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Strong Authentication
        (2FA)

        Michał Sobiegraj, CISSP
            michal@sobiegraj.com
1. Access Control
2. Knowledge
3. Ownership
4. Characteristics
5. 2FA
1/5

  Access Control
1

                Access control
    1. Identification
      – Who you say you are?
    2. Authentication (1)
      – Prove it!
    3. Authorisation (1 & 2 & ACL/Capability List)
      – OK, so here is what you can do.
    4. Accountability (1 & 2 & Audit trail)
      – You are responsible for this!
1

    Identification methods

        •   User ID
        •   Account number
        •   PIN
        •   Badge
        •   Biometrics
1

    Identifier characteristics


    • Unique to each user
    • Not relating to a job function
    • Standardised naming conventions
1

       Authentication

    • Knowledge based
      – Something only you know
    • Ownership based
      – Something only you have
    • Characteristics based
      – Something only you are
1
    Traditional means of identification
            and authentication

     • People knew each other in person
       – They used face recognition
       – Something only you are (biometrics)
     • Internet made it useless
       – More need for proving identity
       – Impossible to know people in person
1

          Authentication


    Each single factor is fairly
      easy to compromise

       Lets use 2 factors!
1
1

    Classic examples of 2FA

    ATM (Automated Teller Machine)
    – Something you have (card)
    – Something you know (PIN)



    Credit card and signature
    – Something you have (card)
    – Something you are (signature)
2/5
      Knowledge
 (Something You Know)
2. Knowledge

                     Password/PIN
  • Free
  • Easy to use
      – People got used to it and understand it
  • The weakest factor
      – Easily guessable/bruteforcable or complex
         • To complex ones get written down
      – One password everywhere or many to remember
         • If there is to many, they get written down
2. Knowledge

               Cognitive password


    •   Series of random personal questions
    •   Takes longer to authenticate
    •   No need to remember a password
    •   Fairly weak if based on personal information
2. Knowledge

                   Passphrase


  • Longer to enter than a password
  • Less susceptible to brute forcing and guessing
  • Still sniff-able and susceptible to key logging
2. Knowledge

                SYK Pros/Cons
  • No need to carry anything
  • Susceptible to classic attacks
     – Key logging
     – Social engineering/shoulder surfing
     – Brute force/dictionary attacks
     – Sniffing and replay attacks
     – IT Staff abuse of privileges
     – Man in the middle attacks

                          http://img.alibaba.com/photo/11475911/KeyShark_Hardware_Keylogger.jpg
                                 http://www.phuketgazette.com/newsimages/bull8282007-5914-4.jpg
2. Knowledge

                SYK Pros/Cons
  • No strong accountability
     – Easily shareable
  • Frequently written down
    in predictable places




                               http://klaatu.anastrophe.com/wp-images/postit.jpg
3/5
      Ownership
  (Something You Have)
3. Ownership

                   PKI Certificate
       • Transfers trust
           – Make sure the signer is trustworthy!
       • Usually server authenticates to the user
           – Mutual authentication may cause significant
             administrative overhead
       • Something not only you have
           – Google: quot;index ofquot; +ovpn
           – Courtesy Aleksander P.
3. Ownership


       One Time Password (OTP) list

        • Session based authentication
        • Valid only once
           – Usually only for a short period of time
        • Not reusable by design
           – Not susceptible to replay attacks
        • A paper list or an electronic generator
3. Ownership
                      Asynchronous token
                         (challenge – response)




           http://www.cc.com.pl/img/vasco/300photo.gif
3. Ownership
                      Asynchronous token
                         (challenge – response)




          Usually requires user to
           retype the challenge
              into the token



           http://www.cc.com.pl/img/vasco/300photo.gif
3. Ownership
                      Asynchronous token
                         (challenge – response)




           http://www.cc.com.pl/img/vasco/300photo.gif
3. Ownership
                      Asynchronous token
                         (challenge – response)




           http://www.cc.com.pl/img/vasco/300photo.gif
3. Ownership
                      Asynchronous token
                         (challenge – response)




           http://www.cc.com.pl/img/vasco/300photo.gif
3. Ownership
                      Asynchronous token
                         (challenge – response)




           http://www.cc.com.pl/img/vasco/300photo.gif
3. Ownership

               Synchronous token
    • Generates a deterministic random-looking
      value every minute/button push
    • The value is cryptographically derived from:
       – The previous value
       – A shared secret known only to a token and to
         an authentication server
       v1 = f(seed, secret); v2 = f(v1, secret); etc.
    • The secret is unrecoverable from the
      token*

                          * With today’s technology
3. Ownership

               Synchronous token
      • Time-based synchronisation
          – De-syncing in time if not used
          – Clock drift is corrected
          – Server accepts neighbouring values
      • Event-based synchronisation
          – Easily de-synced by issuing to many values
            ahead

                                                  http://www.radiocomputerguy.com/images/paypal_token.gif
                                                                     http://admin.avisian.com/images/rsa1.gif
                                                    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:RSA-SecurID-Tokens.jpg
                       http://www.comprosec.ch/fileadmin/images/rsa/securid/SD520_450x297_72dpi_crop.jpg
3. Ownership

               Software tokens


      • Java (J2ME) applets
      • More convenient
      • Easier to reverse engineer
        the secret out




                           http://www.developer.com/img/2006/06/Marcia6.JPG
3. Ownership

          Man in the Middle (MITM)
  • None of the factors solve the MITM problem
  • Insecure connection allows for credentials
    disclosure
      – SSL allows only for a TCP link authentication
3. Ownership

               Phishing case
3. Ownership

               Phishing case
3. Ownership

               Phishing case
3. Ownership

               Phishing case
3. Ownership

               Phishing case
3. Ownership

               Phishing case
3. Ownership

                   Phishing case


          • A customised attack
          • A time-limited OTP is better but still
            not enough
3. Ownership

               Out of band channel


     •   E.g. mobile text messaging (SMS)
     •   Adresses the MITM problem
     •   Allows for mutual end-to-end authentication
     •   Convenient
3. Ownership

               Out of band channel
3. Ownership

               Out of band channel
3. Ownership

               Out of band channel
3. Ownership

               Out of band channel
3. Ownership

               Out of band channel
3. Ownership

               Out of band channel
3. Ownership

               Out of band channel
3. Ownership

                   Memory card
       • Also called a swipe card or a magnetic
         stripe card
       • Equipped with a magnetic stripe
       • Interacts with a reader
       • Stores authentication information
       • Relatively inexpensive
       • Fairly easy to duplicate
           – Harder then a password, though
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/atm-skim1.jpg
3. Ownership

                                                           Smartcard
                        • Interacts through a reader
                        • Contains authentication information
                                – e.g. PKI certificate
                        • Is able to do crypto on-board
                        • Allows for continous authentication
                        • Tamper-proof  solves the duplication
                          problem


http://gallery.hd.org/_exhibits/money/_more2003/_more02/UK-bank-and-credit-cards-smartcard-smartcards-VISA-Mastercard-Nationwide-Barclaycard-Egg-cropped-JR.jpg
3. Ownership




               http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Matkakortti_ja_kortinlukija.jpg
3. Ownership

               Contactless Smartcard

          • Contains an RF transciver (RFID)
          • Works in close proximity to a reader
               – Up to 10cm (ISO 14443)
               – Up to 50cm (ISO 15693)
          • Quick and hands-free
          • Contactless credit card
               – No PIN required
               – Small amounts $5-50
3. Ownership


     Potential issues with smartcards

          • Privacy concerns
               – Contactless smartcards make it
                 possible to track individuals without
                 their knowledge


          • Easy to damage the chip
3. Ownership


                                                 iButton




               http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:1-Wire_lock.jpg
3. Ownership

                    Form factor
           • Feasibly small and convenient
           • Attachable to something you
             usually have with you
               – Key-dongles
               – Wallet size cards
               – Credit-card size tokens
               – Phone applets or a phone itself
3. Ownership

                    SYH Pros/Cons
          • Not susceptible to classic attacks
               –   Key logging
               –   Shoulder surfing
               –   Brute force/dictionary attacks
               –   Sniffing and replay attacks
          • Hinders social engineering attacks
          • Impedes IT Staff abuse of privileges
          • Stronger accountability
               – Responsibility of the owner
               – Although still not strong enough
http://img.thedailywtf.com/Images/200612/rsakey.jpg
3. Ownership

                   SYH Pros/Cons

               • Easily lost
                  – Burden of revoking the token and
                    getting a new one
                  – Not much harm if combined with
                    another factor
4/5
  Characteristics
  (Something You Are)
4. Characteristics


                             Static
     Physiological characteristics of a human body


                     •   Fingerprints
                     •   Iris granularity
                     •   Retina blood vessels
                     •   Facial looks
                     •   Hand geometry
4. Characteristics


                       Dynamic
       Behavioral characteristics of a human body



                     • Voice inflections
                     • Keyboard strokes
                     • Signature dynamics
4. Characteristics


          Biometrics selection criteria

                     • Accuracy
                     • Acceptability
                     • Reaction time
4. Characteristics

                           Crossover Error Rate


                                            User friendlieness
    Error Rate




                        CER
                                                    Security




                                                  Accuracy

                 False Acceptance Error Rate (Type II)    False Rejection Error Rate (Type I)
4. Characteristics




                     http://www.newenglandchapel.org/images/fingerprint.jpg
4. Characteristics
                                       Fingerprint
                                                    static

   • Characteristic points are marked on a print
   • Positions are specified relatively to other
     marks




              http://shs.westport.k12.ct.us/forensics/04-fingerprints/fingerprint_parts.jpg
4. Characteristics
              Fingerprint and palm print
                              static



   • Compares computed pattern with a stored
     one
   • High accuracy
       – Fairly simple for small sets of potential matches
   • Good acceptance
   • 5 – 7 seconds for reaction
4. Characteristics

             Fingerprint scanner types
         • Static picture scanner




         • Line scanners
             – Scan is dynamic
             – Harder to fool

                                     http://www.trustedreviews.com/images/article/inline/3331-6.jpg
                     http://www.mrgadget.com.au/catalog/images/targus_defcon_authenticator_usb.jpg
4. Characteristics
4. Characteristics
                     Hand geometry scan
                                 static

      • Measures hand features
          – Length, width, thickness and contour of fingers
      • Not very accurate
          – Not good in large populations
              • Hand shape is not as unique as a finger print
          – Good in combination with another factor
      • Well accepted
      • Very fast reaction (3 – 5 seconds)
      • Reader is quite large
4. Characteristics

              Diagram of a human eye




              http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Human_eye_cross-sectional_view_grayscale.png
4. Characteristics




                     http://research.unc.edu/endeavors/win2005/images/retina.jpg
4. Characteristics
                         Retinal scan
                                static
         • Compares blood vessels with a reference
         • Very high accuracy
             – Retinal pattern is entirely unique
             – Poor lighting can affect results
         • Susceptible to eye changes
             – Diabetes, Heart attacks
             – Cataract, Glaucoma
             – Pregnancy
         • Bad acceptance
             – Highly invasive
             – Not very user friendly
         • Fast reaction (4 – 7 seconds)
4. Characteristics




                     http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Humaniris.jpg
4. Characteristics
                            Iris scan
                                static

         • Compares retina texture with a reference
         • Very high accuracy (IrisCode algorithm)
             – No false match reported ever
             – Iris texture remain stable over decades
         • Good acceptance
             – No need to touch anything
         • Very fast reaction (1 – 2 seconds)
         • Allows for continuous monitoring
             – Distance from 10 cm to a few meters
             – Needs cooperation
4. Characteristics


         Dynamic characteristics

      • Measures confidence level
          – Instead of the traditional pass/fail
      • Allows for explicitly defined individual risk
        appetite
          – By changing accepted confidence level
4. Characteristics
                                              Voice pattern
                                                          dynamic



                    • Compares a speech sample with a
                      reference material
                    • Low accuracy
                           – Even lower with a background noise
                    • Well accepted
                    • Long response time (10 – 14 seconds)


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Human_voice_spectrogram.jpg
4. Characteristics
                     Facial recognition
                                 dynamic

 • Measures certain features of
   the face
     – 14 of measurable 80 features
       are selected
     – Distance between eyes
     – Shape of chin and jaw
     – Length and width of the nose
     – Shape of cheek bones and eye
       sockets

                        http://www.wpi.edu/News/Transformations/2002Spring/Images/recognition1.jpg
4. Characteristics
                     Facial recognition
                            dynamic


         • Good for authentication
             – Accurate in controlled environment
             – Could provide continuous authentication
             – Less invasive then retinal scan
         • Not very good for identification
             – Less accurate in moving crowd
             – Not well accepted due to privacy reasons
4. Characteristics
                     Signature dynamics
                              dynamic

            • Records pen stroke dynamics
                – Speed
                – Direction
                – Pressure
            • Accurate
            • Well accepted
            • Way better then a static signature
                – More features can be observed
                – No physical leftovers
4. Characteristics
      Typing rhythm (keystroke dynamics)
                              dynamic

      •   Measures key dwell- and flight time
      •   Well accepted
      •   Accurate
      •   Very easy to deploy
      •   Provides continuous authentication
          – Helps to identify account sharing
      • Temporal variations may render false negatives
          – Gazillion of reasons
4. Characteristics

                     SYA Pros/Cons
       • Not easily transferable between humans
           – Very good accountability (nothing to lose)
           – Although one can lose their finger
       • Immune to most of the classic attacks
           – Key logging
           – Shoulder surfing
           – Brute force/dictionary attacks
       • Hinders social engineering attacks
       • Impedes IT Staff abuse of privileges
4. Characteristics

                     SYA Pros/Cons

       • May be used to track individuals (privacy
         concerns)
       • The most intrusive factor
       • Susceptible to sniffing and replay attacks
           – Suitable for local authentication
5/5
         2FA
 (Strong Authentication)
What is 2FA again?


Combination of any
2 of the 3 available
       factors
And what’s not a 2FA?

               • Finger scanner on your laptop
               • Door pass at the premises
               • Thumb-locked pendrive




http://www.turbogadgets.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/03/fingerprint-pendrive.jpg
http://blog.kievukraine.info/uploaded_images/2043-733282.jpg

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Strong Authentication (Michal Sobiegraj)

  • 1. Strong Authentication (2FA) Michał Sobiegraj, CISSP michal@sobiegraj.com
  • 2. 1. Access Control 2. Knowledge 3. Ownership 4. Characteristics 5. 2FA
  • 3. 1/5 Access Control
  • 4. 1 Access control 1. Identification – Who you say you are? 2. Authentication (1) – Prove it! 3. Authorisation (1 & 2 & ACL/Capability List) – OK, so here is what you can do. 4. Accountability (1 & 2 & Audit trail) – You are responsible for this!
  • 5. 1 Identification methods • User ID • Account number • PIN • Badge • Biometrics
  • 6. 1 Identifier characteristics • Unique to each user • Not relating to a job function • Standardised naming conventions
  • 7. 1 Authentication • Knowledge based – Something only you know • Ownership based – Something only you have • Characteristics based – Something only you are
  • 8. 1 Traditional means of identification and authentication • People knew each other in person – They used face recognition – Something only you are (biometrics) • Internet made it useless – More need for proving identity – Impossible to know people in person
  • 9. 1 Authentication Each single factor is fairly easy to compromise Lets use 2 factors!
  • 10. 1
  • 11. 1 Classic examples of 2FA ATM (Automated Teller Machine) – Something you have (card) – Something you know (PIN) Credit card and signature – Something you have (card) – Something you are (signature)
  • 12. 2/5 Knowledge (Something You Know)
  • 13. 2. Knowledge Password/PIN • Free • Easy to use – People got used to it and understand it • The weakest factor – Easily guessable/bruteforcable or complex • To complex ones get written down – One password everywhere or many to remember • If there is to many, they get written down
  • 14. 2. Knowledge Cognitive password • Series of random personal questions • Takes longer to authenticate • No need to remember a password • Fairly weak if based on personal information
  • 15. 2. Knowledge Passphrase • Longer to enter than a password • Less susceptible to brute forcing and guessing • Still sniff-able and susceptible to key logging
  • 16. 2. Knowledge SYK Pros/Cons • No need to carry anything • Susceptible to classic attacks – Key logging – Social engineering/shoulder surfing – Brute force/dictionary attacks – Sniffing and replay attacks – IT Staff abuse of privileges – Man in the middle attacks http://img.alibaba.com/photo/11475911/KeyShark_Hardware_Keylogger.jpg http://www.phuketgazette.com/newsimages/bull8282007-5914-4.jpg
  • 17. 2. Knowledge SYK Pros/Cons • No strong accountability – Easily shareable • Frequently written down in predictable places http://klaatu.anastrophe.com/wp-images/postit.jpg
  • 18. 3/5 Ownership (Something You Have)
  • 19. 3. Ownership PKI Certificate • Transfers trust – Make sure the signer is trustworthy! • Usually server authenticates to the user – Mutual authentication may cause significant administrative overhead • Something not only you have – Google: quot;index ofquot; +ovpn – Courtesy Aleksander P.
  • 20. 3. Ownership One Time Password (OTP) list • Session based authentication • Valid only once – Usually only for a short period of time • Not reusable by design – Not susceptible to replay attacks • A paper list or an electronic generator
  • 21. 3. Ownership Asynchronous token (challenge – response) http://www.cc.com.pl/img/vasco/300photo.gif
  • 22. 3. Ownership Asynchronous token (challenge – response) Usually requires user to retype the challenge into the token http://www.cc.com.pl/img/vasco/300photo.gif
  • 23. 3. Ownership Asynchronous token (challenge – response) http://www.cc.com.pl/img/vasco/300photo.gif
  • 24. 3. Ownership Asynchronous token (challenge – response) http://www.cc.com.pl/img/vasco/300photo.gif
  • 25. 3. Ownership Asynchronous token (challenge – response) http://www.cc.com.pl/img/vasco/300photo.gif
  • 26. 3. Ownership Asynchronous token (challenge – response) http://www.cc.com.pl/img/vasco/300photo.gif
  • 27. 3. Ownership Synchronous token • Generates a deterministic random-looking value every minute/button push • The value is cryptographically derived from: – The previous value – A shared secret known only to a token and to an authentication server v1 = f(seed, secret); v2 = f(v1, secret); etc. • The secret is unrecoverable from the token* * With today’s technology
  • 28. 3. Ownership Synchronous token • Time-based synchronisation – De-syncing in time if not used – Clock drift is corrected – Server accepts neighbouring values • Event-based synchronisation – Easily de-synced by issuing to many values ahead http://www.radiocomputerguy.com/images/paypal_token.gif http://admin.avisian.com/images/rsa1.gif http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:RSA-SecurID-Tokens.jpg http://www.comprosec.ch/fileadmin/images/rsa/securid/SD520_450x297_72dpi_crop.jpg
  • 29. 3. Ownership Software tokens • Java (J2ME) applets • More convenient • Easier to reverse engineer the secret out http://www.developer.com/img/2006/06/Marcia6.JPG
  • 30. 3. Ownership Man in the Middle (MITM) • None of the factors solve the MITM problem • Insecure connection allows for credentials disclosure – SSL allows only for a TCP link authentication
  • 31. 3. Ownership Phishing case
  • 32. 3. Ownership Phishing case
  • 33. 3. Ownership Phishing case
  • 34. 3. Ownership Phishing case
  • 35. 3. Ownership Phishing case
  • 36. 3. Ownership Phishing case
  • 37. 3. Ownership Phishing case • A customised attack • A time-limited OTP is better but still not enough
  • 38. 3. Ownership Out of band channel • E.g. mobile text messaging (SMS) • Adresses the MITM problem • Allows for mutual end-to-end authentication • Convenient
  • 39. 3. Ownership Out of band channel
  • 40. 3. Ownership Out of band channel
  • 41. 3. Ownership Out of band channel
  • 42. 3. Ownership Out of band channel
  • 43. 3. Ownership Out of band channel
  • 44. 3. Ownership Out of band channel
  • 45. 3. Ownership Out of band channel
  • 46. 3. Ownership Memory card • Also called a swipe card or a magnetic stripe card • Equipped with a magnetic stripe • Interacts with a reader • Stores authentication information • Relatively inexpensive • Fairly easy to duplicate – Harder then a password, though
  • 48. 3. Ownership Smartcard • Interacts through a reader • Contains authentication information – e.g. PKI certificate • Is able to do crypto on-board • Allows for continous authentication • Tamper-proof  solves the duplication problem http://gallery.hd.org/_exhibits/money/_more2003/_more02/UK-bank-and-credit-cards-smartcard-smartcards-VISA-Mastercard-Nationwide-Barclaycard-Egg-cropped-JR.jpg
  • 49. 3. Ownership http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Matkakortti_ja_kortinlukija.jpg
  • 50. 3. Ownership Contactless Smartcard • Contains an RF transciver (RFID) • Works in close proximity to a reader – Up to 10cm (ISO 14443) – Up to 50cm (ISO 15693) • Quick and hands-free • Contactless credit card – No PIN required – Small amounts $5-50
  • 51. 3. Ownership Potential issues with smartcards • Privacy concerns – Contactless smartcards make it possible to track individuals without their knowledge • Easy to damage the chip
  • 52. 3. Ownership iButton http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:1-Wire_lock.jpg
  • 53. 3. Ownership Form factor • Feasibly small and convenient • Attachable to something you usually have with you – Key-dongles – Wallet size cards – Credit-card size tokens – Phone applets or a phone itself
  • 54. 3. Ownership SYH Pros/Cons • Not susceptible to classic attacks – Key logging – Shoulder surfing – Brute force/dictionary attacks – Sniffing and replay attacks • Hinders social engineering attacks • Impedes IT Staff abuse of privileges • Stronger accountability – Responsibility of the owner – Although still not strong enough
  • 56. 3. Ownership SYH Pros/Cons • Easily lost – Burden of revoking the token and getting a new one – Not much harm if combined with another factor
  • 57. 4/5 Characteristics (Something You Are)
  • 58. 4. Characteristics Static Physiological characteristics of a human body • Fingerprints • Iris granularity • Retina blood vessels • Facial looks • Hand geometry
  • 59. 4. Characteristics Dynamic Behavioral characteristics of a human body • Voice inflections • Keyboard strokes • Signature dynamics
  • 60. 4. Characteristics Biometrics selection criteria • Accuracy • Acceptability • Reaction time
  • 61. 4. Characteristics Crossover Error Rate User friendlieness Error Rate CER Security Accuracy False Acceptance Error Rate (Type II) False Rejection Error Rate (Type I)
  • 62. 4. Characteristics http://www.newenglandchapel.org/images/fingerprint.jpg
  • 63. 4. Characteristics Fingerprint static • Characteristic points are marked on a print • Positions are specified relatively to other marks http://shs.westport.k12.ct.us/forensics/04-fingerprints/fingerprint_parts.jpg
  • 64. 4. Characteristics Fingerprint and palm print static • Compares computed pattern with a stored one • High accuracy – Fairly simple for small sets of potential matches • Good acceptance • 5 – 7 seconds for reaction
  • 65. 4. Characteristics Fingerprint scanner types • Static picture scanner • Line scanners – Scan is dynamic – Harder to fool http://www.trustedreviews.com/images/article/inline/3331-6.jpg http://www.mrgadget.com.au/catalog/images/targus_defcon_authenticator_usb.jpg
  • 67. 4. Characteristics Hand geometry scan static • Measures hand features – Length, width, thickness and contour of fingers • Not very accurate – Not good in large populations • Hand shape is not as unique as a finger print – Good in combination with another factor • Well accepted • Very fast reaction (3 – 5 seconds) • Reader is quite large
  • 68. 4. Characteristics Diagram of a human eye http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Human_eye_cross-sectional_view_grayscale.png
  • 69. 4. Characteristics http://research.unc.edu/endeavors/win2005/images/retina.jpg
  • 70. 4. Characteristics Retinal scan static • Compares blood vessels with a reference • Very high accuracy – Retinal pattern is entirely unique – Poor lighting can affect results • Susceptible to eye changes – Diabetes, Heart attacks – Cataract, Glaucoma – Pregnancy • Bad acceptance – Highly invasive – Not very user friendly • Fast reaction (4 – 7 seconds)
  • 71. 4. Characteristics http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Humaniris.jpg
  • 72. 4. Characteristics Iris scan static • Compares retina texture with a reference • Very high accuracy (IrisCode algorithm) – No false match reported ever – Iris texture remain stable over decades • Good acceptance – No need to touch anything • Very fast reaction (1 – 2 seconds) • Allows for continuous monitoring – Distance from 10 cm to a few meters – Needs cooperation
  • 73. 4. Characteristics Dynamic characteristics • Measures confidence level – Instead of the traditional pass/fail • Allows for explicitly defined individual risk appetite – By changing accepted confidence level
  • 74. 4. Characteristics Voice pattern dynamic • Compares a speech sample with a reference material • Low accuracy – Even lower with a background noise • Well accepted • Long response time (10 – 14 seconds) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Human_voice_spectrogram.jpg
  • 75. 4. Characteristics Facial recognition dynamic • Measures certain features of the face – 14 of measurable 80 features are selected – Distance between eyes – Shape of chin and jaw – Length and width of the nose – Shape of cheek bones and eye sockets http://www.wpi.edu/News/Transformations/2002Spring/Images/recognition1.jpg
  • 76. 4. Characteristics Facial recognition dynamic • Good for authentication – Accurate in controlled environment – Could provide continuous authentication – Less invasive then retinal scan • Not very good for identification – Less accurate in moving crowd – Not well accepted due to privacy reasons
  • 77. 4. Characteristics Signature dynamics dynamic • Records pen stroke dynamics – Speed – Direction – Pressure • Accurate • Well accepted • Way better then a static signature – More features can be observed – No physical leftovers
  • 78. 4. Characteristics Typing rhythm (keystroke dynamics) dynamic • Measures key dwell- and flight time • Well accepted • Accurate • Very easy to deploy • Provides continuous authentication – Helps to identify account sharing • Temporal variations may render false negatives – Gazillion of reasons
  • 79. 4. Characteristics SYA Pros/Cons • Not easily transferable between humans – Very good accountability (nothing to lose) – Although one can lose their finger • Immune to most of the classic attacks – Key logging – Shoulder surfing – Brute force/dictionary attacks • Hinders social engineering attacks • Impedes IT Staff abuse of privileges
  • 80. 4. Characteristics SYA Pros/Cons • May be used to track individuals (privacy concerns) • The most intrusive factor • Susceptible to sniffing and replay attacks – Suitable for local authentication
  • 81. 5/5 2FA (Strong Authentication)
  • 82. What is 2FA again? Combination of any 2 of the 3 available factors
  • 83. And what’s not a 2FA? • Finger scanner on your laptop • Door pass at the premises • Thumb-locked pendrive http://www.turbogadgets.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/03/fingerprint-pendrive.jpg