report2

1. 1. Biography
a. Birth
It is widelyacceptedthat Plato, the Athenianphilosopher, was born in428-7 B.C.E and diedat the age ofeightyor eighty-one at
348-7 B.C.E. These dates, however, are not entirely certain, for according to Diogenes Laertius (D.L.), following Apollodorus'
chronology, Plato was born the year Periclesdied, was six years younger thanIsocrates, anddiedat the age of eighty-four (D.L.
3.2-3.3). If Plato's date ofdeathis correct in Apollodorus' version, Plato wouldhave beenborn in430 or 431. Diogenes'claim that
Plato was bornthe year Periclesdied wouldput hisbirthin429. Later (at 3.6), Diogenes says that Platowas twenty-eight when
Socrates wasput to death (in399), whichwould, again, put his year of birthat 427. In spite of the confusion, the dates ofPlato's
life we gave above, which are based upon Eratosthenes' calculations, have traditionally been accepted as accurate.
b. Family
Little can be known about Plato's early life. According to Diogenes, whose testimony is notoriously unreliable, Plato's parents
were Ariston andPerictione (or Potone—see D. L. 3.1). Both sides of the familyclaimed to trace their ancestrybackto Poseidon
(D.L. 3.1). Diogenes' report that Plato's birth was the result of Ariston's rape of Perictione (D.L. 3.1) is a good example of the
unconfirmed gossip in which Diogenes so often indulges. We can be confident that Plato also had two older brothers, Glaucon
and Adeimantus, and a sister, Potone, bythe same parents (see D.L. 3.4). (W. K. C. Guthrie, A Historyof GreekPhilosophy, vol. 4,
10 n. 4 argues plausiblythat GlauconandAdeimantus were Plato's older siblings.) After Ariston's death, Plato's mother married
her uncle, Pyrilampes (in Plato's Charmides, we are told that Pyrilampes was Charmides' uncle, and Charmides was Plato's
mother's brother), with whom she had another son, Antiphon, Plato's half-brother (see Plato, Parmenides 126a-b).
Plato came from one of the wealthiest and most politically active families in Athens. Their political activities, however, are not
seen as laudable ones by historians. One of Plato's uncles (Charmides) was a member of the notorious "Thirty Tyrants," who
overthrew the Athenian democracy in 404 B.C.E. Charmides' own uncle, Critias, was the leader of the Thirty. Plato's relatives
were not exclusivelyassociated withthe oligarchic factioninAthens, however. His stepfather Pyrilampes was saidto have been
a close associate of Pericles, when he was the leader of the democratic faction.
Plato's actual given name was apparently Aristocles, after his grandfather. "Plato" seems to have started as a nickname
(for platos, or "broad"), perhaps first given tohimbyhis wrestling teacher for his physique, or for the breadthof his style, or even
the breadthof his forehead(all given in D.L. 3.4). Although the name Aristocleswas still given as Plato's name on one of the two
epitaphs on his tomb (see D.L. 3.43), history knows him as Plato.
c. Early Travels and the Founding of the Academy
When Socrates died, Platoleft Athens, staying first in Megara, but then goingontoseveralother places, includingperhaps Cyrene,
Italy, Sicily, andevenEgypt. Strabo(17.29) claims that he wasshownwhere Plato lived whenhe visitedHeliopolis in Egypt. Plato
occasionallymentions Egypt in hisworks, but not inways that reveal muchofanyconsequence (see, for examples, Phaedrus 274c-
275b; Philebus 19b).

2. Better evidence may be found for his visits to Italy and Sicily, especially in the Seventh Letter.According to the account given
there, Platofirst went to ItalyandSicilywhenhe was "about forty" (324a). While he stayed inSyracuse, he became the instructor
to Dion, brother-in-lawof the tyrant Dionysius I. According to doubtful stories fromlater antiquity, Dionysius became annoyed
with Plato at some point during this visit, and arranged to have the philosopher sold into slavery (Diod. 15.7; Plut. Dion 5; D.L.
3.19-21).
In anyevent, Platoreturnedto Athens and foundeda school, knownas the Academy. (This iswhere we get our word, "academic."
The Academygot its name from its location, a grove of treessacredto the heroAcademus—or Hecademus [seeD.L. 3.7]—a mile
or so outside the Athenian walls; the site can still be visited in modern Athens, but visitors will find it depressingly void of
interesting monuments or features.) Except for two more trips to Sicily, the Academyseems to have been Plato's home base for
the remainder of his life.
d. Later Trips to Sicily and Death
The first of Plato's remaining twoSicilian adventures came after Dionysius I diedandhis youngson, Dionysius II, ascended to the
throne. His uncle/brother-in-law Dion persuaded the young tyrant to invite Plato to come to help him become a philosopher-
ruler of the sort described in theRepublic. Although the philosopher (now in his sixties) was not entirely persuaded of this
possibility(SeventhLetter 328b-c), he agreed togo. This trip, like the last one, however, did not gowell at all. Withinmonths, the
younger Dionysius hadDionsent intoexile for sedition(SeventhLetter 329c, Third Letter 316c-d), andPlatobecame effectively
under house arrest as the "personal guest" of the dictator (Seventh Letter 329c-330b).
Plato eventually managed to gain the tyrant's permission to return to Athens (Seventh Letter338a), and he and Dion were
reunitedat the Academy(Plut. Dion17). Dionysius agreed that "after the war" (Seventh Letter 338a;perhaps the Lucanian War
in 365 B.C.E.), he would invite Platoand Dion backto Syracuse (Third Letter 316e-317a, Seventh Letter 338a-b). Dion andPlato
stayedinAthens for the next four years (c. 365-361 B.C.E.). Dionysius thensummonedPlato, but wished for Dionto wait a while
longer. Dion acceptedthe conditionandencouraged Platoto go immediatelyanyway(Third Letter 317a-b, SeventhLetter 338b-
c), but Platorefusedthe invitation, muchto the consternationof bothSyracusans (Third Letter 317a,SeventhLetter 338c). Hardly
a year hadpassed, however, before Dionysius s ent a ship, withone of Plato's Pythagoreanfriends (Archedemus, an associate of
Archytas—see SeventhLetter 339a-bandnext section) onboard beggingPlatoto return toSyracuse. Partlybecause ofhis friend
Dion's enthusiasmfor the plan, Platodeparted one more time to Syracuse. Once again, however, things inSyracuse were not at
all to Plato's liking. Dionysius once again effectively imprisoned Plato in Syracuse, and the latter was only able to escape again
with help from his Tarentine friends ( Seventh Letter 350a-b).
Dion subsequently gathered an army of mercenaries and invaded his own homeland. But his success was short-lived: he was
assassinated and Sicily was reduced to chaos. Plato, perhaps now completely disgusted with politics, returned to his beloved
Academy, where he livedout the last thirteen years of hislife. According to Diogenes, Platowas buriedat the school he founded
(D.L. 3.41). His grave, however, has not yet been discovered by archeological investigations.
2. Influences on Plato
a. Heraclitus

3. Aristotle and Diogenes agree that Plato had some early association with either the philosophy ofHeraclitus of Ephesus, or with
one or more ofthat philosopher's followers (see Aristotle Metaph. 987a32, D.L. 3.4-3.5). The effects ofthisinfluence canperhaps
be seen in the mature Plato's conception of the sensible world as ceaselessly changing.
b. Parmenides and Zeno
There can be no doubt that Plato was also strongly influenced by Parmenides and Zeno (both of Elea), in Plato's theory of the
Forms, which are plainlyintendedto satisfythe Parmenideanrequirement of metaphysicalunityandstabilityinknowable reality.
Parmenides and Zeno also appear as characters in his dialogue, the Parmenides. Diogenes Laertius also notes other important
influences:
He mixed together in his works the arguments of Heracleitus, the Pythagoreans, and Socrates. Regarding the sensibles, he
borrows fromHeraclitus; regarding the intelligibles, from Pythagoras; and regarding politics, from Socrates. (D.L. 3.8)
A little later, Diogenes makes a series of comparisons intended to show how much Plato owed to the comic poet, Epicharmus
(3.9-3.17).
c. The Pythagoreans
Diogenes Laertius (3.6) claims that Plato visited several Pythagoreans in Southern Italy (one of whom, Theodorus, is also
mentioned as a friend to Socrates in Plato's Theaetetus). In the Seventh Letter, we learn that Plato was a friend of Archytas of
Tarentum, a well-known Pythagorean statesman and thinker (see 339d-e), and in the Phaedo, Plato has Echecrates, another
Pythagorean, inthe group aroundSocrates on his final dayin prison. Plato's Pythagoreaninfluences seem especiallyevident in
his fascinationwithmathematics, andinsome of his political ideals(see Plato's political philosophy), expressedinvarious ways
in several dialogues.
d. Socrates
Nonetheless, it is plain that no influence on Plato was greater than that of Socrates. This is evident not only in many of the
doctrines and arguments we find in Plato's dialogues, but perhaps most obviously in Plato's choice of Socrates as the main
character inmost of his works. According to theSeventhLetter, PlatocountedSocrates"the justest man alive" (324e). According
to Diogenes Laertius, the respect was mutual (3.5).
3. Plato's Writings
a. Plato's Dialogues and the Historical Socrates
Supposedlypossessedof outstandingintellectual and artistic abilityeven fromhis youth, accordingto Diogenes, Platobegan his
career as a writer of tragedies, but hearing Socrates talk, he wholly abandoned that path, and even burned a tragedy he had
hoped to enter in a dramatic competition (D.L. 3.5). Whether or not any of these stories is true, there can be no question of
Plato's masteryofdialogue, characterization, anddramatic context. He may, indeed, have writtensome epigrams;ofthesurviving
epigrams attributed to him in antiquity, some may be genuine.
Plato was not the only writer of dialogues in which Socrates appears as a principal character and speaker. Others, including
Alexamenos of Teos (Aristotle Poetics 1447b11; De Poetis fr. 3 Ross [=Rose2 72]), Aeschines (D.L. 2.60-63, 3.36,
Plato Apology33e), Antisthenes (D.L. 3.35, 6;Plato,Phaedo 59b; Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.4.5, 3.2.17), Aristippus (D.L. 2.65-104,

4. 3.36, Plato Phaedo59c), Eucleides (D.L. 2.106-112), Phaedo (D.L. 2.105; Plato, Phaedo passim), Simon (D.L. 122-124), and
especially Xenophon (see D.L. 2.48-59, 3.34), were also well-known "Socratics" who composed such works. A recent study of
these, by Charles H. Kahn (1996, 1-35), concludes that the very existence of the genre—and all of the conflicting images of
Socrates we findgiven bythe various authors—shows that we cannot trust as historicallyreliable anyof the accounts ofSocrates
given in antiquity, including those given by Plato.
But it is one thing to claim that Plato was not the onlyone to write Socratic dialogues, andquite another to holdthat Platowas
onlyfollowing the rules of some genre of writings in hisown work. Sucha claim, at anyrate, is hardlyestablished simplybythe
existence of these other writers and their writings. We may still wish to ask whether Plato's own use of Socrates as his main
character has anything at all to do with the historical Socrates. The question has led to a number of seemingly irresolvable
scholarlydisputes. At least one important ancient source, Aristotle, suggests that at least some of the doctrines Platoputs into
the mouthof the "Socrates" of the "early" or "Socrates" dialogues are the veryonesespousedbythe historical Socrates. Because
Aristotle has no reason not to be truthful about this issue, many scholars believe that his testimony provides a solid basis for
distinguishingthe "Socrates" of the "early" dialoguesfrom the character bythat name inPlato's supposedlylater works, whose
views and arguments Aristotle suggests are Plato's own.
b. Dating Plato's Dialogues
One wayto approach thisissue has beento findsome wayto arrange the dialoguesinto at least relative dates. It has frequently
been assumed that if we can establish a relative chronology for when Plato wrote each of the dialogues, we can provide some
objective test for the claim that Plato represented Socrates more accurately in the earlier dialogues, and less accurately in the
later dialogues.
In antiquity, the ordering of Plato's dialogues was given entirely along thematic lines. The best reports of these orderings (see
Diogenes Laertius' discussion at 3.56-62) included many works whose authenticity is now either disputed or unanimously
rejected. The uncontroversial internal and external historical evidence for a chronological ordering is relatively slight. Aristotle
(Politics2.6.1264b24-27), Diogenes Laertius (3.37), and Olympiodorus (Prol. 6.24) state that Plato wrote the Laws after
the Republic. Internal references in the Sophist (217a) and the Statesman (also known as the Politicus; 257a, 258b) show
the Statesman to come after the Sophist. The Timaeus(17b-19b) may refer to Republic as coming before it, and more clearly
mentions the Critias as following it (27a). Similarly, internal references inthe Sophist (216a, 217c) andthe Theaetetus(183e) may
be thought to show the intended order of three dialogues: Parmenides, Theaetetus, andSophist. Evenso, it does not followthat
these dialogues were actually written in that order. AtTheaetetus 143c, Plato announces through his characters that he will
abandonthe somewhat cumbersome dialogue form that is employedinhis other writings. Since the form doesnot appear ina
number of other writings, it is reasonable to infer that those in whichit does not appear were written after the Theaetetus.
Scholars have sought to augment thisfairlyscant evidence byemploying different methods of orderingthe remaining dialogues.
One such method is that of stylometry, by which various aspects of Plato's diction in each dialogue are measured against their
uses and frequencies in other dialogues. Originally done by laborious study by individuals, stylometry can now be done more
efficiently with assistance by computers. Another, even more popular, way to sort and group the dialogues is what is called

5. "content analysis," which works byfindingandenumeratingapparent commonalities or differencesinthe philosophicalstyle and
content of the various dialogues. Neither of these general approacheshas commandedunanimous assent among scholars, and
it is unlikelythat debates about thistopic canever be put entirelyto rest. Nonetheless, most recent scholarship seems to assume
that Plato's dialoguescan be sorted intodifferent groups, andit is not unusual for books andarticles onthe philosophyof Socrates
to state that by"Socrates" theymean to refer to the character inPlato's "early" or Socratic dialogues, as ifthis Socrates was as
close to the historicalSocratesas we are likelyto get. (We have more to sayonthis subject in the next section.) Perhaps the most
thorough examination of this sort can be found in Gregory Vlastos's,Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cambridge and
Cornell, 1991, chapters 2-4), where ten significant differences between the "Socrates" of Plato's "early" dialogues and the
character bythat name inthe later dialoguesare noted. Our own view of the probable dates andgroups of dialogues, whichto
some extent combine the results of stylometryandcontent analysis, is as follows (all lists but the last in alphabetical order):
Early
(All after the death of Socrates, but before Plato's first trip to Sicily in 387 B.C.E.):
Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Protagoras,
Republic Bk. I.
Early-Transitional
(Either at the end of the early group or at the beginning of the middle group, c. 387-380 B.C.E.):
Cratylus, Menexenus, Meno
Middle
(c. 380-360 B.C.E.)
Phaedo, Republic Bks. II-X, Symposium
Late-Transitional
(Either at the end of the middle group, or the beginning of the late group, c. 360-355 B.C.E.)
Parmenides, Theaetetus, Phaedrus
Late
(c. 355-347 B.C.E.; possibly in chronological order)
Sophist, Statesman, Philebus, Timaeus, Critias, Laws
c. Transmission of Plato's Works
Except for the Timaeus, all of Plato's works were lost to the Western world until medieval times, preserved only by Moslem
scholars in the Middle East. In 1578 Henri Estienne (whose Latinizedname wasStephanus) publishedaneditionof the dialogues
in which each page of the text is separatedintofive sections (labeleda, b, c, d, and e). The standardstyle of citationfo r Platonic
texts includes the name of the text, followedbyStephanus page andsection numbers (e.g. Republic511d). Scholars sometimes
also add numbers after the Stephanus section letters, which refer to line numbers withinthe Stephanus sections inthe standard
Greek edition of the dialogues, the Oxford Classical texts.
4. Other Works Attributed to Plato
a. Spuria

6. Several other works, including thirteen letters and eighteen epigrams, have been attributed to Plato. These other works are
generally called the spuria and the dubia. The spuria were collected among the works of Plato but suspected as frauds even in
antiquity. The dubia are those presumed authentic in later antiquity, but which have more recently been doubted.
Ten of the spuria are mentionedbyDiogenes Laertius at 3.62. Five of these are no longer extant:the Midonor Horse-breeder,
Phaeacians, Chelidon, Seventh Day, and Epimenides. Five others do exist: the Halcyon, Axiochus, Demodocus,
Eryxias, and Sisyphus. To the ten Diogenes Laertius lists, we may uncontroversially add On Justice, On Virtue, and
the Definitions, which was included in the medieval manuscripts of Plato's work, but not mentioned in antiquity.
Works whose authenticity was also doubted in antiquity include the Second Alcibiades (orAlcibiades II), Epinomis,
Hipparchus, and Rival Lovers (also known as either Rivals or Lovers), and these are sometimes defended as authentic today. If
anyare of these are authentic, theEpinomiswould be inthe late group, and the others wouldgowiththe earlyor earlytransitional
groups.
b. Epigrams
Seventeen or eighteen epigrams (poems appropriate to funerarymonuments or other dedications) are also attributed to Plato
by various ancient authors. Most of these are almost certainly not by Plato, but some few may be authentic. Of the ones that
could be authentic (Cooper 1997, 1742 names 1, 2, 7, and especially3 as possiblyauthentic), one (1) is a love poemdedicatedto
a student ofastronomy, perhaps at the Academy, another (2) appears to be a funeraryinscriptionfor that same student, another
(3) is a funerary inscription for Plato's Syracusan friend, Dion (in which the author confesses that Dion "maddened my heart
with erôs"), and the last (7) is a love poem to a young woman or girl. None appear to provide anything of great philosophical
interest.
c. Dubia
The dubia present special risks to scholars: On the one hand, any decision not to include them among the authentic dialogues
creates the risk of losing valuable evidence for Plato's (or perhaps Socrates') philosophy; on the other hand, any decision to
include them creates the risk of obfuscating the correct view of Plato's (or Socrates') philosophy, by including non-Platonic (or
non-Socratic) elements withinthat philosophy. The dubia include the First Alcibiades (or Alcibiades I),Minos, andTheages, allof
which, if authentic, would probably go with the early or early transitional groups, the Cleitophon, which might be early, early
transitional, or middle, andthe letters, ofwhichthe Seventhseems the best candidate for authenticity. Some scholars have also
suggested the possibility that the Third may also be genuine. If any are authentic, the letters would appear to be works of the
late period, with the possible exception of the Thirteenth Letter, which could be from the middle period.
Nearlyall of the dialogues now accepted asgenuine have beenchallenged asinauthentic bysome scholar or another. In the 19th
Century in particular, scholars often considered arguments for and against the authenticity of dialogues whose authenticity i s
now onlyrarelydoubted. Of those we listedas authentic, above (in the earlygroup), onlythe Hippias Major continuesoccasionally
to be listed as inauthentic. The strongest evidence against the authenticity of the Hippias Major is the fact that it is never
mentioned inanyof the ancient sources. However, relative to how much wasactuallywrittenin antiquity, solittle nowremains
that our lack ofancient referencesto thisdialogue doesnot seemto be anadequate reason to doubt its authenticity. Instyle and
content, it seems to most contemporary scholars to fit well with the other Platonic dialogues.
5. The Early Dialogues

7. a. Historical Accuracy
Although no one thinks that Plato simply recorded the actual words or speeches of Socrates verbatim, the argument has been
made that there is nothing inthe speeches Socrates makes intheApologythat he could have not utteredat the historical trial. At
any rate, it is fairly common for scholars to treat Plato's Apology as the most reliable of the ancient sources on the historical
Socrates. The other early dialogues are certainly Plato's own creations. But as we have said, most scholars treat these as
representingmore or lessaccuratelythe philosophyandbehavior of the historical Socrates—even iftheydo not provide literal
historical records of actual Socratic conversations. Some of the earlydialogues include anachronisms that prove their historical
inaccuracy.
It is possible, of course, that the dialogues are all wholly Plato's inventions and have nothing at all to do with the historical
Socrates. Contemporaryscholars generallyendorse one of the following four views about the dialoguesandtheir representation
of Socrates:
1. The Unitarian View:
This view, more popular earlyinthe 20th Centurythanit is now, holds that there is but a single philosophyto be found
in all of Plato's works (ofanyperiod, if suchperiods canevenbe identifiedreliably). There is no reason, according to
the Unitarianscholar, ever to talkabout "Socratic philosophy" (at least fromanythingto be foundinPlato—everything
in Plato's dialogues is Platonic philosophy, according to the Unitarian). One recent versionofthisview has been argued
by Charles H. Kahn (1996). Most later, but still ancient, interpretations of Plato were essentially Unitarian in their
approach. Aristotle, however, was a notable exception.
2. The Literary Atomist View:
We call this approach the "literary atomist view," because those who propose this view treat each dialogue as a
complete literary whole, whose proper interpretation must be achieved without reference to any of Pl ato's other
works. Those who endorse this view reject completely any relevance or validity of sorting or grouping the dialogues
into groups, on the ground that anysuch sorting is of no value to the proper interpretation of anygiven dialogue. In
this view, too, there is no reason to make any distinction between "Socratic philosophy" and "Platonic philosophy."
According to the literaryatomist, allphilosophyto be foundinthe works of Plato shouldbe attributed only to Plato.
3. The Developmentalist View:
According to this view, the most widelyheldof all of the interpretative approaches, the differences between the early
and later dialogues represent developments inPlato's ownphilosophical andliterarycareer. These mayor maynot be
relatedto his attempting inanyof the dialogues to preserve the memoryof the historical Socrates (see approach4);
such differences may only represent changes in Plato's own philosophical views. Developmentalists may generally
identify the earlier positions or works as "Socratic" and the later ones "Platonic," but may be agnostic about the
relationship of the "Socratic" views and works to the actual historical Socrates.
4. The Historicist View:
Perhaps the most commonof the Developmentalist positions is the view that the "development" noticeable between
the early and later dialogues may be attributed to Plato's attempt, in the early dialogues, to represent the historical

8. Socrates more or less accurately. Later on, however (perhaps because of the development of the genre of "Socratic
writings," withinwhich other authors were making no attempt at historical fidelity), Platobegan more freelyto put his
own views into the mouth of the character, "Socrates," in his works. Plato's own student, Aristotle, seems to have
understood the dialogues in this way.
Now, some scholars whoare skeptical about the entire programof dating the dialogues intochronological groups, andwhoare
thus strictlyspeaking not historicists (see, for example, Cooper 1997, xii -xvii)nonetheless accept the view that the "early" works
are "Socratic" in tone and content. Withfew exceptions, however, scholars agreedthat if we are unable to distinguish anygroup
of dialogues as earlyor "Socratic," or even if we can distinguisha separate set of "Socratic" works but cannot identifya coherent
philosophywithinthose works, it makes little sense to talkabout "the philosophyof historical Socrates" at all. There is just too
little (and too little that is at all interesting) to be found that could reliably be attributed to Socrates from any other ancient
authors. Any serious philosophical interest in Socrates, then, must be pursued through study of Plato's early or "Socratic"
dialogues.
b. Plato's Characterization of Socrates
In the dialogues generally accepted as early (or "Socratic"), the main character is always Socrates. Socrates is represented as
extremely agile in question-and-answer, which has come to be known as "the Socratic method of teaching," or "the elenchus"
(or elenchos, from the Greekterm for refutation), withSocrates nearlyalways playing the role as questioner, for he claimedto
have no wisdom of his own to share with others. Plato's Socrates, in this period, was adept at reducing even the most difficult
and recalcitrant interlocutors to confusion and self-contradiction. In theApology, Socrates explains that the embarrassment he
has thus caused to so many of his contemporaries is the result of a Delphic oracle given to Socrates' friend Chaerephon
(Apology21a-23b), according to whichnoone waswiser thanSocrates. As a result of his attempt to discernthe true meaning of
this oracle, Socrates gaineda divinelyordainedmission inAthens to expose the false conceit of wisdom. The embarrassment his
"investigations" have caused to somanyof his contemporaries—whichSocrates claims was the root cause of his beingbrought
up on charges (Apology 23c-24b)—is thus no one's fault but his "victims," for having chosen to live "the unexamined life" (see
38a).
The way that Plato's represents Socrates going about his "mission" in Athens provides a plausible explanation both of why the
Athenians wouldhave brought himto trial andconvictedhiminthe troubledyears after the endof the PeloponnesianWar, and
also of whySocrates was not reallyguiltyofthe chargeshe faced. Evenmore importantly, however, Plato's earlydialogues provide
intriguing arguments and refutations of proposed philosophical positions that interest and challenge philosophical readers.
Platonic dialogues continue to be included among the required readings in introductory and advanced philosophy classes, not
onlyfor their readyaccessibility, but also because theyraise manyof the most basic problems of philosophy. Unlike most other
philosophical works, moreover, Platoframes the discussions he represents in dramatic settings that make the content of these
discussions especiallycompelling. So, for example, inthe Crito, we find Socrates discussing the citizen's dutyto obeythe laws of
the state as he awaits his own legally mandated execution in jail, condemned by what he and Crito both agree was a terribly
wrong verdict, the result of the most egregious misapplication of the very laws they are discussing. The dramatic features of
Plato's works have earned attention even from literary scholars relatively uninterested in philosophy as such. Whatever their

9. value for specifically historical research, therefore, Plato's dialogues will continue to be read and debated by students and
scholars, andthe Socrateswe findinthe earlyor "Socratic" dialogues will continue to be countedamong the greatest Western
philosophers.
c. Ethical Positions in the Early Dialogues
The philosophical positions most scholars agree can be found directly endorsed or at least suggested in the early or "Socrati c"
dialogues include the following moral or ethical views:
 A rejectionof retaliation, or the return of harm for harm or evil for evil (Crito 48b-c, 49c-d;Republic I.335a-e);
 The claimthat doing injustice harms one's soul, the thing that is most precious to one, and, hence, that it is better to
suffer injustice than to do it (Crito 47d-48a; Gorgias 478c-e, 511c-512b; Republic I.353d-354a);
 Some form of what is called "eudaimonism," that is, that goodness is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to
human happiness, well-being, or flourishing, which may also be understood as "living well," or "doing well"
(Crito 48b; Euthydemus 278e, 282a; Republic I. 354a);
 The view that onlyvirtue is goodjust byitself;anything else that is goodis goodonlyinsofar as it serves or is usedfor
or by virtue (Apology 30b; Euthydemus 281d-e);
 The view that there is some kind of unity among the virtues: In some sense, all of the virtues are the same
(Protagoras 329b-333b, 361a-b);
 The viewthat the citizenwho has agreedto live ina state must always obeythe laws of that state, or else persuade the
state to change its laws, or leave the state (Crito 51b-c, 52a-d).
d. Psychological Positions in the Early Dialogues
Socrates also appears to argue for, or directly makes a number of related psychological views:
 All wrongdoing is done in ignorance, for everyone desires only what is good ( Protagoras352a-
c; Gorgias 468b; Meno 77e-78b);
 In some sense, everyone actuallybelieves certainmoralprinciples, eventhough some maythink they donot have such
beliefs, and may disavow them in argument (Gorgias 472b, 475e-476a).
e. Religious Positions in the Early Dialogues
In these dialogues, we also find Socrates represented as holding certain religious beliefs, such as:
 The gods are completely wise and good (Apology 28a; Euthyphro 6a, 15a; Meno 99b-100b);
 Ever since his childhood (see Apology 31d) Socrates has experienced a certain "divine something" (Apology 31c-d;
40a; Euthyphro 3b; see also Phaedrus 242b), which consists in a "voice" (Apology 31d; see also Phaedrus 242c), or
"sign" (Apology 40c, 41d; Euthydemus272e; see also Republic VI.496c; Phaedrus 242b) that opposes him when he is
about to do something wrong (Apology 40a, 40c);
 Various forms of divinationcanallow humanbeings to come to recognize the willof the gods (Apology21a-23b, 33c);

10.  Poets andrhapsodes are able to write anddothe wonderful things theywrite anddo, not fromknowledge or expertise,
but from some kind of divine inspiration. The same canbe said of diviners and seers, although they do seem to have
some kindofexpertise—perhaps onlysome technique bywhichto put themina state ofappropriate receptivityto the
divine (Apology 22b-c; Laches 198e-199a; Ion 533d-536a, 538d-e; Meno 99c);
 No one reallyknows what happens after death, but it is reasonable to think that deathis not anevil;there maybe an
afterlife, in which the souls of the good are rewarded, and the souls of the wicked are punished ( Apology 40c-
41c; Crito 54b-c; Gorgias 523a-527a).
f. Methodological and Epistemological Positions in the Early Dialogues
In addition, Plato's Socrates in the earlydialogues mayplausiblybe regardedas havingcertainmethodological or epistemological
convictions, including:
 Definitional knowledge of ethical terms is at least a necessarycondition of reliable judging of specific instances of the
values they name (Euthyphro 4e-5d, 6e; Laches 189e-190b; Lysis223b; Greater Hippias 304d-e; Meno 71a-b,
100b; Republic I.354b-c);
 A mere list of examples of some ethical value—even if all are authentic cases of that value—would never provide an
adequate analysis of what the value is, nor would it provide anadequate definitionof the value term that refers tothe
value. Proper definitions must state what is common to all examples of the value (Euthyphro 6d-e; Meno 72c-d);
 Those withexpert knowledge or wisdom ona givensubject donot err intheir judgments onthat subject (Euthyphro4e-
5a; Euthydemus 279d-280b), go about their business in their area of expertise in a rational and regular way
(Gorgias 503e-504b), and can teach and explain their subject (Gorgias 465a, 500e-501b, 514a-b; Laches 185b, 185e,
1889e-190b);Protagoras 319b-c).
6. The Middle Dialogues
a. Differences between the Early and Middle Dialogues
Scholarly attempts to provide relative chronological orderings of the early transitional and middle dialogues are problematical
because all agree that the main dialogue of the middle period, theRepublic, has several features that make dating it precisely
especially difficult. As we have already said, many scholars count the first book of the Republic as among the early group of
dialogues. But those who read the entire Republic will also see that the first book also provides a natural and effective
introduction to the remaining books of the work. A recent study by Debra Nails ("The Dramatic Date of Plato's Republic," The
Classical Journal 93.4, 1998, 383-396) notesseveral anachronisms that suggest that the process of writing(andperhaps re-editing)
the work mayhave continued over a verylong period. Ifthis centralwork of the periodis difficult to place into a specific context,
there can be no great assurance in positioning any other works relative to this one.
Nonetheless, it does not take especiallycareful studyof the transitional andmiddle perioddialoguesto notice clear differences
in style and philosophical content from the early dialogues. The most obvious change is the way in which Plato seems to
characterize Socrates:Inthe earlydialogues, we findSocrates simplyaskingquestions, exposinghis interlocutors' confusions, all
the while professing hisowninabilityto shedanypositive light onthe subject, whereas inthe middle period dialogues, Socrates
suddenlyemerges as a kindof positive expert, willing to affirm and defendhis owntheories about manyimportant subjects. In

11. the early dialogues, moreover, Socrates discusses mainly ethical subjects with his interlocutors—with some related religious,
methodological, and epistemological views scattered within the primarily ethical discussions. In the middle period, Plato's
Socrates'interests expand outwardinto nearlyeveryarea of inquiryknown to humankind. The philosophical positions Socrates
advances in these dialogues are vastly more systematical, including broad theoretical inquiries into the connections between
language andreality(inthe Cratylus), knowledge andexplanation (inthe Phaedo and Republic, Books V-VII). Unlike the Socrates
of the earlyperiod, who was the "wisest of men" onlybecause he recognized the full extent of his ownignorance, the Socrates
of the middle period acknowledges the possibility of infallible human knowledge (especially in the famous similes of light, the
simile of the sunandgoodandthe simile of the dividedline inBook VI andthe parable of the cave inBook VII of the Republic),
and this becomespossible invirtue of a special sort of cognitive contact with the Forms or Ideas (eidê ), which exist in a supra-
sensible realmavailable onlyto thought. This theoryof Forms, introduced andexplainedinvarious contexts in eachof the middle
perioddialogues, is perhaps the single best-known andmost definitive aspect of what has come to be known as Platonism.
b. The Theory of Forms
In manyof hisdialogues, Platomentions supra-sensible entities he calls "Forms" (or "Ideas"). So, for example, in the Phaedo, we
are told that particular sensible equal things—for example, equal sticks or stones (see Phaedo 74a-75d)—are equal because of
their "participation" or "sharing" in the character of the Form of Equality, which is absolutely, changelessly, perfectly, and
essentiallyequal. Platosometimes characterizes this participationin the Form as a kindof imaging, or approximation of the Form.
The same may be said of the many things that are greater or smaller and the Forms of Great and Small (Phaedo 75c-d), or the
many tall things and the Form of Tall (Phaedo 100e), or the many beautiful things and the Form of Beauty (Phaedo 75c-
d, Symposium211e,Republic V.476c). When Platowrites about instancesof Forms "approximating"Forms, it is easyto infer that,
for Plato, Forms are exemplars. If so, Plato believes that The Form of Beauty is perfect beauty, the Form of Justice is perfect
justice, andso forth. Conceiving of Forms in thiswaywas important to Platobecause it enabled the philosopher whograsps the
entities tobe best able tojudge to what extent sensible instances of the Forms are good examples of the Forms theyapproximate.
Scholars disagree about the scope ofwhat is oftencalled "the theoryof Forms," and questionwhether Platobeganholdingthat
there are onlyForms for a small range of properties, suchas tallness, equality, justice, beauty, andsoon, and thenwidenedthe
scope to include Forms correspondingto everyterm that canbe appliedto a multiplicityof instances. Inthe Republic, he writes
as if there maybe a great multiplicityof Forms—for example, inBook Xof that work, we find himwriting about the Form of Bed
(see Republic X.596b). He may have come to believe that for any set of things that shares some property, there is a Form that
gives unityto the set ofthings (and univocityto the term bywhichwe refer to members ofthat set of things). Knowledge involves
the recognition of the Forms (Republic V.475e-480a), and any reliable application of this knowledge will involve the ability
compare the particular sensible instantiations of a property to the Form.
c. Immortality and Reincarnation
In the earlytransitional dialogue, the Meno, Platohas Socratesintroduce the Orphic andPythagoreanidea that soulsare immortal
and existed before our births. All knowledge, he explains, is actually recollected from this prior existence. In perhaps the most
famous passage in this dialogue, Socrates elicits recollection about geometry from one of Meno's slaves (Meno 81a-86b).
Socrates'apparent interest in, andfairlysophisticatedknowledge of, mathematics appears whollynew inthis dialogue. It is an
interest, however, that shows upplainlyinthe middle period dialogues, especially in the middle books of the Republic.

12. Several arguments for the immortality of the soul, and the idea that souls are reincarnated into different life forms, are al so
featuredin Plato's Phaedo (which also includesthe famous scene in whichSocrates drinks the hemlock and utters hislast words).
Stylometryhas tendedto count thePhaedoamong the earlydialogues, whereas analysis of philosophicalcontent has tendedto
place it at the beginning of the middle period. Similar a ccounts of the transmigration of souls may be found, with somewhat
different details, in Book X of the Republic and in the Phaedrus, as well as in several dialogues of the late period, including
the Timaeus and the Laws. No traces ofthe doctrine of recollection, or the theoryof reincarnationor transmigrationof souls, are
to be found in the dialogues we listed above as those of the early period.
d. Moral Psychology
The moral psychologyof the middle period dialogues also seems to be quite different from what we findinthe earlyperiod. In
the earlydialogues, Plato's Socrates is an intellectualist—that is, he claims that people always act inthe waytheybelieve is best
for them (at the time of action, at anyrate). Hence, all wrongdoing reflects some cognitive error. But inthe middle period, Plato
conceives of the soul as having (at least) three parts:
1. a rationalpart (the part that loves truth, which shouldrule over the other parts of the soul throughthe use of reason),
2. a spirited part (which loves honor and victory), and
3. an appetitive part (which desires food, drink, and sex),
and justice will be that conditionof the soul in whicheach ofthese three parts "does its own work,"anddoes not interfere inthe
workings of the other parts (see esp. Republic IV.435b-445b). It seems clear from the wayPlatodescribes what cango wrongin
a soul, however, that in this new picture of moral psychology, the appetitive part of the soul can simply overrule reason's
judgments. One maysuffer, inthis account of psychology, from what is called akrasia or "moral weakness"—inwhichone finds
oneself doing something that one actuallybelieves is not the right thingto do(see especially Republic IV.439e-440b). Inthe early
period, Socrates deniedthat akrasia was possible: One might change one's mind at the last minute about what one ought todo—
and couldperhaps change one's mindagainlater to regret doing what one has done—but one couldnever do what one actually
believed was wrong, at the time of acting.
e. Critique of the Arts
The Republic also introduces Plato's notorious critique of the visual and imitative arts. In the early period works, Socrates
contends that the poets lack wisdom, but he also grants that they "say many fine things." In the Republic, on the contrary, it
seems that there is little that is fine in poetry or any of the other fine arts. Most of poetry and the other fine arts are to be
censoredout of existence inthe "noble state"(kallipolis) Platosketchesinthe Republic, as merelyimitating appearances (rather
than realities), and as arousing excessive and unnatural emotions and appetites (see esp.Republic X.595b-608b).
f. Platonic Love
In the Symposium, whichis normallydated at the beginning of the middle period, and in thePhaedrus, whichis datedat the end
of the middle periodor later yet, Plato introduces his theoryoferôs (usuallytranslatedas "love"). Several passagesand images
from these dialogues continuedtoshow upin Western culture—for example, the image of two lovers as being eachother's "other
half," whichPlatoassigns to Aristophanes inthe Symposium. Alsointhat dialogue, we are told ofthe "ladder of love," bywhich
the lover canascendto direct cognitive contact with(usuallycomparedto a kindof visionof)BeautyItself. In the Phaedrus, love
is revealedto be the great "divine madness" through which the wings of the lover's soul maysprout, allowing the lover to take

13. flight to all of the highest aspirations and achievements possible for humankind. Inbothof these dialogues, Platoclearlyregards
actual physical or sexual contact between lovers as degraded and wasteful forms of erotic expression. Because the true goal
of erôs isreal beautyand real beautyis the Formof Beauty, what PlatocallsBeautyItself, erôs finds its fulfillment onlyin Platonic
philosophy. Unless it channels its power of love into "higher pursuits," which culminate in the knowledge of the Form of
Beauty, erôs is doomed to frustration. For this reason, Plato thinks that most people sadly squander the real power of love by
limiting themselves to the mere pleasures of physical beauty.
7. Late Transitional and Late Dialogues
a. Philosophical Methodology
One of the novelties of the dialogues after those of the middle period is the introduction of a new philosophical method. This
method was introduced probably either late in the middle period or in the transition to the late period, but was increasingly
important inthe late period. Inthe earlyperioddialogues, as we have said, the mode ofphilosophizingwas refutative question-
and-answer (called elenchos or the "Socratic method"). Althoughthe middle perioddialoguescontinue to showSocrates asking
questions, the questioning in these dialogues becomes much more overtly leading and didactic. The highest method of
philosophizing discussed in the middle period dialogues, called "dialectic," is never very well explained (at best, it is jus t barely
sketchedin the divided line image at the endof Book VI of the Republic). The correct methodfor doing philosophy, we are now
told inthe later works, is what Platoidentifies as "collectionanddivision," whichis perhaps first referred to at Phaedrus 265e. In
this method, the philosopher collects all of the instances of some generic category that seem to have common characteristics,
and then divides them into specific kinds until they cannot be further subdivided. This method is explicitly and extensively on
display in the Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus.
b. Critique of the Earlier Theory of Forms
One of the most puzzlingfeatures of the late dialogues is the strong suggestionin them that Platohas reconsideredhis theoryof
Forms in some way. Although there seems still in the late dialogues to be a theory of Forms (although the theory is, quite
strikingly, whollyunmentioned intheTheaetetus, a later dialogue on the nature of knowledge), where it doesappear inthe later
dialogues, it seems in several ways to have been modified from its conception in the middle period works. Perhaps the most
dramatic signal of such a change in the theoryappears first intheParmenides, whichappears to subject the middle periodversion
of the theoryto a kindof "Socratic" refutation, onlythis time, the mainrefuter is the older Eleatic philosopher Parmenides, and
the haplessvictim ofthe refutationis a youthful Socrates. The most famous (andapparentlyfatal) ofthe arguments provided by
Parmenides in this dialogue has come to be known as the "Third Man Argument," which suggests that the conception of
participation(bywhich individual objects take on the characters of the Forms) fallspreyto aninfinite regress:If individualmale
things are male invirtue of participationinthe Form of Man, andthe Form of Manis itself male, thenwhat is commonto both
The Form of Man andthe particular male things must be that theyall participate in some (other)Form, say, Man2. But then, if
Man 2 is male, thenwhat it has in commonwiththe other male things is participationinsome further Form, Man3, and so on.
That Plato's theory is open to this problem gains support from the notion, mentioned above, that Forms are exemplars. If the
Form of Man is itself a (perfect) male, thenthe Form sharesa propertyin common withthe males that participate init. But since
the Theoryrequires that for anygroupofentities witha common property, there is a Form to explainthe commonality, it appears
that the theory does indeed give rise to the vicious regress.

14. There has been considerable controversyfor manyyears over whether Plato believedthat the Theoryof Forms was vulnerable
to the "Third Man" argument, as Aristotle believedit was, andsouses the Parmenides to announce his rejectionofthe Theoryof
Forms, or instead believed that the Third Man argument can be avoided by making adjustments to the Theory of Forms. Of
relevance to this discussionis the relative datingof the Timaeus andthe Parmenides, since the Theoryof Forms verymuch as it
appears in the middle period works plays a prominent role in the Timaeus.Thus, the assignment of a later date to
the Timaeus shows that Platodid not regardthe objectiontothe Theoryof Forms raisedin the Parmenides as inanywaydecisive.
In anyevent, it is agreed onall sidesthat Plato's interest inthe Theoryshifted in the Sophist and Stateman to the explorationof
the logical relations that hold between abstract entities. In the Laws, Plato's last (and unfinished) work, the Theory of Forms
appears to have droppedout altogether. Whatever value Plato believedthat knowledge of abstract entities has for the proper
conduct of philosophy, he nolonger seems to have believedthat suchknowledge is necessaryfor the proper running ofa political
community.
c. The "Eclipse" of Socrates
In several of the late dialogues, Socrates is even further marginalized. He is either represented as a mostly mute bystander (in
the Sophist and Statesman), or else absent altogether from the cast of characters (in the Laws and Critias). In
the Theaetetus and Philebus, however, we find Socrates in the familiar leadingrole. The so-called"eclipse" of Socratesinseveral
of the later dialogues has been a subject of much scholarly discussion.
d. The Myth of Atlantis
Plato's famous myth of Atlantis is first given in the Timaeus, which scholars now generally agree is quite late, despite being
dramaticallyplacedonthe dayafter the discussionrecountedintheRepublic. The myth of Atlantisis continued inthe unfinished
dialogue intended to be the sequel to the Timaeus, the Critias.
e. The Creation of the Universe
The Timaeus is also famous for its account of the creation of the universe by the Demiurge. Unlike the creation by the God of
medieval theologians, Plato's Demiurge does not create ex nihilo, but rather orders the cosmos out ofchaotic elemental matter,
imitating the eternal Forms. Platotakesthe four elements, fire, air, water, and earth (whichPlato proclaims to be composed of
various aggregatesof triangles), making various compounds ofthese intowhat he calls the Bodyof the Universe. Of all ofPlato's
works, the Timaeus provides the most detailed conjectures in the areas we now regard as the natural sciences: physics,
astronomy, chemistry, and biology.
f. The Laws
In the Laws, Plato's last work, the philosopher returns once againto the questionof how a societyought best to be organized.
Unlike his earlier treatment inthe Republic, however, the Lawsappears to concernitselfless with what a best possible state might
be like, and much more squarely with the project of designing a genuinely practicable, if admittedly not ideal, form of
government. The founders of the communitysketched in the Laws concern themselves with the empiricaldetails of statecraft,
fashioning rules tomeet the multitude ofcontingenciesthat areapt toarise inthe "real world" of humanaffairs. A work enormous
length and complexity, running some 345 Stephanus pages, the Laws was unfinished at the time of Plato's death. According to
Diogenes Laertius (3.37), it was left written on wax tablets.
8. References and Further Reading

15. a. Greek Texts
 Platonis Opera (in 5 volumes) - The Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press):
 Volume I (E. A. Duke et al., eds., 1995): Euthyphro, Apologia Socratis, Crito, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophista, Politicus.
 Volume II (John Burnet, ed., 1901): Parmenides, Philebus, Symposium, Phaedrus, Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II, Hipparchus,
Amatores.
 Volume III (JohnBurnet, ed., 1903): Theages, Charmides, Laches, Lysis, Euthydemus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Meno, Hippias Maior,
Hippias Minor, Io, Menexenus.
 Volume IV (John Burnet, ed., 1978): Clitopho, Respublica, Timaeus, Critias.
 Volume V (John Burnet, ed. 1907): Minos, Leges, Epinomis, Epistulae, Definitiones, De Iusto, De Virtute, Demodocus, Sisyphus,
Eryxias, Axiochus.
 The Oxford Classical Texts are the standard Greek texts of Plato's works, including all of
the spuria and dubiaexcept for the epigrams, the Greek texts of which may be found in Hermann Beckby (ed.), Anthologia
Graeca(Munich: Heimeran, 1957).
b. Translations into English
 Cooper, J. M. (ed.), Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).
 Contains very recent translations of all of the Platonic works, dubia, spuria, and epigrams. Now generally
regarded as the standard for English translations.
c. Plato's Socrates and the Historical Socrates
 Kahn, Charles H., Plato and the Socratic Dialogue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
 Kahn's own version of the "unitarian" reading of Plato's dialogues. Although scholars have not widely
acceptedKahn's positions, Kahn offers several arguments for rejecting the more establishedheld"developmentalist" position.
 Vlastos, Gregory, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1991).
 Chapters 2 and3 of this bookare invariablycitedas providing the most influential recent arguments for the
"historicist" version of the "developmentalist" position.
d. Socrates and Plato's Early Period Dialogues
 Benson, Hugh H. (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
 A collectionof previouslypublishedarticles byvarious authors on Socrates and Plato's early dialogues.
 Brickhouse, Thomas C. and Nicholas D. Smith, Plato's Socrates (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
 Six chapters, each on different topics in the study of Plato's early or Socratic dialogues.
 Brickhouse, Thomas C. and Nicholas D. Smith, The Philosophy of Socrates (Boulder: Westview, 2000).
 Seven chapters, each on different topics inthe studyof Plato's earlyor Socratic dialogues. Some changes in
views from those offered in their 1994 book.
 Prior, William (ed.), Socrates: Critical Assessments (Londonand New York, 1996) in four volumes:I: The Socratic Problem and
Socratic Ignorance; II: Issues Arising from the Trial of Socrates; III: Socratic Method;IV: Happiness and Virtue.
 A collectionof previouslypublishedarticles byvarious authors on Socrates and Plato's early dialogues.
 Santas, Gerasimos Xenophon, Socrates: Philosophy in Plato's Early Dialogues (Boston and London: Routledge, 1979).
 Eight chapters, each on different topics in the study of Plato's early or Socratic dialogues.
 Taylor, C. C. W. Socrates: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
 Very short, indeed, but nicely written and generally very reliable.
 Vlastos, Gregory, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1991). (Also cited in VIII.3, above.)
 Eight chapters, each on different topics in the study of Plato's early or Socratic dialogues.
 Vlastos, Gregory, Socratic Studies (ed. Myles Burnyeat; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
 Edited and published after Vlastos's death. A collection of Vlastos's papers on Socrates not published in
Vlastos's 1991 book.
 Vlastos, Gregory (ed.) The Philosophy of Socrates (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980).
 A collection of papers by various authors on Socrates and Plato's early dialogues. Although now somewhat
dated, several articles in this collection continue to be widely cited and studied.
e. General Books on Plato
 Cherniss, Harold, The Riddle of the Early Academy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945).

16.  A study of reports in the Early Academy, following Plato's death, of the so-called "unwritten doctrines" of
Plato.
 Fine, Gail (ed.), Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology and Plato II: Ethics, Politics, Religion and the Soul(Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999).
 A collectionof previouslypublishedpapers byvarious authors, mostlyon Plato's middle and later periods.
 Grote, George, Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates 2nd ed. 3 vols. (London: J. Murray, 1867).
 3-volume collectionwithgeneraldiscussionof"the Socratics" other thanPlato, as wellas specific discussions
of each of Plato's works.
 Guthrie, W. K. C., A Historyof Greek Philosophy(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress) vols. 3 (1969), 4 (1975) and 5 (1978).
 Volume 3 is onthe Sophists andSocrates;volume 4 is onPlato's earlydialoguesandcontinues withchapters
onPhaedo, Symposium, and Phaedrus, and then a final chapter on the Republic.
 Irwin, Terence, Plato's Ethics (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
 Systematic discussion of the ethical thought in Plato's works.
 Kraut, Richard (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
 A collection of original discussions of various general topics about Plato and the dialogues.
 Smith, NicholasD. (ed.), Plato: Critical Assessments (LondonandNewYork:Routledge, 1998) in four volumes:I: General Issues
of Interpretation; II: Plato's Middle Period: Metaphysics and Epistemology; III: Plato's Middle Period: Psychology and Value
Theory; IV: Plato's Later Works.
 A collectionof previouslypublishedarticles byvarious authors oninterpretive problemsandonPlato'smiddle
and later periods. Plato's early period dialogues are covered in this series by Prior 1996 (see VIII.4).
 Vlastos, Gregory, Platonic Studies 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).
 A collectionof Vlastos's papers onPlato, including some important earlier work on the early dialogues.
 Vlastos, Gregory, PlatoI:Metaphysics andEpistemologyandPlatoII:Ethics, Politics, andPhilosophyof Art andReligion (South
Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987).
 A collection of papers by various authors on Plato's middle period and later dialogues. Although now
somewhat dated, several articles in this collection continue to be widely cited and studied.