Xrootd proxies Andrew Hanushevsky

1. xrootd Proxies
Andrew Hanushevsky (SLAC)
Middleware Security Group Meeting
5-6 June 2006
http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu
xrootd is largely funded by the US Department of Energy
Contract DE-AC02-76SF00515 with Stanford University

2. Outline
xrootd Architecture Overview
Terms and Concepts
Clustering
Proxies
Single and double firewalls
Proxy clusters for scalability
Security transformations
Conclusions & Acknowledgements
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
2: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

3. xrootd Plugin Architecture
authentication
(gsi, krb5, etc)
Protocol Driver
(XRD)
Protocol (1 of n)
(xrootd)
lfn2pfn
prefix encoding
authorization
(name based)
File System
Storage System
(ofs, sfs, alice, etc)
(oss, drm/srm, etc)
Clustering
(olbd)
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
3: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

4. Acronyms, Entities & Relationships
xrootd
olbd
Control Network
Managers, Supervisors & Servers
(resource info, file location)
Redirectors
olbd
M
Data Network
(redirectors steer clients to data
Data servers provide data)
ctl
xrootd
Data Clients
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
olbd
S
data
xrootd
Data Servers
4: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

5. Cluster Architecture
A manager is an optionally
replicated xrootd/olbd pair
functioning as a root node
Up to 64 servers
or cells can connect
to a manager
Server
A server is an xrootd/olbd
pair leaf node that
delivers data
A cell is 1-to-64 entities (servers or cells)
clustered around a cell manager
called a supervisor
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
5: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

6. Single Level Switch
A
open file X
Redirectors
Cache file
location
2nd open X go to C
open f
ile X
Client
Who has file X?
go to C
Redirector
(Head Node)
I ha
B
ve
C
Data Servers
Cluster
Client sees all servers as xrootd data servers
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
6: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

7. Two Level Switch
Client
oh
Wh
open file X
open
file X
go to C
X?
(Head Node)
go to F
A
Data Servers
I ha
Redirector
open file X
ile
as f
B
ve
?
ile X
sf
o ha
ve
Wh
I ha
C
Supervisor
I ha
(sub-redirector)
D
E
ve
F
Cluster
Client sees all servers as xrootd data servers
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
7: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

8. SLAC Configuration
kan01
kan02
kan03
bbr-olb03
kan04
bbr-olb04
client machines
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
8: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu
kanxx
kanolb-a

9. Extending Access
Easy clustered local access
Everyone sees everyone
Simple configuration
Low human overhead to maintain
Remote access
Difficult because of connection constraints
Want to make it humanly administrable
Critical to minimize cross-domain knowledge
Utilize the peer-to-peer nature of xrootd
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
9: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

10. Proxies I (single firewall)
data01
data02
data03
data04
IN2P3
olbd
2
Firewall
3
proxy xrootd
INDRA
1
client machines
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
10: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

11. Scaling Proxies
Need to provide more than one proxy
Selection criteria for proxies?
Utilize natural rooted clustering
Create proxy clusters
Automatically load balance
No practical limit on number
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
11: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

12. Proxy Clusters (single firewall)
data01
data02
data03
data04
olbd
5
4
proxy server
xrootd
olbd
2
proxy manager
xrootd
1
Firewall
3
client machines
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
12: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

13. Dealing With Lockdowns
Double Firewalls
Reality sets in.
Incoming and outgoing traffic limited
Utilize peer-to-peer nature of rooted
Maintains practical simplicity
Alternative not particularly appealing
Application controlled firewall
LBL and ANL models for gridFTP.
Could use xrootd’s for this as well, though.
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
13: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

14. Proxies II (double firewall, simplified)
data01
data02
olbd
data03
data04
4
3
remote proxy xrootd
2
Firewalls
local proxy xrootd
1
client machines
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
14: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

15. N-to-M Authentication issues
Clusters of proxies on each side
Random server-server connections
Authentication key management issues
Complex because of size and interactions
Would like to simplify key distribution
Use a security transformation
GSI to global session key
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
15: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

16. Scalable Proxy Security
SLAC PROXY
1
RAL PROXY
2
2
Data Servers
Data Servers
3
1 Authenticate & develop session key
2 Distribute session key to authenticated subscribers
3 Servers can log into each other using session key
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
16: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

17. Extending Security Transforms
xrootd protocol allows security transforms
Redirect can pass along a CGI string
Anyone can redirect!
No practical redirect limit.
Allows security framework substitutions
Minimizes GSI intra-cluster overhead
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
17: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

18. Security Transforms
data01
data02
data03
olbd
3
GSI “proxy”
xrootd
data04
4
x-auth
xrootd
1
2
client machines
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
18: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

19. Conclusion
xrootd has a security enabling architecture
Protocol was designed with security in mind
Accommodates security transforms
Server-to-server
Client-server
Very easy to administer
Critical for maintaining security
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
19: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu

20. Acknowledgements
Software collaborators
INFN/Padova: Fabrizio Furano, Alvise Dorigao
Root: Fons Rademakers, Gerri Ganis
Alice: Derek Feichtinger, Guenter Kickinger, Andreas Peters
Cornell: Gregory Sharp
SLAC: Jacek Becla, Tofigh Azemoon, Wilko Kroeger, Bill Weeks
Princeton: Pete Elmer
Operational collaborators
BNL, CNAF, FZK, INFN, IN2P3, RAL, SLAC
MWSG 5-6 June 2006
20: http://xrootd.slac.stanford.edu