Presentation to Cyber Policy Center Spring Webinar series on Apr 12 2022

1. Censorship, Surveillance and
Cyberthreats in Hong Kong
Charles Mok
Global Digital Policy Incubator, Stanford University
April 12, 2022

2. From freedom to censorship
• Before NSL (2020)
• No official or legal mechanism to censor
• No external firewall or filtering mechanism
• Regional telecom hub for underseas cables and datacenters
• Government attempts to introduce censorship
• 2012: Consultation of Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles
Ordinance
• Proposal for mandatory “operator-level content filtering” withdrawn
after public opposition
• 2016: Copyright Ordinance Amendments
• Criminalization of online derivative works of copyrighted materials
• Withdrawn by government in legislature after filibuster in legislature

3. Can China’s Great Firewall extend to Hong Kong?
• China
• State-owned telecom controls external gateways from 3 coastal cities
with backbone of at least 7 other inland cities (2014)
• China failed to live up to its commitment when joining WTO (2001) for
“ICT and telecom market opening to foreign producers”
• Numerous laws and operational infrastructure to conduct censorship
• Hong Kong’s telecom regime was completely liberalized since 2003
• Buy back incumbent’s external exclusivity license in 1998
• Telecom Ordinance: No limit on number of licenses and foreign
ownership
• No law or censorship infrastructure, until the NSL
• Vibrant civil society, until the NSL

4. How to shut down the Internet in Hong Kong?
• Emergency Regulations Ordinance (Cap. 241)
• (1) On any occasion which the Chief Executive in Council may consider to be an
occasion of emergency or public danger he may make any regulations whatsoever
which he may consider desirable in the public interest.
• (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (1), such
regulations may provide for
(a)censorship, and the control and suppression of publications, writings, maps,
plans, photographs, communications and means of communication;
• The ERO was used many times in the last three yers to bypass the legislature
• Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106) Section 13
• 13. Possession of telecommunications stations taken by government in emergencies
• (1) Where, in the opinion of the Governor, an emergency has arisen in which it is
expedient for the public service that the Government should have control over
telecommunications stations, the Governor, by warrant under his hand, may direct
or cause such telecommunications stations as are specified in the warrant to be
taken possession of and to be used for the service of the Government…

5. The decline of trust of Internet freedom
• FireChat during
Hong Kong’s
Umbrella
Movement (2014)
and Taiwan’s
Sunflower
Movement (2014)

6. 2019 Anti-extradition bill protests
• Widespread use of Telegram groups
• Apple App Store removal of apps

7. 2019 Anti-extradition bill protests
• Doxxing, from both sides, but law
enforcement on one side only

8. High Court injunction to censor Internet content (2019.10.31)
• The Police and the Secretary for Justice applied for and was granted a High
Court injunction
• Prohibiting anyone from communicating through “any Internet-based
platform” any materials that “promotes, encourages or incites the use or
threat of violence, intended or likely to cause” bodily injury or property
damage
• Broad and vague scope caused chilling effect on freedom of expression
• Bypass any legislation
• Local civil society applied for discharge or restriction on the injunction
• High Court ruled to continue the injunction with minor amendments to
emphasize the wilfulness of the act
• Injunction was extended and never rescinded
• This can be considered to be the first arbitrary legal weapon against free speech
in Hong Kong

9. National Security Law (2020)
• Mainland law imposed on Hong Kong — not based on Common Law —
targeting against “secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with
foreign forces”
• Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong SAR:
• A “designated police officer” can order to take down messages or
contention any electronic platform that was deemed “likely to constitute
an offense endangering national security”
• Failure to comply means the service provider may face seizure of their
electronic devices, plus fines and prison terms up to 6 months
• Chief Executive may authorize the police to intercept communications and
conduct surveillance to “prevent and detect offences endangering
national security”
• The universal reach of the law’s extraterritorial power

10. After NSL
• Self censorship
• Removing social media posts or entire profiles
• Closing of many online press outlets
• Media closing
• Apple Daily, StandNews, and many others
• Blocking of websites hosted overseas
• HKChronicles (doxxing of police officers and pro-Beijing figures)
• Taiwan’s Transitional Justice Commission*, Presbyterian Church*, DPP*,
Recruitment Centre of National Armed Force
• 2021 Hong Kong Charter
• June 4th Incident Online Museum
• Hong Kong Watch (UK human rights group)
• Some were later reported to be accessible again (*)
• Real name system for prepaid SIM cards (from March 1 2022)

11. What’s Next?
• Observations
• Contrasts with Taiwan, one of the freest in Asia: Hong Kong’s “One Country One System” reality
• How easy it is to go from free to censorship
• Role of global platforms
• Large commercial presence of Facebook, Google, AWS, Microsoft, etc.
• The government has so far stopped short of openly imposing orders on them to censor
• Very limited underseas cable investment or capacity expansion
• PLCN submarine network etc. redirected to terminate at Taiwan
• Likely a gradual decline of its role as regional telecom and datacenter hub
• Misinformation law
• Imitating Singapore’s POFMA or India’s ITA?
• Make it easier for government to remove any undesirable speech, without invoking NSL
• More pressure on global platforms
• Article 23 local national security law legislation
• Relating to “treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or
theft of state secrets” and overseas political ties
• GFW 2.0 — A soft and dynamic firewall?
• More censorship, surveillance and self-censorship; less bandwidth growth, investment and freedom

12. Charles Mok
Visiting Scholar
Global Digital Policy Incubator
@charlesmok
cpmok@stanford.edu