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DNSSEC
                          for the Root Zone
                           MENOG 6 Riyadh , Saudi Arabia
                                  April 2010

                               Mehmet Akcin, ICANN




Thursday, April 8, 2010
This design is the result of a cooperation
                       between ICANN & VeriSign with
                      support from the U.S. DoC NTIA




Thursday, April 8, 2010
Roles and
                          Responsibilities


Thursday, April 8, 2010
ICANN
                                  IANA Functions Operator


                      • Manages the Key Signing Key (KSK)
                      • Accepts DS records from TLD operators
                      • Verifies and processes request
                      • Sends update requests to DoC for
                          authorization and to VeriSign for
                          implementation


Thursday, April 8, 2010
DoC NTIA
                                  U.S. Department of Commerce
                   National Telecommunications and Information Administration


                      • Authorizes changes to the root zone
                          ‣ DS records
                          ‣ Key Signing Keys
                          ‣ DNSSEC update requests follow the same
                            process as other changes

                      • Checks that ICANN has followed their
                          agreed upon verification/processing policies
                          and procedures
Thursday, April 8, 2010
VeriSign
                                   Root Zone Maintainer



                      • Manages the Zone Signing Key (ZSK)
                      • Incorporates NTIA-authorized changes
                      • Signs the root zone with the ZSK
                      • Distributes the signed zone to the root
                          server operators



Thursday, April 8, 2010
DNS records sent from                      Verified data     Authorized data                                                      Root Zone
               TLD operator to ICANN                       sent to DoC     sent to VeriSign                                                    distributed to
                                                                                                                                               root servers

                                ICANN                                                    VeriSign

            TLD                                                                                                                                                  Root
                                           RZM                           DoC                  Unsigned root           Signer     Signed root                    Servers
           Operator




                KSK published              KSK                                                                         ZSK
                                                                 ZSK sent from VeriSign to ICANN
                  by ICANN              Management                                                                  Management



                                                     Keyset is signed by KSK and sent back from ICANN to VeriSign




Thursday, April 8, 2010
Deployment



Thursday, April 8, 2010
Goals
                      • Deploy a signed root zone
                          ‣ Transparent processes
                          ‣ Audited procedures
                          ‣ DNSSEC deployment
                            •   validators, registries, registrars, name server
                                operators

                      • Communicate early and often!
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Anticipated Issues



Thursday, April 8, 2010
DO=1
                      • A significant proportion of DNS clients
                          send queries with EDNS0 and DO=1
                      • Some (largely unquantified, but potentially
                          significant) population of such clients are
                          unable to receive large responses
                      • Serving signed responses might break those
                          clients


Thursday, April 8, 2010
Rollback
                      • If we sign the root, there will be some early
                          validator deployment
                      • There is the potential for some clients to
                          break, perhaps badly enough that we need
                          to un-sign the root (e.g., see previous slide)
                      • Un-signing the root will break the DNS for
                          validators


Thursday, April 8, 2010
Staged Deployment



Thursday, April 8, 2010
Deploy Incrementally

                      • The goal is to leave the client population
                          with some root servers not offering large
                          responses until the impact of those large
                          responses is better understood
                      • Relies upon resolvers not always choosing a
                          single server



Thursday, April 8, 2010
DURZ
                      • Deploy conservatively
                          ‣ It is the root zone, after all
                      • Prevent a community of validators from
                          forming
                          ‣ This allows us to unsign the root zone during
                             the deployment phase (if we have) to without
                             collateral damage



Thursday, April 8, 2010
DURZ
                      •   “Deliberately Unvalidatable Root Zone”
                      •   Sign RRSets with keys that are not published in
                          the zone (but with matching keytag…)
                      •   Publish keys in the zone which are not used, and
                          which additionally contain advice for operators
                          (see next slide)
                      •   Swap in actual signing keys (which enables
                          validation) at the end of the deployment process


Thursday, April 8, 2010
DURZ
                 .       3600    IN     DNSKEY  257  3  5 (
                                        AwEAAa++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
                                        ++THIS/KEY/AN/INVALID/KEY/AND/SHOULD
                                        /NOT/BE/USED/CONTACT/ROOTSIGN/AT/ICA
                                        NN/DOT/ORG/FOR/MORE/INFORMATION+++++
                                        ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
                                        ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
                                        ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
                                        ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
                                        ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
                                        ++++++++++++++++++++++/=
                                        ) ; Key ID = 6477




Thursday, April 8, 2010
Deploy Incrementally
                               L          Completed on 27 January
                               A          Completed on 10 February
                              M, I          Completed on 3 March
                            D, K, E        Completed March 22nd
                                          Being Completed this week.
                          B, H, C, G, F
                                                 “April 14th”
                                J                  May 5th



Thursday, April 8, 2010
Measurement

                      • For those root servers that are
                          instrumented, full packet captures and
                          subsequent analysis around signing events
                      • Ongoing dialogue with operator
                          communities to assess real-world impact of
                          changes



Thursday, April 8, 2010
Testing

                      • A prerequisite for this proposal is a captive
                          test of the deployment
                          ‣ Test widely-deployed resolvers, with validation
                             enabled and disabled, against the DURZ
                          ‣ Test with clients behind broken networks that
                             drop large responses




Thursday, April 8, 2010
Interaction with TLDs



Thursday, April 8, 2010
DS Change Requests
                      • Approach likely to be based on existing
                          methods for TLD managers to request
                          changes in root zone
                      • Anticipate being able to accept DS requests
                          1-2 months before the validatable signed
                          root zone is in production
                      • Current topic of discussion within Root
                          DNSSEC Design Team


Thursday, April 8, 2010
Communication



Thursday, April 8, 2010
Project Web Page
                      • http://www.root-dnssec.org
                          ‣ Status updates
                          ‣ Documents
                          ‣ Presentation Archive
                          ‣ Small collection of links to relevant tools
                          ‣ Contact information
                          ‣ RSS

Thursday, April 8, 2010
Communication
                                 with non-technical audiences




                      • Will reach the non-technical and semi-
                          technical audiences with press releases and
                          other means.
                      • PR departments with people who know
                          how to do this will be engaged.




Thursday, April 8, 2010
Communication
                                    with technical audiences


                      • Reaching the technical audiences via mailing
                          lists and other means
                          ‣ IETF DNS lists (e.g. DNSOP)
                          ‣ non-IETF DNS lists (e.g. DNS-OARC)
                          ‣ General operator lists (e.g. MENOG)
                          ‣ …


Thursday, April 8, 2010
Draft Timeline
                      •   December 1, 2009
                          ‣ Root zone signed
                            •   Initially signed zone stays internal to ICANN and VeriSign
                          ‣ ICANN and VeriSign begin KSR processing
                            •   ZSK and KSK rolls

                      •   January - July 2010
                          ‣ Incremental roll out of signed root
                      •   July 1, 2010
                          ‣ KSK rolled and trust anchor published
                          ‣ Signed root fully deployed
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Deployment Status
                               13 April 2010




Thursday, April 8, 2010
Documentation
                      • Requirements document posted
                      • High-Level Architecture, Policy and Practice
                          Statements, Trust Anchor Publication,
                          Deployment documents posted in draft
                          form
                      • Ceremony, KSK Facility Requirements,
                          Testing documents expected to be posted
                          soon
                                http://www.root-dnssec.org
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Testing

                      • Data collection testing by Root Server
                          Operators complete - have now done this
                          for real
                      • Several KSR/SKR exchanges complete
                      • DURZ vs. Resolver testing complete

Thursday, April 8, 2010
DURZ Roll-Out

                      • L, A, M, I, D, K, and E root servers are
                          running the DURZ
                      • B C G F and H will complete the transition
                          this week.
                      • J will have DURZ on 5 May 2010

Thursday, April 8, 2010
Other zones

                                      ARPA is now signed
                              Work on how to sign IN-ADDR.ARPA,
                          IP6.ARPA is happening and reasonable progress
                                          is expected.




Thursday, April 8, 2010
Thoughts?


                      • Feedback is extremely welcome
                          ‣ Email to rootsign@icann.org




Thursday, April 8, 2010
Root DNSSEC Design Team
                               Joe Abley
                           Mehmet Akcin
                             David Blacka
                            David Conrad
                            Richard Lamb
                             Matt Larson
                          Fredrik Ljunggren
                             Dave Knight
                          Tomofumi Okubo
                            Jakob Schlyter
                           Duane Wessels


Thursday, April 8, 2010

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Rootsign menog6-overview

  • 1. DNSSEC for the Root Zone MENOG 6 Riyadh , Saudi Arabia April 2010 Mehmet Akcin, ICANN Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 2. This design is the result of a cooperation between ICANN & VeriSign with support from the U.S. DoC NTIA Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 3. Roles and Responsibilities Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 4. ICANN IANA Functions Operator • Manages the Key Signing Key (KSK) • Accepts DS records from TLD operators • Verifies and processes request • Sends update requests to DoC for authorization and to VeriSign for implementation Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 5. DoC NTIA U.S. Department of Commerce National Telecommunications and Information Administration • Authorizes changes to the root zone ‣ DS records ‣ Key Signing Keys ‣ DNSSEC update requests follow the same process as other changes • Checks that ICANN has followed their agreed upon verification/processing policies and procedures Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 6. VeriSign Root Zone Maintainer • Manages the Zone Signing Key (ZSK) • Incorporates NTIA-authorized changes • Signs the root zone with the ZSK • Distributes the signed zone to the root server operators Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 7. DNS records sent from Verified data Authorized data Root Zone TLD operator to ICANN sent to DoC sent to VeriSign distributed to root servers ICANN VeriSign TLD Root RZM DoC Unsigned root Signer Signed root Servers Operator KSK published KSK ZSK ZSK sent from VeriSign to ICANN by ICANN Management Management Keyset is signed by KSK and sent back from ICANN to VeriSign Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 9. Goals • Deploy a signed root zone ‣ Transparent processes ‣ Audited procedures ‣ DNSSEC deployment • validators, registries, registrars, name server operators • Communicate early and often! Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 11. DO=1 • A significant proportion of DNS clients send queries with EDNS0 and DO=1 • Some (largely unquantified, but potentially significant) population of such clients are unable to receive large responses • Serving signed responses might break those clients Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 12. Rollback • If we sign the root, there will be some early validator deployment • There is the potential for some clients to break, perhaps badly enough that we need to un-sign the root (e.g., see previous slide) • Un-signing the root will break the DNS for validators Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 14. Deploy Incrementally • The goal is to leave the client population with some root servers not offering large responses until the impact of those large responses is better understood • Relies upon resolvers not always choosing a single server Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 15. DURZ • Deploy conservatively ‣ It is the root zone, after all • Prevent a community of validators from forming ‣ This allows us to unsign the root zone during the deployment phase (if we have) to without collateral damage Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 16. DURZ • “Deliberately Unvalidatable Root Zone” • Sign RRSets with keys that are not published in the zone (but with matching keytag…) • Publish keys in the zone which are not used, and which additionally contain advice for operators (see next slide) • Swap in actual signing keys (which enables validation) at the end of the deployment process Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 17. DURZ .       3600    IN     DNSKEY  257  3  5 (                        AwEAAa++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++                        ++THIS/KEY/AN/INVALID/KEY/AND/SHOULD                        /NOT/BE/USED/CONTACT/ROOTSIGN/AT/ICA                        NN/DOT/ORG/FOR/MORE/INFORMATION+++++                        ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++                        ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++                        ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++                        ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++                        ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++                        ++++++++++++++++++++++/=                        ) ; Key ID = 6477 Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 18. Deploy Incrementally L Completed on 27 January A Completed on 10 February M, I Completed on 3 March D, K, E Completed March 22nd Being Completed this week. B, H, C, G, F “April 14th” J May 5th Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 19. Measurement • For those root servers that are instrumented, full packet captures and subsequent analysis around signing events • Ongoing dialogue with operator communities to assess real-world impact of changes Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 20. Testing • A prerequisite for this proposal is a captive test of the deployment ‣ Test widely-deployed resolvers, with validation enabled and disabled, against the DURZ ‣ Test with clients behind broken networks that drop large responses Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 22. DS Change Requests • Approach likely to be based on existing methods for TLD managers to request changes in root zone • Anticipate being able to accept DS requests 1-2 months before the validatable signed root zone is in production • Current topic of discussion within Root DNSSEC Design Team Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 24. Project Web Page • http://www.root-dnssec.org ‣ Status updates ‣ Documents ‣ Presentation Archive ‣ Small collection of links to relevant tools ‣ Contact information ‣ RSS Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 25. Communication with non-technical audiences • Will reach the non-technical and semi- technical audiences with press releases and other means. • PR departments with people who know how to do this will be engaged. Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 26. Communication with technical audiences • Reaching the technical audiences via mailing lists and other means ‣ IETF DNS lists (e.g. DNSOP) ‣ non-IETF DNS lists (e.g. DNS-OARC) ‣ General operator lists (e.g. MENOG) ‣ … Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 27. Draft Timeline • December 1, 2009 ‣ Root zone signed • Initially signed zone stays internal to ICANN and VeriSign ‣ ICANN and VeriSign begin KSR processing • ZSK and KSK rolls • January - July 2010 ‣ Incremental roll out of signed root • July 1, 2010 ‣ KSK rolled and trust anchor published ‣ Signed root fully deployed Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 28. Deployment Status 13 April 2010 Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 29. Documentation • Requirements document posted • High-Level Architecture, Policy and Practice Statements, Trust Anchor Publication, Deployment documents posted in draft form • Ceremony, KSK Facility Requirements, Testing documents expected to be posted soon http://www.root-dnssec.org Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 30. Testing • Data collection testing by Root Server Operators complete - have now done this for real • Several KSR/SKR exchanges complete • DURZ vs. Resolver testing complete Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 31. DURZ Roll-Out • L, A, M, I, D, K, and E root servers are running the DURZ • B C G F and H will complete the transition this week. • J will have DURZ on 5 May 2010 Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 32. Other zones ARPA is now signed Work on how to sign IN-ADDR.ARPA, IP6.ARPA is happening and reasonable progress is expected. Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 33. Thoughts? • Feedback is extremely welcome ‣ Email to rootsign@icann.org Thursday, April 8, 2010
  • 34. Root DNSSEC Design Team Joe Abley Mehmet Akcin David Blacka David Conrad Richard Lamb Matt Larson Fredrik Ljunggren Dave Knight Tomofumi Okubo Jakob Schlyter Duane Wessels Thursday, April 8, 2010