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Single Packet Authorization
Increasing Security in SSH
                                              Leandro Almeida
                      lcavalcanti.almeida@gmail.com




                                
                    III ENSOL Liberdade no Extremo
              João Pessoa­PB 19,20 e 21 de Junho de 2009
Who is this guy?
    ●


    ●   Degree in Computer Network
    ●   Post­graduate in Information 
        Security
    ●   Security Analist




                      
AGENDA
    ●   SSH
    ●   Firewall
    ●   Port Knocking
    ●   Single Packet Authorization
    ●   FWKNOP
    ●   Video
    ●   Questions

                         
Who here uses SSH?

              
Do you think the SSH 
           secure?
              
●   CERT® Advisory CA­2002­18 OpenSSH 
        Vulnerabilities in Challenge Response Handling
    ●   USN­649­1: OpenSSH vulnerabilities
    ●   OpenSSH Security Advisory: cbc.adv ­ Plaintext 
        Recovery Attack Against SSH CPNI­957037
    ●   CPNI Vulnerability Advisory SSH – CPNI­957037
    ●   openssh vulnerability CVE­2008­0166, 
        http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn­612­1

 
    ●   SSH is an application and have flaws
                                 
When someone comes and says...
     If you are not safe places a 
               Firewall




                   
Search / Design a solution to 
            your problem
                   
Otherwise an attacker can 
            succeed!
                 
There is a light at the 
       end of the tunnel



                
●   Port Knocking
        ●   Literally “door knocking”
        ●   The technique is built on a 
            sequence of packages pre­
            determined
        ●   If the sequence is wrong, nothing 
            (SSH access) will be released
        ●   Use the fields reserved for the 
            TCP/UDP
        ●    Does not use encryption


                             
1º Moment: Blue
2º Moment: Red
3º Moment: green
                    
Problems...
          
The encryption can not be 
               used
                 
Packets may arrive out of order, 
    which breaks a string
    An attacker may be sending 
    packets to random ports, breaking 
     the sequence
    Susceptible to attack by replay

                   
And now? Who can save 
            us...




               
Single Packet Authorization




                 
It is a technique based a Port Knocking
    ●   The SPA inherits the strengths and 
        addresses the major flaws of Port Knocking
        The application that implements the SPA is 
        FWKNOP (FireWall KNock OPerator) 
        The FWKNOP is Free Software maintained by 
        Michael Rash
        http://cipherdyne.org/fwknop/

                           
Only one packet is sent
                Correcting the problem of delivery 
                  out of order
        Uses the field­related data of the package
                Correcting the problem of encryption
    ●   Creates a temporary rule in the firewall, 
        allowing access only to client
        There is not the possibility of using the 
        same package in a range of pre­determined 
        time (default 60s) 
            –   Correction of attacks on Replay

                             
Ability to encrypt packets with keys
                Symmetrical (Rijndael)
            –   Asymmetric (GPG + ElGamal)
        Makes the deciphering of the packages 
        to verify
                IP  address  of  the  packet    with 
                  the IP address of the encrypted
    ●   Addition  of  a  block  of  random  content 
        generated  for  each  packet,  thus 
        allowing the encryption single




                             
Packet SPA




         
Scenario testing




            
1º Moment: Without SPA

               
2º Moment: With SPA

              
SSH Access Released o/

                
     
     
Thanks!
    Leandro Almeida
    Blog:leandro­cavalcanti.blogspot.com
    Email:lcavalcanti.almeida@gmail.com




                     
References
    ●   http://www.cipherdyne.org/fwknop/
    ●   http://www.linuxjournal.com/article
        /9565
    ●   http://www.linux.com/archive/featur
        e/135100
    ●   http://www.jsena.info/downloads/pal
        estras/JansenSena_FISL9_Single_Pack
        et_Authorization.pdf
    ●




                        

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Single Packet Authorization - Slides English