1. Cable Viewer
Currently released so far... 6093 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan
Browse latest releases
2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08
2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16
2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24
2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11
2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19
2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27
2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08
2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16
2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24
2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08
2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17
2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20
Browse by creation date
66 72 73 75 79 85 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11 2002/12
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02
Browse by origin
file:///F|/Top%20Secret/cablegate-201103201804/cable/2010/01/10BANGKOK192.html[31/5/2554 2:00:36]

2. Cable Viewer
ABCDFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWYZ
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy
Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate
Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es
Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy
Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy
Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb
Browse by tag
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
AR AJ ASEC AE AEMR AF AMGT APER AG AM AORC AU AS ACOA AX AFIN AL AFFAIRS AA AMED ABLD
AROC ATFN ASEAN AFGHANISTAN ADCO AO AFU AER AODE ABUD ATRN APECO ASUP AID AC APCS AGMT
AVERY ASIG ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
BU BM BEXP BR BA BRUSSELS BL BO BTIO BH BE BK BX BIDEN BG BY BF BBSR BC BT BB BILAT BMGT
BTIU
CH CU CJAN CMGT CVIS CO CA CE COUNTER CASC CBW CG CI CS CDG CIA CACM CDB CAN CN CY COE
CD CM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CACS CWC CF CONDOLEEZZA CT CARSON CL CR CIS CLINTON CODEL
CTM CB CKGR COM CJUS CV COUNTERTERRORISM
DJ DEAX DA DOE DISENGAGEMENT DEA DK DHS DR DTRA DS DOD
file:///F|/Top%20Secret/cablegate-201103201804/cable/2010/01/10BANGKOK192.html[31/5/2554 2:00:36]

3. Cable Viewer
EINV ECON ENRG EPET ETRD EAGR ELAB EUN EFIN EAID EU EIND ETTC ECPS EWWT ES EG EXTERNAL
EMIN ECIP EINDETRD EN EAIR EZ EUC EI ELTN EREL ER ECIN ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EFIS EC ENVR ECA
ET ENERG EINT ENGY ETRO ELECTIONS ELN EK EFTA ECONCS ECONOMICS EUR ENGR ECONEFIN ENIV
EINVETC EINN ESA ETC ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV EUNCH ETRDECONWTOCS ENNP ENVI ECUN EINVEFIN
FR FAO FTAA FARC FREEDOM FI FBI FJ FINR FMLN
GM GZ GTMO GOI GG GV GH GA GT GR GE GAZA GCC GOV GY GTIP GANGS
HO HURI HA HU HR HUMAN HILLARY HK HYMPSK HSTC
IR IS IZ IN IT IAEA ID IO IV ICTY IQ ICAO INTERPOL IPR INRB ITPHUM IWC IC IIP ICRC ISRAELI
INTELSAT IMO IL IA INR ITALIAN ITALY ITPGOV IZPREL IRAQI ILC IRC INRA INRO IRAJ IEFIN IF IACI
IBRD IMF ICJ ITRA
JAMES JA JO JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JM JUS
KCRM KCOR KDEM KPAO KG KTIP KICC KNNP KV KBCT KPAL KTFN KU KSPR KJUS KHLS KTIA KWBG KMDR
KGHG KN KUNR KS KIRF KISL KFRD KIPR KAWC KPWR KCIP KSUM KWAC KMIG KOLY KZ KAWK KSEC KIFR
KDRG KDEMAF KFIN KGIC KGCC KPIN KBIO KHIV KSCA KE KPKO KPLS KIRC KRAD KMCA
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KWMN KACT KGIT KPRP KOMC KSTC KFLU KBTR KBTS KPRV
KVPR KTDB KERG KWMM KRVC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KSTH KSEP KNSD KFLO KMPI
KVIR KNUP KTER KCFE KNEI KDDG KHSA KMRS KHDP KTLA KPAK KNAR KREL KPAI KTEX KNPP KCOM
KNNPMNUC KO KPOA KLIG KOCI KRFD KHUM KDEV KNUC KCFC KWWMN KTBT KOMS KSAF KCRS KR
LY LG LE LH LI LO LOG LT LTTE LAB LU
MCAP MO MNUC MARR MPOS MASS MOPS MAR MD MX MZ MEPP MA MR ML MIL MTCRE MOPPS MAPP MU
MY MASC MP MT MERCOSUR MK MDC MI MAPS MCC MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MUCN MTCR MG MTRE MC
MRCRE MEPI MV
NATO NI NG NO NL NU NIPP NPT NS NSG NA NZ NATIONAL NP NRR NAR NE NASA NK NPG NT NSF NGO
OVIP OTRA OPRC OSCI OTR OREP ODIP OPDC OSAC OAS OEXC OIIP OFDP OSCE OECD OPCW OPIC OIC
OVP OFFICIALS OIE
PINR PGOV PBTS PREL PTER PE PO PROP PHUM PBIO PARM PECON PINS PM PK PHSA PREF PL PAK
POGOV PINL POL PSOE PKFK PMIL PY PFOR PALESTINIAN PHALANAGE PARTY PRAM PAO PA PMAR
PGOVLO POLITICS PUNE PORG PHUMPREL PF POLINT PHUS PGOC PNR PGGV PNAT PGOVE PRGOV PRL
PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PARMS PINT PINF PLN PEL POV PG PEPR PSI PU POLITICAL PARTIES
QA
RS RU RO RW RIGHTS RF RICE ROBERT RFE REGION RP
SP SOCI STEINBERG SN SA SY SNAR SMIG SO SENV SCUL SR SF SG SW SU SL SZ SIPRS SH SI SNARCS
SOFA SANC SHUM SK ST SAN SC SEVN SYR
TI TX TU TW TC TERRORISM TPHY TRGY TS TIP TBIO TSPA TH TO TZ TK TSPL TNGD TINT TRSY TR
TFIN TD TURKEY TP TT
UK UZ UNMIK UN US UG UNSC UP USEU UY UNGA UNO UV USUN UNESCO UNEP UNDP UNCHS UNHRC
UNAUS USTR UNVIE UNCHC UE UNDESCO UNHCR USAID UAE UNDC
VE VZ VT VTPREL VN VM
WI WTRO WTO WTRQ WWARD WB WHA WZ WBG WA WHO WMO WEU
XF XA XG XT XM XR XS XL XH XZ XW XY XE XK XD XC
YI YM YE YMCS
ZP ZR ZI ZU ZB ZF ZO ZANU ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZJ
Browse by classification
CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Community resources
Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10BANGKOK192, THAILAND: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PRIVY
file:///F|/Top%20Secret/cablegate-201103201804/cable/2010/01/10BANGKOK192.html[31/5/2554 2:00:36]

4. Cable Viewer
COUNCIL CHAIR
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to
discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent,
and what its initial classification was.
The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes
information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject,
references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by
the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as
reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference
number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate
link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter
with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10BANGKOK192.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10BANGKOK192 2010-01-25 07:07 2010-12-15 21:09 SECRET Embassy Bangkok
VZCZCXRO6557
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #0192/01 0250759
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 250759Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9667
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2258
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7904
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 6126
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0330
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 7534
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
Monday, 25 January 2010, 07:59
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000192
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON
EO 12958 DECL: 01/25/2030
TAGS PREL, PGOV, TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PRIVY COUNCIL CHAIR
PREM, OTHER “ESTABLISHMENT” FIGURES ON YEAR AHEAD
REF: BANGKOK 184 (SEH DAENG)
BANGKOK 00000192 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador paid a series of New Year’s-related calls on influential Thai
figures, including Privy Council Chair GEN Prem, Privy Council member ACM Siddhi, and former PM
Anand, to discuss the year ahead. Abhisit’s performance, issues related to the royal family, and
challenges posed by Thaksin/Hun Sen emerged as the primary themes. Prem offered a more positive
assessment of Abhisit’s performance than Siddhi, who criticized Abhisit for a lack of resolve and
the absence of an effective team to carry out his policies. All three focused on the challenge
posed by Thaksin to the government and, indirectly, to the monarchy; Anand attributed part of the
King’s poor health to Thaksin, and both Prem and Siddhi were upset about Thaksin’s alliance of
convenience with Cambodian leader Hun Sen. All three had quite negative comments about Crown
Prince Vajiralongkorn. While asserting that the Crown Prince will become King, both Siddhi and
Anand implied the country would be better off if other arrangements could be made. Siddhi
file:///F|/Top%20Secret/cablegate-201103201804/cable/2010/01/10BANGKOK192.html[31/5/2554 2:00:36]

5. Cable Viewer
expressed preference for Princess Sirindhorn; Anand suggested only the King would be in a
position to change succession, and acknowledged a low likelihood of that happening.
¶2. (S) Comment: On the two most difficult and sensitive issues of the day in Thailand -- Thaksin
and the monarchy -- the Thai elite appear as unsure about the future as any other sector of
society. The stakes are significant for all sides, and resolution of the political divide and
royal succession could still be far over the horizon. Elite concerns about Abhisit in office
appear to reflect less on his performance than on general worries about the ultimate resolution
of issues. End Summary and Comment.
Mixed Views on Abhisit’s performance
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Privy Councilor Chair GEN Prem shared his assessments of PM Abhisit, the Crown Prince’s
relationship with Thaksin, and difficulties dealing with Cambodia/Hun Sen with Ambassador over
lunch January 13. Regarding Abhisit, Prem referenced widespread criticism that the PM was too
young and not strong enough to be an effective leader in trying times. However, Prem felt that
Abhisit had proved in 2009 that he was up to the challenge of doing what was necessary to run a
fractious coalition government, no easy task. In addition, there were no other politicians
available who were more principled and had more integrity than Abhisit, and Thailand needed such
a leader at this point. Prem expressed hope that Thais and foreigners alike would be more patient
with Abhisit, who he believed was the right man to serve as premier.
¶4. (C) Fellow Privy Councilor ACM Siddhi, hosting Ambassador at his home January 11, was more
critical of Abhisit than Prem. Siddhi said that he had told Abhisit’s father, his own long-time
personal physician, that his son needed to be more decisive and “make more friends” in 2010.
Abhisit spent too much time at the podium and not enough time assembling an effective team to
which he could delegate action and rely on for well-thought out policy initiatives, in Siddhi’s
view. Abhisit also needed to get out to engage the grassroots, one of Thaksin’s strengths. On
Siddhi’s wish list: Abhisit pushing through a permanent appointment for Acting Police Chief
Pratheep; using his power over wayward coalition parties by threatening parliamentary dissolution
if they did not get in line; and telling the Army to take action to dismiss renegade MGEN
Khattiya, even if Defense Minister Prawit refused to sign a dismissal order.
Political Year Ahead
--------------------
¶5. (C) While GEN Prem expressed moderate concern about the potential for violence and political
discord in early 2010, he felt the situation was no worse than six months ago. Prem asked about
U.S. laws regarding demonstrations and avoiding
BANGKOK 00000192 002.2 OF 003
excessive disruptions of government functions and daily lives of citizens; Ambassador explained
the U.S. system of permits for protests which allowed for free speech but not free access
everywhere. Ambassador shared U.S. frustration about decisions negatively affecting
economic/investment climate, such as Ma Tha Phut and the digital lottery cancellation; the uneven
application of the rule of law, breaches of contract, and regulatory shifts affected the
investment climate more negatively at this point than political turmoil.
¶6. (C) ACM Siddhi expressed more concerns than Prem about the security situation in 2010,
suggesting that Army Commander Anupong’s inability to control wayward red-affiliated MGEN
Khattiya’s M-79 attacks on yellow-shirt rallies and trips to see Thaksin overseas was not a good
harbinger (note: three days later, someone attacked Anupong’s office at night with an M-79, with
Khattiya widely seen as the likely suspect, see reftel. End note). Siddhi said he had higher
hopes for deputy Commander Prayuth, widely expected to replace Anupong in October and seen as
particularly close to the Queen. Siddhi claimed Prem had sent a signal of his displeasure with
Anupong by snubbing him during a group call at Prem’s residence to pass birthday greetings, not
stopping to talk to Anupong personally as he did with other key military commanders.
Royal Family: King, Crown Prince, Entourages
--------------------------------------------
¶7. (S) Regarding King Bhumibol’s health, Prem indicated that the King was exercising 30 minutes
a day on a stationary bicycle at Siriraj Hospital and passing a medicine ball with a physical
therapist to build up strength and regain weight. Prem acknowledged that he had not seen the King
since the hospitalization, but that the Queen and Princess Sirindhorn saw the King daily. When
Ambassador asked about the Crown Prince’s involvement, Prem repeated: the Queen and Sirindhorn
visit him daily.
¶8. (S) Prem acknowledged Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn probably maintained some sort of
relationship with fugitive former PM Thaksin, “seeing him from time to time.” Prem, clearly no
fan of either man, cautioned that Thaksin ran the risk of self-delusion if he thought that the
Crown Prince would act as his friend/supporter in the future merely because of Thaksin’s monetary
support; “he does not enjoy that sort of relationship.” When Ambassador asked where the Crown
Prince was currently, in Thailand or Europe, Prem replied dismissively: “You know his social
life, how he is.” (Note: a presumed reference to Vajiralongkorn’s preference to spend time based
out of Munich with his main mistress, rather than in Thailand with his wife and son).
¶9. (S) ACM Siddhi, in a similar vein, noted that the Crown Prince frequently slipped away from
Thailand, and that information about his air hostess mistresses was widely available on websites;
he lamented how his former aide, now Thai Ambassador to Germany, was forced to leave Berlin for
Munich often to receive Vajiralongkorn. Siddhi raised Thaksin’s controversial November Times On-
line interview, which Siddhi claimed cast the King in a bad light and attempted to praise the
Crown Prince as broad-minded and educated abroad, hinting that Vajiralongkorn would be ready to
welcome Thaksin back to Thailand once he became King.
¶10. (S) Ambassador mentioned to Siddhi the Crown Prince’s more engaging approach in the early
December King’s Birthday reception with Ambassadors, shaking each envoy’s hand and appearing more
at ease than in the 2008 reception. Siddhi stated that succession would be a difficult transition
time for Thailand. According to Palace Law, the Crown Prince would succeed his father, but added
after a pause, almost hopefully: “if the Crown Prince were to die, anything could happen, and
maybe Prathep (Sirindhorn) could succeed.”
¶11. (S) Ambassador similarly raised the Crown Prince’s more confident demeanor with former PM
Anand in late December, seeking Anand’s assessment of the dynamics in play as succession
file:///F|/Top%20Secret/cablegate-201103201804/cable/2010/01/10BANGKOK192.html[31/5/2554 2:00:36]

6. Cable Viewer
inevitably drew nearer. Anand’s response was
BANGKOK 00000192 003.2 OF 003
similar to Siddhi’s, but more detailed and blunt. Anand said that he had always believed that the
Crown Prince would succeed his father, according to law. However, there could be complicating
factors -- if Vajiralongkohn proved unable to stay out of politics, or avoid embarrassing
financial transactions. After a pause, Anand added that the consensus view among many Thai was
that the Crown Prince could not stop either, nor would he be able, at age 57, to rectify his
behavior. After another pause, Anand added that someone really should raise the matter with the
King, before adding with regret that there really was no one who could raise such a delicate
topic (note: implied was the need for an alternative to Vajiralongkorn).
¶12. (S) ACM Siddhi expressed his personal concern about the declining image of the royal family
in Thailand, noting that something as simple as excessive motorcade-related traffic jams caused
by minor royals was an unnecessary but enduring irritant. Personal Private Secretary Arsa Sarasin
had raised this with the King about eight years ago, according to Siddhi, and the King had
agreed, authorizing Arsa to talk to royal family members and to set up new rules limiting
entourages and occasions when traffic would be stopped. Nothing had changed; Siddhi noted that he
had been caught up in traffic for 45 minutes the previous week returning for a meeting with the
Chinese Ambassador, due to a royal motorcade. Stories that the Crown Prince now ordered second
story windows closed as his motorcade passed achieved nothing but additional popular resentment,
Siddhi added sorrowfully.
Thaksin and Hun Sen
-------------------
¶13. (C) Thaksin clearly remained on the mind of all three “establishment” figures. Former PM
Anand asserted that the King’s health and mood remained poor “primarily because of Thaksin” and
the challenge Thaksin posed to the stability of the country. GEN Prem asked Ambassador what the
U.S. would do in the situation Thailand found itself, with a neighboring country appointing as an
adviser a former leader bent on bringing down the government. Ambassador replied that while
former U.S. Presidents did occasionally give paid speeches overseas, they would never work for
another government; he advised Prem and Thai officials to take the high road in their public
comments about Cambodia, and not to be drawn into a tit for tat with Thaksin and Hun Sen. (Note:
Prem seemed to be musing out loud, but he clearly was focused on what he perceived as a threat
from Thaksin and Hun Sen’s facilitation of Thaksin’s efforts).
¶14. (C) ACM Siddhi said that PM Abhisit had called him on his 90th birthday recently and had
indicated that now that Thailand was no longer ASEAN Chair, Abhisit would feel less constrained
in responding to Hun Sen’s bullying rhetoric more freely. Siddhi expressed concern that in
addition to Cambodia and Brunei, clearly in Thaksin’s camp due to his close personal ties with
Hun Sen and the Brunei Sultan, Laos and Vietnam might back Hun Sen in the ongoing Thai-Cambodia
diplomatic spat.
¶15. (C) ACM Siddhi attacked Thaksin as trying to use money, red-shirt protests, and Hun Sen to
“destroy our country,” but he predicted Thaksin would not succeed. Thaksin never had tried to
negotiate, Siddhi alleged, but only issued demands; had he been willing to come back and spend a
nominal time in jail for his conviction, Thaksin likely would have been quickly pardoned/released
as a former PM. Now Thaksin would try to create chaos, possibly sparking the use of force. While
Siddhi expected Thaksin to lose the February 26 decision on his 76 billion baht ($2.3 billion) in
frozen assets, he claimed his sources indicated Thaksin still had 240 billion baht ($7.3 billion)
overseas. Rather than live overseas quietly, Thaksin had decided to fight, funding websites
attacking the King and Queen to stir up anti-monarchy views. JOHN
file:///F|/Top%20Secret/cablegate-201103201804/cable/2010/01/10BANGKOK192.html[31/5/2554 2:00:36]