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Penetration testing using open source tools
Agenda
 What is SOA and SOAP communication?
 What are web services?
 Attacker’s approach
Google Hacking
Universal Description Discovery and Integration
(UDDI)
 Exploiting XML parsers
 Error Handling
 Attack simulation Technique & Tools
 Simulating the attack
 Conclusion
What is SOA?
SOA is similar to building blocks.
Conventionally, the components of an
IT industry were tightly rigid, so
implementing change was difficult.
With SOA it is easy to assemble,
easily reconfigurable.
How SOAP communicates?
What is the meaning of web
service? Web service is a server-
oriented system which
operates on server side, and
performs tasks, when it is
called upon by an application.
Web service is registered in a
web service registry, which an
application uses to call
specific service it requires.
A web service is not language
and platform dependent, it
uses XML to communicate
with other services or
application.
Web service in Action
The communication starts
with the user submitting the
data.
1. The application contacts
the UDDI to look up the
service required to perform
this functionality.
UDDI ProviderClient
The UDDI provider creates a binding which associates the message to the service
requested, and its location. The UDDI provider then returns a WSDL file to the
client, which the application completes as a SOAP message.
Web service in Action
The Soap message then gets sent to the
application server which hosts the web
service needed to execute the current
operation.
This is done by binding the details in the
WSDL file from the UDDI.
Web service in Action
Using the SOAP instructions, the
web services can correctly
execute the task according to
the parameters it was given, and
deliver the processed
conversation.
Note: Appending ?wsdl or .wsdl reveals the wsdl file.
http://172.16.125.233/HacmeBank_v2_WS/Install/Install.asmx?WSDL
Attacker’s approach
 Google hacking
Filetype: wsdl
Indexof “wsdl”
Inurl: wsdl
Inurl: asmx (note that asmx is the WSDL equivalent
in ASP.net)
 UDDI (Universal Description and Integration):
This provides a centralized repository of web
services and their wsdl files. Service providers often
post their details using public UDDI’s to discover at
run time.
Web Application v/s Web services
WEB APPLICATION WEB SERVICES
1. XSS
2. SQL Injection
3. Malicious File execution
4. Broken Authentication and Session
Management
5. Insecure Direct Object References
6. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
7. Insecure Cryptographic Storage
8. Failure to Restrict URL Access
And many more…..
1. Almost all the attacks that are
applicable to web application.
2. Xpath/XML Injection
3. LDAP Injection
4. Exploiting XML parsers
5. Brute forcing
Exploiting XML parser
Document Object Model SAX
Buffer overflow XML Injection
Error handling
 Uncaught exceptions within application
logic are caught at the SOAP engine
and displayed as a SOAP fault element.
Defense
○ Ensure all exceptions caught are generic error
messages returned with SOAP responses.
○ Suppress exception details from being
included in the fault element.
Attack simulation Technique and
Tools
 Foot printing
Discovering the existence of some services relevant
to the target.
Discovering the entry points to those respective
services.
○ Techniques based on the UBR (Universal Business
Register) and UDDI will work
○ WSDL scanning and schema poisoning
○ Discovery of .wsdl, .jws, .aspx
 Tool: wspawn – It does footprint via the UBR(UDDI) inquire
API’s. It also does discovery based protocol.
Enumeration
○ Service Information
○ Port type information
○ Operation information
Simulating the attack
DEMO
Other tools
 Commercial Tools:
WebInspect
WSID4ID (Web services interface Definition
for intrusion Defense)
Conclusion
 We can now attack web services 
Any Questions ??
WCF Services/Security

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SOA Architecture & SOAP Protocol Architecture Detail & Attack Vector

  • 1. Penetration testing using open source tools
  • 2. Agenda  What is SOA and SOAP communication?  What are web services?  Attacker’s approach Google Hacking Universal Description Discovery and Integration (UDDI)  Exploiting XML parsers  Error Handling  Attack simulation Technique & Tools  Simulating the attack  Conclusion
  • 3. What is SOA? SOA is similar to building blocks. Conventionally, the components of an IT industry were tightly rigid, so implementing change was difficult. With SOA it is easy to assemble, easily reconfigurable.
  • 5. What is the meaning of web service? Web service is a server- oriented system which operates on server side, and performs tasks, when it is called upon by an application. Web service is registered in a web service registry, which an application uses to call specific service it requires. A web service is not language and platform dependent, it uses XML to communicate with other services or application.
  • 6. Web service in Action The communication starts with the user submitting the data. 1. The application contacts the UDDI to look up the service required to perform this functionality. UDDI ProviderClient The UDDI provider creates a binding which associates the message to the service requested, and its location. The UDDI provider then returns a WSDL file to the client, which the application completes as a SOAP message.
  • 7. Web service in Action The Soap message then gets sent to the application server which hosts the web service needed to execute the current operation. This is done by binding the details in the WSDL file from the UDDI.
  • 8. Web service in Action Using the SOAP instructions, the web services can correctly execute the task according to the parameters it was given, and deliver the processed conversation. Note: Appending ?wsdl or .wsdl reveals the wsdl file. http://172.16.125.233/HacmeBank_v2_WS/Install/Install.asmx?WSDL
  • 9. Attacker’s approach  Google hacking Filetype: wsdl Indexof “wsdl” Inurl: wsdl Inurl: asmx (note that asmx is the WSDL equivalent in ASP.net)  UDDI (Universal Description and Integration): This provides a centralized repository of web services and their wsdl files. Service providers often post their details using public UDDI’s to discover at run time.
  • 10. Web Application v/s Web services WEB APPLICATION WEB SERVICES 1. XSS 2. SQL Injection 3. Malicious File execution 4. Broken Authentication and Session Management 5. Insecure Direct Object References 6. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 7. Insecure Cryptographic Storage 8. Failure to Restrict URL Access And many more….. 1. Almost all the attacks that are applicable to web application. 2. Xpath/XML Injection 3. LDAP Injection 4. Exploiting XML parsers 5. Brute forcing
  • 11. Exploiting XML parser Document Object Model SAX Buffer overflow XML Injection
  • 12. Error handling  Uncaught exceptions within application logic are caught at the SOAP engine and displayed as a SOAP fault element. Defense ○ Ensure all exceptions caught are generic error messages returned with SOAP responses. ○ Suppress exception details from being included in the fault element.
  • 13. Attack simulation Technique and Tools  Foot printing Discovering the existence of some services relevant to the target. Discovering the entry points to those respective services. ○ Techniques based on the UBR (Universal Business Register) and UDDI will work ○ WSDL scanning and schema poisoning ○ Discovery of .wsdl, .jws, .aspx  Tool: wspawn – It does footprint via the UBR(UDDI) inquire API’s. It also does discovery based protocol. Enumeration ○ Service Information ○ Port type information ○ Operation information
  • 15. Other tools  Commercial Tools: WebInspect WSID4ID (Web services interface Definition for intrusion Defense)
  • 16. Conclusion  We can now attack web services 

Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. DOM based parsers load the entire XML stream into the memory creating a hierarchical object that is referenced within the app logic. Obvious attack vector is inputting large XML files to consume server-side resources during parsing, resulting in DOS attack. SAX based parsers are not susceptible to the Denial of Service attacks. Because SAX based parsers are event driven, they parse the XML stream as needed, thus holding a maximum of 2 elements in memory at given time. They are susceptible to XML injection