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Infoblox Advanced DNS Protection 
Case Study 
Adam Obszyński | CEE SE 
PLNOG13 2014.09.29 
1 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
Agenda 
1 DNS in the news 
2 DNS: How to prepare? 
3 ADP What’s new? 
4 ADP Stories 
2 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
Infoblox and Service Providers 
Dedicated SP product line 
• Leads Industry with >1M DNS qps and 
Advanced DDoS protection 
• Carrier-grade solution adopted at major 
Tier 1 providers 
220+ Service Providers; 55,000+ 
systems shipped; 7000+ Enterprises 
3 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
3 
Dedicated SP Business Unit 
• EVP from Juniper, Cisco carrier sales 
• Dedicated Sales, SEs, Marketing, 
Engineering, Product Mgmt 
Market leadership 
• #1 in DNS Caching; First DNS Firewall 
• Competition in decline 
IPO April 2012 NYSE (BLOX) 
$225M Revenue; $2B Market Cap 
Total Revenue 
(Fiscal Year Ending July 31) 
$35.0 
$56.0 
$61.7 
$102.2 
$132.8 
$169.2 
$225.0 
$250 
$200 
$150 
$100 
$50 
$0 
FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013
The Problem 
DNS is one of the 
fastest growing 
attack vectors 
4 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
Traditional 
protection is 
ineffective against 
evolving threats 
DNS outage causes 
network downtime, 
loss of revenue, 
and negative 
brand impact 
Unprotected DNS infrastructure introduces security risks
DNS Hijackings: 2013 & 2014 
5 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
How DNS DDoS is Becoming Easier 
Attack Apps Being Built 
• DDoS attacks against major 
U.S. financial institutions 
• Launching (DDoS) 
taking advantage of 
server bandwidth 
• 4 types of DDoS attacks: 
̶ DNS amplification 
̶ Spoofed SYN 
̶ Spoofed UDP 
̶ HTTP+ proxy support 
• Script offered for $600-800 
6 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
Malware/APT Requires DNS 
Every step of malware life cycle relies on DNS 
Infection Download Exfiltration 
7 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
DNS server 
Query a 
malicious 
domain 
Query the 
‘call home server’ Query 
Exfiltration 
destinations
The Rising Tide of DNS Threats 
Are You Prepared? 
8 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
The bottom line is 
“Organizations should invest in 
protecting their DNS infrastructure.” 
– Gartner5 
5. Leverage Your Network Design to Mitigate DDoS Attacks, Report ID G00253330, Gartner, July 2013
Advanced DNS Protection: 
Defend Against DNS Attacks 
Protection against the Widest Range of DNS Attacks 
Threat Adapt Technology 
9 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
• Intelligently defends against widest range of attacks to 
ensure secure, resilient, and trustworthy DNS services 
• Blocks attacks while continuing to respond to legitimate 
DNS requests 
• Continuously adapts to evolving threats; automatically 
updates protection without patching or downtime 
• Uses latest threat intelligence from analysis and research, 
and new threats seen in customer networks 
• Morphs protection to reflect DNS configuration changes 
Quick Deployment 
• Deploys easily and runs in any environment 
• Immediately starts blocking attacks—even if an attack 
is already in progress
Infoblox Differentiation and Value 
Infoblox Advanced 
DNS Protection 
10 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
Load 
Balancers 
Pure 
DDoS 
Next-gen 
Firewalls 
IPS Cloud 
Dedicated compute for 
threat mitigation 
General DDoS 
DNS DDoS 
DNS amplification 
DNS reflection 
DNS server OS and 
application vulnerabilities 
DNS semantic attacks 
Cache poisoning 
DNS tunneling 
DNS hijacking 
Volumetric/DDoS Attacks 
DNS-specific Exploits
DNS Protection is Not Just About DDoS 
DNS reflection/DrDoS attacks 
11 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
Using third-party DNS servers (mostly open resolvers) to propagate 
a DoS or DDoS attack 
DNS amplification 
Using a specially crafted query to create an amplified response to 
flood the victim with traffic 
TCP/UDP/ICMP floods 
Denial of service on layer 3 or 4 by bringing a network or service down 
by flooding it with large amounts of traffic 
DNS-based exploits Attacks that exploit bugs or vulnerabilities in the DNS software 
DNS cache poisoning Corruption of DNS server cache data with a rogue domain or IP 
Protocol anomalies 
Causing the server to crash by sending malformed DNS packets 
and queries 
Reconnaissance 
Attempts by hackers to get information on the network environment 
before launching a DDoS or other type of attack 
DNS tunneling 
Tunneling of another protocol through DNS port 53 for malware 
insertion and/or data exfiltration 
Volumetric/DDoS Attacks 
DNS hijacking 
Modifying the DNS record settings to point to a rogue DNS 
server or domain 
NXDomain attack 
Attacks that flood DNS server with requests for non-existent domains, 
causing it to send NXDomain (non-existent domain) responses 
Phantom domain attack 
Attacks where a DNS resolver is forced to resolve multiple non-existent 
domains, causing it to consume resources while waiting for responses 
DNS-specific Exploits
12 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
Advanced Appliances - Four Models 
Performance: 
50 000 qps 
143 000 qps 
200 000 qps 
Authoritative & Cache 
HW Protect 
HW Protect 
HW Protect 
Caching / Recursive ONLY 
Done in Hardware 
Advanced Appliances have next-generation programmable processors 
that provide dedicated compute for threat mitigation. 
The appliances offer both AC and DC power supply options. 
13 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
500 000 qps (ADP) 
1 000 000 qps HW Caching & HW Protect
Deployment Options 
14 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
1 
Enterprise 
External 
Authoritative 
Caching & 
Internal 
Service 
Provider 
Caching 
Hosted/Ext. 
Authoritative 
• Advanced appliances PT-1400, 
PT-2200, PT-4000 can be used in 
both authoritative and recursive 
DNS deployments 
• 4030 appliances offer ‘DNS 
Hardware Cache Acceleration’ 
for Caching/Recursive and offer 
protection against attacks on 
caching servers
DNS Caching 
Protection against Attacks on DNS Caching Servers 
Data Center 
GRID Master 
and Candidate (HA) 
INTERNET 
Advanced DNS Protection can secure the DNS Caching layer against internal or 
15 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
externally generated threats 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
- Data Center, 
- Disaster recovery site(s) 
Endpoints 
IB-4030 + Advanced 
DNS Protection 
IB-4030 + Advanced 
DNS Protection
DNS Caching 
Protection against attacks on caching servers 
• Large number of bots make more requests of the DNS server than it can handle 
• Causes the DNS server to drop inbound DNS requests 
Advanced DNS Protection can secure DNS Caching Servers from DNS Floods 
16 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
and other threats
Internal DNS (Service Provider IT) 
Protection against Internal Attacks on Recursive Servers 
Advanced DNS Protection can secure internal DNS environments where internal 
17 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
user traffic is hostile 
Data Center 
GRID Master 
and Candidate (HA) 
INTRANET 
- Campus office 
- Regional office(s) 
- Disaster recovery site(s) 
Endpoints 
Advanced DNS 
Protection 
Advanced DNS 
Protection
Secure DNS Deployment 
18 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
Centralized Visibility: Reporting 
Intelligence Needed to Take Action 
• Attack details by category, member, rule, severity, and time 
• Visibility into source of attacks for blocking, to understand scope and severity 
• Early identification and isolation of issues for corrective action 
19 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
20 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AA2llll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
0 
© 2013 Infoblox Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
SIEM / Syslog LOGGING 
• Threat Protection events are logged to syslog using 
CEF format 
e.g 
2014-09-05T03:24:59+00:00 daemon (none) threat-protect-log[5986]: err 
CEF:0|Infoblox|NIOS Threat|6.10.0- 
225023|5053001|Blacklist:abc.com|7|src=10.32.2.52 spt=45242 
dst=10.35.1.98 dpt=53 act="DROP" cat="BLACKLIST FQDN lookup UDP" 
- Syslog severity: Error (Corresponds to rule severity “Major”) 
- Device product: NIOS Threat 
- NIOS version: 6.10.0-225023 
- Rule ID: 5053001 
- Rule name: Blacklist:abc.com 
- CEF Severity: 7 
- Source IP address: 10.32.2.52 
- Source Port: 45242 
- Destination IP address: 10.35.1.98 
- Destination port: 53 
- Action: Drop 
- Rule category: Blacklist FQDN lookup UDP 
20
21 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
Co NOWEGO?
Monitor mode 
• What is it? 
̶ This is like the ‘what-if’ mode where the product will function by 
generating logs and dashboard to drop the packets that are malicious 
and will trigger attack detection. However, it will not actually drop any 
packets. So the result is as if the box is put in the monitor only mode. 
̶ Caution: There is no actual mitigation for the attack. This is Passive 
mode more/less like IDS. 
22 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
4030 & PT-xxxx: NIC Failover 
• Problem to be solved 
̶ Provides port level protection on IB-4030/PT appliances 
• Feature Description 
̶ Allows user configure LAN1 and LAN2 in ACTIVE-PASSIVE mode: 
- Provides port-level (layer-2) redundancy between LAN1 and LAN2 ports on 
appliances. 
- If a link to one of the ports fails, the appliance will fail over to the other port, 
avoiding a service disruption. 
• Benefit 
̶ Improves the overall product resiliency 
23 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
High Availability Failover (VRRP) for 4030 & ADP 
24 © 2013 Infoblox | © 20 124 I0nfo1bl3ox IInnIccn.. AAflloll RRbiigghhlottss xRRee ssIeenrrvveecdd... All 
2
Nxdomain - Rate limiting 
• What is it? 
̶ There are attacks that cause the DNS servers in recursion mode to 
be overwhelmed due to the need to do NXdomain for non existent 
domain requests generated by the attacker. 
̶ If a client has generated a large number of Nxdomain responses, we 
block requests coming from that particular client for a configurable 
period of time. 
• How can NXdomain rate limiting help? 
̶ Clients generating this response are blocked so other legit DNS 
queries are addressed. 
̶ Rate limiting on the NXdomain can prevent the outbound WAN 
bandwidth choke in case the server is being used as an attacker. 
25 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
Black listed domain names 
• What are black list domains? 
̶ Independently, Infoblox research team that writes the threat rules receives Peta bytes 
of traffic from various tap ports from different geo locations mine this data to figure out 
the bad/phantom domains that showed symptoms of these types of attacks. 
̶ As a result of this effort, we are updating Threat rules ruleset with these newly 
identified bad domains. 
• From customer's perspective 
̶ All you need is to keep the subscription updates ON. This will automatically add new 
domains to the rule set. 
26 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
DNS Integrity: Check 
• What it is? 
̶ Provides a way to check parent name servers to ensure that domains are not 
hijacked ensuring DNS integrity. 
• Where it is application 
̶ This is a feature that is useful for all our authoritative DNS server use cases. 
̶ This feature applies to authoritative servers and only checks for top level 
domains (TLDs). 
• Notification provided by 
̶ Syslog 
̶ Email notification 
̶ SNMP notification 
̶ Dashboard 
27 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
DNS Integrity: Types of alerts 
• There may be different types of discrepancies between the parent and 
the authoritative NS RRs. They could be of type: 
̶ CRITICAL- Where the authoritative and the delegated NS RRsets are completely 
disjoint (the New York Times attack use case). Disjoint set- {A} {D} 
̶ SEVERE- Authoritative and delegated NS RRsets overlap but are different. (This is a 
use case of partial compromise or honest mistake of broken delegation.) Slight 
overlap- {A {overlap} D} 
̶ WARNING- Authoritative NS RRset is a subset of the delegated RRset. (Possibility of 
someone adding the wrong IP address to the list at the registrar) A as a subset of D- 
{D(A)} 
̶ INFORMATIONAL- Delegated NS RRset is a subset of the authoritative RRset. (Use 
case where there is a delay in registration.) D as a subset of A- {A(D)} 
28 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
Czas na opowieść 
29 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
http://mlpeters.com
For Whom the Bell Tolls? 
• Support ticket for DNS under stress? 
• Name of the company in the news  
• Compliance requirements? 
̶ Finance and Banking! 
• Insurance & Risk 
30 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
If not ADP - Options Today? 
• Over provisioning infrastructure 
̶ Costly, in-efficient 
• Put an IPS device or a next-gen firewall in front of DNS 
server 
̶ +1 point of failure, turning on so many services is compute 
intensive 
̶ No deep understanding of DNS protocol 
̶ No deep DNS specific attack coverage 
• Cloud based solutions 
̶ Basic rate limiting, focused on volumetric attacks 
̶ Privacy concerns (and data mining concerns) 
̶ Latency 
31 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
A jaka będzie twoja 
32 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
historia? 
http://mlpeters.com
Zapraszam na sesję o DNSSEC. 
Wtorek: 
33 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
Plotki w sieci. 
Czyli gdzie warto zajrzeć? 
34 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
DNS Security Risk Assessment 
1. Analyzes an organization’s DNS setup to assess level of risk of exposure to 
DNS threats 
2. Provides DNS Security Risk Score and analysis based on answers given 
3. www.infoblox.com/dnssecurityscore 
Higher the score, higher the DNS Security Risk!! 
35 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
Best Practices Poster 
http://www.infoblox.com/downloads/resources/securing-dns-best-practices 
36 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
37 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
Videos 
38 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
• Advanced DNS Protection Demo 
• Provide technical validation – 
show what UI looks like before 
and during simulated attacks, 
• Show fine-tuning capabilities and 
reports 
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mg6jC7ljtnw 
• Executive Video 
• Provide technical validation – 
show that Advanced DNS 
Protection responds to all of the 
“good” DNS queries even under 
attack, while BIND and Microsoft 
get overwhelmed 
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PR6Sv-buoP8
39 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 
Q&A

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PLNOG 13: Adam Obszyński: Case Study – Infoblox Advanced DNS Protection

  • 1. Infoblox Advanced DNS Protection Case Study Adam Obszyński | CEE SE PLNOG13 2014.09.29 1 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 2. Agenda 1 DNS in the news 2 DNS: How to prepare? 3 ADP What’s new? 4 ADP Stories 2 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 3. Infoblox and Service Providers Dedicated SP product line • Leads Industry with >1M DNS qps and Advanced DDoS protection • Carrier-grade solution adopted at major Tier 1 providers 220+ Service Providers; 55,000+ systems shipped; 7000+ Enterprises 3 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 3 Dedicated SP Business Unit • EVP from Juniper, Cisco carrier sales • Dedicated Sales, SEs, Marketing, Engineering, Product Mgmt Market leadership • #1 in DNS Caching; First DNS Firewall • Competition in decline IPO April 2012 NYSE (BLOX) $225M Revenue; $2B Market Cap Total Revenue (Fiscal Year Ending July 31) $35.0 $56.0 $61.7 $102.2 $132.8 $169.2 $225.0 $250 $200 $150 $100 $50 $0 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013
  • 4. The Problem DNS is one of the fastest growing attack vectors 4 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. Traditional protection is ineffective against evolving threats DNS outage causes network downtime, loss of revenue, and negative brand impact Unprotected DNS infrastructure introduces security risks
  • 5. DNS Hijackings: 2013 & 2014 5 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 6. How DNS DDoS is Becoming Easier Attack Apps Being Built • DDoS attacks against major U.S. financial institutions • Launching (DDoS) taking advantage of server bandwidth • 4 types of DDoS attacks: ̶ DNS amplification ̶ Spoofed SYN ̶ Spoofed UDP ̶ HTTP+ proxy support • Script offered for $600-800 6 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 7. Malware/APT Requires DNS Every step of malware life cycle relies on DNS Infection Download Exfiltration 7 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. DNS server Query a malicious domain Query the ‘call home server’ Query Exfiltration destinations
  • 8. The Rising Tide of DNS Threats Are You Prepared? 8 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. The bottom line is “Organizations should invest in protecting their DNS infrastructure.” – Gartner5 5. Leverage Your Network Design to Mitigate DDoS Attacks, Report ID G00253330, Gartner, July 2013
  • 9. Advanced DNS Protection: Defend Against DNS Attacks Protection against the Widest Range of DNS Attacks Threat Adapt Technology 9 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. • Intelligently defends against widest range of attacks to ensure secure, resilient, and trustworthy DNS services • Blocks attacks while continuing to respond to legitimate DNS requests • Continuously adapts to evolving threats; automatically updates protection without patching or downtime • Uses latest threat intelligence from analysis and research, and new threats seen in customer networks • Morphs protection to reflect DNS configuration changes Quick Deployment • Deploys easily and runs in any environment • Immediately starts blocking attacks—even if an attack is already in progress
  • 10. Infoblox Differentiation and Value Infoblox Advanced DNS Protection 10 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. Load Balancers Pure DDoS Next-gen Firewalls IPS Cloud Dedicated compute for threat mitigation General DDoS DNS DDoS DNS amplification DNS reflection DNS server OS and application vulnerabilities DNS semantic attacks Cache poisoning DNS tunneling DNS hijacking Volumetric/DDoS Attacks DNS-specific Exploits
  • 11. DNS Protection is Not Just About DDoS DNS reflection/DrDoS attacks 11 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. Using third-party DNS servers (mostly open resolvers) to propagate a DoS or DDoS attack DNS amplification Using a specially crafted query to create an amplified response to flood the victim with traffic TCP/UDP/ICMP floods Denial of service on layer 3 or 4 by bringing a network or service down by flooding it with large amounts of traffic DNS-based exploits Attacks that exploit bugs or vulnerabilities in the DNS software DNS cache poisoning Corruption of DNS server cache data with a rogue domain or IP Protocol anomalies Causing the server to crash by sending malformed DNS packets and queries Reconnaissance Attempts by hackers to get information on the network environment before launching a DDoS or other type of attack DNS tunneling Tunneling of another protocol through DNS port 53 for malware insertion and/or data exfiltration Volumetric/DDoS Attacks DNS hijacking Modifying the DNS record settings to point to a rogue DNS server or domain NXDomain attack Attacks that flood DNS server with requests for non-existent domains, causing it to send NXDomain (non-existent domain) responses Phantom domain attack Attacks where a DNS resolver is forced to resolve multiple non-existent domains, causing it to consume resources while waiting for responses DNS-specific Exploits
  • 12. 12 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 13. Advanced Appliances - Four Models Performance: 50 000 qps 143 000 qps 200 000 qps Authoritative & Cache HW Protect HW Protect HW Protect Caching / Recursive ONLY Done in Hardware Advanced Appliances have next-generation programmable processors that provide dedicated compute for threat mitigation. The appliances offer both AC and DC power supply options. 13 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 500 000 qps (ADP) 1 000 000 qps HW Caching & HW Protect
  • 14. Deployment Options 14 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 1 Enterprise External Authoritative Caching & Internal Service Provider Caching Hosted/Ext. Authoritative • Advanced appliances PT-1400, PT-2200, PT-4000 can be used in both authoritative and recursive DNS deployments • 4030 appliances offer ‘DNS Hardware Cache Acceleration’ for Caching/Recursive and offer protection against attacks on caching servers
  • 15. DNS Caching Protection against Attacks on DNS Caching Servers Data Center GRID Master and Candidate (HA) INTERNET Advanced DNS Protection can secure the DNS Caching layer against internal or 15 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. externally generated threats INFRASTRUCTURE - Data Center, - Disaster recovery site(s) Endpoints IB-4030 + Advanced DNS Protection IB-4030 + Advanced DNS Protection
  • 16. DNS Caching Protection against attacks on caching servers • Large number of bots make more requests of the DNS server than it can handle • Causes the DNS server to drop inbound DNS requests Advanced DNS Protection can secure DNS Caching Servers from DNS Floods 16 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. and other threats
  • 17. Internal DNS (Service Provider IT) Protection against Internal Attacks on Recursive Servers Advanced DNS Protection can secure internal DNS environments where internal 17 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. user traffic is hostile Data Center GRID Master and Candidate (HA) INTRANET - Campus office - Regional office(s) - Disaster recovery site(s) Endpoints Advanced DNS Protection Advanced DNS Protection
  • 18. Secure DNS Deployment 18 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 19. Centralized Visibility: Reporting Intelligence Needed to Take Action • Attack details by category, member, rule, severity, and time • Visibility into source of attacks for blocking, to understand scope and severity • Early identification and isolation of issues for corrective action 19 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 20. 20 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AA2llll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. 0 © 2013 Infoblox Inc. All Rights Reserved. SIEM / Syslog LOGGING • Threat Protection events are logged to syslog using CEF format e.g 2014-09-05T03:24:59+00:00 daemon (none) threat-protect-log[5986]: err CEF:0|Infoblox|NIOS Threat|6.10.0- 225023|5053001|Blacklist:abc.com|7|src=10.32.2.52 spt=45242 dst=10.35.1.98 dpt=53 act="DROP" cat="BLACKLIST FQDN lookup UDP" - Syslog severity: Error (Corresponds to rule severity “Major”) - Device product: NIOS Threat - NIOS version: 6.10.0-225023 - Rule ID: 5053001 - Rule name: Blacklist:abc.com - CEF Severity: 7 - Source IP address: 10.32.2.52 - Source Port: 45242 - Destination IP address: 10.35.1.98 - Destination port: 53 - Action: Drop - Rule category: Blacklist FQDN lookup UDP 20
  • 21. 21 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. Co NOWEGO?
  • 22. Monitor mode • What is it? ̶ This is like the ‘what-if’ mode where the product will function by generating logs and dashboard to drop the packets that are malicious and will trigger attack detection. However, it will not actually drop any packets. So the result is as if the box is put in the monitor only mode. ̶ Caution: There is no actual mitigation for the attack. This is Passive mode more/less like IDS. 22 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 23. 4030 & PT-xxxx: NIC Failover • Problem to be solved ̶ Provides port level protection on IB-4030/PT appliances • Feature Description ̶ Allows user configure LAN1 and LAN2 in ACTIVE-PASSIVE mode: - Provides port-level (layer-2) redundancy between LAN1 and LAN2 ports on appliances. - If a link to one of the ports fails, the appliance will fail over to the other port, avoiding a service disruption. • Benefit ̶ Improves the overall product resiliency 23 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 24. High Availability Failover (VRRP) for 4030 & ADP 24 © 2013 Infoblox | © 20 124 I0nfo1bl3ox IInnIccn.. AAflloll RRbiigghhlottss xRRee ssIeenrrvveecdd... All 2
  • 25. Nxdomain - Rate limiting • What is it? ̶ There are attacks that cause the DNS servers in recursion mode to be overwhelmed due to the need to do NXdomain for non existent domain requests generated by the attacker. ̶ If a client has generated a large number of Nxdomain responses, we block requests coming from that particular client for a configurable period of time. • How can NXdomain rate limiting help? ̶ Clients generating this response are blocked so other legit DNS queries are addressed. ̶ Rate limiting on the NXdomain can prevent the outbound WAN bandwidth choke in case the server is being used as an attacker. 25 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 26. Black listed domain names • What are black list domains? ̶ Independently, Infoblox research team that writes the threat rules receives Peta bytes of traffic from various tap ports from different geo locations mine this data to figure out the bad/phantom domains that showed symptoms of these types of attacks. ̶ As a result of this effort, we are updating Threat rules ruleset with these newly identified bad domains. • From customer's perspective ̶ All you need is to keep the subscription updates ON. This will automatically add new domains to the rule set. 26 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 27. DNS Integrity: Check • What it is? ̶ Provides a way to check parent name servers to ensure that domains are not hijacked ensuring DNS integrity. • Where it is application ̶ This is a feature that is useful for all our authoritative DNS server use cases. ̶ This feature applies to authoritative servers and only checks for top level domains (TLDs). • Notification provided by ̶ Syslog ̶ Email notification ̶ SNMP notification ̶ Dashboard 27 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 28. DNS Integrity: Types of alerts • There may be different types of discrepancies between the parent and the authoritative NS RRs. They could be of type: ̶ CRITICAL- Where the authoritative and the delegated NS RRsets are completely disjoint (the New York Times attack use case). Disjoint set- {A} {D} ̶ SEVERE- Authoritative and delegated NS RRsets overlap but are different. (This is a use case of partial compromise or honest mistake of broken delegation.) Slight overlap- {A {overlap} D} ̶ WARNING- Authoritative NS RRset is a subset of the delegated RRset. (Possibility of someone adding the wrong IP address to the list at the registrar) A as a subset of D- {D(A)} ̶ INFORMATIONAL- Delegated NS RRset is a subset of the authoritative RRset. (Use case where there is a delay in registration.) D as a subset of A- {A(D)} 28 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 29. Czas na opowieść 29 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. http://mlpeters.com
  • 30. For Whom the Bell Tolls? • Support ticket for DNS under stress? • Name of the company in the news  • Compliance requirements? ̶ Finance and Banking! • Insurance & Risk 30 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 31. If not ADP - Options Today? • Over provisioning infrastructure ̶ Costly, in-efficient • Put an IPS device or a next-gen firewall in front of DNS server ̶ +1 point of failure, turning on so many services is compute intensive ̶ No deep understanding of DNS protocol ̶ No deep DNS specific attack coverage • Cloud based solutions ̶ Basic rate limiting, focused on volumetric attacks ̶ Privacy concerns (and data mining concerns) ̶ Latency 31 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 32. A jaka będzie twoja 32 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. historia? http://mlpeters.com
  • 33. Zapraszam na sesję o DNSSEC. Wtorek: 33 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 34. Plotki w sieci. Czyli gdzie warto zajrzeć? 34 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 35. DNS Security Risk Assessment 1. Analyzes an organization’s DNS setup to assess level of risk of exposure to DNS threats 2. Provides DNS Security Risk Score and analysis based on answers given 3. www.infoblox.com/dnssecurityscore Higher the score, higher the DNS Security Risk!! 35 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 36. Best Practices Poster http://www.infoblox.com/downloads/resources/securing-dns-best-practices 36 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 37. 37 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd..
  • 38. Videos 38 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. • Advanced DNS Protection Demo • Provide technical validation – show what UI looks like before and during simulated attacks, • Show fine-tuning capabilities and reports • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mg6jC7ljtnw • Executive Video • Provide technical validation – show that Advanced DNS Protection responds to all of the “good” DNS queries even under attack, while BIND and Microsoft get overwhelmed • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PR6Sv-buoP8
  • 39. 39 © 2013 Infoblox | 2014 IInncc.. AAllll RRiigghhttss RReesseerrvveedd.. Q&A