are down
                            roughly 25% since December 2009.)
                            Outside Greece, banks and companies having Greek counterparties would
                            be frantically trying to rearrange agreements, and Greece would fall into
                            a Depression.
                            The prospect of such an implosion spreading to Italy would be an
                            existential challenge to the eurozone. Italian bond yields—already at levels
                            unsustainable over the longer term—would skyrocket, and banks inside
                            and outside the zone would default.
                        2. Although Berlusconi is no longer Premier, his party has the most seats
                           in Parliament. Investors should not assume that a new coalition after a
                           future election would have the kind of stability that occurs in Northern
                           Europe after a government loses an election.
                        3. Spanish bond yields will probably continue to climb after this month's
                           election, putting that nation into deeper recession.
                        4. Investors assume that Ireland and Portugal have been stabilized, but
                           when banks across Europe are pulling in lines of credit in response to a
                           collapse in Greece and a potential collapse in Italy, all lesser-grade credits
                           will suffer.
                        Since Greece first went on investors' radar there have been dozens of days
                        in which global stocks have plunged because of a threatened Greek default,
                        followed by brief rallies because of a new rescue package, followed by more
                        riots and yet another bailout proposal, followed by another selloff because
                        of a crisis in another country.
                        It is unacceptable that global stock markets are being held hostage to the
                        follies and fake financials of a few underachieving, overindebted economies
                        in a zone with an overvalued currency and over-stringent monetary policies.
                        Somehow, this must stop.
                        Stein’s Law says that it will.

20    November 2011     THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
The Implications for Gold
To date, the major asset class which has benefited most from the PIIGS
dramas is gold.

When the possibility of a Greek default first came under serious discussion in      This is beginning to
May 2010, gold was trading in the $1100 range, and the S&P was in the 1166          look like Gold Bug
range. Ten-Year Treasury yields were roughly 3.8%. Remarkably, the euro was                   Nirvana...
roughly 1.35 in dollar terms—where it is today. The KEBI Index was roughly
35: it is now 19.5.

We have been arguing for more than a year that the existential challenge to
the euro from the plight of the PIIGS is the primary driver of gold prices.
Europeans who find that their bank deposits, paychecks, life insurance and
pensions are all euro-denominated have been buying some protection in
the form of gold. Other investors, contemplating the possible implosion of
the currency of the world's second-largest trading zone have been making
similar moves. The growing problems in the zone have been shrinking
global economic activity and central banks other than the ECB are—as of
now—virtually unanimous in lowering rates to minuscule levels to avert
recessions...and to depreciate their currencies.

For the first time since the abandonment of the gold standard, central banks
are overwhelmingly dedicated to weakening the exchange rates of their
currencies. When faith in the “printed paper promises of politicians" flags,
gold offers an incorruptible store of value. This is beginning to look like Gold
Bug Nirvana—where panicky people protect their wealth by selling paper to
buy gold. (Maybe the bankers are ahead of the pack: central banks bought
148 tonnes of gold in the third quarter.)

Ben Bernanke has said zero interest rates will remain until at least 2014.
That means the financial heroin will continue to flow, which means
continuation—and exacerbation—of negative real interest rates as far as
most eyes can see.

What the US and Europe seem to be experiencing is a modified stagflation,
in which food and fuel prices stay stubbornly high, and interest rates remain
at losing levels for investors.

Gold is the only historic medium of exchange whose value has been rising
for nearly 11 straight years.

The forces driving it upward are accelerating.

Conclusion: Once gold breaks through its August peak of 1920, it will challenge
the magic millennium level of 2000—and will eventually pierce it.

                                                                                     November 2011    21
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                       US Energy Policies: Political Risk for Oil Investing Rises
                       1. The Politics of Keystone XL
[President Obama] is   For coolly-calculated political reasons, President Obama has kicked the
back to doing what     Keystone XL oil can down the road.
he enjoys most and
                       We had thought that would be his likeliest response, and raised the political
does better than
                       risk issue in Basic Points and our Conference Calls—(albeit merely as a
anyone—campaigning.
                       significant possibility investors should consider). He cited environmental
                       concerns about aquifers, but those were never the gut issue on Keystone,
                       and were already being fully addressed by TransCanada (TRP) in response to
                       a long list of State Department requirements. Even the Nebraska Governor
                       who led the opposition agreed that some relatively modest tweaks would
                       meet his state’s concerns, and joined all the state governors on the pipeline
                       route in praising the opportunities, jobs and progress the line would deliver.
                       TransCanada swiftly agreed to those changes—but Obama held firm.

                       He is back to doing what he enjoys most and does better than
                       anyone—campaigning.

                       The pipeline was a big, obvious victim of calculations in Presidential politics
                       made by the most muscular environmental NGOs and the White House.

                       The wealthiest NGOs had made it their signature issue. They were candid
                       that they needed “a big win” to revive their coalitions and supporters, such
                       as Hollywood's leading experts on environmental science issues, who flew to
                       Washington to protect the environment by spending a night in jail protesting
                       "dirty oil."

                       From the NGOs' standpoint, after polls showed that only a small minority of
                       the population believed in man-made global warming as a relevant political
                       issue, something big and preferably foreign was needed.

                       Although most of the actual debate and analysis on the issue—and the State
                       Department's exhaustive review—were about the pipeline itself, the NGOs
                       made it clear they want to kill Keystone to stop the oil sands operations. They've
                       been horrified about the Canadian publicity that the oil sands are "the new
                       Saudi Arabia." This is their chance to ensure that there's no North American
                       Saudi Arabia.




22   November 2011     THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
Weeks ago, we watched an interview on public television's "News Hour,"
featuring some celebrity (whose name escapes us) who had demonstrated in
Washington and had spent a night in jail. He never mentioned the Nebraskan
environmental questions. He said that blocking the pipeline was the only way
to stop oil sands expansion and perhaps even force shutdowns. When told               Truth is the first victim
that the Alberta government said that Canada could just divert the output            in such scorched-earth
to the Pacific Coast to ship to China, he said that their information was that          campaigns waged by
indigenous people would kill any such proposal. (We are inclined to agree           wealthy enthusiasts who
with him in that appraisal.)                                                         travel in jet planes and
                                                                                         automobiles to kill
The opposition to Alberta went global when the European Union issued a
                                                                                              oil exploration.
policy statement that European refiners were not to use fuel from "dirty oil
production"—which is a term used by the Banana (Build Absolutely Nothing
Anywhere Near Anything) school of enviro-enthusiasm.

Mr. Obama is not such an extremist—at least not outside North America. On
his trip to Brazil he renewed US financial support for that nation's ambitious
program of developing offshore oil, at a time exploration in the Gulf of
Mexico was largely shut down. (The US, through government-guaranteed
loans, is participating in a big way in developing those fields.)

Until recently, the main NGO fund-raising campaigns focused on blocking
oil projects in Alaska, and drilling on any US coast. The litmus test for fighting
a vile energy project is that it has the potential for raising many millions of
dollars for tax-exempt organizations with strong records in using litigation
to tie up energy (and mining) developments. The Alberta oil sands became
their Hate #1 because they not only produce oil, but, until recently, most
of it came from mining. (Steam-Assisted Gravity Drilling, which leaves a
footprint smaller than a football field, is a more recent development, but
it gets lumped in with the open pits that supposedly despoil boreal forests
and kill birds. That a typical wind farm kills many more birds and bats in
a year than all the oil sands projects have accomplished throughout their
history is, of course, irrelevant. Truth is the first victim in such scorched-
earth campaigns waged by wealthy enthusiasts who travel in jet planes and
automobiles to kill oil exploration.)

When TransCanada agreed to all the State Department requirements for
permitting, its management thought their long approval campaign was
over. The State Department had the authority to draft the rules, with EPA
assistance, and that was that.




                                                                                            November 2011    23
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                        But, very late in the game, well after the time Canadian authorities and the
                        US oil industry were convinced Keystone was a "Go," Obama announced
                        he was intervening and would make the final decision. By postponing the
                        decision until after the elections, he has virtually guaranteed his campaign
American drivers will   huge support from the major left-wing and environmental funding sources,
be paying more for      because they now know that if he loses next year, the decision on Keystone
their gasoline...       will be made by a Republican—and Republicans are overwhelmingly in
                        favor.

                        Speaker John Boehner spoke last week of its many thousands of high-pay
                        immediate "shovel-ready" construction and maintenance jobs that won't
                        cost US taxpayers a dime. (Obama spent hundreds of billions allegedly for
                        "shovel-ready" jobs, but it turned out only a minuscule amount went for
                        such jobs. Most went for unionized bureaucrats and teachers employed by
                        state and local governments. As Rick Perry scoffed, "My dog has created more
                        shovel-ready jobs than Obama." He may have been on target, but, as has
                        been his experience in his ill-starred campaign, he didn't score any points,
                        because the quip wasn't original.)

                        One Canadian company—Enbridge—seems to have made the correct
                        calculations about Obama's plans. Within days after the Obama rejection,
                        it, with backing from the Caisse de Depot, it bought a pipeline from
                        ConocoPhillips and plans to switch the direction of its flow northward from
                        the Gulf to Cushing. That means the huge discount on WTI to Brent must
                        narrow—and it did narrow on Wednesday. American drivers will be paying
                        more for their gasoline, but that doesn't offend the NGOs, who want high
                        gas prices to supply a pricing umbrella for their various green strategies.

                        As of now, Obama stands likely to win re-election. He says he's raising a
                        billion dollars in campaign funds and no one seems to doubt he'll do it, even
                        though his campaign oratory is loaded with attacks on "the rich," and his
                        overwhelming support in mainstream media means he doesn't really need
                        that kind of money. The Republicans will not be running an opponent with
                        his Teleprompter talents, charisma, or charm—or heartwarming personal
                        biography…

                        And he will not be facing a Reagan.




24   November 2011      THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
It looks as if the oil industry is making its plans on the assumption that
Keystone will not proceed. Big Obama backer Warren Buffett's railroad stands
to win big, because the huge growth in Dakotas oil production will have to
go by train if Keystone isn't approved.
                                                                                  Keystone is in mortal
The odds, as of now, are that Keystone is in mortal peril. The death certificate
                                                                                       peril. The death
is due November 2012.
                                                                                      certificate is due
It takes a re-elected Democrat to sign it.                                            November 2012.

                                                                                   It takes a re-elected
2. Shale Gas and Oil                                                               Democrat to sign it.
The other relatively new campaign against production of fossil fuels is the
opposition to shale gas and oil produced through fracking.

To date, this has been a regional struggle. Most states are thrilled with the
money pouring into local economies—not to mention the soaring royalty
payments. To date, hundreds of thousands of high-paying jobs have been
created. Example: the Dakotas' economies are booming as never before, and
most residents cannot believe their good fortune. As Dennis Gartman reports,
North Dakota now produces more oil than an OPEC member, Ecuador—and
production is headed much higher—if environmentalists don't stop it.

In communities with colleges, and other centers of employment for leftist
enthusiasts—such as upstate New York—opposition to fracking has been
fierce—and successful. The opponents allege pollution of aquifers and cite
numerous examples of headaches ascribed to air pollution.

Until very recently, the prevailing viewpoint of big-picture thinkers without
ties to litigating NGOs or oil and gas companies was that the US benefits
hugely from the cheapest natural gas in the industrial world, and the
prospect of cheap gas prices for perhaps a century is one reason to be bullish
on America.




                                                                                      November 2011   25
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                     The environmentalists who oppose all fossil fuels (as opposed to people
                     who oppose polluting coal plants) were becoming desperate.

                     Then a potentially seismic shift in public opinion suddenly emerged: some
                     recent small earthquakes in the Midwest just may have been caused by
...man-made quakes
                     fracking. At least one seismologist has publicly argued that earthquakes in
in low-or-no-risk
                     low-risk earthquake areas were probably caused by fracking.
zones are a new
concept.             These are early days for this brand-new debate, but investors should not
                     dismiss the possibility that gas producers could be faced with gigantic liability
                     lawsuits brought by deep-pocketed NGOs should a quake cause meaningful
                     damage.

                     Seismology is still evolving. Scientists have learned to develop probability
                     forecasts for big quakes in earthquake-prone zones such as the San Andreas
                     Fault.

                     But man-made quakes in low-or-no-risk zones are a new concept. Lawsuits
                     alleging them would probably, until now, be considered as fanciful as
                     alleging that tribal gods had been angered. (We recall—with awe—how
                     leading liberals renowned for killing conventional energy projects elsewhere
                     and supporting Green projects across the nation managed to kill a wind farm
                     off Cape Cod by having a section of the ocean declared as religiously sacred
                     for aborigines. This land is their land—even when under the sea.)

                     One hopeful sign: the influential Natural Resources Defense Council asserts
                     that fracking has, in fact, caused two small quakes. However, it goes on
                     to outline safety procedures—such as avoiding fracking along major fault
                     zones—that should minimize fracquake risks. In other words, the industry
                     should be able to progress as long as it follows stringent rules.

                     So—just maybe—the shale gas industry can confine most of its worrying to
                     gas prices.




26   November 2011   THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!


THE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT
1. How the Capital Markets Could Eventually Reach A Happy Ending
                                                                                        ...Greece has gone
Euro vs. US Dollar
                                                                                    from being renowned
January 1, 1999 to November 17, 2011                                                  for its ruins to being
1.7
                                                                                          renowned for the
1.6                                                                                        ruin it inflicts on
1.5                                                                                          the eurozone's
1.4                                                                                              economy...
                                                                           1.35
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
  Jan-99     Jan-01    Jan-03     Jan-05     Jan-07     Jan-09    Jan-11


How much longer must global investors start their days by checking whether
their stock markets will be up or down based on the latest news in Greece
and/or Italy?

Would anyone have predicted 15 months ago that Greek politics, promises
and riots would have more sustained impact on stock prices in North America
than US GDP changes, US payroll employment data and changes in earnings
forecasts? Greece hasn't been truly important since the death of Alexander
the Great, (although its revolt against Turkish rule did lead to Lord Byron's
death from fever).

In the past year, Greece has gone from being renowned for its ruins to being
renowned for the ruin it inflicts on the eurozone's economy and on share
prices of European—and even some major American—bank stocks.

Greek disease spread swiftly across the Aegean, and Italy now reels, with
fallout as far as Spain. If Italy fails, then there is no hope of saving the euro
or averting a deep recession. Thanks to the Basel capital asset pricing rules,
banks across Europe not only have Greek exposure but big bets on Italy.
(According to Reuters, as of June, French banks held $416.4 billion worth of
Italian bonds.)




                                                                                         November 2011      27
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                           When the euro was forged, the Bundesbank did its best to ensure that, even
                           if governments broke the rules, monetary policies would be noninflationary.
                           Jean-Claude Trichet has consciously imitated Karl-Otto Pöhl, Axel Weber,
                           and other revered Bundesbankers.
...during a full year in
                           Meanwhile, across the rest of the world, as we have discussed, central bankers
which most of the news
                           and their governments are doing their best to drive down the value of their
from the eurozone has
                           currencies. When the Swiss National Bank was transformed from being a
been of crises...
                           model of prudence to looking like a Weimar banker in drag, it was clear that
the Euro's exchange
                           global inflation threats would rise—eventually.
rate against the dollar
is unchanged.              But the European Central Bank stuck to its Bundesbanque idée fixe of fighting
                           inflation through a strong currency that has, by dint of sound monetary
                           policies, inherited the global respect long accorded to the Deutschemark.
                           Result: during a full year in which most of the news from the eurozone has
                           been of crises, interrupted by crisis meetings, followed by new crises, and new
                           crisis meetings, the Euro's exchange rate against the dollar is unchanged.

                           This is probably the most arresting economic statistic of the year.

                           But the euro formidable in a world where nearly every other central bank and
                           government craves weakness for its currency has long since become a major
                           source of weakness for eurozone economies:

                           The strong Northern economies find their global competitiveness challenged
                           by the strength of their currencies.

                           The weak southern economies wasted the major benefits to them of the
                           euro—low interest rates and seemingly unquenchable demand for their
                           bonds. They became uncompetitive with Northern economies—notably
                           Germany, which had sacrificed for 15 years to rebuild East Germany; during
                           that long period, German unions accepted pay increases that were laughably
                           low compared to wage gains for workers and civil servants in the South (and
                           Ireland) , and to tight deficit controls that were brutally restrictive compared
                           to the loose fiscal policies practiced by most of the PIIGS.

                           The peripherals ignored their declining competitiveness in markets outside
                           the eurozone as the euro gained strength in a currency world of weaklings.
                           They were thus hit with a double whammy: they lost competitiveness almost
                           everywhere, and now slide into recessions that inflate their deficits at a time the
                           adamant euroelites demand they cut their deficits—or else. Their economies
                           contract because of the sickening declines in their competitiveness, and the
                           contractionary policies hammering their feeble societies.




28    November 2011        THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
The Bundesbank mentality served the Northern economies well for the
decades in which most global economies were usually concerned that their
currencies were strong—or at least stable.

But this new era when strong currencies are despised by their own central
                                                                                       It's time for the
banks is unforgiving for the only large economy that practices the old-time
                                                                                     eurozone to start
currency religion.
                                                                                      pumping out its
This week's disorderly eurobond markets have triggered an open flap between                own brand of
the two Euroguardian nations about the ECB's responsibility for stabilizing         Bernanke heroin...
bond prices. Each time Italian and Spanish bond yields soar, the ECB steps
in, but only to prevent chaos. France argues that the ECB should do far more
than Germany says is legal under EU rules.

The Germans and Jean-Claude Trichet have been pleased that the anti-
inflationary policies of the ECB have worked for 11 years, delivering lower
inflation and a far higher market price for the currency than the dollar.

But inflation isn't the issue now.

It's survival.

Therefore:

The euro must be devalued. The target should be its value as of its inception for
accounting on 1/1/99—$1.16—although the ECB should allow for downsize
overshoot.

The process of devaluing it will involve massive liquidity expansion within
the eurozone, thereby reliquifying the parched banking system and restoring
lending activity across the eurozone.

It's time for the eurozone to start pumping out its own brand of Bernanke
heroin—until the euro reaches a globally competitive range and the European
banks have rebuilt themselves to at least the minimal-to-modest strength of
their American counterparts

When eurobanks no longer have to pay infinitely higher rates on short-term
deposits than American banks, they will be better able to handle the problems
of (1) putrefying American CDOs purchased when the euro was trading far
above par on the dollar, and (2) depreciating PIIGS bonds lending their own
peculiar odors to their balance sheets.




                                                                                     November 2011    29
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                      But how can such reliquification and monetary depreciation be sold to the
                      Germans? They know of two disastrous policy regimes—hyperinflation and
                      Hitler. They believe that one begot the other. Never again!

                      Sarkozy talks of a new Franco-German domain within the eurozone, and
James Carville,
                      Finland now argues that the six members with AAA ratings should have a
where art thou now?
                      greater measure of control: (Slovakia shouldn't have a veto.)

                      The Germans still act publicly as if there can be no retreat from the sound
                      money policies that have prevailed under Duisenberg and Trichet.

                      But Angela Merkel is a realist and she is the new uncrowned queen Angela of
                      the eurozone. She can expect powerful support from German manufacturers
                      who fear losing their competitiveness in peripheral economies that abandon
                      the euro—and are losing competitiveness globally because of the levitating
                      euro. As one German auto manufacturing CEO told a friend of ours, " If the
                      euro comes apart in a crash, then we'd be left with a mark whose value was
                      up 40% over the peripherals and we couldn't sell in the South or in most of
                      the world!"

                      She can also point out that inflation in major non-euro economies with weak
                      currencies is roughly at—or even less than—eurozone levels. There's room
                      for currency depreciation and bank reliquification.

                      She has shown herself open to discussions of a new core decisionmaking
                      structure for the euro. With French yields soaring far above bunds, the
                      partnership that is crucial for euro-survival risks destruction by the new bond
                      vigilantes. (James Carville, where art thou now?)

                      We suspect that what could bring Merkel and the German political leaders to
                      accept (temporary) Bernankization of the ECB is the rapid deterioration of
                      finances for the European banking system. This is, in reality, the core issue that
                      is destabilizing global capital markets.

                      If the European Central Bank, backed by the full eurozone membership,
                      reflated money supplies and drove short-term rates to America levels, there
                      would be strong rallies among the beaten-down bank stocks, giving them
                      the opportunity to raise new infusions of equity—a process of financial
                      strengthening that would feed on itself as global investors stopped worrying
                      about an epidemic of Dexia-itis and looked at the rising values of banks' net
                      equity.




30   November 2011    THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
It is not too Panglossian to expect that the financial crisis of the eurozone
would gradually migrate from Page One of newspapers within Europe—and
across the world.

If—or when—that happened, share prices of major US banks would also
                                                                                   Monetary virtue works
stop falling and start rising.
                                                                                   well in theory, but how
If—or when—that happened, a new global equity bull market would be                 does it work in practice
born.                                                                              when nobody seems to
                                                                                         prize it anymore?
But even before that overall rally was returning smiles to Wall Street and the
world, that other bull market that never really went away would be exciting
investors...


2. Gold Moves From the Sidelines to Center Stage
As the only medium of exchange that cannot be synthesized or devalued
by high-speed central bank printing presses, gold wins from eurodespair or
eurodevaluation.

If the ECB—the last holdout against financial heroin—joins the lotus-eating
majority of central bankers, gold would enter a spectacular bull market once
it became apparent that the euroelites had decided to save their banks and
their economies by rejoining the world. Monetary virtue works well in theory,
but how does it work in practice when nobody seems to prize it anymore?

We have been advocating the reintroduction of gold into the world monetary
system by using it to back long-duration bonds of profligate nations such
as Italy and the USA. That still could happen, but we've had no takers.
Keynesian orthodoxy lives among intellectual elites, even as they lose faith
in the Old-Time Religion.

But the failure to rebrand gold as the backing for long-duration inflation-
hedged bonds doesn't mean gold has no future.

If investors in other assets sense that the last holdout against monetary excess
has decided that virtue is punishing all members of its currency zone, they
will rush into gold as the last refuge in a universe of Paper Moonshine.




                                                                                         November 2011   31
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                     For those who wish to protect their wealth against monetary excesses on a
                     global scale, there are several options:
                         Gold Bullion or ETFs
                         Gold Royalty and Streaming companies
                         Large-Cap Gold Miners
                         Medium- and Small-Cap Gold Miners, and Exploration Companies

                     Gold Bullion or ETFs
                     We believe gold bullion—in specie or ETF—should be a cornerstone of
                     almost any long-term portfolio.

                     It meets the KISS principle of simplicity, and is devoid of the execution and
                     other risks that beset the mining stocks. It provides liquidity, security and a
                     foundation for performance, based on current and near-term prices for the
                     metal.

                     We disagree with those who say you can’t trust the ETFs because governments
                     could block access to the bullion. The major bullion ETFs track spot gold
                     prices.

                     Dennis Gartman is the most articulate exponent of the view that investors
                     should only buy the GLD or other bullion equivalents—not gold miners. He
                     notes that the profitability of mining gold has failed to keep pace with the
                     rise in bullion, and the mines have great political risks.

                     Rather than avoiding all miners, we recommend that investors seek the
                     opportunities offered by mining companies with the right characteristics:
                     great assets, good management, operating in politically-secure areas of the
                     world.

                     Gold bullion, and the royalty and streaming companies, perform well when
                     investors are filled with fear, and seek the safety of "the asset that is nobody’s
                     liability."

                     The ETF has been the sweet spot in this year's strong gold rally.




32   November 2011   THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
Gold Royalty and Streaming Companies
These companies have unique business models that allow them to minimize
risk and maximize upside reward from rising metal prices:

    Because their earnings come from dozens of mines, they provide a                     ...gold miners (and
    diversified portfolio of known revenue streams.                                      royalty companies)
                                                                                     provide a levered play
    They have fixed costs—they don't have to provide more money as capital           on gold price increases.
    costs for opening and extending mines increase.

    Despite having huge and growing revenues, they have staff counts and
    overheads that are normally found only in companies too small to apply
    for stock exchange listings. The auto dealer from whom we purchased our
    family car has roughly as many employees as one of these companies.

They are core investments for almost any investor who wants to participate
in the future of gold.

Large-Cap Gold Miners
All long-term gold investors should have some exposure to the major mining
companies.

Our core investment thesis is: “invest in companies with unhedged reserves in the
ground in politically-secure areas of the world”.

Furthermore, gold miners (and royalty companies) provide a levered play on
gold price increases.

The relative value of unhedged reserves compared with the investment value
of holding spot gold is changing as strong gold prices improve both the
profitability of existing production and the volume of economic reserves.
As the price of gold goes up, not only does the value of currently recorded
reserves rise with it, but the total reserves economic for mining increase.

Investors in well-managed large-cap gold mines have been greatly
disappointed at their stocks' recent price performance.

Why? Because the investor consensus on gold, which shifts from fear of
inflation to fear of a deflationary crash, is in one of its confused periods. That
means speculative enthusiasm for the miners and exploration companies is
at a relatively low ebb.




                                                                                          November 2011   33
It's the Economy Banks, Stupid!

                         The North American and Australian-based majors are all serious companies,
                         with strong management teams, and most boast splendid properties and
                         long-life reserves in politically-secure regions. (We note, however, that, while
                         gold reserves are increasing, so are political risks. Investors must be wary
...while gold reserves   about deterioration in some formerly favorable nations.)
are increasing, so
                         We believe investors have soured on the large caps stocks unduly and expect
are political risks.
                         them to benefit when gold shows signs of a new upside breakout.
Investors must
be wary about
deterioration in some    Medium- and Small-Cap Gold Miners, and Exploration Companies
formerly favorable       When gold was surging toward $1,900 the bullion and the exploration
nations.                 companies were outperforming the established miners—the bookends of
                         enthusiasm.

                         When retail investors regain the confidence to take bets on the exploration
                         companies' ability to find orebodies that are strong candidates for acquisition
                         by the major miners, this group can deliver sensational returns.

                         We strongly recommend exposure to those smaller companies that have
                         proven management teams, proven reserves in politically-secure areas of the
                         world, and properties with potential for major additions to reserves within
                         the next four years.

                         We are old enough to remember the days of $35 gold when mines were
                         unprofitable unless the ore grade was near one ounce per ton. These days,
                         even mines with grades near one gram per ton can be very profitable—if
                         the resources are large enough, the local communities and governments
                         are greatly supportive, and the management is adept, realistic, long-term-
                         oriented—and gutsy.

                         Silver and Other Precious Metals
                         We have always recommended some exposure to silver. We believe silver will
                         be pulled skyward with gold, but do not recommend that investors maintain
                         large silver or platinum exposure at the expense of gold.

                         Gold is the clear-cut choice—and the metal that offers the greatest chance for
                         reintegration into global monetary programs.




34    November 2011      THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
3. The Bullet-Proof Dividend Stocks
Since we began recommending these stocks as a discrete asset class, we have
been receiving a growing number of inquiries about our selection and
management criteria.                                                                       ...we began
We plan to make this concept and the implications for pension funds of           recommending these
holding exposure in such securities within what is ordinarily classified as the      stocks as a discrete
Fixed Income section of their portfolios, the core of our January issue.                   asset class...

In the meantime, we notice such developments as Warren Buffett's purchase
of a 5.4% stake in IBM stock as evidence that something big is unfolding for
companies with strong finances, strong managements, and strong dividend
policies.




                                                                                     November 2011     35
Don Coxe Basic Points Nov. 2011
Don Coxe Basic Points Nov. 2011
Don Coxe Basic Points Nov. 2011
Don Coxe Basic Points Nov. 2011
Don Coxe Basic Points Nov. 2011
Don Coxe Basic Points Nov. 2011
Don Coxe Basic Points Nov. 2011

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Don Coxe Basic Points Nov. 2011

  • 1. Basic Points It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! November 18, 2011 Published by Coxe Advisors LLP Distributed by BMO Capital Markets
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  • 3. Don Coxe THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! November 18, 2011 published by Coxe Advisors LLP Chicago, IL
  • 4. THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! November 18, 2011 Coxe Advisors LLP. Author: Donald Coxe 312-461-5365 dc@coxeadvisors.com Editor: Angela Trudeau 604-929-8791 at@coxeadvisors.com 190 South LaSalle Street, 4th Floor Chicago, Illinois USA 60603 Basic Points is published exclusively for BMO Financial Group and distributed by BMO Capital Markets Equity Research for clients of BMO Capital Markets, BMO Nesbitt Burns, BMO Harris Private Banking and Harris Private Bank. BMO Capital Markets Equity Research Manager, Publishing: Monica Shin monica.shin@bmo.com Desktop Publishing and Anna Goduco Distribution Coordinator anna.goduco@bmo.com
  • 5. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! OVERVIEW Too many equity investors are getting sick of the stock market. Glowing corporate earnings don't seem to matter anymore, and the market is subject to absurdly wide price swings. Many American equity investors who are pulling money out of their mutual funds are telling advisors they think the stock market must be rigged. The seemingly endless pattern of risk-on risk-off days in European and North American stocks which scares investors originates from the Wagnerian-scale drama of the existential crisis of the euro, and the problems of European and, to a somewhat lesser extent, American banks. These dramas play out against the backdrop of growing fears of a new global recession, which could, some analysts fear, be at least as challenging as its predecessor, because governments have exhausted their bailout funds. We are not convinced that a North American recession is inevitable and, in any case, we doubt that its severity would approach 2008 levels. Zero interest rates and record deficits should be good cushions. This month we explain why investors should indeed be worried about those badly-managed Wall Street and European banks in the light of the collapse of their asset pricing models. But we suggest that those endless crises in the eurozone could very likely trigger a policy response that would dramatically improve the outlook for European banks—and stocks generally. We also consider the implications of the politicization of the Keystone application in a broader context of debates on US energy policies. The Canadian government and much of the Canadian oil industry were surprisingly naive about Keystone's chances, actually believing that environmental issues were the only barriers to an Obama OK. We are leaving our Asset Mix recommendations unchanged. November 2011 1
  • 6. 2 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 7. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! The wise Northrop Frye once told students of a trans-continental trip he had taken in the observation car of a train. He noted that passengers could choose seats that faced forward or backward. This was a option not available to the pioneers who came by foot, horseback or canoe. They had to look ahead. ...the men who run He said that those train passengers who looked backwards were reflecting big US and European on where they had been, and that this was, on balance, a better strategy banks are collectively than looking ahead, because one could gradually build one's understanding the most publicly about the land—and the nation—without trying to peer ahead to what controversial segment would come next. of Big Business... We are going to follow Frye's precept by beginning with two pages of charts about where we have been. We want clients to reflect on how ghastly the performance of the [non-Canadian] bank stocks has been. While musing on these horror stories of failures and bailouts, clients should also be reflecting on the fact that the men who run big US and European banks are collectively the most publicly controversial segment of Big Business in claiming that they deserve to be paid more than they earn. Really? Were they football or baseball coaches with such disastrous records, they'd have been ridiculed and fired. Bizarrely, they have managed to elicit support from many naive conservatives who drink the Kool-Aid that Wall Street is composed of capitalist giants beset by leftist political Lilliputians. Even in the midst of the worst crash since 1929, they insisted that their bonuses had to be paid or they might decamp to.... No one seemed to ask where they could go with their blown-up risk models. Zimbabwe? November 2011 3
  • 8. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! Citigroup (C) Bank of America (BA) January 1, 1986 to November 17, 2011 January 1, 1985 to November 17, 2011 600 60 500 50 400 40 300 30 200 20 100 10 6.83 31.59 0 0 Jan-86 Jan-89 Jan-92 Jan-95 Jan-98 Jan-01 Jan-04 Jan-07 Jan-10 Jan-85 Jan-88 Jan-91 Jan-94 Jan-97 Jan-00 Jan-03 Jan-06 Jan-09 Goldman Sachs (GS) Banco Santander (SAN) May 1, 1999 to November 17, 2011 January 1, 1985 to November 17, 2011 250 16 225 14 200 12 175 10 150 8 125 6 6.18 100 4 92.35 75 2 50 0 May-99 Nov-00 May-02 Nov-03 May-05 Nov-06 May-08 Nov-09 May-11 Jan-85 Jan-88 Jan-91 Jan-94 Jan-97 Jan-00 Jan-03 Jan-06 Jan-09 Deutsche Bank (DB) UBS (UBS) January 1, 1985 to November 17, 2011 January 1, 1985 to November 17, 2011 120 80 70 100 60 80 50 60 40 30 40 30.35 20 20 10 11.21 0 0 Jan-85 Jan-88 Jan-91 Jan-94 Jan-97 Jan-00 Jan-03 Jan-06 Jan-09 Jan-85 Jan-88 Jan-91 Jan-94 Jan-97 Jan-00 Jan-03 Jan-06 Jan-09 Societe Generale (GLE) Credit Suisse (CS) January 1, 1987 to November 17, 2011 January 1, 1985 to November 17, 2011 160 100 140 80 120 100 60 80 60 40 40 25.60 20 20 21.10 0 0 Jan-87 Jan-90 Jan-93 Jan-96 Jan-99 Jan-02 Jan-05 Jan-08 Jan-11 Jan-85 Jan-88 Jan-91 Jan-94 Jan-97 Jan-00 Jan-03 Jan-06 Jan-09 4 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 9. It looks as if the Big Banks could be in a Triple Waterfall collapse formation that would force further assistance. We are frequently asked when the next Triple Waterfall would arrive. As discussed in our book1, financial markets of the last three decades of the ...the herd of past millennium were driven by three Triple Waterfall rises and crashes— Too Big to Fail banks commodities in the 70s, Japan in the 80s, and technology in 90s. should have been Each of these convulsions sucked in vast amounts of capital on the way up and culled... became a source of funds for the next mania on the way down. The housing bubble which inflated the Big Bank Bubble sucked in far more capital than its predecessors, because a 60% rise in house prices at a time of shrinking or vanishing down payments imposed monstrous demands on debt markets. The Greenspan Put obliged, as did so many central banks abroad. We have no doubt that, had governments not intervened during the 2008 crash with gigantic bailouts, unbelievably cheap money, and extremely generous guarantees on deposits, the past decade would have been defined by a crash of 1929 proportions in which many American and European banks would have been wiped out. That would have been a rather sudden Triple Waterfall, but the collateral damage from letting so many wretchedly-managed banks fail simultaneously would have been catastrophic. Nevertheless, the herd of Too Big to Fail banks should have been culled, thereby freeing up liquidity and capital for well-managed organizations. We have long wondered why Lehman was the last to go. Reading Ron Suskind's perceptive account of the Obama Administration (The Confidence Men), we were interested to learn that President Obama issued orders to let Citigroup go bust. This was, to us, a remarkably wise decision, and our respect for Obama rose on reading it. Regrettably, Obama didn't follow up to ensure compliance. Mr. Geithner somehow never got around to implementing those orders, and Citi has lived on, a sickly multi-strategy hedge fund masquerading as a bank. Was it saved because Robert Rubin had been collecting fees totaling more than $100 million for dispensing strategic advice—including increasing the bank's leverage during the later stages of the bubble? 1 The New Reality of Wall Street, 2003, McGraw Hill. November 2011 5
  • 10. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! KBW US Bank Stock Index (BKX) October 1, 1992 to November 17, 2011 140 120 The big bankers of 100 Wall Street and Europe are, it would seem, 80 modern Bourbons, 60 who have forgotten 40 37.30 nothing [about their 20 boom-built bonuses] and learned nothing 0 [about the perils of Sep-92 Oct-94 Nov-96 Dec-98 Jan-01 Feb-03 Mar-05 Apr-07 May-09 Jun-11 physics-based risk models and excess leverage]. This chart of the history of the BKX shows Leg One taking the Big Banks up roughly 200% to the Long-Term Capital crisis, which produced a swift 45% crash; this was halted by the Greenspan Put, which continued to pump in liquidity, taking them back to their peaks in a long sideways move, followed by a retrenchment. Then came the second Greenspan Put taking them to a new peak during the real estate bubble which took them to a peak that was 300% above the 1995 lows. The entire rallying process consumed 12 years—two to three years longer than the rallies of the previous Triple Waterfalls. An optimist would argue that the 2008-09 crash ended the banks' equivalent of a Triple Waterfall crash, which means they had been sufficiently punished for their sins against capitalism and, thus cleansed, were ready to resume their industry's historic role in economic expansion: less leverage, more lending, reduced risks, and more contribution to economic progress. Sadly, this never happened. The big bankers of Wall Street and Europe are, it would seem, modern Bourbons, who have forgotten nothing [about their boom-built bonuses] and learned nothing [about the perils of physics-based risk models and excess leverage]. 6 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 11. Like the Bourbons, they lost their heads, if only metaphorically. In the earlier case, there was never a question of showering more wealth on King Louis and Marie Antoinette in hope that they would clean up their acts and strengthen the French economy. However one might disparage the Jacobins, they weren't naïve. Like the Bourbons, they lost their heads... What about those earlier Triple Waterfalls? Commodities remain in a long-term bull market that shows scant signs of the excesses of the 1970s. Even gold, which is frequently cited as being in bubble mode, is merely catching up to long-term monetary expansion. (Its price multiplied 22 times in the Seventies mania.) Gold ($/oz) vs. Currency in Circulation* ($billion) January 1, 1998 to November 17, 2011 1,900 1,100 1,050 1,700 1,000 Last 1,052.15 1,500 1 Wk chng +6.79 950 1,300 900 850 1,100 800 900 750 700 700 650 500 Last 1,721.00 600 1 Wk chng –67.68 550 300 500 100 450 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Gold ($/oz) Currency in Circulation ($billions) *source: Federal Reserve Chart courtesy of Meridian Macro Research (info@meridianmacro.com) Japan, to our disappointment, remains in its Triple Waterfall mode 21 years after the crash began. As the Olympus scandal now reveals, investors are not convinced that Japanese businesses have been able to shrug off either the corruption of the yakuza (the Japanese mafia) or the nation's disastrous demography. November 2011 7
  • 12. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! As an industry, Technology has survived Nasdaq’s Triple Waterfall collapse, and has remained an engine of global growth, although investors who held onto such 1990s darlings as Cisco may not be consoled. Google wasn't public at the peak and Apple was not the company in 2000 that it would become "In the 1880s, total UK with the 2nd Jobs incarnation. bank assets were equal to 5% of GDP. At the Cisco (CSCO) bubble peak they were January 1, 1991 to November 17, 2011 500%..." 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 18.53 10 0 Nov-91 Nov-93 Nov-95 Nov-97 Nov-99 Nov-01 Nov-03 Nov-05 Nov-07 Nov-09 Nov-11 The perceptive Tony Jackson wrote in The Financial Times (Nov. 6, 2011) about a speech delivered by Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England, "that most of the harmful developments in finance in the last century came from the banks' ‘desire to break their balance sheet chains’." "In the 1880s, total UK bank assets were equal to 5% of GDP. At the bubble peak they were 500%. As to consolidation, the assets of the UK's three biggest banks at the start of the 20th Century were 7% of GDP. By the end of it they were 75% and by 2007— astonishingly—200%. Leverage climbed from 3 - 4 times in the 19th Century to 30 times in the bubble. And return on equity— unsurprisingly—went from modest single figures to 30% at the peak." We all know what happened next. 8 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 13. Have the Big, Bad, Bonused Bailout Banks (hereinafter called B5) learned from their near-death experience? Apparently not. The bonus fixation that has driven the desire for excess leverage is part of ...in the case of UBS, Wall Street's self-spawned DNA. After the crash, not only did Merrill Lynch bonuses were paid pay their fallen "stars" based on phantom earnings that ignored losses on from a pool that had subprimes, but in the case of UBS, bonuses were paid from a pool that had been totally drained by been totally drained by rogue trader fraud. rogue trader fraud. Bonus promises for bankers are, it would appear, like excessive pension promises for unionized government employees created by deals for union support for politicians in elections: they must be honored even when they are funded from over-greedy investment projections, and by imploded capital asset risk models. Not all big banks are run to enrich insiders with returns from perilously high leverage and dubious investments: the index of Canadian bank stocks reveals an industry that has continued its long tradition of behaving itself, thereby dramatically outperforming its counterparts in the US and Europe: S&P/TSX Canadian Bank Stocks vs. KBW US Bank Index (BKX) June 1, 2002 to November 17, 2011 250 200 175.73 150 100 50 -45.48 0 May-02 Jul-03 Sep-04 Nov-05 Jan-07 Mar-08 May-09 Jul-10 Sep-11 S&P/TSX Canadian Bank Stocks KBW US Bank Index (BKX) Source: S&P/TSX Bank Stocks; GICS, Industry Group November 2011 9
  • 14. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! No Canadian bank went bust in the Depression, so it was no surprise that all the Canadian banks came through the worst banking crash since the Thirties in solid condition. Credit good management, constrained leverage, and supervision by the Bank of Canada under its great governors in the past ...the occupiers of decade—David Dodge and Mark Carney. That Mr. Carney was recently chosen Zuccotti Park...tap to lead the global Financial Standards Board (replacing Mario Draghi who into rage that the moved to the European Central Bank) should be reassuring to investors— banks who were the and a spit in the eye for JPMorgan Chase's CEO, Jamie Dimon, who had biggest private sector assailed him in Washington weeks before. Mr. Dimon is one of those big causes of the crash bankers whose public displays of arrogance helped spawn the Occupy Wall and recession show Street demonstrations. Although the occupiers of Zuccotti Park are leaderless, little remorse and undisciplined and largely incoherent in their demands, they tap into rage little willingness to that the banks who were the biggest private sector causes of the crash and accept constraints on recession show little remorse and little willingness to accept constraints on their leverage and their leverage and proprietary trading. (One TV clip showed some signs they proprietary trading. were holding, including one that impressed us: "Bring Back Glass-Steagall.") The demonstrators should also, of course, be targeting Barney Frank and his politically-correct Fannie Mae allies, who probably deserve as much of the blame as the banks for the housing collapse, but that is a complicated story to explain, and the mainstream media have certainly not chosen to cite the catastrophic misdeeds of politicians they favor. 10 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 15. The Eurozone Crisis—and the Banks Since May, we have been warning that the Basel banking version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model was obsolete and misleading—and could trigger a new collapse. ...the G-20 Meeting— The Dexia collapse is a form of financial sick joke: a major financial institution held on the site of the that passed the European Banking Authority's supposedly-demanding stress famed Film Festival, test with flying colors in July thereupon vaporized within weeks. Imagine (but might have been someone dying of cancer who had taken out a $10 million term life insurance better held in a morgue) policy at a reduced premium for exceptional health two months earlier. Would the insurer and its reinsurer continue to retain the examining doctor? The proximate cause of the Dexia demise was the worsening of the Greek crisis at a time the prices for outstanding debt of other PIIGS—most notably Italy—were weakening. As this is written, despite at least €70 billion of ECB purchases, the benchmark ten-year Italian government bond yields 7.04%—a scary 5.25% more than German bunds, and 3.38% more than French bonds— whose yield spread above bunds has been also been widening recently. (By way of comparison, Treasurys yield 2% and Canadas yield 2.13%.) Italy's outstanding debt—120% of GDP—is the world's third-largest, and it must roll over more than €200 billion next year—let alone finance its growing fiscal deficit. Spanish yields have also been climbing sharply and are now 6.29%. The market is convinced that Italian yields are unsustainable, and is getting rapidly becoming panicky about Spain's. At the G-20 Meeting—held on the site of the famed Film Festival, (but might have been better held in a morgue), Silvio Berlusconi was in fine form for the role of Harlequin in a Commedia Dell' Arte farce. He airily dismissed talks of an Italian debt crisis, saying he had turned down an IMF loan, as being unnecessary. He said the plunging price of Italian bonds was "Yesterday's story, the restaurants are full, it is difficult to reserve a seat on a plane...I can't see another figure on the Italian scene capable of representing Italy on the international stage." November 2011 11
  • 16. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! Despite that (probably accurate) self-assessment, he lost his parliamentary majority in a vote on Nov. 8th, and got the hook from Stage Left. He is replaced by Mario Monti, a non-elected technocrat, with a glowing resume who began his political career as a Communist. He announced a Cabinet composed of ...no external other technocrats—no elected politicians. (Plato would have approved of an conclave could all-guardian government with no voter input.) A bank portfolio manager humiliate Greece as prepared to take a big bet on Italian bonds based on the belief that the dramatically as its Italian parliament and population will submit to Monti's medicines for own bureaucrats, more than a few months probably shouldn't even be managing his or her union leaders and own money—let alone anyone else's. tax-dodging rich Meanwhile, where the eurocrisis began, another leader has fallen. George have... Papandreou is gone. Nothing became Papandreou in his premiership as the leaving of it: he tried to give the voters a chance to ratify the Draconic terms of the nation’s bailout. We were sorry the EU banned that resort to democracy. The terms of the rescue package have been denounced as "humiliating" for Greece, but no external conclave could humiliate Greece as dramatically as its own bureaucrats, union leaders and tax-dodging rich have during the many months that little Greece has been making big waves in global markets. What really upset Sarkozy, Merkel, et al. was the idea of putting terms of a eurodeal to the voters. The euro was a confection of the elites and they have been congratulating each other for years on its wondrous qualities. It was only put to the electorate of a few members—not including the Germans—and barely survived. The members of the eurozone ruling class tend to be more comfortable with each other—despite personal rivalries—than with their voters. They graduate from the best universities and are virtually unanimous that the route to repealing Europe's bloody past is with supranational institutions that, through one-time constitution-style agreements, are placed permanently above and beyond the direct control of voters. Prior to the "make or break" euro meetings of October 25th, one of the officials justified the bailout plan by expostulating, "We cannot make war on the nation of Plato." 12 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 17. Plato, it will be recalled, abandoned Athens for Sicily, where he tried to make the regime of a local dictator the demonstration of his views on Guardians and the Cave. The project failed dismally, and Greece only got good government briefly during the reign of Alexander the Great—a Macedonian. It has had little—if any—experience with wise government since 323 B.C. A proposed Greece only got good €120 billion bailout 2,334 years later that is justified on the basis of helping government briefly Plato's heirs could only be conceived by an eurocrat who would never think during the reign of of putting the proposal to a vote of his own nationals. Alexander the Great— a Macedonian. But the fact that this emotional resort to Platonic philosophy was adduced in the midst of a modern crisis set us to thinking about the importance of philosophy in the Continental leaders' learning. They have all studied the same philosophers, albeit with natural national predispositions to their own great minds. Descartes' cool, geometric logic was at the root of French socialist Jacques Delors' design of the euro: a perfectly-designed currency with no provision for exits, like the succession of perfectly-drafted French constitutions, which in practice have only been amended by the Paris mob. Rousseau's concept of the supremacy of the General Will untrammeled by popular elections on fixed schedules therefore has enormous appeal for the new European aristocracy. The classic liberalism of the Scottish and English philosophers and economists—Berkeley, Hume, Smith, Locke, Ricardo and Mill—has had only modest influence with the Continental elites, where the French philosophes— such as Voltaire, Rousseau, and Condorcet, and more recently, Durkheim, and the German schools of Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer and Hegel are studied intensively. Angela Merkel emerged from that dramatic eurocrisis meeting of Oct. 26 as the leader of the eurozone, outlasting all the male elitists in a marathon that extended to 3 a.m. Her triumph triggered a gigantic global stock market rally, driven (as we learned later), mostly by short-covering. We wondered whether her own philosophic training was crucial. Raised in the most Marxist of the Eastern European Soviet dictatorships, she would have been taught Hegel's "great waltz" dialectic, which had been incorporated by Marx and Lenin into Communist dogma. If so, she might have taken the euro regime and rules as the Thesis, the Greek rebellion against it as the Antithesis, and sought to achieve a Synthesis with the 50% haircut on the value of Greece's outstanding bonds as the price of a new, durable euro. November 2011 13
  • 18. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! Crucial to this synthesis was—and is—a rule that a Hegelian might admire: a decree that slashing the value of Greece's bonds shall not be deemed a "credit event" that would automatically trigger the many billions in credit default swaps (CDS). Since these instruments were never part of the design If a 50% slash in of the euro or euro bond markets, they must not be allowed to dictate the principal value is not a terms of any new synthesis. credit event—what is? This bold concept has doubtless been a shock to holders of CDS—Greek and otherwise. If a 50% slash in principal value is not a credit event—what is? This ruling creates big winners and big losers. That apparently leaves it to investors to try to find out which banks were big writers of Greek CDS and which banks were big buyers. KBW European Large-Cap Banking Index (KEBI) January 1, 2005 to November 17, 2011 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 18.46 10 Jan-05 Nov-05 Sep-06 Jul-07 May-08 Mar-09 Jan-10 Nov-10 Sep-11 The KEBI chart of the large European banks shows that they broke through their 200-day moving average on the downside for good in January 2008 and have failed to rally back close to it since the crash. They are down 76% from their 2007 highs, outdistancing the BKX, which is down by two-thirds. Some investors tell us that the US banks are considerably stronger than their European counterparts. Based on the record of Dexia and earlier collapses of European banks within weeks of passing stress tests, that argument has appeal. 14 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 19. European banks collectively have four times the assets of their American counterparts—but, malheureusement, do not have four times their tangible net equity. That huge trans-Atlantic asset variation comes from the difference in savings habits of the two continents. American savings rates were near- zero in the years pre-crash, while Europeans have had relatively stronger Wall Street, where the savings rates. Also, Europeans are far more inclined to save through banks physics PhDs (turned than Americans. That helps to explain why Europe—notably Germany—is financial alchemists) so overbanked compared to the US. converted leadpipe losers into gold. That disparity worked out disastrously for European banks during the force-fed US housing bubble. The past decade was the first time the American economy experienced the full effect of collapse in US fertility rates. As fertility rates fell from approximately 2 babies per female during the Seventies and Eighties to 1.4 or less, the result was that the number of first-time jobholders and homebuyers was drastically reduced during the "noughts." Europe experienced the same demographic collapse, but its governments did not, like Washington, introduce stringent rules for banks that forced banks to make loans to minorities somewhat commensurate with the volume of loans they were making to whites. Barney Frank was the leader in Congress in demanding strict enforcement of these rules. Regional banks which plunged into the origination of dubious loans found that Wall Street and Washington were eager to take them off the banks' hands. Through complex derivatives, the Street achieved the miracle of AAA ratings even when significant portions of the loans in the product were to borrowers who—if they actually existed and were not in jail, (requirements which were not always enforced during the manic years)—were unlikely to be able to service the debts when the music stopped, as the dancing man, Citigroup’s Chuck Prince, so memorably framed it. Angelo Mozilo of Countrywide Financial, and a long list of brand-new upstart lenders eagerly arranged the deals and sent them to Wall Street, where the physics PhDs (turned financial alchemists) converted leadpipe losers into gold. To an astounding degree, they peddled them to European banks. When the housing bubble burst, the fallout was a TransAtlantic disaster. November 2011 15
  • 20. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! As Michael Lewis records in Vanity Fair, German bankers bought the CDOs because they were AAA-rated, and "we thought America was a rules-based society." (Germany is, of course, the quintessential rules-based society.) Wall Street was, in a way, a rules-based society. As Nassim Taleb explained ...the term "legacy (when we shared a platform in 2007), the Street was relying on terribly assets" to describe unrealistic risk models, managed by arrogant fools who knew physics and rotting remnants of the mathematics but almost nothing about finance. This would lead, he said, to past binge based on a crash that might recall 1929. He was exulting because a journal devoted to investment models... statistics (The American Statistician, August 2007) had just devoted an entire is of a piece with such issue to attacking him and defending the models. Victorian euphemisms The Basel version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model decreed that AAA-rated as "nightsoil" for the mortgage derivatives required no allocations of the [scarce] capital of contents of bedpans. European banks. Result: before the eurobanks began to lose on sovereign PIIGS debt, they were already ailing from the effects of overexposure to putrid products backed by American real estate. According to The Wall Street Journal, "Sixteen top European banks are holding a total of about €386 billion ($532 billion) of potentially suspect credit market and real estate assets.....more than the €339 billion of Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish government debt that those same banks were holding at the end of last year....European banks, on average, have roughly halved their stockpiles of legacy assets since 2007...meanwhile the top three US banks, Bank of America, Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase have slashed such assets by well over 80% over a similar period." We had not previously heard the term "legacy assets" to describe rotting remnants of the past binge based on investment models. It is of a piece with such Victorian euphemisms as "nightsoil" for the contents of bedpans. The Victorians lacked complex mathematical models, and they made no bets on bedpans. Today's badly-performing banks lack bedpans, but they're swimming in perfumed portfolios excreted by mathematical models. This is called progress. 16 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 21. One possible benefit of the "legacies" of the misplaced enthusiasms of European banks for American subprime paper could be that the European Central Bank—now under the leadership of Mario Draghi—will be swift to continue cutting the competitively skyhigh rates imposed by previous management under Jean-Claude Trichet. [M. Trichet] was an inflation-fighting central M. Trichet may have been the world's most obdurate inflation fighter. The banker who put his ECB, unlike the Fed and many other central banks—has only one mandate— American counterparts fighting inflation. With rising commodity prices driving up costs of food to shame. and fuels, M. Trichet drove ECB rates to levels infinitely higher than Ben Bernanke's zero-level prices. (Dr. Bernanke is seemingly pleased to be giving his money away free: he is promising to continue this largesse at least until 2014. That will mean six years of free money. Who can tell the long-term effect of consuming financial heroin on such a scale?) M. Trichet actually raised his rate twice this year at a time eurozone economies were visibly sagging. He pronounced that his record as an inflation fighter was better than the Bundesbank's. He proudly characterized his performance as "Impeccable! Impeccable!" We agree. He was an inflation-fighting central banker who put his American counterparts to shame. The euro's rise in value on his watch accurately reflects his impeccable inflation credentials. He managed to make a global store of value out of a dubious theory. His enthusiastic self-appraisal was his swan song, as M. Draghi was already in the waiting room. He dropped the Trichet rate 25 bp his first day on the job. As grim as the outlook for peripheral bonds may be, contagion is spreading across eurozone non-German bonds since the decision to reject the payouts under Greek CDS was announced. According to Gillian Tett of the Financial Times, American banks may have issued a half-trillion dollars’ worth of such paper. What investors in eurobonds now face is the prospect of problems across the zone. As more and more economies face recession, this process is elevating their debt costs. When will the Germans face the fact that they can’t remain obdurate when all their supposedly strong partners are facing financing problems? November 2011 17
  • 22. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! American Banks With the exception of Wall Street, American banks seem to have made some financial progress since 2008. So why do bank stocks Their stock prices have underperformed the S&P but have recently been look bleak? outperforming the big banks represented in the BKX. The S&P—which includes bank stocks—is up roughly 25% in that time. KBW US Bank Index (BKX) vs. KBW US Regional Banking Index ETF (KRE) January 1, 2011 to November 17, 2011 10 0 -10 -13.14 -20 -30 -28.59 -40 Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 KBW US Regional Banking Index ETF (KRE) KBW US Bank Index (BKX) So why do bank stocks look bleak? The answer, of course, is that they couldn't lay off all their suspect real estate loan exposure on Wall Street, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or the Federal Home Loan Bank, (although the taxpayers are down $170 billion and counting on Fan and Fred). It will be recalled that when the Bush Administration finally became concerned about F&F in 2007, and tried to rein them in, Barney Frank led a successful Congressional campaign to protect them from interference by the Fed or the Comptroller. Collectively, the regional banks had large exposure to Fannie and Freddie preferred shares. They loved those tax-exempt dividends. Until there were no dividends...although Fannie and Freddie continue to pay their bosses big bonuses. Depending on the location of the regional banks, their biggest problem is commercial real estate. They may not have any complex real estate derivatives on their books, but they are saddled with piles of debt on vacant stores and shuttered warehouses, and large exposure to municipal bonds of varying quality. 18 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 23. That is one reason why we have been so concerned about the sickly KRE. With the Wall Street banks, we know that most of their problems come from derivatives they can't sell and egos they can’t control. Result: so much of Wall Street debt trades at a discount, and their shares sell at discounts to net asset value. With the Wall Street banks, we know An unwary investor who saw that a bank's shares and debts were selling at a that most of their sizable discount to stated net asset value might assume that the bank's bosses problems come from wouldn't be getting bonuses. derivatives they can't In capitalist theory, executive pay is for value-creating performance of a kind sell and egos they that drives share prices to large premiums over book value—and makes their can’t control. outstanding debts rise in value at a time of zero interest rates from Gentle Ben Bernanke. The bosses of those B5 banks, who are long on greed and short on shame, dodge capitalist principles they find inconvenient for setting their own compensation. They assume that, when their debts trade at discounts, that reduces their debts and therefore generates earnings, which beget bonuses. Nearly one-half of some of the big banks' recently-reported earnings came from the declining market value of their debt. Not the repayment of debt, mind you—merely the bid price of their paper. The regional banks' bosses don't get those Wall Street benefits, because so little of their debt trades actively. Their bosses are old-fashioned enough to believe that they'd like to see their debt trade at a premium to par value. The problem is that until more of those vacant shopping centers and homes find lessees or buyers, the regionals will be struggling. The regionals are also worried about their exposure to debt from subprime state and local governments—like Illinois, California and Harrisburg. One bright spot for some local banks: among the best-run of the regionals are banks that have maintained high exposure to Treasurys. Since Treasurys have been a superb investment this year, some of these banks must have benefited greatly—providing that they didn't confine themselves to the front end of the curve. We'll stick to our long-stated view that the KRE will give the signal that the economy is really on its way back when it solidly outperforms both the S&P and the BKX at a time of rallying equity prices. At the moment, the KRE is treading water—and winter is coming. November 2011 19
  • 24. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! What Happens to Investment Risk Perceptions With Italy Joining Greece in the Calculations? We believe investors should make the following assumptions: Somehow, this must stop. 1. The fight to keep Greece within the eurozone has been so intense because the prospect of a sudden Grecian exit would unleash chaos across the zone. Stein’s Law says that it will. Greek individuals and companies would rush to withdraw funds from Greek banks, and bank lending would come to a standstill. (Already, there is evidence that some Greeks are frightened: bank deposits are down roughly 25% since December 2009.) Outside Greece, banks and companies having Greek counterparties would be frantically trying to rearrange agreements, and Greece would fall into a Depression. The prospect of such an implosion spreading to Italy would be an existential challenge to the eurozone. Italian bond yields—already at levels unsustainable over the longer term—would skyrocket, and banks inside and outside the zone would default. 2. Although Berlusconi is no longer Premier, his party has the most seats in Parliament. Investors should not assume that a new coalition after a future election would have the kind of stability that occurs in Northern Europe after a government loses an election. 3. Spanish bond yields will probably continue to climb after this month's election, putting that nation into deeper recession. 4. Investors assume that Ireland and Portugal have been stabilized, but when banks across Europe are pulling in lines of credit in response to a collapse in Greece and a potential collapse in Italy, all lesser-grade credits will suffer. Since Greece first went on investors' radar there have been dozens of days in which global stocks have plunged because of a threatened Greek default, followed by brief rallies because of a new rescue package, followed by more riots and yet another bailout proposal, followed by another selloff because of a crisis in another country. It is unacceptable that global stock markets are being held hostage to the follies and fake financials of a few underachieving, overindebted economies in a zone with an overvalued currency and over-stringent monetary policies. Somehow, this must stop. Stein’s Law says that it will. 20 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 25. The Implications for Gold To date, the major asset class which has benefited most from the PIIGS dramas is gold. When the possibility of a Greek default first came under serious discussion in This is beginning to May 2010, gold was trading in the $1100 range, and the S&P was in the 1166 look like Gold Bug range. Ten-Year Treasury yields were roughly 3.8%. Remarkably, the euro was Nirvana... roughly 1.35 in dollar terms—where it is today. The KEBI Index was roughly 35: it is now 19.5. We have been arguing for more than a year that the existential challenge to the euro from the plight of the PIIGS is the primary driver of gold prices. Europeans who find that their bank deposits, paychecks, life insurance and pensions are all euro-denominated have been buying some protection in the form of gold. Other investors, contemplating the possible implosion of the currency of the world's second-largest trading zone have been making similar moves. The growing problems in the zone have been shrinking global economic activity and central banks other than the ECB are—as of now—virtually unanimous in lowering rates to minuscule levels to avert recessions...and to depreciate their currencies. For the first time since the abandonment of the gold standard, central banks are overwhelmingly dedicated to weakening the exchange rates of their currencies. When faith in the “printed paper promises of politicians" flags, gold offers an incorruptible store of value. This is beginning to look like Gold Bug Nirvana—where panicky people protect their wealth by selling paper to buy gold. (Maybe the bankers are ahead of the pack: central banks bought 148 tonnes of gold in the third quarter.) Ben Bernanke has said zero interest rates will remain until at least 2014. That means the financial heroin will continue to flow, which means continuation—and exacerbation—of negative real interest rates as far as most eyes can see. What the US and Europe seem to be experiencing is a modified stagflation, in which food and fuel prices stay stubbornly high, and interest rates remain at losing levels for investors. Gold is the only historic medium of exchange whose value has been rising for nearly 11 straight years. The forces driving it upward are accelerating. Conclusion: Once gold breaks through its August peak of 1920, it will challenge the magic millennium level of 2000—and will eventually pierce it. November 2011 21
  • 26. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! US Energy Policies: Political Risk for Oil Investing Rises 1. The Politics of Keystone XL [President Obama] is For coolly-calculated political reasons, President Obama has kicked the back to doing what Keystone XL oil can down the road. he enjoys most and We had thought that would be his likeliest response, and raised the political does better than risk issue in Basic Points and our Conference Calls—(albeit merely as a anyone—campaigning. significant possibility investors should consider). He cited environmental concerns about aquifers, but those were never the gut issue on Keystone, and were already being fully addressed by TransCanada (TRP) in response to a long list of State Department requirements. Even the Nebraska Governor who led the opposition agreed that some relatively modest tweaks would meet his state’s concerns, and joined all the state governors on the pipeline route in praising the opportunities, jobs and progress the line would deliver. TransCanada swiftly agreed to those changes—but Obama held firm. He is back to doing what he enjoys most and does better than anyone—campaigning. The pipeline was a big, obvious victim of calculations in Presidential politics made by the most muscular environmental NGOs and the White House. The wealthiest NGOs had made it their signature issue. They were candid that they needed “a big win” to revive their coalitions and supporters, such as Hollywood's leading experts on environmental science issues, who flew to Washington to protect the environment by spending a night in jail protesting "dirty oil." From the NGOs' standpoint, after polls showed that only a small minority of the population believed in man-made global warming as a relevant political issue, something big and preferably foreign was needed. Although most of the actual debate and analysis on the issue—and the State Department's exhaustive review—were about the pipeline itself, the NGOs made it clear they want to kill Keystone to stop the oil sands operations. They've been horrified about the Canadian publicity that the oil sands are "the new Saudi Arabia." This is their chance to ensure that there's no North American Saudi Arabia. 22 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 27. Weeks ago, we watched an interview on public television's "News Hour," featuring some celebrity (whose name escapes us) who had demonstrated in Washington and had spent a night in jail. He never mentioned the Nebraskan environmental questions. He said that blocking the pipeline was the only way to stop oil sands expansion and perhaps even force shutdowns. When told Truth is the first victim that the Alberta government said that Canada could just divert the output in such scorched-earth to the Pacific Coast to ship to China, he said that their information was that campaigns waged by indigenous people would kill any such proposal. (We are inclined to agree wealthy enthusiasts who with him in that appraisal.) travel in jet planes and automobiles to kill The opposition to Alberta went global when the European Union issued a oil exploration. policy statement that European refiners were not to use fuel from "dirty oil production"—which is a term used by the Banana (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything) school of enviro-enthusiasm. Mr. Obama is not such an extremist—at least not outside North America. On his trip to Brazil he renewed US financial support for that nation's ambitious program of developing offshore oil, at a time exploration in the Gulf of Mexico was largely shut down. (The US, through government-guaranteed loans, is participating in a big way in developing those fields.) Until recently, the main NGO fund-raising campaigns focused on blocking oil projects in Alaska, and drilling on any US coast. The litmus test for fighting a vile energy project is that it has the potential for raising many millions of dollars for tax-exempt organizations with strong records in using litigation to tie up energy (and mining) developments. The Alberta oil sands became their Hate #1 because they not only produce oil, but, until recently, most of it came from mining. (Steam-Assisted Gravity Drilling, which leaves a footprint smaller than a football field, is a more recent development, but it gets lumped in with the open pits that supposedly despoil boreal forests and kill birds. That a typical wind farm kills many more birds and bats in a year than all the oil sands projects have accomplished throughout their history is, of course, irrelevant. Truth is the first victim in such scorched- earth campaigns waged by wealthy enthusiasts who travel in jet planes and automobiles to kill oil exploration.) When TransCanada agreed to all the State Department requirements for permitting, its management thought their long approval campaign was over. The State Department had the authority to draft the rules, with EPA assistance, and that was that. November 2011 23
  • 28. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! But, very late in the game, well after the time Canadian authorities and the US oil industry were convinced Keystone was a "Go," Obama announced he was intervening and would make the final decision. By postponing the decision until after the elections, he has virtually guaranteed his campaign American drivers will huge support from the major left-wing and environmental funding sources, be paying more for because they now know that if he loses next year, the decision on Keystone their gasoline... will be made by a Republican—and Republicans are overwhelmingly in favor. Speaker John Boehner spoke last week of its many thousands of high-pay immediate "shovel-ready" construction and maintenance jobs that won't cost US taxpayers a dime. (Obama spent hundreds of billions allegedly for "shovel-ready" jobs, but it turned out only a minuscule amount went for such jobs. Most went for unionized bureaucrats and teachers employed by state and local governments. As Rick Perry scoffed, "My dog has created more shovel-ready jobs than Obama." He may have been on target, but, as has been his experience in his ill-starred campaign, he didn't score any points, because the quip wasn't original.) One Canadian company—Enbridge—seems to have made the correct calculations about Obama's plans. Within days after the Obama rejection, it, with backing from the Caisse de Depot, it bought a pipeline from ConocoPhillips and plans to switch the direction of its flow northward from the Gulf to Cushing. That means the huge discount on WTI to Brent must narrow—and it did narrow on Wednesday. American drivers will be paying more for their gasoline, but that doesn't offend the NGOs, who want high gas prices to supply a pricing umbrella for their various green strategies. As of now, Obama stands likely to win re-election. He says he's raising a billion dollars in campaign funds and no one seems to doubt he'll do it, even though his campaign oratory is loaded with attacks on "the rich," and his overwhelming support in mainstream media means he doesn't really need that kind of money. The Republicans will not be running an opponent with his Teleprompter talents, charisma, or charm—or heartwarming personal biography… And he will not be facing a Reagan. 24 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 29. It looks as if the oil industry is making its plans on the assumption that Keystone will not proceed. Big Obama backer Warren Buffett's railroad stands to win big, because the huge growth in Dakotas oil production will have to go by train if Keystone isn't approved. Keystone is in mortal The odds, as of now, are that Keystone is in mortal peril. The death certificate peril. The death is due November 2012. certificate is due It takes a re-elected Democrat to sign it. November 2012. It takes a re-elected 2. Shale Gas and Oil Democrat to sign it. The other relatively new campaign against production of fossil fuels is the opposition to shale gas and oil produced through fracking. To date, this has been a regional struggle. Most states are thrilled with the money pouring into local economies—not to mention the soaring royalty payments. To date, hundreds of thousands of high-paying jobs have been created. Example: the Dakotas' economies are booming as never before, and most residents cannot believe their good fortune. As Dennis Gartman reports, North Dakota now produces more oil than an OPEC member, Ecuador—and production is headed much higher—if environmentalists don't stop it. In communities with colleges, and other centers of employment for leftist enthusiasts—such as upstate New York—opposition to fracking has been fierce—and successful. The opponents allege pollution of aquifers and cite numerous examples of headaches ascribed to air pollution. Until very recently, the prevailing viewpoint of big-picture thinkers without ties to litigating NGOs or oil and gas companies was that the US benefits hugely from the cheapest natural gas in the industrial world, and the prospect of cheap gas prices for perhaps a century is one reason to be bullish on America. November 2011 25
  • 30. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! The environmentalists who oppose all fossil fuels (as opposed to people who oppose polluting coal plants) were becoming desperate. Then a potentially seismic shift in public opinion suddenly emerged: some recent small earthquakes in the Midwest just may have been caused by ...man-made quakes fracking. At least one seismologist has publicly argued that earthquakes in in low-or-no-risk low-risk earthquake areas were probably caused by fracking. zones are a new concept. These are early days for this brand-new debate, but investors should not dismiss the possibility that gas producers could be faced with gigantic liability lawsuits brought by deep-pocketed NGOs should a quake cause meaningful damage. Seismology is still evolving. Scientists have learned to develop probability forecasts for big quakes in earthquake-prone zones such as the San Andreas Fault. But man-made quakes in low-or-no-risk zones are a new concept. Lawsuits alleging them would probably, until now, be considered as fanciful as alleging that tribal gods had been angered. (We recall—with awe—how leading liberals renowned for killing conventional energy projects elsewhere and supporting Green projects across the nation managed to kill a wind farm off Cape Cod by having a section of the ocean declared as religiously sacred for aborigines. This land is their land—even when under the sea.) One hopeful sign: the influential Natural Resources Defense Council asserts that fracking has, in fact, caused two small quakes. However, it goes on to outline safety procedures—such as avoiding fracking along major fault zones—that should minimize fracquake risks. In other words, the industry should be able to progress as long as it follows stringent rules. So—just maybe—the shale gas industry can confine most of its worrying to gas prices. 26 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 31. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! THE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT 1. How the Capital Markets Could Eventually Reach A Happy Ending ...Greece has gone Euro vs. US Dollar from being renowned January 1, 1999 to November 17, 2011 for its ruins to being 1.7 renowned for the 1.6 ruin it inflicts on 1.5 the eurozone's 1.4 economy... 1.35 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 Jan-99 Jan-01 Jan-03 Jan-05 Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 How much longer must global investors start their days by checking whether their stock markets will be up or down based on the latest news in Greece and/or Italy? Would anyone have predicted 15 months ago that Greek politics, promises and riots would have more sustained impact on stock prices in North America than US GDP changes, US payroll employment data and changes in earnings forecasts? Greece hasn't been truly important since the death of Alexander the Great, (although its revolt against Turkish rule did lead to Lord Byron's death from fever). In the past year, Greece has gone from being renowned for its ruins to being renowned for the ruin it inflicts on the eurozone's economy and on share prices of European—and even some major American—bank stocks. Greek disease spread swiftly across the Aegean, and Italy now reels, with fallout as far as Spain. If Italy fails, then there is no hope of saving the euro or averting a deep recession. Thanks to the Basel capital asset pricing rules, banks across Europe not only have Greek exposure but big bets on Italy. (According to Reuters, as of June, French banks held $416.4 billion worth of Italian bonds.) November 2011 27
  • 32. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! When the euro was forged, the Bundesbank did its best to ensure that, even if governments broke the rules, monetary policies would be noninflationary. Jean-Claude Trichet has consciously imitated Karl-Otto Pöhl, Axel Weber, and other revered Bundesbankers. ...during a full year in Meanwhile, across the rest of the world, as we have discussed, central bankers which most of the news and their governments are doing their best to drive down the value of their from the eurozone has currencies. When the Swiss National Bank was transformed from being a been of crises... model of prudence to looking like a Weimar banker in drag, it was clear that the Euro's exchange global inflation threats would rise—eventually. rate against the dollar is unchanged. But the European Central Bank stuck to its Bundesbanque idée fixe of fighting inflation through a strong currency that has, by dint of sound monetary policies, inherited the global respect long accorded to the Deutschemark. Result: during a full year in which most of the news from the eurozone has been of crises, interrupted by crisis meetings, followed by new crises, and new crisis meetings, the Euro's exchange rate against the dollar is unchanged. This is probably the most arresting economic statistic of the year. But the euro formidable in a world where nearly every other central bank and government craves weakness for its currency has long since become a major source of weakness for eurozone economies: The strong Northern economies find their global competitiveness challenged by the strength of their currencies. The weak southern economies wasted the major benefits to them of the euro—low interest rates and seemingly unquenchable demand for their bonds. They became uncompetitive with Northern economies—notably Germany, which had sacrificed for 15 years to rebuild East Germany; during that long period, German unions accepted pay increases that were laughably low compared to wage gains for workers and civil servants in the South (and Ireland) , and to tight deficit controls that were brutally restrictive compared to the loose fiscal policies practiced by most of the PIIGS. The peripherals ignored their declining competitiveness in markets outside the eurozone as the euro gained strength in a currency world of weaklings. They were thus hit with a double whammy: they lost competitiveness almost everywhere, and now slide into recessions that inflate their deficits at a time the adamant euroelites demand they cut their deficits—or else. Their economies contract because of the sickening declines in their competitiveness, and the contractionary policies hammering their feeble societies. 28 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 33. The Bundesbank mentality served the Northern economies well for the decades in which most global economies were usually concerned that their currencies were strong—or at least stable. But this new era when strong currencies are despised by their own central It's time for the banks is unforgiving for the only large economy that practices the old-time eurozone to start currency religion. pumping out its This week's disorderly eurobond markets have triggered an open flap between own brand of the two Euroguardian nations about the ECB's responsibility for stabilizing Bernanke heroin... bond prices. Each time Italian and Spanish bond yields soar, the ECB steps in, but only to prevent chaos. France argues that the ECB should do far more than Germany says is legal under EU rules. The Germans and Jean-Claude Trichet have been pleased that the anti- inflationary policies of the ECB have worked for 11 years, delivering lower inflation and a far higher market price for the currency than the dollar. But inflation isn't the issue now. It's survival. Therefore: The euro must be devalued. The target should be its value as of its inception for accounting on 1/1/99—$1.16—although the ECB should allow for downsize overshoot. The process of devaluing it will involve massive liquidity expansion within the eurozone, thereby reliquifying the parched banking system and restoring lending activity across the eurozone. It's time for the eurozone to start pumping out its own brand of Bernanke heroin—until the euro reaches a globally competitive range and the European banks have rebuilt themselves to at least the minimal-to-modest strength of their American counterparts When eurobanks no longer have to pay infinitely higher rates on short-term deposits than American banks, they will be better able to handle the problems of (1) putrefying American CDOs purchased when the euro was trading far above par on the dollar, and (2) depreciating PIIGS bonds lending their own peculiar odors to their balance sheets. November 2011 29
  • 34. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! But how can such reliquification and monetary depreciation be sold to the Germans? They know of two disastrous policy regimes—hyperinflation and Hitler. They believe that one begot the other. Never again! Sarkozy talks of a new Franco-German domain within the eurozone, and James Carville, Finland now argues that the six members with AAA ratings should have a where art thou now? greater measure of control: (Slovakia shouldn't have a veto.) The Germans still act publicly as if there can be no retreat from the sound money policies that have prevailed under Duisenberg and Trichet. But Angela Merkel is a realist and she is the new uncrowned queen Angela of the eurozone. She can expect powerful support from German manufacturers who fear losing their competitiveness in peripheral economies that abandon the euro—and are losing competitiveness globally because of the levitating euro. As one German auto manufacturing CEO told a friend of ours, " If the euro comes apart in a crash, then we'd be left with a mark whose value was up 40% over the peripherals and we couldn't sell in the South or in most of the world!" She can also point out that inflation in major non-euro economies with weak currencies is roughly at—or even less than—eurozone levels. There's room for currency depreciation and bank reliquification. She has shown herself open to discussions of a new core decisionmaking structure for the euro. With French yields soaring far above bunds, the partnership that is crucial for euro-survival risks destruction by the new bond vigilantes. (James Carville, where art thou now?) We suspect that what could bring Merkel and the German political leaders to accept (temporary) Bernankization of the ECB is the rapid deterioration of finances for the European banking system. This is, in reality, the core issue that is destabilizing global capital markets. If the European Central Bank, backed by the full eurozone membership, reflated money supplies and drove short-term rates to America levels, there would be strong rallies among the beaten-down bank stocks, giving them the opportunity to raise new infusions of equity—a process of financial strengthening that would feed on itself as global investors stopped worrying about an epidemic of Dexia-itis and looked at the rising values of banks' net equity. 30 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 35. It is not too Panglossian to expect that the financial crisis of the eurozone would gradually migrate from Page One of newspapers within Europe—and across the world. If—or when—that happened, share prices of major US banks would also Monetary virtue works stop falling and start rising. well in theory, but how If—or when—that happened, a new global equity bull market would be does it work in practice born. when nobody seems to prize it anymore? But even before that overall rally was returning smiles to Wall Street and the world, that other bull market that never really went away would be exciting investors... 2. Gold Moves From the Sidelines to Center Stage As the only medium of exchange that cannot be synthesized or devalued by high-speed central bank printing presses, gold wins from eurodespair or eurodevaluation. If the ECB—the last holdout against financial heroin—joins the lotus-eating majority of central bankers, gold would enter a spectacular bull market once it became apparent that the euroelites had decided to save their banks and their economies by rejoining the world. Monetary virtue works well in theory, but how does it work in practice when nobody seems to prize it anymore? We have been advocating the reintroduction of gold into the world monetary system by using it to back long-duration bonds of profligate nations such as Italy and the USA. That still could happen, but we've had no takers. Keynesian orthodoxy lives among intellectual elites, even as they lose faith in the Old-Time Religion. But the failure to rebrand gold as the backing for long-duration inflation- hedged bonds doesn't mean gold has no future. If investors in other assets sense that the last holdout against monetary excess has decided that virtue is punishing all members of its currency zone, they will rush into gold as the last refuge in a universe of Paper Moonshine. November 2011 31
  • 36. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! For those who wish to protect their wealth against monetary excesses on a global scale, there are several options: Gold Bullion or ETFs Gold Royalty and Streaming companies Large-Cap Gold Miners Medium- and Small-Cap Gold Miners, and Exploration Companies Gold Bullion or ETFs We believe gold bullion—in specie or ETF—should be a cornerstone of almost any long-term portfolio. It meets the KISS principle of simplicity, and is devoid of the execution and other risks that beset the mining stocks. It provides liquidity, security and a foundation for performance, based on current and near-term prices for the metal. We disagree with those who say you can’t trust the ETFs because governments could block access to the bullion. The major bullion ETFs track spot gold prices. Dennis Gartman is the most articulate exponent of the view that investors should only buy the GLD or other bullion equivalents—not gold miners. He notes that the profitability of mining gold has failed to keep pace with the rise in bullion, and the mines have great political risks. Rather than avoiding all miners, we recommend that investors seek the opportunities offered by mining companies with the right characteristics: great assets, good management, operating in politically-secure areas of the world. Gold bullion, and the royalty and streaming companies, perform well when investors are filled with fear, and seek the safety of "the asset that is nobody’s liability." The ETF has been the sweet spot in this year's strong gold rally. 32 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 37. Gold Royalty and Streaming Companies These companies have unique business models that allow them to minimize risk and maximize upside reward from rising metal prices: Because their earnings come from dozens of mines, they provide a ...gold miners (and diversified portfolio of known revenue streams. royalty companies) provide a levered play They have fixed costs—they don't have to provide more money as capital on gold price increases. costs for opening and extending mines increase. Despite having huge and growing revenues, they have staff counts and overheads that are normally found only in companies too small to apply for stock exchange listings. The auto dealer from whom we purchased our family car has roughly as many employees as one of these companies. They are core investments for almost any investor who wants to participate in the future of gold. Large-Cap Gold Miners All long-term gold investors should have some exposure to the major mining companies. Our core investment thesis is: “invest in companies with unhedged reserves in the ground in politically-secure areas of the world”. Furthermore, gold miners (and royalty companies) provide a levered play on gold price increases. The relative value of unhedged reserves compared with the investment value of holding spot gold is changing as strong gold prices improve both the profitability of existing production and the volume of economic reserves. As the price of gold goes up, not only does the value of currently recorded reserves rise with it, but the total reserves economic for mining increase. Investors in well-managed large-cap gold mines have been greatly disappointed at their stocks' recent price performance. Why? Because the investor consensus on gold, which shifts from fear of inflation to fear of a deflationary crash, is in one of its confused periods. That means speculative enthusiasm for the miners and exploration companies is at a relatively low ebb. November 2011 33
  • 38. It's the Economy Banks, Stupid! The North American and Australian-based majors are all serious companies, with strong management teams, and most boast splendid properties and long-life reserves in politically-secure regions. (We note, however, that, while gold reserves are increasing, so are political risks. Investors must be wary ...while gold reserves about deterioration in some formerly favorable nations.) are increasing, so We believe investors have soured on the large caps stocks unduly and expect are political risks. them to benefit when gold shows signs of a new upside breakout. Investors must be wary about deterioration in some Medium- and Small-Cap Gold Miners, and Exploration Companies formerly favorable When gold was surging toward $1,900 the bullion and the exploration nations. companies were outperforming the established miners—the bookends of enthusiasm. When retail investors regain the confidence to take bets on the exploration companies' ability to find orebodies that are strong candidates for acquisition by the major miners, this group can deliver sensational returns. We strongly recommend exposure to those smaller companies that have proven management teams, proven reserves in politically-secure areas of the world, and properties with potential for major additions to reserves within the next four years. We are old enough to remember the days of $35 gold when mines were unprofitable unless the ore grade was near one ounce per ton. These days, even mines with grades near one gram per ton can be very profitable—if the resources are large enough, the local communities and governments are greatly supportive, and the management is adept, realistic, long-term- oriented—and gutsy. Silver and Other Precious Metals We have always recommended some exposure to silver. We believe silver will be pulled skyward with gold, but do not recommend that investors maintain large silver or platinum exposure at the expense of gold. Gold is the clear-cut choice—and the metal that offers the greatest chance for reintegration into global monetary programs. 34 November 2011 THE COXE STRATEGY JOURNAL
  • 39. 3. The Bullet-Proof Dividend Stocks Since we began recommending these stocks as a discrete asset class, we have been receiving a growing number of inquiries about our selection and management criteria. ...we began We plan to make this concept and the implications for pension funds of recommending these holding exposure in such securities within what is ordinarily classified as the stocks as a discrete Fixed Income section of their portfolios, the core of our January issue. asset class... In the meantime, we notice such developments as Warren Buffett's purchase of a 5.4% stake in IBM stock as evidence that something big is unfolding for companies with strong finances, strong managements, and strong dividend policies. November 2011 35