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Clamdigging: Leveraging ClamAV for Malware Analysis and Detection
- 2. Signature based detection • Dead, right? • No, it’s not *totally*useless • Of course, not enough on its own • Defense in depth • sigh, I know.. • but srsly • Hunting! Tracking! Punching!
- 3. ClamAV • Its 2017, why are we talking about ClamAV • Developed by Sourcefire, acquired by Cisco in 2013 • Free, open source (GPL) anti virus solution for mail, endpoint and on demand scanning • Linux / BSD • OSX • Windows • Target filetypes / structures • Decompression / unrolling of filetypes • UPX/NSPack, ZIP/RAR/OLE, LZMA, etc
- 4. ClamAV 0.99+ • Yay, good reasons to use it! • Updated functionality • Decompression / unrolling of more filetypes! • PCRE! • Yara functionality! • Yara -> ClamAV (with some exceptions) • ClamAV decompression / unrolling + YARA logic == win • Expanded sigtool functionality!
- 5. So.. why ClamAV? • Why not? I just gave you some good reasons • It’s free • Some MTAs have Clam functionality built in • Similar functionality to Yara, just does some other stuff better • Quick triage of attachments • Evil documents, macros, exploits, etc. • Detection capabilities • Track threats across the board • Classify threats • Known evil doc vs known evil macro inside a doc vs known Flash exploit • Actor tracking • APTz, Builders, Gangs, campaigns, etc
- 7. Integration for Malware Analysis • Pipe into your favorite tools for sorting results • Know when things update and you start missing detection • EKs • Track the use of known dropped exploits (Flash, Silverlight, etc) • Macros / Documents • Track Actors / Campaigns • Hunting! • Write generic sigs to detect evil conditions and start to hunt
- 9. ClamAV for Malware Analysis • Hancitor document keyword
- 10. ClamAV for Malware Analysis • APT maldoc detected by generic XOR exe sig
- 12. ClamAV for Malware Analysis • Determine common doc social engineering lure text • Used ~1,000 malicious docs • Determined common strings using statistical analysis • Most common: • Document created in earlier version of Microsoft Office (Word|Excel) • To (view|decrypt|display) this (content|document), please click "Enable Editing" (form|from) the yellow bar and then click "Enable Content” • To properly display the document, please Enable Content. • To display the contents of the document click on Enable Content button.
- 18. ClamAV for Analysts • Run locally, using command line scanner • Dissect raw macros within documents • How does *ClamAV* see things? • What if you don’t want to beautify/deobfuscate the macros? • Built in tools • sigtool • clamscan • External tools • oletools • viper • Cuckoo • lots more
- 19. clamscan • Command line version of ClamAV • $clamscan –d rules.ldb attachment • What I find most useful: • --debug • Provides a ton of useful information on the target file • Also will provide information when a file is scanned • --info • Provides a ton of useful information on the target file • --leave-temps • Saves temp files generated during analysis • UPX packed file -> saves compressed file
- 20. sigtool • Swiss-army knife for ClamAV • What I find most useful are: • --vba • Dumps out the raw macros inside of a document • --html-normalise • Creates an ascii output html/js file which is ‘normalized’ for how ClamAV will read it • Removes case, whitespaces, et • --decode-sigs • Feeds in sigs from stdin and decodes the signatures contents • --hex-dump • Reads in from stdin and spits out hex dump
- 21. sigtool • $ sigtool --vba ‘evildoc.bin’ | sigtool --hex-dump | less
- 22. sigtool • $ cat local-rules.ldb | sigtool --decode
- 23. Detour: Sound Rule Writing Theory • Know what you want to detect: • Super specific content, ideally only one version of something (think hash, or very specific contents) • Generic signature • Detects a specific type of content, but with some wiggle room as far as things like variable names, or domain names • Loose / Heuristical Signature • Detects abnormalities, or the presence of something in particular • Sometimes INFO level, but other times Jumping off point to hunt • i.e this APT uses this specific control to auto-run macros when this document opens • Ideally, the perfect rule will be loose enough to allow slight changes, but specific enough to capture the right amount of maliciousness indicative of that specific threat
- 24. ClamAV Signatures • Have you used YARA? It’s pretty similar • Various types of ClamAV signatures, not limited to, but: • hdb (hash database) • Hash based signatures– simple • ldb (logical database) • Logical signatures– getting trickier now • Boolean logic • Regex • Content modifiers • Other stuff I’m not getting into because these I find most useful
- 25. hdb signatures • 7d8d7e1b9b4e54a113769fae842cc279:48237:EnableMacroLureImg.9.170412 md5 hash file size message • sigtool --md5 <file>
- 26. Suggestions for sound signatures • Naming • MiscreantPunch.EvilMacro.MultiPSD L.170425 • Content • Utilize conditional features • <, >, =, |, & for logical expressions • i, a, w, | for contents • * , ?? (wild card bytes) • !(hex), negate bytes • {x-y}, byte ranges • Offsets • 0:[hex], etc • PCREs! • Anchor appropriately to a content (i, s, g, etc) • Use the appropriate flags • ldb logic • Take advantage of • <,>,=,|,& • Target type • OLE / Flash / html/js / etc
- 28. ldb signatures • MiscreantPunch.EvilMacro.VBDL.170404; Engine:81-255,Target:2; (0&1&2&3&4&(5|6)&7&8&9&10); 4174747269627574652056425f::i;55524c446f776e6c6f6164546f46696c65::i;5c50726f6772616d73::i;5c537 46172747570::i;2e657865::i;2e72756e::i;7368656c6c::i;68747470::i;7/x3a//[^x22x27]+.exeb/si;433a:: i;9/[^x22x27]+.exeb/si Signature name Engine compatibility, and Target type Logical expression Desired contents used for detection as well as PCRE 0: Attribute VB_ 1: URLDownloadToFile 2: Programs
- 30. QAing your Sigs • It’s important to test signatures before either deploying to prod or an analysis environment • Twofold: • Checking your sigs for: • Misspellings • Formatting • Errors • Test sigs against evil docs and benign docs– ensure what is supposed to happen.. does
- 31. I wrote a sig and it didn’t fire • Getting things to fire on first go isn’t easy • Probably is your pcre • Debug! • --debug • $ clamscan –d <rule-file>.ldb <file> --debug • Spits out a ton of information with regards to how the engine inspected the file, what it found, and what conditions exist • Useful for determining why a sig didn’t fire or had problems
- 32. clam-punch • Owned / Created by the rule druid himself, Will Metcalf • Github repo containing buckets and shovels • Several rulesets updated p much daily • MiscreantPunch099-Low.ldb • miscreantpunch.hdb • MiscreantPunch099-INFO-Low.ldb • exexor99.ldb • Clamdigger • Signature generation tool
- 33. clamdigger.py • Python script for generating ldb ClamAV signatures • Does the heavy lifting • Converts content -> hex • Logically formats it • Appends macro auto* stuff (if you want) • Add/remove modifiers
- 34. Limitations • Encrypted docs • Observed in recent campaigns • Use some tool to bruteforce (or enter if known) -> send to clam for processing • EPS Files detected as PostScript are blanket ignored • Multimatch can be unreliable
- 35. Resources • ClamAV Signature Docs (really important!) • github.com/vrtadmin/clamav-devel/blob/master/docs/signatures.pdf • Miscreant Punch Sigs • github.com/wmetcalf/clam-punch • Tutorial on sigwriting I made • www.malwarefor.me/writing-signatures-for-clam-av-0-99-a-tutorial • SaneSecurity 3rd party Sigs • sanesecurity.com/usage/signatures • ClamAV Mailing List • lists.clamav.net/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/clamav-users • Mal(?:doc|ware) Samples • malware-traffic-analysis.net • hybrid-analysis.com • malwr.com
- 36. come hang w me (trainings) • OISF Training– Denver, CO: June 20-21st • Mix of Suricata User training with a kicker of signature development • DerbyCon 7.0 – Lousiville, KY: September 20-21st • Practical Signature Development for Open Source IDS • TL;DR how to write Suricata/Snort sigs that don’t suck J • SuriCon 2017 – Prague, CZ: November 15-17th • https://suricon.net/ • CFP open (talk to me!) • Sponsors needed! (support Open Source!)
- 37. Questions? • don’t tweet me: @malwareforme • don’t email me: jack@malwarefor.me • tks wmetcalf • tks jwilliams • tks clamav • tks Steve B / SaneSecurity • tks BSides Denver!