2014 01 17_european elections 2014_the rise of xenophobic and eurosceptic movements in europe_diplocat

1. 1
EUROPEAN
ELECTIONS 2014:
THE RISE
OF XENOPHOBIC
AND EUROSCEPTIC
MOVEMENTS IN
EUROPE
FINAL
REPORT
Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia
Open Society Initiative for Europe
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2. 2
Final Report
Workshop “European elections 2014:
the rise of xenophobic
and eurosceptic movements in Europe”
Held in Barcelona, January 17th, 2014
At the premises of the Open Society Initiative for Europe
C/Elisabets 22-24, 08001 Barcelona
Published by:
Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia (DIPLOCAT)
In cooperation with the Open Society Initiative for Europe (OSIFE)
Summary of Conference by:
, Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia
Publishing accomplishment by:
Ara Llibres, SCCL
www.arallibres.cat
Supported by:
European Journalism Centre
European Journalists Association of Catalonia
European Parliament’s Information Office in Barcelona
We would like to thank all the participants from different European countries.
This final report is the result of their contributions, expertise, insight
and different perspectives which has provided us with informed and balanced
analysis and exceptionally rich and diverse content.
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The Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia (DIPLOCAT) aims to foster
dialogue and build relationships between the citizens of Catalonia
and the rest of the world in order to promote peace, democracy and
understanding. We also seek to contribute to debates on the main global
challenges by encouraging the active involvement of Catalan society
in the mutual exchange of ideas and best practices in key sectors.
This includes raising awareness of European Fundamental Rights and
International Human Rights through conferences and other forms of
mutual exchange of ideas and best practices. With this aim, DIPLOCAT,
in cooperation with the Open Society Initiative for Europe, and with the
support of the European Journalism Centre, the European Journalists
Association of Catalonia and the European Parliament’s Information
Office in Barcelona, invited specialists from media, academia and the
European institutions to analyse the rise of xenophobic and Eurosceptic
movements in the context of the European Parliament elections in May
2014. Participants from different European countries came to Barcelona
this January and openly debated proposals for concrete actions to be
taken before and after the elections. Thanks to their expertise, insight
and different perspectives, the result of their informed and balanced
analysis was exceptionally rich and diverse.
The Open Society Initiative for Europe provided the ideal setting for the
event at their headquarters in Barcelona.
The results of the debate are summarized in this report, which we
present as a lasting account of the content produced during the event.
It will amplify the results with stakeholders from the EU institutions,
organisations and media specialising in the fields of human rights and
integration who have the power to listen and act.
We would like to thank all participants and institutions for their support
and for making possible what can be seen as an initiative for a democratic
future of peaceful coexistence for all European citizens.
Albert Royo
Secretary General
Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia
FOREWORD
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4. 4
EUROPEAN
ELECTIONS 2014:
THE RISE
OF XENOPHOBIC
AND EUROSCEPTIC
MOVEMENTS IN
EUROPE
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INTRODUCTION 7
WORKSHOP SESSIONS 9
1. The European Parliament and populism 9
2. Xenophobia: The next major threat to Europe? 14
3. Controversy: Is the press to blame? 18
CONCLUSION 24
APPENDIX 26
I. Biography of all participants in alphabetical order 26
II. Workshop programme 35
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
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6. © Enric Muñoz, 2014
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7. 7
The 2014 European Parliamentary elections are being used by political
groups as a political opportunity for self-affirmation and to increase
their influence in European decision making. It is probable that populist
movements will win more seats in these elections than ever before.
It is important to understand the possible consequences for European
policies and for the European Parliament as an institution. This can only
be achieved by investigating who these movements are, what relationship
they have with the European Union, and what moves people to vote
for their parties. Before being able to determine how to address the
concerns of their adherents and of society in general, one needs to focus
on the threats and perceptions of threat by voters which can have an
impact on elections. Different types of populism, Euroscepticism and
xenophobia must be distinguished for conclusions to be reached on
how to change either the perceptions or the situations that make voters
vulnerable to populist, if not racist, ideas. In this analysis, the attitudes of
the different actors, including European institutions and MEPs, national
politicians and the press, to populist movements are as decisive as their
field of action in addressing the roots of the problem, and in changing
the perceptions of society in general and of voters in particular. The
European economic crisis and related policies must also be included as
components in the scheme.
This report includes the contributions from all participants who investigated
these topics throughout the workshop. The sessions separately addressed
each of the three pillars - the European institutions, society and media
- with introductions by experts, to then examine and combine them
with the experience and different backgrounds of participants from
institutions, academic circles and media. The experts integrated their
fields of expertise, and voiced their expectations from the other pillars.
This interaction uncovered transcending links between the areas of
politics, society and media, in which the actors and their needs are
interrelated. The analysis led to identifying a structure for correlation
between the European Union and national politics, society, crisis, voting
behaviour and media reporting, which makes clear the requirements and
responsibilities of all partners in the endeavour of European democracy.
The outcomes are recommendations for concrete actions on how to
keep the European values of diversity, tolerance and inclusiveness at
the centre of European politics.
INTRODUCTION
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8. © European Union, 2014
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9. 9
Forecast
The European Parliament is the democratically elected institution
of the European Union, and the next elections taking place in May
2014 are the first to be held after the Lisbon Treaty. It can be
foreseen that more populist MEPs will win seats in the European
Parliament. According to the participants, in the existing Parliament
there are approximately 55 populist MEPs, and forecasts show
that this May, up to 100 populist MEPs could win seats. Overall,
these groups tend to stand for giving fewer powers to the EU,
re-nationalising competences, also renationalising borders and
immigration.
Estimated impact of populism
Whichever of the possible scenarios materialises - one new
populist group, several smaller groups disconnected from the
biggest group, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
or, reflecting the current situation in the European Parliament, a
bulk of non-attached groups on the radical right – the question is
whether decision-making on social issues such as immigration will
change. In the workshop it became clear that while these MEPs
can be disruptive to Parliamentary procedures, they do not have
the critical mass to block decisions. According to the analysis of
experts on the panel, direct influence on the European Parliament as
an institution from populist groups can be expected to be limited,
as fragmentation amongst the different extremist nationalists
impedes concerted actions as one united front.
However, there are several problems related to a rise in extremism
in the European Parliament which will determine their real
practical impact.
Adhesion to European values
Xenophobic and racist rhetoric does not coincide with European values
and rights and could, if strong enough, change the identity of the European
Parliament. The openly xenophobic discourse of some populist MEPs is
opposed to EU values of diversity and multiculturalism.
Looking at voting on immigration and ethnic minority rights, it has been
proven that populist parties are the most likely to vote against these
measures. A higher ratio of populist MEPs in the European Parliament
could lead political discourse away from European core values. It is not
expected that this change would also lead to a change in the resulting
laws proposed, as overall populist MEPs are not forecast to attain a
WORKSHOP
1. The European
Parliament and
populism
European Parliament’s hemicycle,
Brussels
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majority or to form a substantial group. However, there remains the
probability that legislation would be different with a higher number of
populist MEPs, and this could lead to a shift in the core values of social
cohesion across EU borders.
Participation in the European construct
The nationalistic anti-EU discourse that appeals to Eurosceptics is in
favour of limiting the powers of the European Union, including those of
the European Parliament, and could challenge the federal construct of
the EU as such. The attitude observed in populist groups is to disturb,
act as opposition to the system from within but without participating
in policies, because that would make them seem part of the system.
MEPs, who do not adhere to EU norms and values have little incentive
to be constructive, which in itself can be disruptive: extremist parties
are not interested in process but in its obstruction, which, if practised
by a larger number of MEPs, could even undermine the legitimacy of
the European Parliament. Populists have been observed to use EU
funds to build national networks instead of adding value to the EU
construct.
Contamination of political debate
A related problem is that MEPs from moderate right-wing parties are
buying in to populist ideas due to the political advantages of these new
potential allies.
Would mainstream parties cooperate with populists? Even if the populists
do not form one strong group, moderate parties could be more willing
to engage with them when they are more numerous. The EP system of
passing legislation by forming alliances between groups or individuals
could make populist MEPs more important if they became necessary or
helpful for obtaining the critical amount of votes for legislation, even if
they do not belong to one of the major groups. The more populist MEPs
there are in the EP, the more power they could have to broker alliances
and arrange voting majorities. This could lead to MEPs of different groups
supporting populist ideas in their draft laws to attract these allies, or
taking on board their rhetoric in debates.
Moderate groups would also have more incitement to copy extremist
ideas in order to impede extremist efforts to steal susceptible moderate
voters. The more these ideas are expressed in the EP, the greater the
risk of the general political discourse being contaminated.
Legal barrier
Given these predictions, the European Parliament should take seriously
the possible consequences of a rise in populist MEPs, and act against
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the loss or change of European values. To do so, the putting into place
of legal instruments to combat xenophobic discourse was mentioned.
If it is a European concern that all new member states adhere to norms
and regulations, and as such, to the values of Europe, then why should
there not be commitment to European values from the European
political party elite? As well as letters of commitment, there could be
an ethical code on the limits of discourse against racism allowing for
active measures against homophobic individuals within political parties.
Finally, if there was a law against xenophobic and homophobic
discourse, this could eventually be extended to parliamentary and/or
media discourse in the member states if brought to the attention of a
European legal organ.
Regulating speaking and question time
As a second step, actions against attitudes obstructing the functioning
of the EP were proposed. If there was a regulated speaking time, and a
limited time for questions per MEP, all political opinions would have the
chance to be heard, but no disproportionate visibility and little deviation
from the initial topic would be possible. Questions could be regulated
in accordance with European values.
The EP’s image, including all MEPs
The attitude of MEPs in distancing themselves from the European idea,
while acting from within, could be amended by strong emphasis on
specific activities involving all groups and unattached MEPs in favour of
European values (such as activities against xenophobia and for diversity),
which should be openly attributed to the whole of Parliament. It is not
possible to distance oneself from the European activities which one
forms part of, if it is communicated that these activities take place.
Analysis of the vote
One can discuss ideas on how to anchor fundamental rights within the
European Parliament. However, it must be emphasised that all MEPs
have been democratically elected, and that their voters should be taken
seriously. If voters send a message of protest, this message should be
acknowledged, taken into account, and responded to.
If EU institutions take positions which have a negative effect on voters´
lives, the European elections are the one moment when they can express
their frustration, and at that moment, voting itself is an important political
act as a reaction to a political EU. To be able to respond, one needs to
get to the root of the protest vote by understanding the different types
of Euroscepticism.
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Euroscepticism
The rational part of Euroscepticism can be attributed to a democratic
deficit within the EU, and/or to an identity problem of European
democracy. Whether it is the lack of a positive impact of the EP on the
life of the individual, or the lack of visibility of this positive impact, few
people actually know whether and how the EP influences a citizen’s
life. And whether it is the lack of democratic influence of the EP on the
EU institutions, i.e. if it allows citizens’ concerns to be heard, or only
a lack of knowledge of its democratic influence, few people actually
know much about the role of the EP. If the EP is the guardian of EU
values, not many people are aware of this.
To solve this problem one needs to talk about what is right, and deal
with what is wrong in an objective and critical way. This may involve
changing specific policies or procedures, or a democratic reform of the
institutions and treaties to give credibility to the EU project, perhaps by
more accountability of the EP to citizens after elections and during the
term, or more direct or indirect influence of the citizen on the activities
of other EU institutions, or by other measures.
Europhobia
The lack of credibility of the EU project has less rational, more emotional
roots, which lead to the conclusion that “the monster EU is not working,
or not working in our interests”, more often supported by Europhobe
populist voters. When the EU as a construct is too distant, and voters
feel it is unresponsive to control mechanisms they know, it can easily
be perceived as taking over citizens’ lives in an uncontrolled way.
Feelings of insecurity can result in reverting to one’s own borders and
turning on an abstract culprit.
In response, national mainstream parties must work with their MEPs to
find agreement on good arguments for supporting the EU, and to actively
combat its bureaucratic and distant image. The EU can challenge the
“comforting” nationalism of the populists with the same use of positive
symbols and ideologies to show when and how the EU is acting in
favour of the individual, using the same will to reach out to citizens for
direct contact with voters. On a larger scale, including the EU as part
of the national political landscape in national education systems would
make it part of the heritage adopted by the individual, and encourage
identification. This could include showing existing democratic links of
the MEP with the citizen, as well as national influence in the Council of
Ministers. Bringing the EP to the voter should be supported by specific
programmes funded by the EU Commission.
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Xenophobia
Even if xenophobic MEPs do not seem to influence overall political
functioning, the European Parliament needs to take the sentiment of
xenophobia seriously, to protect the fundamental rights inherent in the
concept of the European Union. By taking responsibility for countering
Euroscepticism and the raising of frontiers against strangers, so defending
the European values of diversity, and by making sure these are reaching
citizens, the EP plays its part in countering xenophobia. Europe may
have fewer opportunities than local, regional or national levels to provide
feelings of security and belonging, but that does not mean this should
not be a concern for European institutions.
Debate of the participants
at the OSIFE premises
in Barcelona
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Roots of xenophobia
When debating the causes of xenophobia it became clear that
although feelings of xenophobia within societies have existed
throughout history, most of the time they do not come to the fore.
The causes of xenophobia can be found in the emotions of fear,
aggression and hatred present within society, combined with the
feeling of insecurity. There are different situations of instability
leading to insecurity, such as feelings of being excluded from or
let down by society (including the state, politics, the education
system), or the instability of marginalised stratum of society (lack
of self esteem, resources). If a part of society finds itself in a similar
situation of loss of identity and references, e.g. due to radical
changes in conditions, this can give rise to a desire for conservation
of the old, combined with a permanent sense of insecurity.
Protest votes
These categories are not an automatic target for xenophobic rhetoric. In
some countries, xenophobic voters are well educated youngsters with
fears of losing their jobs and identity, and in distrust of the political elite.
In others, people voting populist have lost out in economic transitions, or
feel nostalgia for an idealised past. It is clear that disappointed or unstable
parts of the population tend to feel unrepresented by mainstream parties.
Protest votes for populist parties are an outlet by which to criticise the
establishment and their policies, and/or offer alternative identities for
honest people against the corrupt and selfish elites.
Anti-racial radicalisation and leadership
All categories can become receptive to scapegoating, in the form of
identifying specific persons or abstract constructs to blame for the
unstable or less favourable situation they find themselves in. Opinions
radicalise when the search for a scapegoat is permitted by society.
Statistics show that there is no uniform condition for the receptiveness of
societies to xenophobic ideas and their permissiveness towards extremism.
Openly xenophobic movements were found to be more prominent in
eastern and southern Europe. While similar racially exclusive parties exist
across northern and western Europe, the extent of radicalism in politics
and society in general was seen to be lower where the social fabric
seems solid enough to prohibit voicing of racially exclusive thoughts.
It then depends on how radicalism is used, stirred, or channelled and
calmed over time.
When strong political leadership coincides with any of the above
WORKSHOP
2. Xenophobia:
the next threat
to Europe?
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factors that condition susceptibility to xenophobia, it can be decisive
in legitimising or de-legitimising radical opinions within society. When
eloquent populist politicians use the receptiveness of society at a given
moment, the way that mainstream politics reacts (adopts ideas, uses
them against political opponents, or distances itself and denounces) has
great influence on whether racist tendencies are absorbed and accepted
(or not) into mainstream rhetoric, and as such into society itself.
Anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic sentiments
Immigrants, representing the unknown and personally unrelated, are
an easy and specific scapegoat, serving to materialise fears and explain
insecurity. As this is an emotional reaction, reality does not necessarily
correlate with it, i.e. as witnessed in some countries, there need not
be many immigrants in a society to find xenophobia. For the majority
of voters of populist parties with xenophobic tendencies, the radical
aspect is part of the identity distinguishing them from the mainstream,
and instrumental in their aim of confronting the mainstream. People
factually against the mixing of races only make up a small fraction of
their adherents.
The European political establishment as an abstract constellation is
another target available for channelling negative emotions, without
antagonising voters who would not adhere to socially unacceptable
racist vocabulary. The concept of Euroscepticism is less stigmatised
than xenophobia and homophobia, whilst also offering strong values
of identification with nationalist and anti-foreigner projections. Populist
parties in some societies are more easily legitimised where they can seize
votes from Europhobes, (convinced of their nationalist, anti-European and
anti-international sentiments, perceiving the EU as an evil, anonymous,
foreign control construct, opening the door to threats from abroad),
and Eurosceptics, (identifying with populism to send protest warnings
to get rid of an EU that they perceive does not represent them and has
strong systemic and conceptual flaws).
Economic instability
In countries in which the political climate favours using xenophobic
political arguments, economic instability can give reasons for the use
of racist ideology. Economic instability can trigger feelings of insecurity
of the individual and real instability of parts of society. This can create
receptiveness for radical discourse. There is however no proof of an
automatic connection between economic condition and the dynamics of
racism and xenophobia. In some countries such as Greece, the European
economic crisis could be seen as one of the factors that enhanced a
xenophobic climate, making parts of the population vulnerable to political
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abuse. In other countries such as Spain, or even more so Latvia, which
have also suffered difficult economic crisis, there has been less growth
in xenophobia or the political use of racist ideas. In countries like France
and Great Britain, support for populist movements peaked when the
economic situation was most stable.
Denouncing xenophobic discourse
The responsibility of mainstream politicians is not to exploit fears, not to
embrace xenophobic discourse to win votes and thereby help extremist
thoughts to be legitimised, and to distance themselves openly from
xenophobic rhetoric through a proactive, integrative discourse.
Their role is also to take citizens’ fears into account, and take the threat
of populist parties to divide society seriously, even if the political impact
of those parties might, depending on the country, be negligible.
Active integration
National politicians should address the feelings of insecurity of parts of
society through integrative actions to avoid losing these citizens, who
do not feel represented by society, to extremism. Where populists give
an alternative to the sense of belonging to mainstream society, it is the
responsibility of mainstream politics to offer such a sense within an inclusive
society. This implies giving identity, actively combating exclusion and
vulnerability. Some social movements are not only politically motivated
but create, have fun, share humour: in short, give positive alternatives to
a negative identification with society. Funding such initiatives through
social programmes should be a major concern of politicians.
The integration of diversity measures into all parts of society, i.e.
Second session,
at the OSIFE premises
in Barcelona
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education, administration, political party representation should be a
concern, as should be the reinforcement of the basic pillars of society such
as education, to give a platform for an informed society to distinguish
between political traps and realities.
In more general advice to governments, the allocation of social housing
and school training was mentioned as practical support against social
exclusion, as well as a new globalisation settlement involving social
globalisation, e.g. environmental protection.
Identification with European values
Education and political discourse should be used to explain and rectify
the attribution of fears to immigrants. If politicians combat fears related
to immigrants and install tolerance, they will also combat the fear that
populist politicians use when pointing to Europe as a liberal entry port
for foreign evil.
Furthermore, if through education and government programmes, a
sense of belonging and inclusion can be given, this can also serve to
convey the social values of diversity, tolerance, peaceful co-existence
and inclusion. Solid roots for society’s values can lead to feelings of
affinity with European values, when social values coincide with those
of the EU. By counteracting xenophobia, a society can also provide the
basis for a European identity.
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Eco crisis and image of the EU
During the seminar it became clear that when there is crisis, the
weak points become a real vulnerability. With the current economic
crisis, the existing problems have been exacerbated.
It could be witnessed that European values such as solidarity,
multiculturalism, diversity, integration suffered, and support
for Europe weakened. When the EU has no human image within
European societies, only the economic regulations and interests
prevail. Which leaves the EU vulnerable for being blamed for
anything. The EU was often projected as inefficient, inexistent
and shallow, slow, bureaucratic, as well as abstract and working
independently.
During the economic crisis this coincided with economic
destabilisation of whole parts of population, and political
destabilisation and even humiliation of political elite – provoked
by strong external pressure on mainstream parties for political
decisions and spending cuts. The EU as guardian of European
values had no visibility then, activities of EU institutions were not
perceived to consider social impact, on the contrary, their related
destabilisation was seen to have laid the grounds for extremism.
EU institutions had become fragile, associated only with rigid and
draconic economic restrictions. The EP as the institution with most
direct democratic legislation is then bearing the brunt of these
often nationally motivated policies, feeling the consequences of
the EU population’s anger with openly Eurosceptic votes.
Immigration as scapegoat
If diversity of the society is not integrated as a positive value into
the mainstream political discourse, it is easily another weak point,
depending on the strength of the social tissue and integrative
politics of the governments over time. If politicians and / or press
then pursue internal political strategies of blaming immigrants,
xenophobia becomes mainstream. Stereotypes were evoked
when talking about the crisis. Fears were awakened in European
societies hit by the crisis. In some countries it was witnessed
that immigrants were made the scapegoat for the bad economic
situation the population is suffering. Especially when the social
tissue was weakened by real economic instability, the feeling of
insecurity, of not being valued, left out of society could be used
politically to stir the protests against scapegoats, either actively
or passively.
WORKSHOP
3. Controversy:
Is the press to
blame?
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The role of the press
Without independence, the press can be one more player in a game
of using scapegoats and stereotypes to explain the political problems
that are causing real instability within society. This is especially the case
when financing of the media is correlated with political parties or specific
industries, subsidised by governments, or cut off from substantial self-
financing such as advertising. The media can be used for sending messages
for political purposes; by politicians, or conversely, as an instrument of
pressure of the owners, to present items on the government agenda.
Figures prove that where the press is less free, there is a correlation
with more populist views.
Some European countries have been identified as having a partisan
press, playing a huge role in strengthening anti-EU views. While the
Eurosceptics were offering persuasive arguments and trendily diffused
them with social media, good arguments for recreating European ideas
during the crisis were missing, and the EU institutions themselves
seemed voiceless. In other cases, passive non-analysis by the media of
catchy material prepared for journalists was the problem. Immigrants
as scapegoats or exclusive nationalism are strong political and media
tools to attract attention. Even without being actively partisan, media
backed xenophobia when accepting and publishing this kind of material
uncritically.
A free press and funding
If media is independent and responsible, it can critically deal with political
arguments, distinguish itself from political parties and business, and
publish verified analysis. If its creative independence is limited due to lack
of financial independence, moral responsibility for not using stereotypes
also falls on the source of funding. With independent financing, the press
has the conditions for taking full responsibility for the consequences of
its reporting.
Balanced reporting
In practical terms, this means that the more the press can act without
connection to political power, the better it can analyse the forces behind
economic downturn, crisis and the measures to be taken, and can make
unilateral ethical decisions to avoid using scapegoats, be it immigrants
or the EU. This may entail holding the EU responsible for applying rules
and scant social consideration in economic decision making, for creating
conditions for the vice of fascism. It may entail criticising national
economies for strategic planning failures or for lack of rigidity and
structure. But it may also entail analysing that immigrants did not cause
the economic crisis, or that it was not an “ungoverned” EU causing social
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20. 20
unrest, without member states influencing its decisions via the Council.
If balanced reporting includes criticism, it is not credible to have
unconditional campaigns in favour of the EU institutions as “the way we
are now is the only way that works”. Depending on the situation and the
political climate, this can be undemocratic as well as counterproductive,
when criticism strengthens the image of extremists and creates rejection
by their voters.
One-sidedness can work in favour of populists also when it comes
to xenophobia. Immigration can be a topic which deserves a factual
discussion, with acknowledgement of the fears present within parts of
the population, while avoiding entering into emotional populist polemics.
De-emotionalising discourse
Whoever the source of the information is - politicians, business or press
- whether politically motivated or meant to create catchy information to
sell news, and whatever the opinion towards immigration and foreigners,
two things can be raised. Firstly, that hatred can be countered with
tolerance, and secondly, that it is possible to avoid playing with emotions
of fear, or stigmatising groups “that are not like us”. There is a need for
the press to de-emotionalise the political discourse, and furthermore,
to openly denounce the political instrumentalisation of fear and hatred.
At the same time, the press can acknowledge fears in society in a way
that disconnects them from dangers of foreign intervention and from
immigration as a threat to security.
Humanising, from parties to individuals
The press has several difficulties to face when writing about xenophobic
politicians.
First: It is easy to be singled out by adherents of a xenophobic movement
as part of the establishment that the movement identifies itself against.
Criticising adds credibility and public visibility to the movement, and
normalises it as just another mainstream party. The act of inviting a
democratically elected party to speak in public automatically makes
the media speak for this party.
Second: Writing about xenophobic politicians with disrespect can turn
against their voters’ political will and credibility. This in turn stigmatises
these voters as outsiders who make unacceptable choices, and thus
possibly reinforces their isolation in their extremist opposition to political
society.
While stigmatising voters may not work, unmasking responsible political
individuals as irresponsible antisocial human beings may. The choice
could be taken not to give them the floor, but to show up this reality,
while conveying the sense that they are unworthy of identifying with.
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The press can humanise and individualise, move away from reporting
on groups, to focus on the individuals in these groups. Talking about the
faces identified with ideologies turns anonymous people into individual
human beings, who are responsible for their acts.
In conclusion, what if one treated xenophobes as “antidemocratic”,
immoral human beings who actively attack parts of the population?
What if one referred to the evil of fascism, Islamophobia etc., instead
of just another legitimate party, explaining the consequences for the
outcast individual? While at the same time referring to their voters as
having been misled by a legitimate-seeming disguise masking inhuman
activities?
Social values and the individual
If EU and member state politicians adopt a social discourse and social
initiatives take place, the press can transmit their message and support
it with interesting and attractive journalism. In parallel or independently,
it can assume a social role, extending its function as a mirror of society
to embrace the responsibility of creating public opinion.
If today values of individualism, consumerism and self-interest have
become predominant, these values prejudice immigrants in times of
crisis. The press can revert to traditional European social values by
focusing less on business and economics, and more on the image of
society and social activities. To counter xenophobia and to support an
inclusive society, the press can transmit concrete examples of integration
success stories, giving a human face to the label of foreigner, be it at
local, national or EU level.
Positive, accessible and clear news with human examples of the integration
of immigrants from the neighbourhood can create understanding, when
showing a rich, multicultural social life, when reflecting the happiness of the
development of identity or problem-solving work by civic organisations,
and when amplifying the voices of individuals who are normally silenced.
Didactic reporting on the fears of society can help to destroy polemic
topics proactively, countering sensationalist reporting and exaggeration.
When the press addresses insecurities within society whilst cutting the
amalgam with immigration, it can make credible social news. e.g. by
showing how immigrants experience the same problems (fear of theft,
instability, unemployment), by underlining the beneficial role of immigrants
for society, their positive economic contribution to welfare systems,
and by reminding that in times of a healthy economy, immigrants were
invited to join the work force.
The EU and national authorities should encourage quality journalism
by financing media that espouses ethics of balanced and researched
news production which install tolerance and understanding in society.
DiploCat_6.indd 21 24/03/14 10:18

22. 22
They could do so by stepping up EU and national awards for inclusive,
representative and responsible reporting. To fund those who pass on
vital messages for inclusive societies.
Working together to give the EU a human face
To change voters’ perceptions of the EU the press can give credible
arguments to pro-Europeans to combat low voter turnout by delivering
interesting and attractive news.
Problem number one: How to interest readers in something that has a
distant image and does not automatically encourage the citizen to feel
involved? For the press which thrives on stories which the reader can
relate to, but depend on the existence of positive events to talk about,
this is a problem. The result is that often, the press is reluctant to publish
on European issues, saying that “it would lose readers, as the public is
not interested, that it is too risky to focus on the EU”. If then Brussels is
blamed, the public believes it, because it has not been told otherwise.
This gap must be closed if the press is to reach the people who will be
voting. However, if communication is about institutions, norms and rules
of procedure, the effort will remain huge.
Problem number two: The EU is seen as a bureaucratic shell, in which
laws are made and passed on to the member states, allegedly with
funds to help implementation. It has very low visibility for its concrete
initiatives, especially in the social sphere. Market events are higher on
the (communications) agenda than social initiatives. This makes the
outcome of social initiatives less representative than market liberalisation
and financial measures. Concrete results could be given to the press by
implementing member states, if national politicians pass the praise for
the good result to the EU.
Problem number three: Well-balanced news items based on facts, which
are de-emotionalised, can be dry and unattractive to readers. Press and
politicians face the same problem of the sensationalist social rhetoric
of some Eurosceptics and populists, and pro-Europeans being unable
to counter on the same level.
The EU needs to be touchable to be interesting, needs to be wrapped
in information on the specific benefits of the EU for citizen, and needs
to be presented together with examples. This way the press can use the
same techniques of proximity as the populists, but in inclusive ways, to
reach out directly to voters.
Pro-Europeans within the EU and national politics need to work together
with the press to give the EU a positive discourse, supported by the
mainstream parties in the European Parliament, at national and local levels.
This facilitates the developing of identity campaigns and awareness-
raising on concrete and customised European projects, with individuals
DiploCat_6.indd 22 24/03/14 10:18

23. 23
who benefit from the EU, so that readers in the different EU member
states can relate to the information. To give pro-European media the
ammunition to be more outspoken and to make a strong case, this could
involve national politicians linking the EU to the national context and
including the EU in their campaigns.
Specific initiatives could involve the provision by the EU of material
from individual projects or results within the member state, to support
national news media in raising support for important initiatives such
as the EU elections. Moreover, independent organisations could be
included in the project of giving EU money for good EU coverage in
national newspapers and TVs, with the aim to fund those who can pass
the message. This common effort should pre-empt the prediction that
the only voters who will vote massively are the anti-Europeans, and
challenge the impression that only the “antis” have good arguments.
Presentation
of one of the speakers,
at the OSIFE premises
in Barcelona
DiploCat_6.indd 23 24/03/14 10:18

24. 24
European democracy has an identity problem, as people do not know
and/or do not identify with it. This opens the door to Eurosceptic
criticism and facilitates the entry of populists. The situation seems
more worrying for EU societies than for EU institutions. The EP as
an institution may not change with these elections, but certainly the
debate on European values, and of law-making proposals, may be
influenced by the increase of populist MEPs in the EP. At national level
the EU is not strongly present, whether the cause is a mis-perception
or the lack of real communication, a flaw in democratic structures or
EU policies, or simply a lack of interest in politics.
Xenophobic populism can gain influence when its ideas are made
acceptable within that society. With economic crisis, a society can
be (but need not be) at risk of becoming more susceptible to this
kind of abuse.
Taking fears within society seriously; abstaining from the exploitation
of fears as a political tactic and from sensational reporting; openly
denouncing the use of fear; not adopting the populist rhetoric proposed
by political individuals or groups: these are all measures for preventing
xenophobic ideas from infiltrating mainstream politics and changing
society’s perception of this discourse. They are valid for the EU institutions,
national politics and media. Any responsible counter-action such as
social inclusion should first analyse the causes of these perceptions,
acknowledging the voter’s choice as a form of protest, or a feeling of
not belonging to mainstream society.
Without conscientious communication at EU level and at national
level, the European institutions will not be able to reap the benefits
of integrative activities favouring European values. Communication in
proximity to citizens and voters is effective, letting readers identify EU
activities with their own interests and environment. National parliaments,
civil society and media have a great influence in transmitting messages.
Their importance must be reflected transversally in programmes, to
support their positive influence on the European construct.
Only far-reaching cooperation of all actors involved can succeed in
stemming the rise of populism and Euroscepticism in the European
Parliament and in reinforcing this institution as the democratic guardian
of human rights of the European construct. The risk of diminishing the
European idea, which stands for inclusion, solidarity and the sharing
of common cultural and political roots, must be taken seriously on
all political and societal levels, in a shared effort for the peaceful
coexistence of all members of European society.
CONCLUSION
DiploCat_6.indd 24 24/03/14 10:18

25. EUROPEAN
ELECTIONS 2014:
THE RISE
OF XENOPHOBIC
AND EUROSCEPTIC
MOVEMENTS IN
EUROPE
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26. 26
SERGI BARRERA
Sergi Barrera is a journalist and press officer at the Information
Office of the European Parliament in Barcelona since September
2008. Previously he was press officer of the Secretariat for
the EU and the Delegation of the Government of Catalonia
to the EU (2007-2008) and former President of the Young European
Federalists (JEF Europe) in Catalonia (2008-2009).
LILA CABALLERO
Lila Caballero is head of projects at Counterpoint and the
project manager and senior researcher on the Recapturing
Europe’s Reluctant Radicals project. Ms Caballero holds a
PhD in Government and an Msc in Comparative Politics from
the London School of Economics. During her postgraduate studies she
focused on the underlying power dynamics of institutions, which are
deeply rooted in culture and traditions. At Counterpoint she has been
able to continue exploring the “hidden wiring” and cultural complexities
of European institutions, mainly through her work on populism. Ms
Caballero has authored, co-authored and commissioned various pieces
on the hidden wiring of populism within the Reluctant Radicals project,
and often writes short pieces on current events for the Counterpoint
website.
TERESA CARRERAS
Teresa Carreras is President of the Association of European Journalists
of Catalonia (APEC). She is also professor of journalism at the Faculty
of Communication Sciences at the Autonomous University of Barcelona,
and at the Tecnocampus Mataró-Maresme, which forms part of the
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Furthermore, she is correspondent
for the weekly El Siglo, and is director of The Independent news agency
for gender topics. Previously Ms Carreras worked as a journalist for
Spanish TV (TVE) for twenty five years; from 2001-2004 she was editor
in chief of TVE in Barcelona, and correspondent in Brussels from 1989
to 2008.
KYRIAKOS CHATZISTEFANOU
Kyriakos Chatzistefanou is a journalist and film director. He has worked
for BBC World Service, The Guardian and several media organisations
in Greece and Cyprus. He co-directed the documentaries “Debtocracy”
and “Catastroika” and he is now finishing the documentary “Fascism
Inc”. He is the author of three books on current affairs.
APPENDIX
I. Participants
in alphabetical
order
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27. 27
CARME COLOMINA
CarmeColominaisworldeditoratARAnewspaperandAssociateResearcher
on European Affairs at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs
(CIDOB). She also teaches International Journalism at Pompeu Fabra
University (Barcelona) and University of Vic. She is a frequent contributor
to various media as an analyst of European current affairs. She graduated
in Information Science from the Autonomous University of Barcelona and
postgraduated in European Union Studies from the Open University of
Catalonia. She has been head of international affairs and correspondent
of Catalunya Ràdio in Brussels. Ms Colomina has covered international
summits in some 20 countries and the war in Afghanistan in 2001. She has
worked as an adviser on various communication projects in the European
and Euro-Mediterranean sphere, and was head of Interregional Cooperation
in the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Catalonia.
JEAN COMTE
Jean Comte is a freelance journalist for Euractiv, and contributing
journalist to the website CafeBabel.fr, where he specialises in European
Affairs and the European institutions and their relations with European
citizens. He covered several of Commissioner Reding’s Citizens’ dialogues,
and also wrote about the European year of citizens and European
citizens’ initiatives. He contributes to several French newspapers,
such as Le Monde, Le Quotidien, L’Avenir, La Dépêche du Midi and
Paris Normandie. Mr Comte holds degrees in Philosophy from Paris
and Brussels University.
MARC GAFAROT i MONJÓ
Marc Gafarot is projects manager at the Barcelona Centre for
International Affairs (CIDOB). He holds a degree in Humanities from
the Universidad de Navarra, an MSc in European Studies from the
London School of Economics and an MA in Latin American Studies from
the University of Liverpool. As a journalist and political commentator
he has worked from London for Bloomberg LP, in Latin America for
Summit Communications and served as a Parliamentary Adviser at
the European Parliament in Brussels and Strasbourg. Mr Gafarot has
also worked from Barcelona as Head of International Relations for
Fundació CATmón and for the English-written magazine Catalan
International View. He has written a book on Flanders and Federalism in
Belgium called “La mort de Bèlgica: La gradual i pacífica emancipació
flamenco” and he has co-authored “The Student’s Guide to European
Integration”. He collaborates with a number of Catalan publications
and has published works on Political Science, Nationalism, Immigration,
European and world politics.
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28. 28
FRANCESCA GUARDIOLA
Francesca Guardiola is Deputy Director General of the Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs, Government of Catalonia since September 2011.
Previously she was Head of the MP’s Services Section of the Parliament
of Catalonia from 2006-2011 and Head of Protocol at the Ministry of
Education of the Government of Catalonia from 2003 -2006. She holds
a BA in Catalan Philology and a Master’s degree in Cultural Management
from the University of Barcelona, and attended postgraduate courses
in Acting at the Arts Educational School in London.
DAVID KARVALA
David Karvala is one of the initiators and spokespeople of Unitat
Contra el Feixisme i el Racisme (UCFR), the broad antifascist and
antiracist movement in Catalonia founded in 2010. He grew up in
London, and participated in the Anti-Nazi League in the late 1970s.
For the last 20 years, he has lived in Barcelona, where he is an activist
in the anti-capitalist left and the social movements. He was one of the
spokespeople of Plataforma Aturem la Guerra, Catalonia’s antiwar
movement, from 2003-10. He edited and co-authored the book “No
Pasarán, aunque lleven trajes”. Forthcoming is a book analysing the
European far right, with a special emphasis on distinguishing between
populist and fascist parties.
PETER KELLNER
Peter Kellner is President of YouGov, an international opinion polling
organisation, in the United Kingdom. He was previously a journalist
and political commentator for the Sunday Times, Independent,
New Statesman, Evening Standard, BBC Newsnight, BBC election
programmes and Channel 4 News. As well as being a member of the
British Polling Council’s committee on disclosure, Mr Kellner has been
an adviser on polls and public opinion to the Bank of England, Foreign
Office, Corporation of London, National Westminster Bank plc and
Trades Union Congress. Mr Kellner is also a member of the Council,
National Institute of Economics and Social Research and a Trustee at
the Action on Smoking and Health, the Hansard Society and Upring.
In 2011 he was given a Special Recognition award by the Political
Studies Association for his work over four decades on opinion polls,
elections and political analysis, and named Chairman of the Year by
Quoted Companies Alliance (2006).
Amongst others, he is author of “Democracy: the 1,000-year struggle
for British Liberty, 2009” and “New Mutualism: The Third Way, 1998”.
He has an MA in Economics and Statistics from Cambridge University.
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29. 29
PÉTER KREKÓ
Péter Krekó is Director of Political Capital, a policy research and
consulting institute in Hungary. He graduated as a psychologist
specializing in social psychology and also holds a Master’s Degree
in Political Sciences. His main research interest is the social demand
for radical right movements and the social psychology of conspiracy
theories. As an assistant professor at Eötvös Loránd University, he
is delivering lectures on social and political psychology, including
intergroup conflicts and prejudices, the social psychology of political
radicalism, and the social psychology of conspiracy theories. He is the
author of numerous studies and articles on the radical right and the
demand for right wing radicalism, and regularly comments in domestic
and international media on these issues. He has been a consultant of
the Hungarian Anti-Racist Foundation. He is now a co-chair of the
Preventing Violent Extremism working group of the EU Radicalisation
Awareness Network, an umbrella organization that connects key groups
of people involved in countering violent radicalisation across the EU
and serves as an advisory board for the Commission.
XAVIER MAS DE XAXÀS
Xavier Mas De Xaxàs is foreign desk reporter at La Vanguardia. Since
2010 he has been covering the Arab world from Algeria to Yemen. He
was correspondent in the US from 1996 to 2002, and covered in 1989
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany. He then went
on to write about the Balkans, Russia and other European countries.
Moreover, he teaches writing at Ramon Llull University. Mr Mas de Xaxàs
is author of two books: “The American smile” (Mondadori, 2003) and
“Lies. A journalist’s trip to disinformation” (Destino, 2005).
ROSA MASSAGUÉ
Rosa Massagué is journalist at El Periódico de Catalunya, the daily
Barcelona newspaper, where she has developed most of her professional
career. She has been correspondent in London and Rome and has reported
as special envoy on conflicts such as Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and the
Balkans. She is a senior analyst on international affairs, writing regular
columns for the print and on-line version of El Periódico, and is also
member of the Editorial board. Ms Massagué is a regular commentator
on radio and TV stations. She is the author of the book “El legado político
de Blair” (Catarata, 2007) and teaches International Journalism at the
Master in Journalism BCN_NY.
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30. 30
PETER MATJAŠI
Peter Matjaši is project coordinator for the Open Society Initiative for
Europe. His work focuses on the 2014 European elections. Before joining
the Open Society Foundations, Mr Matjaši was a project coordinator
at Avanti Europe. He has been active in the field of youth work for ten
years: as a volunteer with the European Volunteer Service in Barcelona, a
youth trainer and facilitator for the European Youth Forum, and a youth
representative and youth worker with the Young European Federalists.
He set up the English version of Le Taurillon webzine under the name
thenewfederalist.eu, serving as its first editor-in-chief. He graduated
in International Relations.
YASIR MIRZA
Yasir Mirza is the global head of diversity & inclusion at Guardian News
& media, and has overall responsibility for ensuring that on an editorial
level, the Guardian better reflects the values of independence and
inclusiveness, by not only ensuring a broader diversity of voices to be
heard within the papers and websites, but that the Guardian’s editorial
coverage accurately reflects the diverse societies we live in today. Mr
Mirza started out as a freelance consultant and trainer working for various
public and private sector organisations. He was involved in training
programmes for organisations using interactive theatre and forum
techniques, such as Augusto Boal’s theatre of the oppressed, as a way
to tackle organisational inertia by exploring the dynamics of power, and
using interventions to tackle “oppression” in all its forms. He has also
performed as an actor acting for various productions, been a TV presenter,
and has also worked with children from dis-advantaged backgrounds,
using theatre as a technique to build self-esteem, confidence, and self-
expression. He currently runs citizen reporting training with marginalised
voices in oppressed communities globally to help unearth their stories.
MARLEY MORRIS
Marley Morris is a researcher and consultant at Counterpoint on the
Recapturing Europe’s Reluctant Radicals project. He focuses on populist
parties and movements, political narratives, and the social and cultural
determinants of instability in Europe. His reports include “Recapturing
the Reluctant Radical: How to win back Europe’s populist vote” and
“Conflicted Politicians: the populist radical right in the European
Parliament”. He is also currently managing the “Rival Political Narratives”
project and is leading a series of populism “self-defence” workshops
on how to counter populist rhetoric in Europe. Prior to his work at
Counterpoint, Marley was at the Violence and Extremism programme
at Demos, where he contributed to the report “The New Face of Digital
DiploCat_6.indd 30 24/03/14 10:18

31. 31
Populism” and developed a well-being index for a study on ageing across
Europe. Marley has a Master’s degree in Mathematics and Philosophy
from Oxford University.
MILAGROS PÉREZ OLIVA
Milagros Pérez Oliva is a journalist and university professor. In 1982 she
joined El País as journalist, and is currently member of de Editorial team
and head of Opinion in the Catalan edition of the newspaper, after having
been Public Editor of the newspaper between 2009 and 2012. Moreover,
she collaborates as analyst with the Television of Catalonia (TVC / TV3)
programme “Bon dia, Catalunya”, the Catalunya Ràdio programme “El
Matí de Catalunya Ràdio”, the Cadena Ser radio programme “Hora 25”
and the Spanish TV (TVE) programme “El Debat”. In 2006 she was
awarded the National Journalism Prize (Government of Catalonia) for
her independent and critical journalist work on the subjects of public
health and epidemiology.
MONTSERRAT RADIGALES
Montserrat Radigales is international correspondent for El Periódico
de Catalunya. She was a political reporter for Avui (1977-83) and El
Periódico (1983-84) during the Spanish transition to democracy. She has
been London correspondent (1984-1990) and Brussels correspondent
(1992-1996). She has reported extensively on the European Union, the
Balkans and the Middle East. Ms Radigales worked for the Office of the
High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina as Head of Public
Affairs and spokesperson of the Supervisor of Brcko (1998-2000) and
for the Spanish Embassy in Sarajevo as Assistant and Advisor to the
Ambassador during the Spanish Presidency of the EU (2002). She
was awarded a Fulbright scholarship and holds a Master’s degree in
International Public Policy from the School of Advanced International
Studies (SAIS, Washington D.C.) of the Johns Hopkins University (1991).
She is a member of the board of the Association of European Journalists
of Catalonia (APEC).
RAÜL ROMEVA
Raül Romeva is Member of the European Parliament for the Group of
the Greens/European Free Alliance since 2004, and since 2009 one of
its Vice Presidents. He is member of the ICV de Iniciativa per Catalunya
Verds party’s Youth Development Group and National Council, and since
2004 Head of the Europe Group. Amongst his activities in the European
Parliament are reports on international arms trade and his contributions
as member of the InterGroup LGTB. Mr Romeva graduated in Economics
from the Autonomous University of Barcelona (1989), and received
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32. 32
his Doctorate in International Relations from this University in 2002.
Specialising in Foreign Affairs, he was research analyst in armed conflict
and post-war rehabilitation (UNESCO Centre of Catalonia, Intermón Oxfam
and the School for a Culture of Peace at UAB), as well as UN consultant
on post-war rehabilitation and disarmament, with responsibilities as
principal assistant to the UNESCO representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
He is author of several books and articles, including “Pau i seguretat a
Europa” (1998); “Desarme y desarrollo” (2000); “Guerra, posguerra y
paz: pautas para el análisis y la intervención en contextos posbélicos o
postacuerdo” (2003),”’Bosnia en paz: lecciones, retos y oportunidades
de una posguerra contemporánea” (2003).
ALBERT ROYO
Albert Royo is Secretary General of the Public Diplomacy Council of
Catalonia since February 2013. He holds a BA in Political Science and
a Master’s degree in Applied Economic Analysis from Pompeu Fabra
University (Barcelona), as well as a degree in European Affairs from
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Moreover,
he is a lecturer of European and International Institutions at Pompeu
Fabra University and has taught European Affairs at the Diplomatic
School of Uruguay. Mr Royo has worked for the Government of Catalonia
as Secretary for International Cooperation (2005-2007) and for the
European Commission as press officer (2001-2013). As for his civil
society engagement, Mr Royo is the promoter of Horitzó Europa, a
non-governmental organisation which fosters debate about Europe in
Catalonia and about Catalonia in Europe.
WILFRIED RÜTTEN
Wilfried Rütten is Director of the European Journalism Centre. He has
worked in German public and private broadcasting as a reporter and
producer (ARD, RTL-Group) as well as in journalism education. Before
joining the EJC he was the head of school for digital television at the
University of Applied Sciences in Salzburg, Austria.
MARINA TUNEVA
Marina Tuneva is lecturer at the School of Journalism and Public Relations
(SJPR) in Skopje, Macedonia. She has completed postgraduate studies
in Diplomacy at the University in Malta and is working on her PhD thesis
in the area of public relations and intercultural communication. As an
expert in public relations, diversity reporting, peace journalism and
intercultural communication, she has been actively involved in developing
educational programs and projects in these areas both in the country
and abroad. She is actively involved in the MEDIANE programme of the
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33. 33
Council of Europe and EU – Media in Europe for Diversity and Inclusiveness
on behalf of the European Journalism Training Association - EJTA. Ms
Tuneva has also taken part in the activities of the Council of Europe
aimed at development of training practices for journalists in the area of
diversity reporting. She is author of three publications: “Introduction to
Public Relations”; “Media, Citizens and Intercultural Communications”
and “The Diversity Reporting Handbook”.
RON VAN DOOREN
Ron van Dooren teaches politics at the Journalism department of
the Fontys University of Applied Sciences (Tilburg, the Netherlands).
His main subjects are the political system of the Netherlands and the
institutions and decision making process in the EU.
MARC VIDAL
Marc Vidal is foreign editor at the newspaper ARA. Previously he was
journalist at Catalunya Ràdio, the national public radio of Catalonia,
broadcasting and editing news from Barcelona and as correspondent
from Brussels. His main focus is on international news, especially on
European countries and EU institutions. He is member of the board
of the Professional Association of Journalists of Catalonia (Col·legi de
Periodistes de Catalunya). He also specialises in New Technologies.
ELINA VIILUP
Elina Viilup is Research Fellow at the Barcelona Centre for International
Affairs (CIDOB). She has worked as an adviser for European Parliament’s
political and administrative management bodies, as well as a special
adviser of the Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, where her
main dossiers included external aspects of energy policy, the Eastern
Dimension of the Union’s external policies, including EU’s bilateral
relations with its Eastern Partners and the Russian Federation, the
Eastern Partnership, the Black Sea Synergy, enlargement to South East
Europe, and parliamentary cooperation with multilateral parliamentary
assemblies (OSCE PA, PABSEC). She started her career as a consultant
and adviser in the area of EU communication policy and enlargement
issues at the European Commission Delegation in Tallinn, Estonia.
She holds a Master’s of Advanced European Studies in European
Politics, European Law, and Economics of European integration from
the University of Basel, Switzerland. She has further obtained a post-
graduate Diploma of International Relations and European Integration
from the Estonian School of Diplomacy. She has graduated in English
Language and Literature, and Public Administration of the University
of Tartu, Estonia.
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34. 34
BALÁZS WEYER
Balázs Weyer is Chairman of the Editors’ Forum Hungary. Previously
he was editor-in-chief at the Hungarian news portal Origo.hu, which
he founded in 1998. During that time, he also participated in the expert
focus group for the European Commission, preparing the audiovisual
directive in 2006 and a board member of the Hungarian Association of
Content Providers between 2003 and 2010. He has been columnist and
editor at Magyar Narancs, Vasárnapi Hírek and managing director of
nationally broadcast news programme RTL Klub, and president of the
board for Tilos Radio. Mr Weyer has acted as President of the president
of the European Association of Community Broadcasters and Vice
President of the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters,
Member of the Advisory Board of the Organisation of Free Radios
in Hungary, as well as of the Foundation for Quality Journalism. He
has authored and co-authored handbooks on investigative reporting
and media ethics for reporters, radio broadcasters, and economic
journalists. He studied communication sciences in Budapest and
ethnomusicology in Sheffield.
RICARD ZAPATA-BARRERO
Ricard Zapata-Barrero is accredited full professor at the Department of
Social and Political Science of the Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona).
He is Director of GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on
Immigration) and the Master Programme on immigration management
at Pompeu Fabra University. Currently Mr Zapata-Barrero is working
on research related to Governance and Diversity, addressing different
aspects of intercultural policies. Amongst others he directs the project
“Diversity: Municipalities and immigration: interculturality and the index
of Governability” (2012-14), funded by the Spanish Ministry of Innovation
and Science, and “Monitoring xenophobic political discourses: A pilot
study in Catalonia” (2012-2014), financed by Open Society Foundations.
Mr Zapata-Barrero founded the Intercultural Cities Network in Spain,
as expert of the intercultural cities program of the Council of Europe.
He is also member of several government advisory boards, and regular
contributor to media and policy debates. He is author of several books,
including “Diversity management in Spain: new dimensions, new
challenges” (Manchester University Press) (2013) and forthcoming
“The Politics of Immigration in Multi-level States” (co-edited with E.
Hepburn), Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave/MacMillan.
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35. 08:30 h
Meeting at the premises of the Open Society
Initiative for Europe
09:00 h
Welcome of the participants and introduction
Peter Matjaši , Coordinator European Elections
Project, Open Society Initiative for Europe.
Albert Royo, Secretary General, Public
Diplomacy Council of Catalonia.
09:15 h
Xenophobia – The next major threat to Europe?
Peter Kellner, President YouGov.
Lila Caballero, Researcher Counterpoint.
Chaired by Peter Matjaši , Coordinator European
Elections Project, Open Society Initiative
for Europe.
10:30 h
Controversy: Is the press to blame?
Péter Krekó, Director Political Capital Institute
(Hungary).
Kyriakos Chatzistefanou, journalist with Greek
media, The Guardian and film director.
Xavier Mas de Xaxàs, Reporter La Vanguardia.
Chaired by Wilfried Rütten, Director European
Journalism Centre.
12:00 h
The European Parliament and populism
Raül Romeva, Member of the European
Parliament, Group of the Greens/European
Free Alliance.
Marley Morris, Researcher Counterpoint.
Chaired by Rosa Massagué, journalist
El Periódico and member of Association
of Catalan European Journalists.
12:45 h
Projections for the elections of the European
Parliament: Repercussions of xenophobia and
euroscepticism – scenarios and conclusions.
Ricard Zapata-Barrero, accredited Professor
of Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona),
Lila Caballero, Kyriakos Chatzistefanou,
Peter Kellner, Péter Krekó, Xavier Mas de Xaxàs,
Marley Morris and Raül Romeva.
Chaired by Albert Royo, Secretary General,
Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia.
13:55 h
Closing remarks
Albert Royo, Secretary General, Public
Diplomacy Council of Catalonia.
APPENDIX II
Programme
of the
workshop
17 January 2014
DiploCat_6.indd 35 24/03/14 10:18

36. Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia
Av. Diagonal, 418, 1r, 2a,
08037 Barcelona
www.diplocat.cat
@ThIsCatalonia / @diplocat_inst
In cooperation with the Open Society Initiative for Europe
EUROPEAN
ELECTIONS 2014:
THE RISE
OF XENOPHOBIC
AND EUROSCEPTIC
MOVEMENTS IN
EUROPE
DiploCat_6.indd 36 24/03/14 10:18