Lecture 8 20th March: 1955 Sihanouk’s abdication and the creation of the Sangkum. Dr Henri Locard

1. XV – 1955: Sihanouk‟s abdication
& the creation of the Sangkum

2. Sihanouk‟s predicament in the face of the
democratic constitution
After the various agreements and treaties, Cambodia
had, by the end of 1954, fully recovered its sovereignty and
independence. The Phnom Penh Agreements of 17th
October 1953 had been recognized by the international
community along with the 21st July 1954 ceasefire and the
evacuation of the Vietminh from the national territory.
Finally, the 24th December Paris Treaty had liquidated the
Indochinese Federation.
• Sihanouk needed to find a way to justify his keeping the
full political power that he had enjoyed for the past two
and a half years. He had therefore recourse to a
referendum.

4. 1 - The Referendum of 17 February 1955
• As far as internal national policy was concerned,
King Sihanouk had personally assumed the
responsibility of the government from 16th June
1952, pledging to the nation that he would bring full
independence to the country within three years.
• He had fulfilled his promise six months in advance.
Sihanouk needed some popular support to set aside,
if not eliminate, the Democratic Party and its
republican components that he saw “as an obstacle
to his ambitions” (Chandler)

5. “Was the royal mission fulfilled to our people’s satisfaction?”
• The answer was, not surprisingly, an overwhelming
99% “Yes”: 925,812 “yes” to 1,824 “no”
[Tioulong], 925,667 to 1,834 [Chandler &
Osborne].
• Tioulong admitted that this was indeed a plebiscite
and in actual fact the real question amounted to
“Was the royal crusade fulfilled to the people’s satisfaction
within a three-year promised delay?”
• During the electoral campaign, a low-flying plane
dropped thousands of leaflets that read: “This is
how you should vote. If you love the King use a
white ballot; if you don‟t love the King, use a black
ballot. You must believe this. Don‟t believe anyone
who says differently”. [Chandler, 77]

6. The referendum was an outright plebiscite
• … to reinforce Sihanouk‟s hand in his fight against
the dominant Democratic Party that was being
transformed from inside by young radicals.
Those, like Keng Vannsak (1925-2009), Prince
Norodom Phurissara (1919-1976), Thiounn Mumm
(1925- ), used the tactics of “entryism” (=the
practice of joining a political party in order to
transform its ideas and plans from inside).
• Sihanouk must have been deeply aware that the elite
could have considered him as a usurper, since, on
the one hand, he was a relatively late comer in the
struggle for independence, and, on the other, the
legitimate successor to King Monivong was Prince
Sisowath Monireth who had been groomed for the
part.

7. The Father of Independence
• This is why Sihanouk needed to establish firmly:
first, that he was the legitimate successor of
Monivong, with overwhelming popular
support, secondly, that he was the Father of
Independence and the only one.
• In this respect, he could never tolerate anyone to
suggest the contrary. This is why, after his triumph
in the plebiscite, he ordered “the arrest of the
editors of several Khmer language
newspapers, including Saloth Sar‟s elder
brother, Saloth Chhay, the editor of Sammaki
(Solidarity)… These papers had taken issue with
Sihanouk‟s claim that he had won Cambodia‟s
independence single-handedly.” [Chandler, 77]

8. 2 – The Abdication of the King
• After the victorious “Royal Crusade for Independence”
and the triumph of the Cambodian delegation at
Geneva, Sihanouk had tasted the nectar, if not of
immortality, at least of absolute power and he was
resolved to sideline all his competitors from those
within the Democratic Party to the ebullient (hyper-
active) Sam Sary, the leading light of the Khmer
Geneva delegation.
• Penn Nouth had given his resignation on 25th January
1955 and, on the very same day, Leng Ngeth, a
magistrate and the King‟s private counsellor, formed a
new government in charge of organizing the next
general elections. But the King was thinking of a
constitutional reform to avoid the instability of the first
Cambodian democratically elected governments.

9. Transforming the “regime of parties”.
• After having organized for peasant delegations from the
provinces to come to the capital and implore the King to
personally conduct the politics of the kingdom, on 19th
February, Sihanouk delivered a three-hour speech on the
necessity of transforming the “regime of parties”.
• He spoke in front of the diplomatic corps, the
International Control Commission (Canada, Poland and
India), ministers and Crown Counsellors. In his
speech, Sihanouk proposed that those who stood for
elections would not be allowed to use party
labels, although parties would still be allowed to exist. He
also offered to grant women the right to vote too. But the
main point was that the government and the Ministers
would exclusively be responsible to the King and no
longer to the National Assembly.

10. Sihanouk‟s proposed constitutional reforms - 2
• Such a reform would have nullified the very substance of a
constitutional monarchy and constituted the first step towards
the re-establishment of the absolute monarchy – all the more
so since by then the kingdom was independent and sovereign
[Tong, 75].
• Finally, the King proposed that “unsatisfactory” representative
could be removed by electorates [Chandler, 77].
Similarly, Sihanouk proposed that provincial assemblies would
be elected, with their own budgets, and that they would be in a
position to dismiss provincial governors. The King also
suggested that there would be a second consultative chamber
whose members would be all nominated by himself.
• Osborne indicates that these proposals were “drafted initially
by Sam Sary and Yem Sambaur” [Prince, 89]. However, both
men would soon fall from the King‟s grace, falling foul of him
and becoming his “enemies”.

11. Coup de théâtre: abdication
• In front of the icy reactions of the international community
that advised him to proceed with the national elections, on
27th February, Sihanouk suddenly dropped all his plans and
brooded by himself. He later claimed he was not following
anybody‟s advice, not even his parents‟. Chandler, in a
note, found some evidence in the papers from the American
embassy that “it is possible that Sihanouk was maneuvered into the
abdication by advisers like Sam Sary who convinced him that the decision
would consolidate his political power”. On 2nd March 1955, Radio-
PhP. received a recorded tape in Khmer and in French that
was to be broadcast at news time. The Khmer version was
broadcast first in the early morning, and the French version at
noon. He announced that he abdicated in favour of his
parents and that he had become “citizen Sihanouk”

13. Why did he abdicate ?
• He also vowed that, under no circumstance, he would ever
return to the throne. He wished to be called “Samdech Euv”,
“Monsignor Papa”, or “Father of Independence”. The full title
was “Samdech Euv upayuvareach”, “the Prince who had been
King”. Osborne quite rightly added: “So far as status and respect
were concerned, he remained King in all but name” [92].
• In his arguments for his abdication, he said he wished to be rid
of the pomp and privileges of the office of King to be nearer to
the “Little People” or his “children”, as he has always called
ordinary citizens, the farming communities in particular; people
he was always to treat as minors who were to be granted the
small presents he liberally distributed along all his journeys in the
provinces, rather than the social justice – the aim of all modern
and democratic States. In a speech he would also attack
“politicians, the rich, the educated who are accustomed to using their
knowledge to deceive others and to place innumerable obstacles in the path
on which I must lead the people

14. Sihanouk‟s new persona
• Opponents to Sihanouk – among the Republican camp in particular –
would later claim that Sihanouk “in fact abdicated in order to impose his
dictatorship thanks to one Party State – his”. Tioulong, the loyal friend
of the King, suggested that Sihanouk wanted, once and for all, to get rid
of the kind of original sin that was his selection by the totally discredited
Vichy regime of Marshal Pétain. He was to be the leading politician of
Cambodia on his own merit and because of his own achievements and
not because an 18 year-old adolescent prince had been selected by
Admiral Jean Decoux. “Inward sentiment of illegitimacy and even usurpation”.
• That abrupt decision was a bombshell in public opinion, as no one was
expecting this at all. Obviously also, to the role of constitutional
monarch, Sihanouk preferred that of Prime Minister. By using the
modern method of universal suffrage he could launch into a new
political career and become a self-made politician. For that, he needed a
party and that was to be the Sangkum Reastr Niyum.

16. 3 - The Creation of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum
• The rationale for creating such a “Community” was to “attain the
aspirations of the Little People, the real people of the Kingdom of
Kampuchea, which we love. Our Community … fights against
injustice, corruption, exactions, oppression and treason committed against our
People and our Country.”
• President, founder, with the title of “Supreme Counsellor” C
(Conseiller Suprême), Norodom Sihanouk signed the statute of the
organization on 22nd march 1955. He had launched the “Socialist
People‟s Community” on 16th March, just before his journey to
India, where he went to return Nehru‟s visit in October 1954. The
members were called Sahachivin (Companions), as this was not to
be a political party, but an association of free citizens above all
parties. In 1958, General de Gaulle Sihanouk admired so much was
to do the same with his “Rassemblement du Peuple Français”
(RPF), founded by the General on 14th April 1947.

17. Samdech Sahachevin
• Sihanouk was to be called Samdech Sahachevin or “Prince
Companion”. Chapter II, article 4 specified that “our
community is not a political party”, while, in total
contradiction, Chapter III, article 1 specified that to be
admitted into the community, “every Cambodian must belong
to no political party”.
• One important article is the one that described the role of
the “Supreme Counsellor”: Chapter V, section 1, “the
Central Committee”, Article 14 :
• “The Supreme Counsellor, who is by definition a personality who
has rendered eminent and undeniable services to Cambodia and is
acknowledged as a veritable national hero, has the duty to constantly
guarantee the cohesion between the Members of the Community and
to inspire, if need be, the national action of the Community.”

19. Many rallied the new party
• The idea of the Sangkum was born of Sihanouk‟s deep distrust
of political parties, like Charles De Gaulle‟s. In his opinion,
the Sangkum must be a wide federation that was meant to
absorb all other political parties.
• Except for the Democratic Party, the Liberal Party and the
Pracheachon, all the smaller parties dissolved into the
Sangkum. That was the case of National Democracy of Oum
Chheang Sun, Khmer Renovation of Colonel Lon Nol, the
People‟s Party of Sam Nhean.
• Shortly after the great success of the referendum, many of the
upper civil servants – the same as those that had voted for the
Democratic Party in the earlier elections – joined the
Community, all the more easily since no subscription was at first
required. At a later stage, those same civil servants were made
to pay into organization coffer a “voluntary contribution” that
was in fact a compulsory deduction from their salary.

20. 4 – The 11th September 1955 National Elections
• After two months of electoral campaign, 75% of
electors took part in the voting. The Sangkum won
630,625 votes or 83% of the number of voters, the
Democratic Party, 93,919 votes or 12% of those who
voted, the Pracheachon 29,509 votes, or 4%. Four
minor parties and independents shared the remaining
1% of the votes.
• In all, there had been 309 candidates competing for 91
seats. This meant the Sangkum had won the totality of
the seats in the National Assembly. Both an
opposition and traditional or normal political parties
had been routed. But had the elections been fair ? It
does not really seem to.

21. Tarnished elections ?
• Tioulong, for instance, admits that some “incidents”
contributed to tarnish the atmosphere. For instance one
candidate from the Democratic Party, Keng Vannsak, was
arrested then released. Pracheachon candidates were
intimidated and had recourse to the International Control
Commission for protection.
• According to Chandler and Osborne, the whole process
was marked by intimidation : violence and even terror
dominated the campaign. In the first place, Sihanouk had
appointed the barely literate Dap Chuon, “known for his
brutality towards his enemies” [Osborne, 97] as director of
national security, in charge of supervising the elections.
He was assisted by Lon Nol, Sam Sary and Kou Roun, “a
man who was to earn a deservedly sinister reputation as the head of
Sihanouk’s secret police during the 1960s” [Osborne, 97].

22. • Osborne continues by pointing out that Dap Chuon‟s men
“systematically intimidated” all opponents to the Sangkum
candidates. That kind of violent pattern was to continue
throughout Sihanouk‟s rule until his overthrow in 1970. “He
knew that his supporters resorted to violence to maintain him in power. He
sanctioned that violence since he could not conceive that his opponents could
be other than foolish, at best, or more likely motivated by evil intent towards
him personally, at worst.” If that was the case, that is if they were
motivated by a personal hatred of the ex-King, “they had forfeited
their right to freedom and possibly to life”.
• The number of victims of the violence among the Democratic
or Pracheachon candidates and campaigners was never made
public, “a pro-Democrat achar named Chung was arrested during the
campaign for reciting poems that were interpreted by some as insulting to the
Prince: he died in prison” [Chandler, 81]. The campaign showed a
“contempt for the elite that was to continue under Sihanouk for many
years”. Since he saw them “as his enemies” [82], ”The idea of an
opposition was anathema to the Prince” [84], and any possibility that
an official one could exist was unimaginable in the context of
his regime. Sam Sary was to be the victim of that.

23. Keng Vannsak (1925-2008)
• We can give two striking instances of Sihanouk‟s undemocratic
ways as mentioned by Tioulong, Chandler and Osborne. The
first was the treatment of Keng Vannsak, one of the most
brilliant speakers in favour of the Democratic Party. In his
speeches he had attacked absolutism, underdevelopment and
exploitation of the poorer classes with great energy. “As he was
addressing a rally in Phnom Penh, a Buick sedan bearing Sam Sary,
heavily armed policemen and a loudspeaker, drove slowly into the crowd
backed by a truckload of Sangkum supporters. Shots rang out, and his
democrat chauffeur was killed.” Vannsak was arrested, accused of
inciting the violence, although he was unarmed. He was
imprisoned for two months without trial or charge. He was
released only after “he had apologized abjectly to the Prince” [83]. As a
result of those intimidations plus meddling with the counting of
the votes and ballot stuffing, the Prince‟s new „Party” won an
overwhelming victory. David Chandler had demonstrated, new
evidence has come out “the Sangkum candidates were, in fact, defeated
in five constituencies” [Osborne, 98].

24. Conclusion : a precarious democracy
• After Sihanouk‟s unexpected triumph, democracy, along with the
Democratic Party, was to a large extent in limbo – or in some
indeterminate place between life and death from 1955 to 1970.
After some half a century of efforts on the part of the French
to set up a professional modern administration and a
government that represented significant steps towards
democracy, the Prince had, in a way, de facto re-established
century-old royal absolutism in Cambodia.
• Rather, it was at best a benignant paternalism (young Sihanouk
presented himself as a father figure - the father of independent
Cambodia). The ideology of his authoritarian one Party rule was
based on a somewhat muddled ideology - a mixture of socialistic
aspirations, Buddhist ethics and traditional royal reverence base
on the revival of the myth of Angkor.
• But the Prince was able nevertheless to rule over fifteen years of
peace, growing prosperity and happiness, after the chaotic years
of the Second World War and the struggle for independence.