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Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
Can Security Vulnerability
Disclosure Processes Be
Responsible, Rational and
Effective?
Toward a Sane Open Source Security
Vulnerability Disclosure Process
Larissa Shapiro
December 8, 2011
LISA ’11, Boston, MA
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
About the Presenter
Larissa Shapiro
ISC Product Manager
larissas@isc.org
@larissashapiro
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
Agenda
•Vulnerability Disclosure Terminology
–History and Context
•ISC’s Current Vulnerability Disclosure Policy
–version 1.1
•New updates for version 1.2
•ISC’s use of Test Driven Development
(TDD) and the impact on Vulnerability
Disclosure
•Q&A
3
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
ISC in a Nutshell
Forum Professional Services Public Benefit Services
Empowerment
• Consulting
• Training
• Software Support Services
• Custom Software Development
• F-Root Corporate Node
• DNS SNS-Com
• Full version of Domain Survey
• DNS F-Root
• DNS Secondary Server Resiliency
(SNS-PB)
• Hosted@ - hosting a range of
open source projects
• Free Domain Survey Report
• Participation in IETF, RIPE WG,
ICANN, ARIN, ISOC, UKNOF, etc
• BIND
• BIND 10 Working Group
• DHCP
• AFTR / PCP
• SRF
• Open Source Routing
• Standards Driver - early implementations of standards based code.
• Policy Meetings - Empowering Spheres of Influence
• Operational Security - Pioneering new approaches to safe guard the Internet (OPSEC-Trust)
• Operational Meetings - (APRICOT, AFNOG, NANOG, LISA, etc)
• Research (DNS OARC)
... and more to come.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
Vulnerability Disclosure Terminology
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/6
Three Major Vulnerability Management Phases
•There are three main phases to
vulnerability management.
–Phase 1 – Vulnerability Reporting,
Acknowledgment, Validation, and Replication
–Phase 2 – Vulnerability Resolution with
workarounds, patches, and fixes
–Phase 3 – Responsible Disclosure and call to
action
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/7
Types of Vulnerability Disclosure
•Full Disclosure
•Responsible Disclosure
•Public Disclosure
•Entitled Disclosure
•Critical Notification Plan (CNP)
•Partner Notification Plan (PNP)
•Phased Disclosure
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/8
Full Disclosure
•(Wikipedia) In computer security, full
disclosure means to disclose all the
details of a security problem which are
known. It is a philosophy of security
management completely opposed to the
idea of security through obscurity.
•Usually means that all information about
the vulnerability is made immediately
public.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/9
Responsible Disclosure
• (Wikipedia) Some believe that in the absence
of any public exploits for the problem, full and
public disclosure should be preceded by
disclosure of the vulnerability to the vendors
or authors of the system. This private advance
disclosure allows the vendor time to produce a
fix or workaround.
• Some vendors may choose to maintain a
responsible disclosure stance in perpetuity.
Exploit details are withheld from the
customers as corporate confidential.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/10
Public Disclosure
• Everyone on the Net has access to the details
of the vulnerability and/or the Security
Bulletin providing information about the
vulnerability. This includes all customers of
the vendor and all miscreants with an intent
to do harm to those customers.
• Used by many vendors who have a broad
customer base who may not be support
customers.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/11
Entitled Disclosure
• Security Bulletin only accessible it customers
and partners of the vendor with a legal
agreement.
• Variants of Responsible Disclosure:
–Limit access to customer & partners
–No broadcasting to the public, news, or security
aliases.
–No deniability – if asked, provide interested parties
with the link to the Security Bulletin and the Title –
but requires username/password for further details.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/12
Critical Notification Plan (CNP)
•Where the undisclosed vulnerability poses
a critical threat to critical infrastructure.
•For past dialog, please see
– ftp://ftp-eng.cisco.com/cons/isp/security/CPN-Summit-2004/Paris-
Sept-04/SE13-PSIRT-IOS-RELEASE-OPERATIONS-SECURITY-and-SP-
OPERATIONS-v.1.pdf
•Ongoing problems with CNP:
–What is critical infrastructure?
–Who gets notified?
–What are the metrics used for “critical” – where
everyone believes their mission is “critical?”
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/13
Partner Notification Plan (PNP)
• PNP is a system to notify and prepare a vendor’s
channel partners before the announcement or
publication of a vulnerability.
• Required if the vendor’s ecosystem is prepared to
support their customers.
• Contracts and NDAs are required to provide some
check and consequence if the disclosure process is
broken.
• Microsoft’s Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure
(CVD) & Microsoft Active Protections Program
(MAPP) are examples of PNP
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/14
Phased Disclosure
• Phased disclosure is a evolution of the
responsible disclosure process – merging
factors of the vulnerability's risk along with the
operational requirements of core infrastructure.
• At times, the operational risk of rushed –
unplanned upgrades is greater than the risk of a
vulnerability moving to active exploit status.
• Disclosure is conducted in phases – notifying
increasingly larger number of organizations –
until the final phase of general public disclosure.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
ISC’s Security Vulnerability
Disclosure Policy
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/16
ISC’s Security Vulnerability Disclosure Policy
•ISC has migrated away from a “entitled
disclosure” process to a phased disclosure
process.
•The phased disclosure process mixes
ISC’s responsibility to critical Internet
infrastructure, our customers, our
operating system partners, our
Forum subscribers, our “ISC Inside”
partners, and our large deployment of
software running on networks throughout
the world.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/17
Our Objectives
• The objective of ISC’s phased disclosure is to
provide the opportunity to upgrade within a
reasonable maintenance window to minimize
rushed action and operational anxiety.
–We balance the risk of rushed upgrades beside the
risk of the vulnerability.
• As an open source organization, we are
working to have all our vulnerability
management processes public.
–This will allow the processes and procedures to be
used as a reference model for the industry.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/18
Five Phases
• Five phases to our Vulnerability Management
Process:
1. Finder’s Report, Acknowledgment, Validation, CVSS
scoring, and Replication (TDD).
2. Vulnerability Resolution with workarounds,
patches, and fixes.
•Drafting the Security Advisory. Obtaining the CVE number.
3. Phased Disclosure
•Interacting with infrastructure partners, security folks,
vendors, customers.
4. General Public Notification Phase
•Reaching as many constituents as possible
5. Postmortem Review
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/19
Two Types of Vulnerability Response
• At ISC, we follow two sorts of process in determining types of
security emergency.
1.Issues reported to ISC through private or secured
channels are treated as “Type I” incidents (see “what to do
if you find something”).
•The normal Vulnerability Management Processes are used.
2.Live Operational Issues or Public Disclosure of
vulnerability are “Type II.”
•Extremely compressed process, public notified as quickly as
possible
•Some lead time for root-ops and other key partners if possible
Note: ISC treats all incidents impacting DNS operations at
multiple sites as security issues until they are confirmed
as non-malicious attacks.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/20
Version 1.1 Disclosure Phases
•Phase One: ISC Forum subscribers, ISC
software support customers, and DNS
Root Operators (where applicable).
–Formal notice and pre-release code snapshot
at least five business days in advance of the
release of the public disclosure.
•Phase Two: CSIRTs and other global
security tracking organizations.
–Written notice of the disclosure ~24 hours
before planned release of the public disclosure
and code.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/21
Version 1.1 Disclosure Phases
• Phase Three: Vendors who package our
code into their operating systems,
appliances, and products, receive written
notice of the disclosure ~24 hours before
planned release of the public disclosure and
code.
–Vendors who are Software Forum Members receive
notification in Phase One.
• Phase Four: General Public disclosure of the
vulnerability, and release of patched versions
of all currently supported affected code.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/22
Factors that Impact Phased Disclosure
• Contractual Trust (working non-disclosure)
and Operational Trust (working discreetly
through the remediation) is critical for a
Phased Disclosure to work.
–The chain of consequences of a disclosure leak
impact the whole community.
–This is why few vendors (software or hardware) use
a phased disclosure approach. It requires more
investment in time and effort to ensure that it
works effectively.
–Non-Disclosure agreements are included in ISC’s
Support, Service, and Forum contracts -- but other
organizations require a NDA.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/23
Factors that Impact Phased Disclosure
•Encrypted communications is required
throughout the phased disclosure.
–It takes time to exchange PGP keys (if keys
are available).
–Not all organizations or individuals use PGP
–Not always easy to exchange keys
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/24
What’s Next?
• ISC continuously improves our Vulnerability
Management and Disclosure Processes.
Versions 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 (etc) will have:
–Security Advisories in Multiple Languages –
working with our partners (i.e. ccTLD colleagues,
CSIRTs, Universities) and our international staff.
–Phase 1 disclosure 7 days before the public
release.
–Integration of Vendor and Operating System
Partners into the Phase 1 disclosure to have the
packages ready to go on the General Disclosure
Phase (T0). This is similar to Microsoft’s and
ICASI’s Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/25
What’s Next (cont)?
–Work with National CSIRTs to provide secured
disclosure sooner than 24 hours before public
advisory.
–Work with global partners to prepare vendor
specific software versions and local language
notification at public disclosure.
–Briefing Calls and Webinars with our support
customers & forum subscribers.
–First publication of our vulnerability
management processes and procedures via
our Knowledge
–Increase compliance with the Common
Vulnerability Reporting Framework (CVRF)
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
Test Driven Development (TDD) and
Vulnerability Disclosure
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/27
TDD and Vulnerabilities
• ISC uses Test Driven
Development extensively as a
key engineering quality process.
• Once we have validated &
replicated the vulnerability, we
then write a unit test.
• We then fix the code and verify
using the test.
• When we get ready to release
the code, we pull out the test so
people will not know how to
build an exploit.
• This unit test is a regression
test. We need to find an
appropriate time to put it back
into the code.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/28
Version 2.0
•In the future ISC will move to v2.0 of our
Vulnerability Disclosure Process.
•The major change in 2.0 will be a public
policy stating when the unit test/
regression test for the defect
(vulnerability) will be integrated back
into the code.
–Operators ask us for this information for their
own verification processes.
–This could make it easier to build an exploit.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/29
Prerequisites to Version 2.0
•ISC has a lot of work to do to prepare the
our constituents for the impact of TDD in
open source.
–We need to have on-line training for our
support customers, forum subscribers, and
submitters.
–We need to improve communications channel
with our customers and the global community
(i.e. let them know they should upgrade)
–We need to interact with the FIRST community
to review the impact this will have greater
community.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/30
Path to Version 2.0
•We’re asking our support customers,
forum subscribers, submitters, and
global user community for feedback as
we integrate TDD practices with our
vulnerability disclosure process.
–What do we need to prepare?
–What do you need to prepare?
–How might this impact your operations?
–What is the appropriate time between the
general disclosure and when we integrate the
unit/regression test back into the code?
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
ISC’s Use of the Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/32
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
•CVSS provides ISC with an industry tool
that improves our security risk,
communications, and disclosure
processes.
•It allows us to perform an initial risk
assessment and dialog with the
vulnerability’s finder to insure we apply
the appropriate level of response.
•The CVSS Base Score is now included as
part of our Security Advisory.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/33
How does CVSS work?
• The Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS) is a tool that allows two very different
organizations to have a meaningful
conversation about the risk a vulnerability can
have on a network.
• CVSS uses metrics and formulas to yield a
score that can be used to assess potential risk.
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
Components of CVSS Score
• Base Score
– Based on the
parameters that are
intrinsic to any given
vulnerability that do not
change over time
• Temporal Score
– Based on the
parameters of a
vulnerability that
change over time
• Environmental Score
– Based on the
parameters of a
vulnerability that are
specific to a user’s
environment
34
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
CVSS is a Metric which drives action
•CVSS is used by CSIRT/SIRT Team for:
–Consultation inside the organization on the risk
–Setting priority of assigned Support Resources
–Setting priority of assigned Engineering
Resources
–Determining which images will be fixed
–Deciding when we would need a security
advisory to drive upgrades and mitigations with
our customers
•cf. Security Notice, Security FYI, or ordinary KB article
–Defining how to communicate risk to our
customers
35
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
ISC CVSS Scoring
CVSS Base Score Internal Description Disclosure Build Plan
8 - 10 Critical & Catastrophic
Potential Critical Notification
Process
Fix all images to cover the
majority of deployed code
(i.e. open EOL images.)
7 Critical Security Advisory Fix all Non-EOL Images
5 - 6 High Security Advisory Fix all Non-EOL Images
3 - 4 Medium No Advisory Fix all Non-EOL Images
0 - 2 Low No Advisory
Just Fix it and Move
Forward
Thursday, December 8, 11
?Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
Questions
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/38
CVSS and CVRF References
• CVSS-SIG: http://www.first.org/cvss/
• CVSS v2 Complete Documentation:
–http://www.first.org/cvss/cvss-guide.html
• NIST Interagency Report 7435:
–http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/
• NIST NVD:
–http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?version=2
–http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?
calculator&version=2
•Common Vulnerability Reporting
Framework
– www.icasi.org/docs/cvrf-whitepaper.pdf
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
Keeping in Contact
http://www.facebook.com/InternetSystemsConsortium
http://www.linkedin.com/company/internet-systems-consortium
http://twitter.com/ISCdotORG
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
ISC Resources
bind-announce for release notifications
http://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-announce
bind-users for community assistance
http://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Knowledge Base articles about many things
http://deepthought.isc.org/
Thursday, December 8, 11
Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/
Thank you for your time.
www.isc.org
Thursday, December 8, 11

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Can Security Vulnerability Disclosure Processes Be Responsible, Rational and Effective? from LISA 2011

  • 1. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ Can Security Vulnerability Disclosure Processes Be Responsible, Rational and Effective? Toward a Sane Open Source Security Vulnerability Disclosure Process Larissa Shapiro December 8, 2011 LISA ’11, Boston, MA Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 2. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ About the Presenter Larissa Shapiro ISC Product Manager larissas@isc.org @larissashapiro Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 3. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ Agenda •Vulnerability Disclosure Terminology –History and Context •ISC’s Current Vulnerability Disclosure Policy –version 1.1 •New updates for version 1.2 •ISC’s use of Test Driven Development (TDD) and the impact on Vulnerability Disclosure •Q&A 3 Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 4. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ ISC in a Nutshell Forum Professional Services Public Benefit Services Empowerment • Consulting • Training • Software Support Services • Custom Software Development • F-Root Corporate Node • DNS SNS-Com • Full version of Domain Survey • DNS F-Root • DNS Secondary Server Resiliency (SNS-PB) • Hosted@ - hosting a range of open source projects • Free Domain Survey Report • Participation in IETF, RIPE WG, ICANN, ARIN, ISOC, UKNOF, etc • BIND • BIND 10 Working Group • DHCP • AFTR / PCP • SRF • Open Source Routing • Standards Driver - early implementations of standards based code. • Policy Meetings - Empowering Spheres of Influence • Operational Security - Pioneering new approaches to safe guard the Internet (OPSEC-Trust) • Operational Meetings - (APRICOT, AFNOG, NANOG, LISA, etc) • Research (DNS OARC) ... and more to come. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 5. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ Vulnerability Disclosure Terminology Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 6. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/6 Three Major Vulnerability Management Phases •There are three main phases to vulnerability management. –Phase 1 – Vulnerability Reporting, Acknowledgment, Validation, and Replication –Phase 2 – Vulnerability Resolution with workarounds, patches, and fixes –Phase 3 – Responsible Disclosure and call to action Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 7. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/7 Types of Vulnerability Disclosure •Full Disclosure •Responsible Disclosure •Public Disclosure •Entitled Disclosure •Critical Notification Plan (CNP) •Partner Notification Plan (PNP) •Phased Disclosure Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 8. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/8 Full Disclosure •(Wikipedia) In computer security, full disclosure means to disclose all the details of a security problem which are known. It is a philosophy of security management completely opposed to the idea of security through obscurity. •Usually means that all information about the vulnerability is made immediately public. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 9. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/9 Responsible Disclosure • (Wikipedia) Some believe that in the absence of any public exploits for the problem, full and public disclosure should be preceded by disclosure of the vulnerability to the vendors or authors of the system. This private advance disclosure allows the vendor time to produce a fix or workaround. • Some vendors may choose to maintain a responsible disclosure stance in perpetuity. Exploit details are withheld from the customers as corporate confidential. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 10. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/10 Public Disclosure • Everyone on the Net has access to the details of the vulnerability and/or the Security Bulletin providing information about the vulnerability. This includes all customers of the vendor and all miscreants with an intent to do harm to those customers. • Used by many vendors who have a broad customer base who may not be support customers. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 11. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/11 Entitled Disclosure • Security Bulletin only accessible it customers and partners of the vendor with a legal agreement. • Variants of Responsible Disclosure: –Limit access to customer & partners –No broadcasting to the public, news, or security aliases. –No deniability – if asked, provide interested parties with the link to the Security Bulletin and the Title – but requires username/password for further details. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 12. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/12 Critical Notification Plan (CNP) •Where the undisclosed vulnerability poses a critical threat to critical infrastructure. •For past dialog, please see – ftp://ftp-eng.cisco.com/cons/isp/security/CPN-Summit-2004/Paris- Sept-04/SE13-PSIRT-IOS-RELEASE-OPERATIONS-SECURITY-and-SP- OPERATIONS-v.1.pdf •Ongoing problems with CNP: –What is critical infrastructure? –Who gets notified? –What are the metrics used for “critical” – where everyone believes their mission is “critical?” Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 13. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/13 Partner Notification Plan (PNP) • PNP is a system to notify and prepare a vendor’s channel partners before the announcement or publication of a vulnerability. • Required if the vendor’s ecosystem is prepared to support their customers. • Contracts and NDAs are required to provide some check and consequence if the disclosure process is broken. • Microsoft’s Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) & Microsoft Active Protections Program (MAPP) are examples of PNP Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 14. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/14 Phased Disclosure • Phased disclosure is a evolution of the responsible disclosure process – merging factors of the vulnerability's risk along with the operational requirements of core infrastructure. • At times, the operational risk of rushed – unplanned upgrades is greater than the risk of a vulnerability moving to active exploit status. • Disclosure is conducted in phases – notifying increasingly larger number of organizations – until the final phase of general public disclosure. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 15. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ ISC’s Security Vulnerability Disclosure Policy Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 16. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/16 ISC’s Security Vulnerability Disclosure Policy •ISC has migrated away from a “entitled disclosure” process to a phased disclosure process. •The phased disclosure process mixes ISC’s responsibility to critical Internet infrastructure, our customers, our operating system partners, our Forum subscribers, our “ISC Inside” partners, and our large deployment of software running on networks throughout the world. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 17. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/17 Our Objectives • The objective of ISC’s phased disclosure is to provide the opportunity to upgrade within a reasonable maintenance window to minimize rushed action and operational anxiety. –We balance the risk of rushed upgrades beside the risk of the vulnerability. • As an open source organization, we are working to have all our vulnerability management processes public. –This will allow the processes and procedures to be used as a reference model for the industry. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 18. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/18 Five Phases • Five phases to our Vulnerability Management Process: 1. Finder’s Report, Acknowledgment, Validation, CVSS scoring, and Replication (TDD). 2. Vulnerability Resolution with workarounds, patches, and fixes. •Drafting the Security Advisory. Obtaining the CVE number. 3. Phased Disclosure •Interacting with infrastructure partners, security folks, vendors, customers. 4. General Public Notification Phase •Reaching as many constituents as possible 5. Postmortem Review Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 19. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/19 Two Types of Vulnerability Response • At ISC, we follow two sorts of process in determining types of security emergency. 1.Issues reported to ISC through private or secured channels are treated as “Type I” incidents (see “what to do if you find something”). •The normal Vulnerability Management Processes are used. 2.Live Operational Issues or Public Disclosure of vulnerability are “Type II.” •Extremely compressed process, public notified as quickly as possible •Some lead time for root-ops and other key partners if possible Note: ISC treats all incidents impacting DNS operations at multiple sites as security issues until they are confirmed as non-malicious attacks. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 20. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/20 Version 1.1 Disclosure Phases •Phase One: ISC Forum subscribers, ISC software support customers, and DNS Root Operators (where applicable). –Formal notice and pre-release code snapshot at least five business days in advance of the release of the public disclosure. •Phase Two: CSIRTs and other global security tracking organizations. –Written notice of the disclosure ~24 hours before planned release of the public disclosure and code. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 21. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/21 Version 1.1 Disclosure Phases • Phase Three: Vendors who package our code into their operating systems, appliances, and products, receive written notice of the disclosure ~24 hours before planned release of the public disclosure and code. –Vendors who are Software Forum Members receive notification in Phase One. • Phase Four: General Public disclosure of the vulnerability, and release of patched versions of all currently supported affected code. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 22. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/22 Factors that Impact Phased Disclosure • Contractual Trust (working non-disclosure) and Operational Trust (working discreetly through the remediation) is critical for a Phased Disclosure to work. –The chain of consequences of a disclosure leak impact the whole community. –This is why few vendors (software or hardware) use a phased disclosure approach. It requires more investment in time and effort to ensure that it works effectively. –Non-Disclosure agreements are included in ISC’s Support, Service, and Forum contracts -- but other organizations require a NDA. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 23. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/23 Factors that Impact Phased Disclosure •Encrypted communications is required throughout the phased disclosure. –It takes time to exchange PGP keys (if keys are available). –Not all organizations or individuals use PGP –Not always easy to exchange keys Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 24. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/24 What’s Next? • ISC continuously improves our Vulnerability Management and Disclosure Processes. Versions 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 (etc) will have: –Security Advisories in Multiple Languages – working with our partners (i.e. ccTLD colleagues, CSIRTs, Universities) and our international staff. –Phase 1 disclosure 7 days before the public release. –Integration of Vendor and Operating System Partners into the Phase 1 disclosure to have the packages ready to go on the General Disclosure Phase (T0). This is similar to Microsoft’s and ICASI’s Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 25. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/25 What’s Next (cont)? –Work with National CSIRTs to provide secured disclosure sooner than 24 hours before public advisory. –Work with global partners to prepare vendor specific software versions and local language notification at public disclosure. –Briefing Calls and Webinars with our support customers & forum subscribers. –First publication of our vulnerability management processes and procedures via our Knowledge –Increase compliance with the Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework (CVRF) Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 26. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ Test Driven Development (TDD) and Vulnerability Disclosure Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 27. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/27 TDD and Vulnerabilities • ISC uses Test Driven Development extensively as a key engineering quality process. • Once we have validated & replicated the vulnerability, we then write a unit test. • We then fix the code and verify using the test. • When we get ready to release the code, we pull out the test so people will not know how to build an exploit. • This unit test is a regression test. We need to find an appropriate time to put it back into the code. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 28. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/28 Version 2.0 •In the future ISC will move to v2.0 of our Vulnerability Disclosure Process. •The major change in 2.0 will be a public policy stating when the unit test/ regression test for the defect (vulnerability) will be integrated back into the code. –Operators ask us for this information for their own verification processes. –This could make it easier to build an exploit. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 29. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/29 Prerequisites to Version 2.0 •ISC has a lot of work to do to prepare the our constituents for the impact of TDD in open source. –We need to have on-line training for our support customers, forum subscribers, and submitters. –We need to improve communications channel with our customers and the global community (i.e. let them know they should upgrade) –We need to interact with the FIRST community to review the impact this will have greater community. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 30. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/30 Path to Version 2.0 •We’re asking our support customers, forum subscribers, submitters, and global user community for feedback as we integrate TDD practices with our vulnerability disclosure process. –What do we need to prepare? –What do you need to prepare? –How might this impact your operations? –What is the appropriate time between the general disclosure and when we integrate the unit/regression test back into the code? Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 31. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ ISC’s Use of the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 32. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/32 Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) •CVSS provides ISC with an industry tool that improves our security risk, communications, and disclosure processes. •It allows us to perform an initial risk assessment and dialog with the vulnerability’s finder to insure we apply the appropriate level of response. •The CVSS Base Score is now included as part of our Security Advisory. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 33. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/33 How does CVSS work? • The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a tool that allows two very different organizations to have a meaningful conversation about the risk a vulnerability can have on a network. • CVSS uses metrics and formulas to yield a score that can be used to assess potential risk. Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 34. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ Components of CVSS Score • Base Score – Based on the parameters that are intrinsic to any given vulnerability that do not change over time • Temporal Score – Based on the parameters of a vulnerability that change over time • Environmental Score – Based on the parameters of a vulnerability that are specific to a user’s environment 34 Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 35. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ CVSS is a Metric which drives action •CVSS is used by CSIRT/SIRT Team for: –Consultation inside the organization on the risk –Setting priority of assigned Support Resources –Setting priority of assigned Engineering Resources –Determining which images will be fixed –Deciding when we would need a security advisory to drive upgrades and mitigations with our customers •cf. Security Notice, Security FYI, or ordinary KB article –Defining how to communicate risk to our customers 35 Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 36. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ ISC CVSS Scoring CVSS Base Score Internal Description Disclosure Build Plan 8 - 10 Critical & Catastrophic Potential Critical Notification Process Fix all images to cover the majority of deployed code (i.e. open EOL images.) 7 Critical Security Advisory Fix all Non-EOL Images 5 - 6 High Security Advisory Fix all Non-EOL Images 3 - 4 Medium No Advisory Fix all Non-EOL Images 0 - 2 Low No Advisory Just Fix it and Move Forward Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 37. ?Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ Questions Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 38. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/38 CVSS and CVRF References • CVSS-SIG: http://www.first.org/cvss/ • CVSS v2 Complete Documentation: –http://www.first.org/cvss/cvss-guide.html • NIST Interagency Report 7435: –http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/ • NIST NVD: –http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?version=2 –http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm? calculator&version=2 •Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework – www.icasi.org/docs/cvrf-whitepaper.pdf Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 39. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ Keeping in Contact http://www.facebook.com/InternetSystemsConsortium http://www.linkedin.com/company/internet-systems-consortium http://twitter.com/ISCdotORG Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 40. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ ISC Resources bind-announce for release notifications http://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-announce bind-users for community assistance http://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users Knowledge Base articles about many things http://deepthought.isc.org/ Thursday, December 8, 11
  • 41. Copyright (c) 2011 Internet Systems Consortium http://www.isc.org/ Thank you for your time. www.isc.org Thursday, December 8, 11