1. Volume II, Issues 9-10
Volume III, Issue 1
Michigan
Journal
Political Science
of
The

2. Editor’s Note:
We are excited to present this edition of the Michigan
Journal of Political Science, which includes: Volume II,
Issue 9, Volume II, Issue 10, and Volume III Issues 1.
For nearly thirty years, MJPS has encouraged and
supported undergraduate research within the field of
political science by providing a professional outlet
through which undergraduate scholars can have their
work published. The Michigan Journal of Political
Science has always been known for the high quality of
work that it publishes and this edition stands as another
important addition to that legacy.
Included in this edition are ten outstanding works
from undergraduate scholars all over the world. The
topics of these papers vary widely but all contribute
important research and perspectives to topics that
political science scholars continue to address. Also
included in this edition are five book reviews authored
by Editors of the Journal, providing insight into the
literature currently influencing the field of political
science.
This edition of the Michigan Journal of Political
Science has been a long time coming but arrives at an
important time, as we are about celebrate our 30th
Anniversary. In many ways, it showcases just how
much the Journal has grown as well as the interest and
quality of undergraduate research in political science.
We would like to thank all of the authors published in
this edition of the Journal for their hard work and
dedication to excellence. Also, we owe much gratitude
for the support of the Department of Political Science at
the University of Michigan. In particular, we would like
to thank Lili Kivisto and Professor Chuck Shipan who
have been invaluable resources in this process. MJPS
continues to be extremely grateful for the support of the
Grace Family whose contributions allow us to maintain
our standard of excellence. Finally, this edition of the
Journal would not have been possible without the
enthusiasm, intelligence and dedication of our editorial
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Editors, and it is they who inspire us to continue on the
work of the Journal, even when the load may seem
overwhelming. We hope you enjoy this edition of the
Journal, may it bring you new knowledge, new
questions, and new perspectives.
Taylor Johnson and Jonathan Hill
Editors-in-Chief
VOLUME II – ISSUE 9: SPRING 2009
ARTICLES
Gun Policy in the USA and Canada: The Impact of
Political Institutions on Bill C-68 and Brady’s Bill
Nick Banerd
Russian Women’s Movements: Freedom,
Progression, and Demise, 1867-1881
Alexis Zimberg
Are Smart People More Trusting? The Relationship
between Political Sophistication and Political Trust
Thomas Cameron
The Utilization of Earmarks in the United States
House of Representatives
Nicholas Lillios
BOOK REVIEW
Review of Bob Woodward’s The War Within: A
Secret White House History: 2006-2008

3. VOLUME II – ISSUE 10: FALL 2009
ARTICLES
Bread an Sheep: Argentina's Falklands Crisis in
Comparative Perspective
Lora Elizabeth MacDonald
The Potential of Title I Funding
Michael Paul Toomey
Hugging with Tactical Arms: What Motivates
China to Export Weapons?
Meredith Lauren Blank
VOLUME III – ISSUE 1: SPRING 2010
ARTICLES
Education, Income, and Poverty: The Long-Term
Impact of Abortion
Allison Davido
The Political Economy of Food: A Persepctive on
the Strategies Employed by Asian Countries to
Enhance National Food Security
Tan Wen Qi
Italian Center-Right Parties and Immigrations: A
Political Patronage Approach
Tommaso Pavone
BOOK REVIEWS
A Review of Why David Sometimes Wins:
Leadership, Organization and Strategy in the
California Farm Worker Movement by Marshall
Ganz
Review by Justin Erickson
A Review of The Philosophers’ Quarrel by Robert
Zaretsky and John T. Scott
Review by Micah Akueze

4. THE MICHIGAN JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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Copyright: Michigan Journal of Political Science (ISSN 0733-4486)
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Editors-in-Chief:
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Jonathan Hill
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Associate Editors:
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Justin Erickson
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Elizabeth Robinson
Gabriel Tourek
Jack Warner

5. VOLUME II ISSUE 9
SPRING 2009

6. EVALUATING GUN POLICY IN THE USA AND CANADA: THE IMPACT OF
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ON BILL C-68 AND BRADY’S BILL
Nick Banerd
University of British Columbia
Abstract
As Seymour Lipset argues, “Canada and the United States probably resemble each other more than any other two
nations on earth.”1
The two countries share a similar history, a parallel ethnic and religious makeup, a nine thousand
kilometer border, and what some historians call a “frontier culture.”2
Canada, however, has adopted dramatically
stricter gun control laws; while the United States has maintained lax regulation and a veritable ‘gun culture.’ Canada
has enacted tough legislation banning handguns, establishing age restrictions for possession, and calling for
universal registration of all firearms, while the United States has not. This essay will compare two significant pieces
of national gun control legislation, Canada’s Bill C-68 and the American Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
(Brady’s Bill) while examining the legislative process of passing both. It will argue that political institutions are
primarily responsible for the divergent firearms policies. While Canadian politicians have been able to pass
legislation through centralized parliamentary majorities, decentralized and fractured American institutions based on
checks and balances have maintained the unregulated status quo. In America, Brady’s Bill has encountered a
number of institutional veto points that have repeatedly blocked or watered down its provisions. In Canada the
absence of key veto points has allowed partisan ambitions and strong party discipline to expedite the passage of the
much stricter Bill C-68. Thus, notwithstanding similar public views regarding gun control, the disparate firearms
regimes can be directly traced to divergent institutional setups in the two countries, as well as the presence or
absence of critical veto points within the legislative process.
1: The Gun Control Puzzle
As firearms-related deaths have consistently made up the largest portion of homicides in
both countries, both the United States and Canada have faced pressures to curb gun proliferation.
Death rates among 15-24 year olds in the US had increased dramatically from lows in the mid
1980’s (7-8 deaths per 100,000 people) to highs of 18-19 deaths per 100,000 in 1993 and 1994.3
In Canada, rates of violent crime roughly paralleled the US, with 80% of Canadians reporting in
1995 that in their opinion crime had increased “a great deal” (45%) or “somewhat” (35%) over
the past ten years.4
Numerous high-profile gun crimes had occurred in Canada, such as the
shooting of fourteen women at Montreal’s Ecole Polytechnique in 1989 and the Concordia
University massacre, which killed four students in 1992. In the United States, shootings at the
University of Iowa in 1991 and the 101 California Street shootings two years later in San
Francisco sparked public outcry. Both governments contemplated gun control measures in the
mid 1990’s: in Canada, increased regulations would expand on an already strict gun control
regime, while in the United States, controls would tighten what has always been a loose
framework of gun control.
1
Seymour M Lipset. 1985. “Canada and the United States: The cultural dimension.” In the American Assembly,
Canada and the United States: Enduring Friendship, Persistent Stress. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice
Hall), p.109
2
Gary Mauser and Michael Margolis. 1992. “The Politics of Gun Control: Comparing Canadian and American
Patterns,” Government and Policy, Vol 10, p. 189
3
FBI: Uniform Crime Report data for 1997 http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/gun_violence/sect01.html Accessed March
12, 2008
4
Mauser, Gary. 1998. “The Politics of Firearms Registration in Canada,” Journal on Firearms & Public Policy, Vol.
10 http://www.saf.org/JFPP10ch1.htm, p. 10

7. Canada has a long history of firearms control. The first regulations were established
within the Criminal Code of Canada in 1892. Owners of pistols were obliged to obtain
government permits, and handgun vendors were required to keep detailed client records. In 1969,
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s government passed Bill C-150, which established the strict
categorization of firearms and prohibited all fully and semi-automatic rifles as well as many
types of handguns.5
In 1991, restrictions were again tightened under Bill C-17; new firearms
owners were obliged to take a gun safety course and submit themselves to a criminal background
check.6
Under the bill, gun buyers obtained Firearms Acquisition Certificates after a 28-day
application process.7
The latest and perhaps most controversial gun law was Bill C-68 passed in
1995 under Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. The bill stipulated new, harsher penalties for
gun crimes, a licensing program for acquiring and possessing firearms, and the registration of all
firearms within Canada’s borders. This paper will focus on the passage and enactment of this
latest bill, which was arguably Canada’s most radical and restrictive gun law.
In the US, the gun control regime has been relatively muted. In 1968, Congress passed
the Gun Control Act as its first attempt to promulgate gun control. This legislation regulated
interstate commerce in firearms and prohibited possession by convicted criminals, illegal aliens,
and fugitives. Many provisions of the act were overturned in 1986 by the Firearm Owners
Protection Act, which sought to ensure safe provision to gun owners traveling across state
borders. This paper will also focus on the Brady Handgun Prevention Act, or Brady’s Bill, which
was introduced in Congress in 1987. Brady’s Bill required a mandatory five-day waiting period
and a criminal background check before one could purchase a gun. The legislation was
repeatedly defeated until President Clinton publicly voiced his support for the bill and succeeded
in ushering its passage in Congress—six full years after its original proposal.8
2: Public opinion--A possible explanation
Today, the United States gun laws are notably more lenient than in Canada. More weapons
are prohibited and restricted in Canada, and accessibility to non-prohibited firearms is
significantly more difficult. Scholars have attributed this divergence in policy to differences in
public opinion, as well as to the existence of a ‘gun culture’ in the United States.9
Martin
Friedland argues that “Canadians are more deferential to established authority” and less
supportive of the use of firearms in self defense than Americans,10
and Pierre Berton contrasts
“Canadian abhorrence of violence with the American love of firearms.”11
As such, one might
expect politicians to invoke gun control laws that accurately reflect the general public’s views.
According to the median voter theory, two-party systems such as in the United States lead to a
situation in which parties align themselves very close to the policy preferences of the median
voter. If public opinion on gun control across the countries is so dissimilar, one might conclude
5
Mauser, p. 10
6
ibid, p. 10
7
ibid, p. 10
8
Marc Christopher Cozzolino. 1992. “Gun Control: The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.” Seton Hall
Legislative Journal http://www.saf.org/LawReviews/Cozzolino1.html p. 251-259
9
Richard Hofstadter. 1970. “America as a Gun Culture.” American Heritage.
10
Martin L. Friedman. 1984. A Century of Criminal Justice. (Toronto: Carswell), p. 131-139
11
Pierre Berton. 1982. Why We Act Like Canadians. (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart), p. 30-35

8. that it makes more sense for two completely different regimes to exist, based on divided public
preference.
Gary Mauser and Michael Margolis refute this logic, arguing that Americans and
Canadians share parallel views towards hunting, as well as common traditions of using
recreational firearms. For Mauser and Margolis, rifle and shotgun possession rates remain quite
comparable: 23% in Canada and 32% in the USA.12
Earlier polls (before Canada’s restrictions
under Trudeau) indicate that numbers used to be more similar. Meanwhile, public opinion in
both countries remains supportive of mandatory permits in order to purchase firearms: 85% in
Canada and 82% in the USA.13
Overwhelming majorities in both countries—86% (Canada) and
92% (USA)—agree that storeowners are at least “sometimes justified” in using firearms to
protect themselves from theft.14
Mauser and Margolis therefore conclude, “large majorities in both countries claim to
support what has been termed "moderate" firearms control legislation while supporting the use of
firearms in self defense.”15
Though they admit that differences in public opinion do exist, these
differences are “substantially exaggerated” and it is “improbable that such small differences in
public opinion would be the primary reason for the important differences in national firearms
legislation.”16
Because similarities in public opinion are apparent, one might expect parties in
both countries to support very similar laws, for politicians should reasonably seek to appease the
median voter. This clearly has not been the case, and a solution must be found elsewhere to the
cross-national gun control puzzle.
3: Theory—Political Institutions and Veto Points
For Ellen Immergut, political institutions and their implications on policy are often crucial
in understanding the adoption of contrasting policies. She argues that “the fate of legislative
proposals ...depends on the number and location of opportunities for veto along the political
chain.”17
The passage of legislation in any polity requires “successive affirmative votes at all
decision points.”18
If few veto points exist in the political process, or if vetoes can be
successfully neutralized, the executive branch of government is in a much more favorable
position to pass its legislation. For Immergut, veto points able to effectively block legislation
include the president (executive), the lower house of the legislative branch, the upper house of
the legislative branch, popular referenda, and the country’s constitution through judicial
interpretation. Each of these cases impinges upon a government’s power of “unilateral action—
the probability that the executive will be confirmed at subsequent points of decision.”19
Political systems with low veto point opportunities are those that produce strong,
centralized governments in which the executive is fused to the legislative branch. Parliamentary
12
Mauser and Margolis, p. 194
13
ibid, p. 194
14
ibid, p. 198
15
ibid, p. 195
16
ibid, p. 200
17
Ellen M. Immergut 1992. “The rules of the Game: The logic of Health policy-making in
France, Switzerland, and Sweden,” in Structuring Politics Historical Institutionalism in
Comparative Perspective, eds. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 63
18
ibid, p. 63
19
ibid, p. 65

9. systems that facilitate large party majorities with strong party discipline have few veto points,
especially if the system is unicameral or maintains a weak upper house.20
In contrast,
decentralized, presidential-style systems that uphold a separation of powers have many veto
points. Interests opposed to particular legislation can effectively lobby the legislative branch of
government, especially if it is separate from the executive.21
A strong upper house that is capable
of blocking legislation or forcing amendments can be a second veto point. A president can
emerge as a third veto point against legislation passed by the legislative branch.22
In a decentralized system, veto holders are subject to increased pressures from both
organized interests and constituents. For Immergut, “specific institutional mechanisms structure
the decision making process,”23
and such mechanisms can provide footholds for interest groups
seeking to influence policy.24
Organized interests can effectively lobby veto holders and threaten
to revoke political support or discontinue financial contributions to political campaigns.
Furthermore, constituents adversely affected by legislation are likely to severely punish
politicians that allow its passage.25
Since voters tend to base their vote on issues that impact them
negatively, they hold a negativity bias.26
Veto-holding politicians who seek re-election are
fearful of this negativity bias. Even if they personally support certain legislation, they have
strong incentives to block punitive bills, thereby avoiding blame and dodging possible electoral
retribution. This tendency is not indicative of personal weaknesses or social origins of certain
representatives but rather their rational self-interest and aversion to incurring blame.27
4: Application to Cases
In Canada, the federal political system is vertically centralized, with much power residing
within the executive branch of government comprised of the prime minister and his cabinet. The
Canadian parliamentary system includes few checks and balances, and during periods of
majority governments, the prime minister is given significant leverage. Members of Parliament
(MPs) are subject to strict party discipline that is rigidly enforced; because party leaders control
candidate nominations they can effectively punish MPs who oppose the executive’s bills.
Therefore, a majority leadership can expect passage of most of its platform with ease, and
opposition parties are often powerless to stop legislation. Such a situation occurred in 1993 when
the Liberal Party under Jean Chrétien won a large majority: 177 of 295 seats in the House of
Commons. Because the legislative branch is fused to the executive in Canada, the Liberal Party
was able to easily pass even controversial legislation, such as the National Firearms Act in 1995.
The Act, or Bill C-68, was not initially popular among voters. Critics labeled the bill as a
move to impose “draconian infringements on the traditional rights of Canadians to due
process.”28
The new regulation regime would severely affect gun owners in the country by
“expanding the grounds for warrantless searches, reducing restraints on issuing warrants, and
20
ibid, p. 64-65
21
ibid, p. 64-65
22
ibid, p. 64-65
23
ibid, p. 66
24
ibid, p. 66
25
ibid, p. 66
26
ibid, p. 67
27
ibid, p. 63
28
Mauser, p. 3

10. requiring people to testify against themselves.”29
During the debate on Bill C-17—a gun control
bill implemented only two years prior—Chiefs of Police, the Chair of the Justice Committee, and
the former Justice Minister had all rejected universal firearms registration as ineffective and
unsuitable for Canada.30
Similarly, for Bill C-68, firearms lobbyists argued that many gun
owners would blatantly refuse to comply with the new laws.31
Furthermore, they argued that
stricter controls were not in favor among the public, as most individuals and antigun groups had
been satisfied by C-17. When asked “what do you think should be done about reducing violent
crime,” only 4% of Canadian respondents voiced concerns of gun control. The majority of
respondents favored increasing penalties for criminals and reducing violence on television.32
As
Mauser points out, “there were no public rallies in support of tighter gun laws...but dozens to
oppose Bill C-68 held in almost all of the provinces.”33
A desire to bow to public demands was
clearly not the primary factor that drove the Liberals.
Instead, Mauser argues that the Firearms Act was put forth by the Liberals for “partisan
considerations in order to gain strategic advantage”.34
First, unresolved claims over native land
as well as an increasingly militant Quebec separatist movement were “simmering just under the
surface of Canadian politics…with the potential to erupt into violence.”35
Tighter gun laws and
increased police powers would help quell such potential incidents. Second, Liberal urban
strongholds in Ontario and Quebec were perceived to be threatened by Jean Charest’s
Progressive Conservatives. Promoting a symbolic issue among young urbanites would help
protect Liberal dominance, while those adversely affected would be concentrated in rural
western ridings where Liberal support was already weak. Though party leaders in centralized
political systems are easily attributed with blame, the Liberal government focused on what Kent
Weaver calls “credit-claiming” opportunities of the Bill.36
The Liberals intended to bolster
support within their traditional strongholds, and downplayed potential punishment from voters in
the next election. Due to the nature of Canada’s political institutions and the strength of
dominant parties, the Liberals were able to enact legislation that was aimed towards the party’s
own interests and its particular vision of Canada rather than an accurate translation of public
preference.
Thanks to Chrétien’s support, Justice Minister Allan Rock succeeded in rushing the Act
through Parliament due to the dominance of the large Liberal majority. Though constituents and
lobbyists petitioned their MPs and rallied against the bill,37
there were few veto points that
opponents could effectively target. The Liberal leadership succeeded in subduing dissent within
its own ranks, as “party discipline held defections down to a minimum.”38
However, a significant
number of Liberal MPs still signaled their opposition to the bill, particularly those from the more
conservative flank of the party and those MPs who held rural ridings. Sixty-two of the party’s
MPs from rural areas in Northern Ontario, the Maritimes, and Western Canada voted with the
government, but would likely have defeated the bill had discipline not been enforced. Three
29
ibid, p. 3
30
ibid, p. 8
31
ibid, p. 8
32
ibid, p. 11
33
ibid, p. 11
34
ibid, 12
35
ibid, p. 8
36
Kent Weaver. 1986. "The Politics of Blame Avoidance," Journal of Public Policy, 6,.4: p. 372
37
Mauser, p. 14
38
ibid, p. 5

11. opposition parties—the PCs, the NDP, and the Reform Party—opposed the bill.39
Reform leader
Preston Manning and his colleagues vehemently attacked the legislation in the House of
Commons, but majority conditions prevented a potential veto point in the lower house.
Reformers were unable to halt the bill in the Senate due to the rubber stamp nature of the
institution. Four provincial governments publicly opposed the bill, and later challenged its
constitutionality, but unlike that of the United States, Canada’s Constitution places responsibility
for criminal law firmly in federal jurisdiction.40
Therefore despite significant opposition to the
Bill at many levels, the federal government succeeded in passing its controversial gun control
legislation. In this case, the highly centralized nature of Canadian political institutions effectively
eliminated four of Immergut’s veto points that actors might have invoked in order to block
legislation.
In the United States, one must examine the institutional separation of powers in order to
understand why such different policies emerged for gun control.41
For Robert Singh, “it remains
easier in the US to purchase a handgun license than a driver's license, while firearms are subject
to less stringent safety standards than are many children's toys.”42
However, in the late 1980’s,
proponents of gun control lobby began to gain in political strength and resources. In its attempts
to discourage regulation of plastic guns able to escape detection at airport metal detectors, as
well as in its opposition to bans on armor-piercing ammunition, the National Rifle Association’s
“absolutist stance had already proven too much for many Americans.”43
Meanwhile, in the
House of Representatives, Democrat Edward Feighan introduced “Brady’s Bill,” which would
implement new regulations on firearms including waiting periods and background checks for
prospective gun buyers. The 1987 bill was named after James Brady, a former federal press
secretary who had been permanently disabled in an assassination attempt on Ronald Reagan six
years earlier. The bill was thought to be the most effective way to deter felons attempting to
purchase firearms and was widely supported by the public and gun control groups44
.
The legislation faced a full-fledged onslaught from the NRA, as the powerful lobby group
mobilized its efforts to target specific veto points in the US political process.45
The NRA’s
position contended that any gun control regulation presented a slippery slope which could
eventually lead to a full-scale ban of all firearms.46
It vehemently opposed what it saw as
increasing government intrusion on public liberties, and adamantly lobbied the US President
because of his veto power.47
The Republican administration under Ronald Reagan faced
potential public reprisal if it opposed Brady, but was hesitant to offend the conservative and rural
backbone of the party, many of whom opposed any sort of legislation regulating firearms.
Reagan would contradict his agenda of limiting government if he supported the bill, but his
39
ibid, p. 5
40
ibid, p. 5
41
Leslie Pal. 2003. “Gun Control.” in Leslie A. Pal and R. Kent Weaver (eds.) The Government
Taketh Away: The Politics of Pain in the United States and Canada. pp. 233-262. (Georgetown:
Georgetown University Press)
42
Robert Singh. 1998. "Gun control in America." Political Quarterly 69.3: p. 290
43
ibid, p. 294
44
ibid, p. 294
45
Cozzolino, p.285
46
ibid, p. 285
47
ibid, p. 285

12. opposition might have sparked controversy since the impetus for the bill was his own
assassination attempt. The Reagan administration opposed the bill.48
As Singh admits, “while the preference of public majorities in America is for stronger
gun control, this rarely assumes a priority status in casting their ballots in either federal or state
elections.”49
American political institutions are exceedingly subject to a negativity bias; gun
owners, lobbyists, and manufacturers hold gun control as a salient issue upon which they base
their vote. Politicians seek to avoid blame by vetoing potentially damaging legislation which
consequently leads to the defeat of progressive bills, ensuring the maintenance of the status quo.
Politicians seeking to act upon the general will must face fierce repercussions at the polls, and
few are willing to take this risk. Because US Congressmen are free to vote against the party line,
they are more directly accountable to the electorate and vulnerable to lobbyist pressures than are
Canadian MPs. While in a centralized system, blame is less clearly attributable, credit-claiming
opportunities are also fewer. A well-organized gun lobby was able to publicize the views of anti-
gun politicians who had much to lose and little to gain by supporting the Brady Bill. Since the
gun lobby was so effective and powerful, the discrete nature of a decentralized system could not
protect politicians from blame attribution. When it became clear that the Reagan administration
would veto the bill and Speaker of the House Tom Foley announced his opposition, the Brady
Bill was voted down in Congress and replaced by a lackluster substitute bill.50
Five years later, Bill Clinton was elected on a platform that espoused increased gun
regulation and lent his support to a revived Brady Act. Polls indicated that 70% of Americans
favored stricter gun control measures,51
and most people believed a short waiting period and
background check were reasonable restrictions.52
Threats of executive vetoes under Reagan and
Bush had disappeared. Again, furious debate raged in Congress. Opponents of the law, such as
Republican congressman Ike Skelton, argued that “a waiting period will only hurt law-abiding
citizens, not criminals,”53
and that such measures “would not make one iota of difference in the
crime rates of large cities.”54
The NRA was again able to capitalize on the weak party discipline
in the United States by appealing to rural Democratic Congressmen, convincing them to oppose
a law that would anger their gun-owning constituents. As the gun control lobby fiercely objected
to waiting periods, gun manufacturers worried that such a provision would lead to marked
declines in sales.
Pro-firearms Congressmen introduced an amendment to the bill with a clause that
abolished five day holding periods after 1998.55
By then, a National Instant Check System
(NICS) would be in place providing criminal background checks within a few moments, and gun
buyers would not face such a substantial deterrent. Despite Democratic control of both the House
and Senate, weakly disciplined Democrats again sought to avoid blame and the electoral
ramifications of appearing too liberal. Many Democrats defected and voted for the NICS
provision, significantly diluting the strength of the law.56
Critics of the provision opined that a
48
ibid, p. 285
49
Singh, p. 294
50
ibid, p. 295
51
Robert Singh. 1999. 'Gun Politics in America : Continuity and Change.' Parliamentary Affairs 52 (1) , p. 10
52
Cozzolino
53
ibid, p. 251
54
ibid, p. 251
55
ibid, p. 253
56
ibid, p. 259

13. NICS check would neither deter crimes of passion nor prevent buyers from lying about their
identity.57
After a six-year struggle, the watered-down Brady Law was finally passed in 1993.
In summary, the US government has had significantly more trouble implementing
considerably softer gun control legislation. Although Brady’s Bill passed—albeit as a diluted
version of the original proposal—most attempts at legislating firearms controls have not
experienced even remote success. In fact, the floor of Congress is virtually littered with firearms
legislation that has died throughout the legislative process. For two decades, all but two
significant pieces of gun control legislation survived the rigorous congressional process: Brady’s
Bill and the National Assault Weapons Ban which passed under Clinton in 1994. Like Brady’s
Bill, organized interests targeted politicians, and pro-gun Congressmen forced the attachment of
a sunset clause which stipulated the legislation’s expiration in ten years. In 2004, Senator Dianne
Feinstein proposed a reenactment of Ban, seeking to maintain the prohibition of 57 types of
semi-automatic weapons.58
Feinstein contended that the ban was effectively “drying up supply
and driving up prices,”59
and dwindling supplies had already brought about a significant drop in
assault weapons crime. However, the legislation faced even greater challenges and veto
opportunities than did Brady’s Bill, especially under a Republican President, George W. Bush,
and Republican majorities in both the House and Senate. The bill died quietly in the Senate after
a 90-8 vote.60
Another key institutional difference between the United States and Canada is that gun
rights are protected under the US Constitution, a feature which strengthens the position of the
gun lobby. The Second Amendment states that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, and the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”61
This constitutional right—despite being notably out of date—has deterred antigun
groups in their attempts to push for stricter gun regulation. Unlike Canada, most US gun laws fall
under state jurisdiction as outlined under the Tenth Ammendment’s residual clause: “the powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”62
In 1997, more key provisions of the Brady Bill were shot down by the Supreme
Court in violation of this amendment. While there is no mention of gun rights in the Canada’s
Constitution, the American Constitution remains a formidable impediment to gun control.
5: Alternative Explanations
The influence of the National Rifle Association has been critical to this paper’s assessment
of US firearms law. A skeptical reader might therefore infer that the country’s relatively weak
gun lobby is a plausible alternative explanation for Canada’s strong gun laws. Though Canada
does have firearms advocate groups, such as the National Firearms Association and the Canadian
Shooting Sports Association, these groups hold significantly less political power than their
American counterparts. The US also has a significant arms manufacturing sector, while Canada
does not. One is right to assume that the power of the US gun lobby has played a role in
perpetuating such a weak gun control regime. But for Immergut, “interest group power is not
57
ibid, p. 259
58
Deborah Sontag. 2005. “Assault Weapons Ban comes to an end: A dud?” The New York Times (online)
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/04/24/news/gun.php>
59
ibid
60
ibid
61
2nd
Amendment of The United States Constitution
62
10th
Amendment of The United States Constitution

14. primarily a function of their relative size or wealth, but the nature of the political system.”63
In
Canada, since veto points are much fewer, the gun lobby has often been ineffective at blocking
legislation and has therefore not elicited sufficient support. The same mechanism can be
inverted; since US institutions are so decentralized, gun groups such as the NRA have
successfully been able to target veto points and influence policy, which in turn has bolstered the
NRA’s political clout. Without access to political vetoes, such as in Canada, the influence and
support of gun lobbies is considerably weakened.
Conclusion
This paper contends that political institutions are the primary reason for the quick passage
of Canadian Bill C-68, a harsh piece of legislation with lethargic public support; while the
American Brady’s Bill, a relatively less binding bill with substantial public support, took six
years to pass. Despite a supportive Democratic president and Democratically-controlled
Congress, the bill emerged significantly weakened. This strongly suggests that any stricter gun
control introduced to the US Congress would face unprecedented dissent, holding almost non-
existent chances of passing (especially under a Republican president and Congress). As for Bill
C-68, Canadian political institutions allowed its government to pass a bill that was arguably too
strict for the country. As a result, Prime Minister Steven Harper’s Conservative government has
since invoked an amnesty on registering firearms, and some initial supporters of the registry now
condemn it. Had Canadian political institutions been constructed differently, the quick passage of
such a controversial bill would most likely not have succeeded. The issue of gun control
demonstrates that although political institutions are designed to enact laws reflecting public
opinion, they themselves can often dramatically shape public policy.
63
Immergut, p. 63

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<http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.overview.html>Accessed March 4, 2009