KCL MUN Study Guide - Historical IAEA Simulation: Nuclear Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya (29/11 and 6/12/2011)

KCL Model United Nations
Society 2011/2012

UN International Atomic Energy
Agency – Historical Simulation
(December 2009):
" Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s
Libya"

KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012

" Nuclear weapons of Gaddhafi’s Libya"
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Table of Contents
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 3
Introduction to the Committee ................................................................................. 4
Overview on the Topic ........................................................................................... 5
Past UN Actions .................................................................................................. 12
Proposed solutions .............................................................................................. 14
Key Actors and Positions ....................................................................................... 16
Issues a resolution must address ............................................................................. 18


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Introduction
The International Atomic Energy Agency will be dealing with the topic of
Libya, which has recently signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty after years of running a secretive nuclear program. Libya has been
working closely with the IAEA in its verification activities and is now
collaborating with the IAEA on a number of projects aimed at
disseminating the many benefits of nuclear technology to the people of
the country. The IAEA must decide on further steps to be taken with
regards to this topic, while also considering the option of internal
instability breaking out within Libya.


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Introduction to the Committee
The conclusion of World War II by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
brought the issue of nuclear power and its potential for shaping the
future to the forefront of the global conscience. United States President
Dwight Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address to the United Nations
General Assembly in December of 1953 outlined U.S. efforts to
disseminate peaceful nuclear technologies throughout the world. This call
to awareness of the pressing issue of nuclear proliferation was echoed by
the United Nations proper. In October of 1956, the IAEA statute, informed
by many of the same ideas that Eisenhower presented, was unanimously
approved by 81 nations. This new organization, which officially began
operation in 1957, was chartered to become a facilitator in the exchange
of nuclear knowledge and a monitor ensuring that nuclear technologies
provided by the as a means of providing hardier crops necessary to
address issues of famine and global hunger. Nevertheless, much of the
IAEA’s time and energy is devoted to addressing militaristic applications
of nuclear technology. The IAEA has actively discouraged the use of
depleted uranium shells, often employed in conventional munitions, as
they have a demonstrated a deleterious environmental and health impact
years when they rest in the ground. But perhaps one of the biggest tasks
undertaken by the IAEA is the monitoring of rogue nuclear states and the
development of their weapons programs. Of late, Iran and North Korea
have been particularly concerning to the IAEA and the wider international
community. Neither of these countries has fully complied with IAEA
requests for information and have not complied with procedures
necessary to provide greater transparency, fuelling suspicion that both
remain intent on developing nuclear weapons.
Two policy-making bodies control the IAEA: the 35-member Board of
Governors and the General Conference of all Member States. The General
Conference, the highest policy-making body within the IAEA, meets
annually to decide upon the agency’s programs and budget, as well as any
other issues brought before it by the Board of Governors. The General
Conference elects the Board of Governors and it meets five times per
year, examining and making recommendations to the General Conference
on a range of issues. This body also considers applications for membership
and appoints the Director- General of the IAEA with the approval of the
General Conference.There exist three pillars underpinning the IAEA’s
worldwide efforts. The first is safeguarding and verification. In this
capacity, the IAEA serves as the world’s nuclear inspectorate, ensuring
that nuclear technologies are not being employed for militaristic
purposes. The second pillar is safety and security. This role empowers the
IAEA to advise countries how to best deal with nuclear technologies to
protect its citizens from harmful radiation. IAEA safety standards are
critical components of dealing with this task. The final pillar is science
and technology, and the IAEA works to ensure that peaceful applications
of nuclear technologies are used to address the needs of developing
nations throughout the world by fighting poverty, sickness, and
environmental pollution.


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Overview on the Topic

Statement of the Problem
Nuclear proliferation has become an unavoidable reality as the
technology and technical expertise required to engage in nuclear
enrichment and atomic fission have become increasingly ubiquitous. Libya
shocked the world on December 19th, 2003 when it announced the
existence of its own covert nuclear program. Libya’s subsequent
cooperation with the international community to remove and eliminate
any such nuclear materials that could be used to create weapons was a
critical step in halting proliferation in Africa, but work remains to be
done to ensure that the nuclear capacity that Libya currently possesses
can be put to use for the benefit of its people as well as within the
regulations established by the IAEA.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s mission is guided by three
pillars, and the one of ensuring nuclear safeguards and verification of
nuclear capability proved to be critical to the earliest stage of responding
to the Libya issue. The agency’s initial 2004 investigation into the Libyan
acquisition of nuclear technology was critical in providing assurance to
the international community that the Libyan concessions were made in
good faith and revealed the succession of government policies that led to
the development of the nuclear program.
The subsequent removal of weapon’s grade highly enriched uranium from
Libya in March 2004 was another watershed for the country. While only 13
kilograms of fissile Uranium- 235 was removed, further confidence in the
country’s disarmament activities was gained. Despite the gains already
made, more questions remain to be answered about the Libyan nuclear
program. According to the latest report of the IAEA Director-General to
its Board of Governors, impurity analysis techniques used to identify place
of origin of uranium compounds have failed to identify the source of
Libya’s UF6. That same report stated that the absence of sensitive
documentations concerning the design of nuclear equipment and facilities
requires further inquiry.
As such, Libya will continue to remain under IAEA scrutiny until these
issues can be resolved satisfactorily. Another issue that remains to be
settled is how the Libyan nuclear program will proceed from this point.
Libya still has nuclear capabilities that can be utilized for peaceful energy
usage, and the IAEA can be a facilitator for the development of any
subsequent power plants and reactors. The Libyan’s are already engaged
in a Technical Cooperative agreement with the IAEA directed towards
development of infrastructure required for sustainable nuclear power.
The IAEA must continue to work with the Libyan government to
promulgate more such cooperative projects.


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History and Discussion of the Problem
The Libyan nuclear program was the child of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi,
the ruler of Libya following his successful coup in 1969. While he initially
defended Libya’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities as purely peaceful, noting
in 1979 that Libya had “signed all agreements on the non proliferation of
nuclear weapons,” he complicated matters through his failure to deny the
Libyan pursuit of nuclear weapons technology. Earlier in 1976, he said
“atomic weapons will be like traditional ones, possessed by every state
according to its potential. We will have our share of this new weapon.”
He viewed Israel and the defense of the Muslim world as a primary
impetus to attain a nuclear weapon, saying later in 1987 that “The Arabs
must possess the atom bomb to defend themselves, until their numbers
reach one thousand million and they learn to desalinate water and until
they liberate Palestine.”
Yet a number of other factors also likely affected Qaddafi’s decision to
pursue nuclear technologies. More than anything else, he needed to
secure the status and legitimacy of his regime. Such an ambitious
program of scientific development would have served to increase public
confidence in and public support for him and his new government.
Similarly, pitting himself as a potential counterbalance against Israel and
defender of the Muslim world would have granted him further favor with
the Libyan populace, as well as gain validation from other countries
sympathetic to his cause. Later evidence would show that the leader’s
words were more grandstanding than assertion of fact, but they would
serve his ends regardless.

The Beginnings of a Nuclear State
The history of Libya’s nuclear program can be traced back nearly forty
years. The establishment of the Atomic Energy Establishment (AEE) in
1973 was intended to hearken a nuclear age in the African nation by
spearheading infrastructural development and implementation of
improvements in other areas as required to improve the state of Libyan
nuclear science. Ostensibly, this program was only directed for the
peaceful application of nuclear technology.
The next major breakthrough for the Libyans would come four years
later. Working in collaboration with the now-defunct USSR, Libya
constructed the Tajura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) in 1977. This new
facility included a 10 megawatt infrared thermal (IRT) research reactor as
well as other laboratories and departments. Testing and initial operation
of the facility was carried out in 1981, and the reactor was put into
operation that same year. Another key development of this year was the
establishment of the Secretariat of Atomic Energy, under whose aegis the
AEE and TNRC came to fall. When Libya entered the IAEA Safeguards
Agreement in July 1980, it declared its nuclear program to consist of the
IRT reactor and a 100 watt critical assembly, both located at the Tajura
Nuclear Research Center. Subsequent developments of the program would


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not be accurately reported to the IAEA, as required by this compact, for
nearly 30 years.
The Libyans wasted little time in moving to acquire nuclear materials.
From 1978 to 1981, over 2300 tons of “yellowcake” uranium oxide
concentrate (UOC) were imported from Niger. Throughout the ensuing
decade, the Libyan’s engaged a variety of activities directed at enriching
and converting this nuclear material. In 1982, Libya acquired from a
Belgian party the basic plans for a uranium ore concentration plant. The
Libyans never began construction on this facility. Enrichment activities
began in the early 1980s, directed by a foreign expert under whose
guidance Libyan engineers began work on uranium gas centrifugation
technology. Despite his assistance, which continued up until 1992, Libyan
efforts to create a functional nuclear centrifuge proved fruitless.

Further Dealings with the USSR
Libya began concluding many of its contracts with the USSR related to the
upkeep of the TNRC during the between 1981 and 1983. 1985 saw the
Libyans send 100 kg of UOC to the Soviet Union, for which they received
56 kg of refined uranium product. They also engaged in talks with the
USSR aimed towards another collaborative project; this time the goal was
creating a uranium conversion facility within Libya. Without the vital
ability to convert unrefined yellowcake into useable forms of uranium,
the Libyan nuclear program would be totally reliant upon other nations to
provide conversion services. The desire to develop domestic a self-reliant
domestic nuclear infrastructure would come to define the Libyan nuclear
program during the coming years.
In addition to nuclear refinement and conversion, useable nuclear power
was also an issue of concern to the Libyans. From 1981-1985, they
discussed the possibility of acquiring two VVER-440 (Russian acronym for
Water Water Energetic Reactor) reactors from the Soviet Union. These
reactors would be employed to generate electricity as well as provide
water desalination capabilities. Although the Libyans would conduct
initial site studies to assess the feasibility of this plan, they would later
claim that no final agreement could be made with the USSR regarding the
supply of these reactors.

A.Q. Khan and Libya’s Nuclear “Middle Ages”
The desire to develop indigenous capacity for creating fissionable nuclear
products led Libya to actively contact multiple countries during the years
of 1983 up until 1985. This effort saw little success other than the
acquisition of two boxes of microfiche documentation from unknown
sources. Upon these slides was information pertinent to nuclear fuel cycle
facilities, but neither tangible equipment nor additional nuclear
capability was acquired during these proceedings.
The next stage in nuclear enrichment would be attained with the
assistance of A.Q. Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist who ran a network


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of supplying nuclear weapons technology to a number of different
regimes, including nations such as Iran and North Korea. Libyan officials
first met with Khan in January 1984. During this initial exchange, Khan
went about describing the necessary equipment and technology for fissile
material acquisition, as well as the resources and capabilities required to
acquire said technologies. He concluded the meeting by attempting to
sell the Libyan’s nuclear centrifuge technology. What Khan offered was
certainly a step forward, but the Libyans were hamstrung by the lack of
progress they had made up unto that point in their own nuclear program.
A Libyan official made a decision not to pursue Khan’s offer after
concluding that Libya lacked the resources and technology required to
meet Khan’s scientific and industrial requirements. Khan would remain an
important fixture in the Libyan nuclear program during the coming years.
Libya would continue to pursue multiple avenues to improve its nuclear
capabilities. In 1986, Libya used an intermediary to purchase a modular
mobile Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) from a Japanese corporation.
With this new equipment, the Libyans would be able to produce a variety
of uranium compounds, including pure uranium metal. Nevertheless, this
would prove to be another case of Libya’s failure to put acquired
technology to use. The facility was only partially assembled, and the
Libyans never actually operated it. On the other hand, in 1984 the
Libyans began fabricating small uranium oxide and uranium metal targets
to be irradiated within the IRT reactor. This fabrication procedure would
continue until 1990. Some of these targets were processed within a
radiochemical laboratory within the same TNRC facility, evidencing a
certain degree of progress, although these successes remained minor.
Minute amounts of plutonium, a critical model often employed in nuclear
weapons, were separated during these proceedings.
In the mid-1980s Libya made further attempts to acquire fuel fabrication
and reprocessing technology. These discussions were carried out with a
liaison that had also collaborated with the Libyans on their chemical
weapons program. At the furthest stage of discussions, plans were made
for a pilot reprocessing plant. Actual detailed designs would be drawn up
in the later that decade, with the plant and attendant facilities based
upon German technologies. The Libyans failed to acquire a complete set
of design drawings for the plant, and they never obtained any equipment
from this contact. This particular project would come to a close at the
end of the 1980s. Libyan inquiry into a heavy water production facility
during this period yielded similar results, leaving the country with nothing
to show for their efforts aside from documents containing basic
information.


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The Next Step Forward
A.Q. Khan became a key figure yet again from 1989 up through 1991.
Libya re-engaged with high- level contacts with the Pakistani scientist.
This time though, deliberations resulted in a solid agreement between
government officials and Khan’s clandestine nuclear network. The result
of the arrangement was the Libyan acquisition of information on the L-1
centrifuge technology developed by Khan himself. Deliberations stalled,
however, when the Libyans began to feel that the information Khan was
providing didn’t match the price he was demanding for it. With the two
parties at an impasse, the centrifuge arrangement stalled, and no
complete centrifuges were provided to the Libyans. 1995 would see the
Libyans turn back to A.Q. Khan and his network. Their continued desire to
obtain nuclear enrichment equipment would finally come to fruition
during this round of negotiations. Libya received twenty pre-assembled L-
1 centrifuges in 1997 from Khan’s contacts. Additionally, they obtained
the necessary parts required to construct another two hundred L-1
centrifuges that same year. Libya was finally on track to initiate nuclear
enrichment activities.
The coming of the twenty-first century brought a series of rapid
developments to the Libyans, who finally saw some of their nuclear
ambitions coming to fruition. The nuclear program surged ahead, taking a
decidedly more active approach to new acquisitions. The year 2000 would
see the Libyan government resume the import of uranium products. In
September the same year, the government received two cylinders of UF6,
and received another cylinder of the material the following February, in
total acquiring nearly two tons of UF624.
There were even more successes during the fall of 2000. Libya completed
the first successful test of an L-1 centrifuge by October. Later that same
year, Libya furthered development of centrifuge technologies, building
progressively larger 9-machine, 19-machine, and 64-machine L-1
centrifuge cascades. These larger cascade configurations allowed for
multiple centrifugation processes to occur simultaneously, thus giving
greater purification yields more quickly. Despite this leap in technical
prowess, none of these cascades were ever totally constructed, with each
at varying stages of completion. Furthermore, the Libyans would later
claim that no nuclear material was ever employed in the testing of these
centrifuges.
Libyan interest in gas centrifuges extended beyond using the older L-1
technology acquired in the nineties, but looked to acquiring newer L-2
centrifuges from A.Q. Khan’s network. In September 2000, Libya
purchased two L-2 centrifuges. Following this acquisition, the Libyans
proceeded to order another 5000 L-2 machines. This number later
doubled to 10,000 L-2s, and a large amount of ancillary equipment was
also purchased from the network. The network not only acquired the
equipment on behalf of the Libyans, but additionally was responsible for
the manufacture and transfer of the components from parties in a number
of different countries. Later in 2001, the Libyans acquired a “precision


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machine workshop” from the network, intended to provide support for
the gas centrifuge program.

The Beginning of the End
By 2002, the Libyan nuclear program had reached unprecedented heights,
but some of the old problems that had plagued the Libyans for decades
resurfaced despite the successes, most notably a failure to acquire and
properly employ all of the necessary technology required to complete
conversion and enrichment activities. The sections of the L-2 centrifuges
ordered from Khan’s network began arriving in large quantities. Missing
from these shipments were rotating components critical to the
centrifugation process. As such, the Libyans could not complete any of
the L-2 centrifuges received. This setback didn’t prevent the Libyan’s
from further acquisition of nuclear materials. 2002 would see the Libyans
acquire even more fissile compounds from an underground source. A
clandestine contact would provide them with uranium compounds, this
time intended for use as laboratory standards. Attempting to disguise this
transaction, the Libyans employed subterfuge, mislabeling the containers
holding the nuclear compounds to conceal their hazardous nature. The
culmination of most nuclear programs i.e., the development of nuclear
weapons, was one of the final projects the Libyans sought to explore.
Towards the end of 2001 or beginning of 2002, the Libyans received
documents from Khan’s network concerning nuclear weapon design and
manufacture. Yet virtually lacking all of the required technology
necessary to perform basic preparation of nuclear materials, Libya’s
effort was improbable from the very beginning. Later investigation by the
IAEA would find no evidence that the Libyans had engaged in work related
to this project.
When Libya officially renounced its nuclear weapons program in
December 2003 the world at large was certainly shocked, but the British
and American governments were intimately aware of the dealings that
had initiated the announcement. The Libyan government had been
subject to unilateral American sanctions for years, but both governments
had been secretly engaging Libya in negotiations since 1999. These
discussions had touched upon the subject of weapons of mass destruction,
but hadn’t concretely addressed the Libyan nuclear issue. That all
changed following a visit to Libya by UK Foreign Office Minister Mike
O’Brien’s visit to Libya in 2002. Later in 2004, the Libyan foreign minister
would assert “Libya decided more than 10 years ago not to develop any
weapons of mass destruction,” and claim that O’Brien’s visit had indeed
been a watershed moment in Libya’s relations with the West. Although
the opening of diplomatic channels certainly served to ameliorate
relations with Libya, the impact of the war in Iraq on Qaddafi’s decision-
making must also be considered. The Libyans had been considerably
intransigent on their stance towards the nuclear issues throughout their
discussions. Nevertheless, America demonstrated its will to use military
strength to tackle regimes possessing or believed to possess weapons of
mass destruction, and the quick fall of Saddam’s regime in Iraq bode ill


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portents for Libya, which had still not fully reconciled itself with the
United States. Just as political survival may have motivated the creation
of the Libyan nuclear program, that same self-preservation instinct may
have driven Qaddafi to quit his nuclear ambitions and come clean to the
world, rather than incur the wrath of Bush and the American military.
The end of the secret Libyan nuclear program had come not with a bang,
but instead a whimper. The December announcement was followed by
swift action by an international community eager to catch up with the
Libyans’ progress. IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei made a
series of visits to Libya that December and the following February. IAEA
nuclear inspectors were soon to follow, and the verification of the Libyan
nuclear program would begin in January 2004. The Libyans’ demonstrated
marked cooperation in the IAEA verification efforts, keen to gain the
confidence and trust of the IAEA inspectorate and other nations. By
March, the UN had initiated the removal of highly-enriched uranium from
the country, evincing the tangible successes of the inspection process.
With Libya returned to the fold, the IAEA has been assisting the country
with its development of peaceful nuclear technologies. The IAEA has
initiated a number of technical cooperative projects with the Libyan
government aimed at a wide variety of issues ranging from improving the
TNRC reactor and developing nuclear power to improving the water
desalination technology. Much work remains to be done in order to see
the Libyans attain their goals, but with the support of the IAEA and the
international community, that day will certainly come sooner rather than
later.


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Past UN Actions
Following Libya’s declaration of a secret nuclear program in December
20031, the IAEA responded quickly to begin verification of the Libyans’
nuclear capabilities. In a meeting held December 20 with the Libyan
Assistant Secretary for Services Affairs Matooq Mohamed Matooq, Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei secured assurances of Libya signing a further
Additional Protocol to its safeguard agreement granting the IAEA a
greater inspection powers. One week later, ElBaradei and the IAEA
inspection team was on the ground in Libya and verification activities
were being commenced. The IAEA’s quick action was certainly a credit to
the organization, and the willingness of the Libyans to initiate inspections
was also notable. Nevertheless, the true test of the success of these
initiatives would come later, as the verification got underway.
By the end of January 2004, the IAEA had reported preliminary
inspections had been extremely successful. Initial inventories of nuclear
components and materials were completed, and items deemed
“sensitive” were removed from the country with the assistance of the US
and UK. These ostensible successes were further heightened by the praise
of the IAEA team, which cited “high level cooperation with Libyan
authorities.” These sorts of statements and the corresponding actions by
Libyan officials allayed concerns that the cooperation in the verification
process was merely superficial. ElBaradei would give further praise to the
Libyans’ forthrightness and assistance in February. Nevertheless, much
work remained to be done for the IAEA inspectorate in the coming
months.
One of the first major successes of the IAEA’s inspections of Libya would
come on March 8 with the removal of highly-enriched uranium from Libya.
The operation was financed by the United States Department of Energy
under a joint US-Russia-IAEA anti-proliferation program called the
Tripartite Initiative. The materials would be airlifted back to Russia,
which in its prior incarnation as the Soviet Union had originally provided
this material to the Libyan government. The Russians assured all parties
that it would convert the product into low-enriched uranium, which is
unsuitable for nuclear weapons usage. This was undoubtedly a tangible
success for the IAEA, and conclusively signaled the full cooperation of the
Libyan government. Two days later, the IAEA Board of Governors issued a
resolution that broadly praised Libyan conduct in the proceedings and
encouraging other countries to enter into full compliance with IAEA
regulations. This same day would see the Libyans sign an Additional
Protocol to its Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty with the IAEA8. This
made good on Matooq’s earlier promise of granting the agency further
oversight powers within Libya. During the remainder of 2004, Mohamed
ElBaradei would proceed to issue two reports on the status of verification
activities in Libya, detailing the results of IAEA investigations into the
extent of the nuclear program. This would be the last substantial dealing
with Libya for nearly two years.


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With Libya reintegrated into the fold of compliant nuclear nations, the
IAEA verification activities continued without undue urgency, and 2005
would prove to be a quiet year. July 2006 would bring another set of
exciting developments. Libya ratified the IAEA’s International Convention
on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, a legally binding document
that unsurprisingly governed the physical protection of nuclear materials
by member states. Later that month, more Russian-origin nuclear
material would be removed from Libya by the IAEA in conjunction with
the United States. As of 2008, Director-General ElBaradei has distributed
a number of reports about the verification activities of the IAEA in Libya,
detailing the history of the Libyan nuclear program and the results of IAEA
investigation. With Libyan cooperation ensured, the present offers the
IAEA an opportunity to continue to investigate unresolved questions about
the Libyan nuclear program. While the time of obfuscation by the Libyans
has certainly passed, the necessity for detailed examination of Libyan
records and facilities still persists.
Without solid answers to the remaining questions, it will be hard for the
Libyans to move forward with the full confidence of the IAEA.
Nevertheless, the IAEA continues to move forward with Libya, striking
multiple partnerships on programs designed to integrate peaceful nuclear
technologies into everyday employ. The continuation and expansion of
such programs will define the future of Libya’s nuclear activities and the
legacy of its nuclear program for years to come.


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Proposed solutions
With the Libyan nuclear program now in full compliance with IAEA
regulations, the way forward is quite clear. Libya needs to develop
proficiency in utilizing domestic nuclear capabilities, and the IAEA is
there to assist the country as it moves along that path. To that end, the
IAEA can help Libya attain a number of goals as they develop their
peaceful applications of nuclear technology.

Primary Applications
The most glaring failure of the Libyan nuclear program was that it never
actually harnessed the power of fissile molecules to do useful work. A
critical role for the IAEA is to ensure that the Libyan nuclear program will
be able to provide the Libyans with critical services, most importantly
power and water desalination. Nevertheless, every journey begins with a
single step, and many steps remain in Libya before those lofty ambitions
can be feasibly entertained.

Training
The Libyans still require training in use of their nuclear reactors, which
have yet to be employed in a consistent, reliable manner, even for basic
scientific testing. With a wealth of nuclear experts at its disposal, the
IAEA can address this need with relative ease. On the issue of water
desalination, the Libyans are in similar straits, still very far away from
any sort of functional domestic applications of the available technology.
With regards to that situation, the IAEA is already engaged in assisting the
Libyans in developing the technology required to simulate nuclear water
desalination.

Infrastructure Development
The goal of nuclear power for Libya is contingent on a number of other
developments occurring beforehand. The necessary infrastructure to
support nuclear power and its distribution throughout the country has yet
to be expanded. The IAEA can certainly serve an advisory role for the
Libyan government as they work towards this goal, but the task remains
quite large, and it is up to the Libyans to ultimately decide how to
proceed.

Social Services
Another way that the IAEA could assist the Libyans is by working on a
number of smaller projects employing radiation technology. Modern
industry in countries throughout the world use radiation to serve a variety
of purposes. These can range from killing bacteria on food to medical
imaging. Like many other developing countries, Libya would benefit from


15

the IAEA’s assistance in training and exposure to these sorts of
technologies as they begin to incorporate them into regular employ. Such
small developments can greatly improve the standard of living in the
country with less investment of time and resources than necessary for
larger projects related to nuclear power or water desalination.


16

Key Actors and Positions

Russian Federation
The Soviet Union was initially an active partner with the Libyan
government, providing some of the foundational technologies for their
nuclear program. Since its dissolution, Russia has been actively engaged
in reclaiming nuclear materials from former Soviet states as well as those
nations for whom the Russians provided assistance with the nuclear
program. It has already extracted nuclear materials from Libya and would
likely continue to provide logistical support for further non- proliferation
activities.

United States of America
The United States has been an active force against proliferation of
nuclear technologies, especially in regimes that it perceives opposing
American policy or harboring extremists groups. The United States had
pressured Libya with sanctions for decades, and the war in Iraq may have
proven to be the final straw for the Libyans, who possibly feared incurring
similar American attentions. Following the renouncement of the nuclear
program, America has worked closely with the IAEA to remove nuclear
materials from the country, and remain likely to demonstrate further
leadership on similar initiatives.

United Kingdom
The United Kingdom’s attempts to negotiate with the Libyan government
was cited as one of the primary reasons Libya chose to renounce its secret
nuclear program and give up any consideration of pursuing weapons of
mass destruction. The UK collaborated with the Americans and IAEA to
help with initial removal of sensitive nuclear materials from Libya.

Pakistan
The Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan established a number of
contacts throughout the world that provided the centrifuges, uranium,
and other items required to develop nuclear programs. Implicated in
helping a number of nations, including Iran and North Korea, with
creating their nuclear programs, Khan was a major figure in latter stages
of the Libyan nuclear program. His contributions were critical in the
Libyan acquisition of critical centrifuge technology for nuclear
enrichment.


17

IAEA Interest Blocs
Following the end of the secret Libyan nuclear program, most of the
decisions regarding Libya are expectedly nonpartisan, as there is no
resistance from the Libyan government to the IAEA intervention. Most
have no reason to oppose IAEA assistance of the Libyans. Nevertheless,
considerations such as the global financial crisis and its economic fallout
might constrain the organization’s general willingness to devote too many
resources to new projects.


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Issues a resolution must address

What importance will be given to further verification activities in
Libya now that they are under full IAEA compliance? How much, in
terms of physical resources, will be devoted to such efforts?
How will the IAEA cooperate with the Libyan government to
improve the reactor and water desalination technologies already
present in the country? How much investment will this require on
the part of the IAEA, and what contributions will Libyans be
expected to make towards any such efforts?
What sorts of infrastructure development projects can be
undertaken to promote sustainable growth of the Libyan nuclear
sector? What expertise can the IAEA bring to the fore in order to
assist the Libyans in such efforts?
Which small-scale applications of nuclear technology are the most
promising prospects for employment in a nuclear Libya? How will
the IAEA assist the Libyans in incorporating these techniques and
procedures into the practical applications of daily life?
What sort of training programs will the IAEA initiate to allow Libya
to develop domestic competence in utilizing the new nuclear
technologies afforded to them? How will these educational
initiatives correspond with government and private sector
training? How will the IAEA initiate projects in Libya while
respecting the country’s sovereignty and encouraging domestic
participation? Should the private sector be brought in to assist on
these projects?

KCL MUN Study Guide - Historical IAEA Simulation: Nuclear Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya (29/11 and 6/12/2011)

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Ähnlich wie KCL MUN Study Guide - Historical IAEA Simulation: Nuclear Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya (29/11 and 6/12/2011)

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KCL MUN Study Guide - Historical IAEA Simulation: Nuclear Weapons in Gaddafi's Libya (29/11 and 6/12/2011)