The document discusses democratic governance and challenges of state reconstruction in Africa. It argues that democratic governance is critical for legitimacy and viability of states. It reviews indicators and benchmarks for democracy and good governance in NEPAD's peer review mechanism. Some key points made include: - Governance reforms since 1990 have shown progress but more work is needed for transparent, trusted, and accountable states. - Constitutions should express the will of the people, not just validate power, but many post-colonial constitutions sanctioned unaccountable power. - There is now a shift toward "constitutionalism" where constitutions are tools for consensus and reflect society, not just state power. - "Governance"

1. Democratic Governance and the Challenge of State
Reconstruction in Africa: Reviewing Indicators and
Benchmarks for Democracy & Good Governance in
NEPAD’s Peer Review Mechanism1
By
J. ‘Kayode Fayemi2
Why Democratic Governance matters
The task of creating and maintaining a viable and legitimate State that is accessible,
efficient, accountable, transparent and equitable has been one of the most critical and
complicated challenges of the transformation process that African countries are
currently undergoing. Governance has been the major vehicle for attaining this
legitimacy and viability. Fundamental to the notion of governance is the ability of the
state to provide efficient and well functioning institutions and infrastructures of
government – legally backed and socially coherent – that together establish and
maintain an enabling environment in which human security and human development
takes place.
Since 1990 democratic developments in African countries have shown encouraging
trends in the economic and political spheres and the notion of good governance has
gained greater prominence and wider acceptability. Many countries are undertaking
reforms, liberalising their economies and improving management. As economic
growth has improved good governance, peace and credible policies are seen as the
prime movers of this turn-around reinforcing the perception that democratic
governance and peace are preconditions for development in Africa. In spite of the
noticeable progress, governance as a theoretical construct has also gone through
conceptual contestations between those who apply it narrowly to refer to the need to
shrink the State‟s „interventionist‟ capacity and proponents of the inclusive and
accountable State who push the idea of a people driven governance. Despite the
debate that raged on the nature of the state, there has been a great deal of unanimity
on the need to arrest the „desertion‟ by citizens that characterised the „old‟ cold war
State, in Africa in the quest for a transparent, trusted and accountable State.
In that old State – the constitution became the defining instrument for organizing
unaccountable governments and it was largely viewed as a set of rules and
administrative arrangements, meant not to regulate or limit excessive state power, but
1
Paper prepared for presentation at the National Conference of Black Political Scientists.
2
Visiting Scholar, Program of African Studies, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois,
Chicago & Director, Centre for Democracy & Development, Lagos, Nigeria
(kfayemi@cddnig.org). Not for quotation.
1

2. rather to validate the newly independent states. Post-colonial governments used the
letter of the law as the instrument for control and repression, and the military regimes
that overthrew them perfected the art of manipulating the law to justify their hold on
power. Helped by the dominant super-power politics of the cold war era that
facilitated monopolies on power by coercive rulers, the manipulation, trivialization,
and disregard of the constitution became the defining characteristic of governance in
much of post-colonial Africa.3 Constitutions that sanctioned one-party states and
racial segregation have been not only seen as legal, but also legitimate documents
regulating the conduct of state affairs, often to the detriment of the population.4
Yet a constitution by its very nature should be more than a mere set of rules and laws
regulating society and government. It is more than a social contract or even the
grundnorm. It is rather an expression of the general will of a nation. It is a reflection
of its history, fears, concerns, aspirations, vision, and indeed, the soul of that nation.
A constitution is obliged to express the mind of the majority; but, in doing so it also
has to take into account the fears and concerns of the minorities. The constitution is
that single document under which diverse and even ideologically opposed groups
unite and rally in defence of democracy. However, for this to happen, the citizenry
must claim ownership of the document. It must be respected and revered by all.
Indeed, the hostility to the old State in the intervening cold war years has encouraged
the notion of a new constitutionalism that is people driven and process led – aimed at
reconstituting the African State along equitable, transparent, socially responsible and
just lines in the post cold war era. At every level on the continent, the idea has taken
root that the African State must be refashioned to reflect the realities of their
multifaceted societies. This has been reflected in the constitutional conferences in
Benin, Mali, Niger, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Cameroon in the
early 1990s, in the successful constitutional arrangement of South Africa, and in the
process-based Constitutional commissions in Uganda, Ghana and Eritrea.
From the experience of these countries, the last decade in Africa has witnessed an
upsurge in the demand for constitution-based governance that broadly reflects, in
terms of process and outcome, the will of the people. Today, the struggle for
constitutional reform is ongoing in several African countries and it typfies to the
generality of the people why rule-based and consensus driven governance matters.
The change in focus from constitutionality - where these documents are merely legal
instruments with no standing with the people to constitutionalism - where
constitutions are now seen as a tool for bridge-building among members of civil
3
Julius Ihonvbere, Towards the New Constitutionalism in Africa (CDD, 2000).
4
Thus, some of the technical and administrative concessions known as “sun-set clauses” granted in the
post-independence constitutions of Kenya, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa remain key sources
of neuralgia in the campaign for constitutional change in these countries.
2

3. society, represents the first and perhaps most critical step in shifting state ownership
from the leaders to the people. Yet, focus remains mainly on government, giving less
importance to consensus building amongst civil society and between the ordinary
citizen and the state.
Yet in order to formulate African political cultures grounded in human rights and
democratic governance, an organic link is needed between the constitution as a rule of
law instrument primarily concerned with restraining government excesses, and the
constitution as a legitimation of power structures and relations based on a broad social
consensus in diverse societies. Many have seen the task at hand is to move away from
the old constitutionality which overemphasised law and state power towards a new
political and socio-economic constitutionalism aimed at restoring trust in the State
whilst arresting desertion from it.
Governance in the Public Sphere
Although the idea of governance has always featured in the management of public
sector, it was rarely defined as a partnership between the rulers and the ruled aimed at
the efficiency of State structures. While the clamour for this type of partnership has
featured in the struggles for the transformation of authoritarian structures and one-
party states, the idea of a people driven governance was largely ignored by the
command economies and „free markets‟ that dominated the world in the cold war era.
The idea that the people ought to have a say in deciding governance strategies was
seen as an anathema and generally discouraged. In the search for strong states, strong
rulers were seen as the sine-qua-non. The more unaccountable these rulers were, the
more legitimate they became in the hands of the metropolitan powers and their
supporters. Even when the command, interventionist economies of the 1970s and
early 80s gave way to structural adjustment programmes in the mid-1980s,
governance defined as partnership aimed at achieving ownership, social equity,
equality and development was still missing from the equation.
Indeed, the end of the cold war brought economic globalisation – the homogenisation
of the world economy, which tended to separate the State from the market in the
belief that strong states cannot produce, strong markets. Given the above, it was not
surprising that even most of the elected governments in Africa collapsed in the wake
of the structural adjustment programmes and the succeeding authoritarian regimes
sharpened the state instruments of coercion in coping with the resistance that
developed against the pernicious economic reform programmes of the period.
It was only later that the notion of governance became acceptable to the promoters of
structural adjustment programmes and policies. This coincided incidentally with the
collapse of the Berlin wall and the various „people power‟ revolutions in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. Indeed, before the World Bank‟s 1989 report “Sub-
3

4. Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth”, the term governance was a
rarely used terminology. Even when it was introduced into the IFIs literature, its
operational use was limited. In its use of the term, the World Bank identified three
distinct aspects of governance:
1. the form of the political regime;
2. the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country‟s
economic and social resources for development; and,
3. the capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies and
discharge functions.(World Bank, 1994b)
Although they recognise the holistic nature of governance, the World Bank and other
multi-lateral agencies have concentrated mainly on the third aspect in their
governance related work – the capacity of governments to design, formulate and
implement policies and discharge functions. Public sector reform and management
has therefore been the most visible area of activity in this regard. This ranged from
capacity building and institutional strengthening in civil service reform; government
budget, public investment programme, modernisation of public sector accounting and
auditing; government financial management information systems, development
assistance and aid coordination, economic management agencies and all other
sections of government that are pivotal to a well functioning public sector.
Governance in the public sector has also been concerned with the levels and quality of
relationship between different layers of government – central government and its
subordinate tiers as well as the public and private sectors.
The basic thrust of this reform process has been state retrenchment in all its
ramifications and this has been manifested in the shift from a highly interventionist
paradigm in many African states to one in which the role of government is primarily
that of an enabler for the private sector, a regulatory framework and a provider of
public infrastructure for the efficient running of the market. Tied to the structural
adjustment reforms whose objective was to establish market friendly set of incentives
that can encourage accumulation of capital and more efficient allocation of resources,
this shift often necessitated conflict between capital and labour and it resulted in huge
labour cuts arising out of privatisation of inefficient state institutions with serious
social consequences – leading often to a disconnection between the shrinking State
and the deprived Society.
The challenge with institutional reform in many of the sectors highlighted above has
been one of building convergence between the demands of the new global democratic
governance environment and the legitimacy for enforcement provided by the local
context in the norm building process. Reconciling the State and Civil Society in the
public sector reform process has remained a challenge that must be overcome.
Examined in conjunction with the NEPAD‟s APRM, the African Union‟s Declaration
4

5. on Democracy and Good Political Governance hold out the promise for establishing
and consolidating a norm building process subscribed to by all members because of
its political relevance and independent verifiability. The challenge is to meet both
objectives.
By focussing on both objective and subjective criteria: rule of law, political
representation, Institutional effectiveness and accountability as well as gender equity,
anti-discrimination rights and peace and security, the APRM approach seeks to
transcend that erstwhile divide in building convergence between the demands of the
new democratic governance environment and the legitimacy for enforcement
provided by the local context. By focusing specifically on the sub-set of governance
issues, which impact on opportunities for development, the role of the state is seen as
crucial in providing the necessary institutional, accountable and enabling environment
for the development and participation of all sectors, which in turn will promote good
governance and poverty alleviation in Africa. In recognising the key role of the state
in good governance and poverty alleviation, the APRM and the Declaration on
Democracy & Political Governance underscores the importance of a capable and
effective state, in which the public service, the legislature, the judiciary and statutory
bodies are empowered to provide an enabling environment for the private sector and
civil society to play their respective roles in a mutually reinforcing manner.
Yet government structures and practices have traditionally been weakest and least
defined in many African countries. Whilst positive changes could be observed, these
changes are occurring in varied political contexts, with their own local dynamics and
challenges, incorporating different prospects for the development of a participatory
political system, facilitative government for the private sector; effective management
of poverty reduction; effective and equitable provision of basic services; personal
security and access to justice; national security and conflict prevention and a honest
and accountable government.
NEPAD’s Democracy & Political Governance Initiative – A Critique5
The NEPAD Strategy document recognises that there can be no development in the
absence of „true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance‟
and its proponents undertake to „respect the global standards of democracy, the core
components of which include political pluralism,‟ include a respect for freedom of
association, including existence of workers‟ unions, and fair, open and democratic
elections.
5
This section derives mainly from a critique of NEPAD’s Strategy Document produced by the
Open Siciety Institute’s Africa Civil Society Network meeting chaired by the author in
Johannesburg, South Africa.
5

6. The purpose of this initiative is to „contribute to strengthening the political and
administrative framework of participating countries, in line with the principles of
democracy, transparency, accountability, integrity, respect for human rights and
promotion of the rule of law. In order to achieve the above, the strategy document
sets out a number of formal commitments and undertakings, including: a) the creation
and consolidation of governance processes and practices; b) taking the lead in
supporting good governance initiatives; c) institutionalising core values that will
enable the NEPAD leadership to honour commitments made and meet basic standards
of good governance and democratic behaviour.
The policy document highlights a number of areas that will be the focus of targeted
institutional capacity building initiatives. These will include primary focus on i)
strengthening administrative and civil services; ii) strengthening parliamentary
oversight; iii) promoting participatory decision-making; iv) adopting effective
measures to combat corruption and embezzlement and v) undertaking effective
judicial reforms.(Sections 81-83)
It is these principles and practical commitments, proposed and adopted by African
governments, which will guide the identification of appropriate diagnostic and
assessment tools (conditionalities), in support of compliance with the shared goals of
good governance as well as identify institutional weaknesses and resources for
addressing these weaknesses. (Section 84).
Based on the identified need to monitor compliance to good governance by African
states, the primary relationship of accountability to be monitored are the internal
relationship between African governments and their own citizens (as opposed to the
external relationship of accountability between these governments and international
donors important as this is). To ensure that this happens, we propose the
establishment of constitutionally empowered, independent national monitoring
mechanisms, which will be staffed by credible and competent African sector
specialists working with the APRM secretariat and the African Union‟s
Commissioner in charge of Political Affairs.
Each independent national monitoring mechanism would conduct systematic and
detailed monitoring of appropriate governance, institutional performance and
effective financial management within the signatory state. This information would in
turn be available for the utilisation of parliamentary oversight committees, civil
society as well as donors, international finance institutions and the continental body in
reaching their own judgements about compliance with the good governance principles
of NEPAD.
In order to avoid the politicisation of the data generated by the independent
monitoring mechanisms, the data produced by the monitoring bodies will be subject
6

7. to independent verification exercises for sufficient rigour and reliability. For
legitimacy, this verification exercise would have to include a focus on the basic
constitutional, legislative and policy frameworks of signatory states in order to
establish whether these are adequate to support the implementation of democratic
governance structures. Specifically, this verification exercise would seek to measure
the degree of parliamentary and civil society oversight of the work of the monitoring
mechanisms and the signatory states.
Secondly, it would require a detailed review of public sector performance within these
states. What human and financial resources do they have available through their
national budgets? How is the budget structured and how is resources transferred to
sub-national levels? How effectively do the executive members responsible for
managing available resources plan to utilise them? How efficiently do they end up
implementing these plans in practice? Finally, what level of service delivery output or
investment in infrastructure is produced?
Answers to the questions posed above will require detailed access to government
budgets, tax revenues, expenditure and economic management performance. This
will necessarily reflect back to the constitutional and legal provisions guaranteeing
transparency in the country and ensuring accountability and answerability of elected
officials. If these legislative guarantees do not exist, then monitoring will be difficult
to achieve and any judgement as to the performance of African leaders and/or the
accountability of African governments will amount to little more than mere
speculation.
The effective and efficient management of public resources will however also require
the establishment of conditions under which instances of corruption and public sector
mal-administration can be reported openly in the public media. Only on this basis of
accountability and answerability could reports of corruption be systematically stored
and monitored by the established national mechanisms. The ability to hold public
officials accountable for their management of public resources will also require
constitutional provisions and legislation governing assets declaration and financial
interests. This will help limit the potential for conflicts of interest and ensure that
existing resources are utilised for public rather than private interests.
Finally, it is important to stress that there is a limit to which poverty can be effectively
managed. Hence, focusing on good governance through the promotion of state
retrenchment and market reform are far from enough. „Enhanced partnership‟ must
also mean the provision of adequate resources that are commensurate with the scale of
the problem and fairer trade rules that promote genuine global partnership. NEPAD
represents a unique opportunity to become a vehicle for an international campaign in
this regard, the challenge remains how best to include the widest range of
stakeholders in a broadened set of partnerships.
7

8. Indicators and Benchmarks of Democracy & Political Governance
Since divergent trajectories of transition have produced a wide assortment of post-
transition configurations on the continent – some complementary and progressive,
others contradictory and worrisome, this necessarily inhibits generalisation about the
state of democracy and political governance. There are several advantages in favour
of developing a comprehensive and workable methodology for assessing the quality
of governance in each African country. A basic condition of such a methodology
should be that it be usable by in-country stakeholders as an instrument for their own
self-assessment of the quality of democratic governance, according to their own
priorities and perception of appropriate standards, rather than being merely externally
driven.
Such a methodology can serve a number of different purposes: contribute to public
debate and knowledge about governance issues; identify development benchmarks for
democratic governance and chart progress towards their realisation; help set standards
for government performance and monitor levels of attainment, to mention just a few.
Yet if the conceptualisation and operationalisation of indicators of democracy and
political governance is to have any real meaning, both the methodology and choice of
instruments, must be placed in the context of Africa‟s reality.
This is important because only through this level of involvement will it be possible to
ensure that stakeholders are committed to the principles of good, democratic
governance, and ownership of the process will be in-country based. A basic
advantage of this commitment to stakeholder involvement is that this could also
develop into an instrument for self assessment of the quality of democratic
governance, according to their own priorities and perception of appropriate standards,
rather than for this to be externally driven.
Given the above, the design and implementation of the benchmarks should emphasise
the following: participation, ownership, accessibility, openness and accountability,
solidarity and legitimacy.
While the idea of a permanent membership of the APRM is desirable, central to the
assessment of the national governance situation should be a determined effort to tap
into the existing wealth of information and knowledge in country. The challenge will
be in scrutinising the materials for accuracy and relevance in the quest to
institutionalise democratic and good political governance, support the state sector to
expand participation of non-state institutions and embrace accountability to the
citizenry. A lot of this will depend on ensuring that the consultation process and
investigatory techniques are designed to achieve real ownership of the process by the
stakeholders themselves. Good involvement techniques are based on an awareness of
divergent interests and opinions in-group discussions and the skills of the facilitator in
8

9. ensuring that all views are reflected in the discussions. Process issues are therefore as
important, if not more critical to the outcome of every national governance
assessment and this should be taken seriously.
Since the focus of the national governance assessment in the areas of democracy and
political governance will be the assessment of the health of the state undergoing
democratic transitions, identifying key role players that must be involved is crucial.
A partial list ought to include the following given the parameters laid out in the
Declaration:
 Elected Legislators and party representatives
 Representatives from the government and public sector responsible for public
sector management, rule of law and access to justice issues as well as
institutional effectiveness and accountability.
 Private sector organisations involved in development.
 Senior members of the judiciary responsible for legal frameworks in the area
of trade and investment.
 NGOs and community groups
 Traders, artisans, farmers and students
The Declaration has already identified some benchmarks aimed at capturing
indicators of good governance in the attempt to present a macro picture of the state of
governance in African states. These are: rule of law and access to justice, political
representation, institutional effectiveness and economic management broadly
construed. The conceptualisation and operationalisation of indicators of good
governance, as well as the methodology and choice of instruments, have all been
placed in the context of Africa‟s reality. The diversity built into these instruments is
very relevant in the context of Nigeria, given the level to which planning has been
based on facts collected from the elite sectors of society. The methodology and
choice of instruments will clearly enable researchers to interact with their sources, the
data on the ground in a manner that can help seek a balance between received wisdom
and context-determined realities.
To avoid judgements that are products of pre-conceived notions, rather than
communal and constituency reflections, it is important that the assessments are based
on independently verifiable information. This becomes critical in interpreting
materials that deal with identity, nationality, gender and ethnicity, those crosscutting
issues that are crucial to measuring the state of governance in a given setting. It is
important also that APRM questions are posed in a comparative mode, to ensure that
answers are not fixed, but more importantly to ensure that assessors recognise that
good governance itself is work in progress, a product of constant negotiation and
struggle. This will also bring out the diversity of views effectively and certainly help
sharpen the articulation of the challenges and prospects of accountable gopvernance
9

10. in a given setting. The critical core assumptions around which these indicators should
be built therefore include, but are not limited to:
 A political system, which provides opportunities for all its citizens including the
poor, and disadvantaged by creating conditions that encourage broad input in
governance and development decision-making from all elements of civil society,
including setting public expenditure levels and priorities.
 A political system that provides for effective transfer and periodic renewal of the
leadership through representative and competitive multi-party and/or multi-
candidate system – inclusive of women and disadvantaged groups; impartial and
credible electoral administration; effective electoral oversight of the electoral
process; and an informed and active citizenry.
 Strengthened public sector legislative and administrative institutions, including
efficient parliamentary oversight and adequacy of the audit machinery – providing
and verifying that government decisions are in line with its legal commitments;
 Transparency, predictability and accountability in political, oversight and
regulatory decisions by government and public bodies.
 Effective public sector management with stable macroeconomic policy, effective
resource mobilisation – adequacy and efficiency of the tax system and revenue
collection mechanisms and efficient use of public resources;
 Democratised security environment that helps to prevent conflict and build peace;
 Adherence to the rule of law in a manner that protects personal and civil liberties
as well as gender equity whilst ensuring public safety and security with equal
access to justice for all; and provides effective and fair legal sector institutions.
In working towards the realisation of the core areas of emphasis identified above,
APRM should pay particular attention to the following in executing the project, with a
view to drawing together different issues, examine their dynamic linkages and
produce an integrated assessment:
 Assessing governance issues in the three arms of government – the Executive,
Legislative and the judiciary branches.
 Identification of key areas of activity on governance issues particularly in relation
to rights based development, norm building and accountability.
 Ensuring that the project design is consistent with the research instruments
identified in the Declaration on Democracy & Political Governance and also
taking into account the governance and poverty reduction objectives of the
International Development & Millennium Targets.
10

11.  Ensuring that the project design and implementation is linked to good governance
issues at all administrative levels at both national, state (province) and local
levels.6
MECHANISM FOR IMPLEMENTATION
This presentation does not pay particular attention to the mode of implementing the
benchmarks captured in the above analysis and in the matrix below, but ultimately –
we all know that APRM will stand or fall on the independence of the delivery
mechanism and its‟ ability to impact on the subscribing states. This is a delicate
balance to achieve.
On the one hand, the demand for independence might necessitate removing the peer
review mechanism outside the framework of the African Union completely and this
will strongly recommend institutions like the United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa, the United Nations Development Programme and/or the African
Development Bank as key monitoring institutions. The above will suffice were it just
a purely technical and administrative process, devoid of politics.
In my view, the moral suasion that might be derived from the technical rigour of an
independent Peer Review Mechanism still needs responsible politics to succeed.
There is a sense in which the premier body – African Union – still has a critical role to
play in the success of the APRM. The idea of an un-elected body of independent
panel of reviewers, important and critical as this is to the authenticity of the process
raises fundamental questions of accountability and answerability. The age-old
question: Who guards the Guardians of ECA, ADB, and UNDP are bound to come to
the fore and persist. This leaves us with the prospects of a monitoring mechanism that
is still under the aegis of the African Union, even if all of the bodies mentioned above
play critical roles in it.
Were these to happen, the question of capacity at the level of the AU secretariat
certainly poses its own problems. As things stand, only the CSSDCA process has a
monitoring mechanism with the potential for delivering anything remotely credible,
given the amount of work that has gone into the development of the four calabashes
and their indicators and benchmarks and the fact that it has been endorsed fully by the
Heads of Government in past deliberations. Yet, since NEPAD has in principle been
relocated to the Union‟s secretariat, there is the opportunity for a creative merger of
the monitoring process between NEPAD‟s APRM and the CSSDCA‟s monitoring
mechanism. To achieve this, the question of capacity has to be confronted now if the
APRM product is to meet the hype currently surrounding it.
6
The format developed by the Peer Review Mechanism Office has taken this largely into
account. (See www.nepad.org)
11

12. It is my fervent hope that this meeting can resolve the mechanics of operationalising
the peer review and achieve at the same time the twin principles of independence and
accountability.
12

13. Proposed Indicators and Benchmarks for the APRM Democratic Governance Cluster
Item Goals Indicative Targets Indicators or Benchmarks Source or Reference
1 Rule of Law & Constitutionalism  Presence of a democratically agreed  Imposed or „People „owned‟  The Constitution
Constitution. constitution
 Laws of the Federation
 Bill of Rights guaranteeing equality  Right to justiciable freedom of
 Court Judgements
of citizens before the law and the expression, information,
liberty of the individuals; individual political association and  African Charter of Human and
and collective freedoms and equality fundamental freedoms, Peoples‟ Rights, UDHR,
of opportunity for all economic, social and political Convention on economic,
rights social and cultural rights.
 Independent Institutions of State
 Ombudsperson, Human Rights  Decisions of the National
 Improvement of law enforcement
Comm., Gender Equality Human Rights Commission
mechanisms and criminal justice
Commission; Anti-Corruption  Police Act, Prison Act and
system
Comm. National Law Reform
 Independence of the Judicial branch
 National judicial reform, Commission‟s work
 Presence of Court of superior Police reform, Prison
jurisdiction to arbitrate in improvement
constitutional matters
 Ensure transparency in
process of selection of judicial
officers; improve incentives
and remuneration.
 Independent Constitutional or
Supreme Court
13

14. 2 Political Representation  Mode of appointment to legislative  Is appointment determined by Nature of Electoral Commission
and governmental positions; elections and do the elections
give room for alternation of
 The composition of the political
political power
system
 Does it consist of a multiparty
 The competitiveness of the political
democracy comprising of two
system
or more parties.
 Nature of appointment to the
 Extent of effective
executive branch.
competitiveness in the political
 Independent candidature process;
 The composition of the national  Role of Legitimacy,
parliament along party lines competence, national character
 The composition of local and
regional councils
 The autonomy and independence of
the electoral system
 Independence & Impartiality of the
electoral authority.
3 Personal security and access to  Strengthening Police Accountability  Community Policing Principles - National Policy on Safety &
justice and Responsiveness; Security
 Demilitarising public order and
 Developing Community Awareness defining security in broader - African Charter provisions
terms
 Improve access to and reduce cost of - International Instruments
„justice‟  Legal Aid and scope of legal
14

15.  Improving Police-Community clinics for pro-bono cases
Relations  Establishment of Independent
 Improving the prosecution service Police Services Commission
and decentralise workload with adequate powers
 Investigate non-traditional forms of  Examine scope for mediation
justice reform and arbitration in the
community
4 National security and conflict  Clearly defined and well articulated  Defence and Security Sector  Defence Act or National
prevention vision and mission of security sector Review & White Papers Security Strategy
organisations7
 Accountability both to elected  Committees on Defence,
 Accountability of Security sector civil authorities and to civil Security, Police Affairs
organizations, particularly in the society
 Incorporation of
security forces
 Constitutionally defined role internationally accepted
 Security sector organizations operate of the security structures standards in domestic security
in accordance with the international laws
 Availability of alternative
law and domestic constitutional law;
sources of verifiable  Coverage of security sector
 Information about security sector knowledge information on the issues in the media and degree
planning and budgeting are widely security sector of openness of military
available, both within government facilities to civilians
 Extent of dialogue and
and to the public, and a
interaction between the  Availability of human rights
comprehensive and disciplined
security sector and civil education in the military
approach to the management of
society training curricula
defence resources is adopted;
15

16.  Civil-military relations are based on a  Clearly defined constitutional  Capacity of Parliamentary
well-articulated hierarchy of authority powers for the Parliament and committees to provide
between civil authorities and the Executive Branch – powers of independent verification and
defence forces, and on a relationship the purse, powers of understanding of security
with civil society that is based on the deployment and powers of issues.
respect for human rights; scrutiny
 ECOWAS Mechanism for
 Civil authorities have the capacity to  Extent of the professional Conflict Prevention,
exercise political control over the autonomy granted to security Peacekeeping, Security;
operations and expenditure of the forces NEPAD‟s APRM, AU‟s Peace
security forces and civil society has and Security Council
 Regional Norms and values
the capacity to monitor the security
forces and provide constructive input
to the political debate;
 An environment exists in which civil
society can be consulted on a regular
basis on security policies, resource
allocation, and other relevant issues;
 Security-force personnel are
adequately trained to discharge their
duties in a professional manner
consistent with the requirements of
democratic societies;
 Fostering an environment supportive
of regional and sub-regional peace
and security has a high priority for
policy-makers
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17. 5 Open and Accountable  The nature and composition of the  Independence of Civil Service
Government civil service
 Accountability of Civil
 Transparency and accountability Service to elected authorities
in government
 Quality Control mechanisms
 Decentralisation of decision for civil service at all levels
making structures and the nature
 Civil Service Commission‟s
of inter-governmental relations
effectiveness
 Media awareness
 Presence and Effectiveness of
independent monitoring agencies
6 Effective and equitable provision  Meeting the 2015 International Extent of fulfilment of goals in UNDP Human Development
of basic services Development and Millennium Targets girl child education, in health, Report; National Development
provision of shelter, poverty Plans, Country strategy papers on
 Country‟s social and economic rights
reduction poverty reduction/eradication
regime
programmes
7 Facilitative government for the  Management of national budgetary  Extent of inputs into the
economic management and process budgetary process by all
private sector development stakeholders, including civil
 Effective Policies for pro-poor
society
growth and management of poverty
reduction/eradication strategy  Extent of Involvement of
Organised private sector in
 The nature and development of the
policy formulation
private sector
 Effectiveness of Policy
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18.  The informal economic sector making mechanisms
 Trade/investment policies
 Private/public partnership
arrangements.
8 Enhanced Global Partnership for  Improving the Conditions of  Level of mutual accountability
Democratic Governance Partnership
 Extent of context determined
inputs.
 Level of corporate
responsibility among trans-
national entities
18