Napoleon Part 2, session v The Sixth Coalition

Napoleon
Part Two
session v
Sixth Coalition

Napoleon
Part Two
session v
Sixth Coalition

Built 1898-1913 by the Kaiser to Celebrate the Sixth Coalition’s Victory

My star was fading. I felt the reins
slipping out of my grasp, and could
do nothing to stop it.

--Napoleon

major topics for this session

I. Down, But Not Out

II. Hit ‘im Again! He’s Corsican

III. Lützen and Bautzen

IV. Dresden

1813 Campaign
Leipzig
16-19 October

1814 Campaign

The campaign of 1813 proved to be one of the longest, most expensive and
ultimately decisive of all the struggles of the Napoleonic Wars. Following
the cataclysm of 1812, Napoleon was desperately attempting to regain the
initiative and repair the damage sustained by both his armies and his
reputation in the depths of Russia. For their part, the Russians--joined
successively by the Swedes, Prussians and Austrians besides a number of
German princelings--were determined to liberate Germany from the
shackles of the French connection and to carry the war to the very
frontiers of France itself. With his Empire crumbling away in Central
Europe, over 200,000 troops and several of his ablest subordinates tied
down in conducting a deteriorating struggle in Spain, his ports blockaded
by the Royal Navy, his allies falling away--Napoleon was faced with one of
the greatest challenges of his career.

Chandler, p. 865

The true issue was simply one of survival, but in early 1813 no thought of
ultimate catastrophe yet darkened the Emperor’s mind and he steadfastly
refused all suggestions of negotiating a compromise peace. He was still
convinced that complete victory was attainable--and indeed at certain
moments during the ﬁrst part of the campaign such an outcome seemed
distinctly possible. In the end, however, a combination of awakening
German nationalism and fast exhausting French resources resulted in
heavy defeat and the loss of almost all terrain lying to the east of the
Rhine.

Chandler, p. 865

Notwithstanding the immense losses Napoleon suffered in Russia, his
extraordinary administrative skills enabled him to rebuild his army by the
spring of 1813.

Fremont-Barnes, Napoleon, p. 36

Rearming
✦ 19 December 1812-the day after he arrived in Paris-”I am extremely pleased with the spirit of
the nation. The people are prepared to make every kind of sacrifice,” he wrote to Murat

✦ 31December--only 13 days after his return--he notified Berthier, “on Sunday I reviewed about
25-30,000 troops”

✦ he had bought nearly 5,000 horses and had contracted for 5,000 more in France, 2,000 from
Warsaw, nearly 5,000 from Hanover with more to come from Prussia and Hamburg

✦ early January 1813-“Come spring I shall march with an army larger than the Grand Army at
the beginning of the [last] campaign,” he wrote the Danish king

✦ 31 January-250,000 conscripts and volunteers were being trained and equipped

✦ mobile columns were rounding up an estimated 100,000 conscripts who had fled the colors

✦ rich young gentlemen had volunteered as cavalry, each with his own mount, weapons & servants

✦ the gendarmerie had been culled to provide troops and horses

✦ 40,000 naval gunners were transferred to the artillery

The thousands of teenagers pressed into service
after the Russian campaign were nicknamed the
Marie-Louises after the equally young empress
who signed their conscription decrees in
Napoleon’s absence. Through necessity, the
uniform was stripped down to its most basic…
[but the shako was still ornate, seen here in its
foul-weather cover]….
‘On taking the ﬁeld, everyone reduced his kit
to the smallest possible dimensions, ridding
himself of all useless articles’
A well-packed haversack (1) might contain
spare shoes (2) [note the condition of the pair
he’s wearing!] a change of shirt (3) a sewing kit
(4) containing needles, thread, awl and also a
bag of cleaning brushes….The soldier’s few
personal possessions including a spoon (5) comb
(6), playing cards (7), pocket knife (8), tobacco
pouch (9), pipe (10), and a handkerchief could
be kept in his coat’s internal pockets.
[note also the oiled rag wrapped around his
musket’s lock to keep it dry in wet weather and
“dinner” hanging from his haversack]
COLOUR PLATE COMMENTARY, pp. 62-63
Osprey, French Napoleonic Infantryman 1803-15, PLATE G

The renascence of military might continued despite two unforeseen
blows. One was the treachery of General Yorck whose Prussian corps, at
least 17,000 men and 60 guns, formed Marshal Macdonald’s rear guard to
Tilsit. Having fought little in the campaign Yorck defected to
Wittgenstein’s corps under terms said to have been negotiated mainly by
Carl von Clausewitz* who had joined the Russian service shortly after the
Prussian-French treaty of 1812. Yorck shortly would take his force back to
Prussia to form the nucleus of a new army allied with Russia.
The other event was Marshal Murat’s impulsive decision at Posen to
leave the Grand Army and return to his Neapolitan kingdom. Each blow
was disappointing, neither an immediate disaster. “I ﬁnd Murat’s conduct
very extravagant--I can think of nothing similar,” Napoleon wrote Viceroy
Eugène. “This is a brave man in battle, but he lacks intelligence and moral
courage.” Napoleon gave the command to Eugène: “I am annoyed at not
having given it to you upon my departure.” Eugène was to send as many
redundant generals as possible to France along with battalion cadres
necessary to build new regiments.

Asprey, pp. 282-283

*Clausewitz would become famous for his On War, a work still widely read by military professionals

It is difficult to fault either Napoleon’s or the French nation’s incredible
activity during these four months, but there were some major drawbacks.
The officers and non-commissioned officers needed to train recruits…were
in very short supply. Equally serious was a shortage of horses. Napoleon’s
initial claims of availability soon proved [overly optimistic]. Contracts
signed outside of France failed to be met in whole or in part, nor did the
home country live up to expectations. By early February the army had
received only 11,000 mounts, a very serious situation in view of cavalry,
artillery and supply requirements. To worsen matters, the troops lacked
nearly everything from crossbelts to sabers, cooking utensils, water bottles,
shoes, shirts, often muskets and bayonets. Quartermasters were short of
wagons, cannon needed carriages and caissons.

Asprey, p. 284

The cavalry posed altogether different problems; here the difficulties were
mainly shortage of time and suitable horses. While an infantry conscript
could be shaken into some sort of shape within a few months, a cavalry
recruit took considerably longer to train to a reasonable standard; yet the
need for new cavalrymen was pressing, for the French mounted arm had
virtually ceased to exist by the end of 1812. Great difficulty was also
experienced in procuring even a proportion of the required number of
horses. Many of the most famous horse-producing areas of Europe lay in
Prussia and central Germany, but the coolness and subsequent defection of
Prussia and sundry other smaller states deprived the French army of many
of its remount sources. This weakness was never remedied, and no small
part of Napoleon’s eventual failure in 1813 was due to his understrength
cavalry force. Deprived of vital intelligence through the paucity of his
cavalry patrol and unable to follow up his victories with the usual hell-for-
leather pursuits, Napoleon was to find himself faced by almost insuperable
obstacles.

Chandler, p. 868

Napoleon’s Horsemanship
Napoleon was an intrepid rider who usually rode stallions – even though
they can be positively dangerous when bad-tempered. He galloped with a
sense of daring and freedom unusual in someone so methodical. Even at
breakneck speed, no obstacle worried him. The memoirs of his staff and
courtiers show that on a horse Napoleon feared little, while his attitude
towards day-to-day stable welfare was often enlightened. He forbade his
soldiers to dock the tails of their horses, a practice then prevalent in the
British army, and horse-buyers were instructed to avoid purchasing horses
with cut tails either for Napoleon or the French cavalry. Cropped tails
saved effort in grooming, but a brush-like stump did not swish away
troublesome ﬂies and other insects and also upset the horses’ balance. In
Britain this cruel custom was not banned until 1949.

http://www.jill-hamilton.com/pdf/marengo-the-myth-of-napoleons-horse.pdf

Wellington’s Horsemanship

On battleﬁeld after battleﬁeld, he demonstrated an uncanny ability to be at
the right place at the right time. At Salamanca, he personally sent into
action every single Allied division. This method of control required,
however, not only the ability to foresee where he would be needed, but
also many expensive horses, superb practical horsemanship and in himself
the hard physical condition of a steeplechase jockey.1
1 Wellington has been accused of having a ‘poor seat’; he was perhaps not a pretty rider. But he could probably move
faster and farther than any other senior commander in European history. Maxwell, II, 28, says that on 16 June 1815,
‘The Duke had ridden from Brussels 5 miles beyond Quatre Bras, 29 miles, then 7 miles to Ligny and back, 43 miles
in all, before the battle began, and remained in the saddle till nightfall.’

Jac Weller, Wellington at Waterloo, p. 27

II. Hit ‘im Again,
He’s Corsican

Austria’s Indispensable Man
✦ his father was the Austrian ambassador to the
three Rhenish electors, Archbishops of Trier,
Mainz & Köln

✦ 1788-at age 15, began studying law at Strasbourg

✦ 1795-married the granddaughter of Maria
Teresa’s Chancellor Kaunitz

✦ 1803-05--ambassador to Saxony and Prussia

✦ 1806-in Paris, had affairs with Pauline, Caroline
& Hortense!

✦ 1809-interned during the War of the Fourth
Coalition, thereafter made Austrian Minister of
State

✦ 1810-after Wagram, engineered a French alliance
Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich and Napoleon’s marriage to Marie-Louise
Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Fürst von Metternich-
Winneburg zu Beilstein
✦ 1812-as the Russian Campaign developed, he
1773 –1859
began his move to neutrality

Napoleon naïvely hoped that his marriage to an Austrian princess would be a
firm link between their two countries. His Austrian in-laws regarded Maria
Louisa only as a temporary sacrifice, tossed to the Corsican ogre. However,
Austria had never recovered from her financial and military losses in 1809
and knew that another defeat could destroy her. Her foreign minister,
Metternich, was aristocratic, courageous, devious as a basket of snakes, and a
sworn foe of the French Revolution---”a gangrene which must be burnt out
with a hot iron.” He chose to prepare Austria for war, while remaining
ostensibly neutral, thus hoping to force both sides to bid high for Austrian
support. He further planned to then demand such humiliating concessions
from France that Napoleon would automatically reject them. Meanwhile, he
briskly pretended friendship, sending Schwarzenberg to Paris “to the side of
his commander in chief.” (En route, Schwarzenberg would urge Napoleon’s
German allies to send the emperor as few troops as possible---and especially
to send no cavalry, which Napoleon particularly needed.) Metternich himself
intrigued murkily with Murat.

Esposito & Elting, after MAP 126

Austrian Soldier Diplomat
✦ 1788-entered the Imperial cavalry, fought the Turks

✦ 1793-decorated for leading a cavalry charge that
killed and wounded 3,000 French and brought
back 32 guns

✦ 1800-the only Austrian general to emerge with
distinction from the defeat at Hohenlinden

✦ 1805--before Mack surrendered at Ulm, his cavalry
cut their way through to freedom

✦ 1809-fought at Wagram, then was sent to Paris to
negotiate Napoleon’s marriage to Marie Louise

✦ 1812-at Napoleon’s request, he commanded the
Austrian forces in the Russian campaign

✦ initially, he ably defended the French right ﬂank in
Volhynia
Karl Philipp Fürst zu Schwarzenberg (Charles Philip,
Prince of Schwarzenberg )
✦ as the campaign disintegrated, he fell back to
1771 – 1820
protect Austria’s territory in Galicia

Prussian Traitor or Patriot?
✦ his father was an army ofﬁcer under Frederick the Great

✦ the family were Kashubians from Pomerania

✦ 1772-joined Frederick’s army but cashiered after 7 years
for criticizing his superior’s recruiting methods. Served
in the Dutch and French armies until Frederick’s death

✦ 1794--back in the Prussian army, won honors in putting
down Kosciuszko’s Polish uprising. Later developed
Prussia’s light infantry and the tactic of skirmishing

✦ 1806-fought ably in the disastrous Jena campaign

✦ 1807-after Tilsit, led in the reorganization of Prussia’s
army. Became commander of the contingent Prussia was
forced to send on the Russian campaign

Johann David Ludwig Graf Yorck von Wartenburg
1759 - 1830

Prussian Traitor or Patriot?
✦ his father was an army ofﬁcer under Frederick the Great

✦ the family were Kashubians from Pomerania

✦ 1772-joined Frederick’s army but cashiered after 7 years
for criticizing his superior’s recruiting methods. Served
in the Dutch and French armies until Frederick’s death

✦ 1794--back in the Prussian army, won honors in putting
down Kosciuszko’s Polish uprising. Later developed
Prussia’s light infantry and the tactic of skirmishing

✦ 1806-fought ably in the disastrous Jena campaign

✦ 1807-after Tilsit, led in the reorganization of Prussia’s
army. Became commander of the contingent Prussia was
forced to send on the Russian campaign

✦ December 1812-after it became clear that the campaign
Johann David Convention of Tauroggen
The Ludwig Graf Yorck von Wartenburg
was doomed, he changed sides
30 December 1812
1759 - 1830
✦ he began Prussia’s shift to the Sixth Coalition

Since Jena, the regenerating political activities of the statesman Stein, the
military reforms of Scharnhorst, the patriotic cultural influence of Arndt and
Körner, and the pervasive, secret power of the Tugendbund or League of
Virtue, had between them produced an entirely new popular atmosphere, and
by 1813 Prussia was ripe for revolt. The fact was amply demonstrated when
the Provincial Assembly of East Prussia---without reference to Berlin---
declared its support for General Yorck and announced its defiance of
Napoleon. So widespread became this defiant mood that the monarchy was
compelled to follow suit. In late February the Convention of Kalisch between
Prussia and Russia was secretly ratified; by it Prussia promised to enter the
war on the side of the Allies in the very near future...while Russia undertook
to see that Prussia would be restored to her pre-1806 boundaries. The Tsar
guaranteed to provide 150,000 soldiers; Frederick William to field at least
80,000 more.

Chandler, pp. 870 & 872

The prospect of continued war appalled the states of the Confederation of the
Rhine. They had pledged Napoleon loyalty; in return, he had increased their
territory and prestige (at the expense of Austria and Prussia), and left their
internal affairs alone. But now the Russians were moving westward, while
Yorck’s and Schwarzenberg’s defections hinted that Prussia and Austria were
about to again switch sides. Prussian “liberation,” Russian occupation, and
French vengeance seemed equally dreadful. Eventually, each did what
seemed safest. Baden, Hesse, Nassau, Westphalia, and Frankfurt---being
under the guns of French fortresses---promptly raised new contingencies for
Napoleon. His country partially overrun, the King of Saxony ﬂed to Bavaria,
ordering his army to remain neutral. At Austria’s urging, Bavaria and
Württemberg considered neutrality.


Krumpersystem und Freikorps
! 1807-Napoleon limited by treaty the Prussian army
to 42,000 men

! late 1812-as his Grande Armée disintegrated, he
authorized a further 33,000. Now these became his
enemies!

Körner ! Scharnhorst had already created a clever ploy to
“beat” the ceiling, the so-called Krumpersystem

! a proportion of the regulars were retired each year,
replaced by recruits who were trained, then placed
in reserve

! February 1813-33,000 reservists were thus produced

Auf Vorposten: Heinrich Hartmann (liegend, links) Theodor ! but the greatest surge would come from the
Körner (sitzend, mitte) und Friedrich Friesen (stehend, rechts) als
Lützower Jäger (Gemälde von Georg Friedrich Kersting 1815) unofﬁcial militias, the Freikorps

We will consider this rising tide of German nationalism in more
detail during our next session.

The Russians were momentarily exhausted. Happily convinced that he was
truly a military genius, Alexander felt a divine mission to become the liberator
of Europe and the champion of its “legitimate” rulers. At the same time,
strictly in the interests of international justice, he would extend Russia’s
frontiers. Kutusov favored letting England ﬁght France. He had much
popular support, and temporarily restrained Alexander.


Once the Grand Army had retreated across the Niemen River Kutusov had
halted his advance owing to casualties and a high sickness rate from lack of
food and cold weather. His army now numbered only around 40,000
effectives (not counting Platov’s Cossacks). Kutusov was old and tired (he
would soon die[ 28 April 1813]), he had done his duty, Russia was free of
enemy, it was time for peace.

Asprey, pp. 286-287

England and the “Second American Revolution”
✦ 1 June 1812-President Madison had struggled unsuccessfully to keep his “War Hawk” wing of
the (Jeffersonian) Republican party under control. They almost declared war on France as well
as Britain!

✦ Lord Liverpool’s government had just been formed after the assassination of his predecessor

✦ now Britain had to divide her meager land forces between Wellington’s Peninsular War and the
defense of her North American and Caribbean possessions

✦ her overwhelming naval superiority would soon limit US ability to interfere with her commerce
as well as producing a crushing blockade of our commerce (New England almost seceded in
1814)

✦ 1813-due to this Second Front, Britain could only contribute her ﬁnancial and diplomatic
resources to the Sixth Coalition (beyond her very important Spanish offensive)

✦ in North America, Britain’s Indian allies, the Canadian militia, supported by a modest number
of British regular units, soon put the American forces on the defensive except on Lake Erie

✦ December 1814-with Napoleon gone, having abdicated in April, Britain turned her full fury on
the “impudent Yankees,” drove our navy from the seas, burned DC and was preparing to
conquer New Orleans when we sued for peace on the basis of status quo ante bellum

With Blücher massing around Dresden, the Elbe River was no longer a tenable line of defense.
Eugene therefore swung his right ﬂank behind the lower Saale River. He had neither held as
much ground nor gained as much time as Napoleon had desired, but he had built up an
effective army and now occupied a strong position.

EUGENE

Vi
st
ul
a
Ri
Od

ve
e rR

r
i ve
Sa Elb r
a le R eR
ive ive
r r

With Blücher massing around Dresden, the Elbe River was no longer a tenable line of defense.
Eugene therefore swung his right ﬂank behind the lower Saale River. He had neither held as
much ground nor gained as much time as Napoleon had desired, but he had built up an
effective army and now occupied a strong position.

EUGENE

Wittgenstein … linked up with

Vi
Blücher. Nevertheless, the Allies found

st
ul
themselves considerably overextended.

a
Ri
Od They had to leave detachments to

ve
e rR besiege the various Polish and German

r
i ve
Sa Elb r fortresses, and Kutusov (now dying)
a le R eR stubbornly held most of the Russian
ive ive
r r army at Kalish. On 19 April came a
rumor that Napoleon was advancing

Russia’s General VEET•gen•SHTAYN
! descended from a medieval family from the
Rhineland whose lands (since the 1300s!) were lost
in 1792 to France, then given to the Grand Duchy
of Hesse Darmstadt in 1806 (Rheinbund)

Sayn and Wittgenstein ca. 1450

Russia’s General VEET•gen•SHTAYN
! descended from a medieval family from the
Rhineland whose lands (since the 1300s!) were lost
in 1792 to France, then given to the Grand Duchy
of Hesse Darmstadt in 1806 (Rheinbund)

! 1769-born near Kiev in the Ukraine. His family had
been military service nobility to the tsars since Peter
the Great

! 1793-fought Kosciuszko as a major of a Ukrainian
light cavalry regiment

! 1805-a major general at Austerlitz; 1806, fought the
Turks; 1807, fought Napoleon at Friedland

Ludwig Adolph Peter, Prince Wittgenstein
! 1812-defended St. Petersburg in the 1st & 2nd
battles of Polotsk. Awarded the Cross of St George (Pyotr Khristianovich Wittgenstein) (German:
Ludwig Adolph Peter Fürst zu Sayn-Wittgenstein Russian:
Пётр Христиа́нович Ви́тгенштейн)
! 1813-age 44, takes command of the Russian army 1769 - 1843
after the death of Kutusov

Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher
Fürst von Wahlstatt *
German pronunciation:

[ˈɡɛphaɐ̯t ˈleːbəʁɛçt fɔn ˈblʏçɐ]
1742 – 1819

! 1658-began as a Swedish hussar (age 16). Born in
Rostock, Mecklenburg, just west of Swedish
Pomerania

During the Napoleonic Wars, the Prussian general
Prince Blücher defeated a French army under
Marshal Macdonald at the Katzbach, a small river
in the Battle of Katzbach on 26 August 1813. In
honor of this victory Blücher received the title
Prince of Wahlstatt on 3 June 1814.

Pomerania

! captured during the Seven Years War, he “turned his
coat” and became a hussar for Frederick the Great

! In peace, however, his ardent spirit led him into excesses of
all kinds, such as mock execution of a priest suspected of
supporting Polish uprisings in 1772. Due to this, he was
passed over for promotion to Major. Blücher sent in a rude
letter of resignation, which Frederick the Great granted in
1773: Der Rittmeister von Blücher kann sich zum Teufel
scheren (Cavalry Captain von Blücher can go to the devil)

! 1789-received the Pour le Mérit (the Blue Max)

! 1801-made general (age 59)
During the Napoleonic Wars, the Prussian general
Prince Blücher defeated a French army under
Marshal Macdonald at the Katzbach, a small river ! 1806-fought at Jena-Auerstadt, ably, but outnumbered
in the Battle of Katzbach on 26 August 1813. In
honor of this victory Blücher received the title
Prince of Wahlstatt on 3 June 1814. ! during the “humiliation” became leader of the Patriots

Pomerania

! captured during the Seven Years War, he “turned his
coat” and became a hussar for Frederick the Great

! In peace, however, his ardent spirit led him into excesses of
all kinds, such as mock execution of a priest suspected of
supporting Polish uprisings in 1772. Due to this, he was
passed over for promotion to Major. Blücher sent in a rude
letter of resignation, which Frederick the Great granted in
1773: Der Rittmeister von Blücher kann sich zum Teufel
scheren (Cavalry Captain von Blücher can go to the devil)

! 1789-received the Pour le Mérit (the Blue Max)

! 1801-made general (age 59)
"Marschall Vorwärts"
(1863)
! 1806-fought at Jena-Auerstadt, ably, but outnumbered

! during the “humiliation” became leader of the Patriots

Bonaparte’s Strategic Plan for 1813

What use did Napoleon think to make of [the] considerable armament [built
up after his failure in Russia]? For some time a master plan had been
formulating in his mind, and although circumstances made it impossible to
put it into execution it is important to grasp its main outlines [emphasis
added] as the Emperor never completely forgot it….

Chandler, p. 875

The Master Plan
✦ “...press back over the Elbe and
march on Berlin

BERLIN

The Master Plan
march on Berlin

✦ “...establish the seat of war between
the Elbe and the Oder, moving under HAMBURG
the protection of the fortresses of
Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg and
Hamburg BERLIN
MAGDEBURG
WITTENBERG
TORGAU

The Master Plan
march on Berlin
DANZIG
✦ “...establish the seat of war between THORN
the Elbe and the Oder, moving under HAMBURG
the protection of the fortresses of MODLIN
Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg and
Hamburg BERLIN
MAGDEBURG
Vistula River
WITTENBERG
✦ “if circumstances permitted he would TORGAU
then relieve the fortresses besieged on
the Vistula--Danzig, Thorn and
Modlin

✦ “If this vast plan succeeded, it could
be hoped that the coalition would be
disorganized and that all the princes
of Germany would conﬁrm their
ﬁdelity and alliances with France.”

Montholon, Mémoires de Napoléon, quoted in Chandler, Ibid.

The Constraining Circumstances
(1)Napoleon considered that he needed 300,000 men to make the plan foolproof,
and by April his numbers were still far below that ﬁgure.

(2)He doubted whether the raw material of his new forces would be capable of
much sustained marching.

(3)His reliance on the assistance of the Confederation of the Rhine and the south
German states proved overoptimistic, for both Saxony and Bavaria proved
understandably hesitant.

(4)The enemy was still advancing in the Dresden area, and there would not be
sufﬁcient French troops available to assure the Saale line if the Army of the
Main set out on its ambitious project.
Chandler, p. 876

Blücher and Wittgenstein...began shifting into closer contact. They knew they would be
outnumbered, and could see only two courses of action: to retire behind the Elbe… , or to attack
BERLIN
Napoleon when he advanced across the Saale….if they could catch [him] astride the steep-banked
Saale, they might be able to destroy his leading corps. East of the river the terrain was open,
favoring their superiority in cavalry (four to one) and artillery (almost two to one). Their well-
trained, now largely veteran soldiers should be individually and collectively superior to the French
conscripts.

Oder River

LEIPZIG

DRESDEN

Saale River

Elbe River
LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN
Situation 25 April 1813, and
Concentrations Prior to the Battle of
Lützen
10 0 10 20 30
MILES

BERLIN

With Kutusov dying, Alexander decreed
Oder River
that the overall command should go to
Wittgenstein, the youngest of the ranking
LEIPZIG generals in both armies. Blücher was
agreeable, but Tormassov and Miloradovich
asserted their seniority. Lacking character
DRESDEN enough to discipline them, Alexander placed
them under his personal command, leaving
Wittgenstein only his own corps, the
Saale River Prussians and Winzengerode.
A hot Allied debate over future plans
ended in quick decision when Napoleon was
reported to be in Weissenfels. The Allies
began assembling between Leipzig and
Elbe River
LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN
A l t e n b u r g . I f N a p o l e o n ’s a d v a n c e
Situation 25 April 1813, and continued, they would advance on Lützen to
Concentrations Prior to the Battle of
Lützen strike his right ﬂank. In the ensuing
10 0 10 20 30 confusion, Bülow was left without orders.
MILES

(1) Lauriston’s corps drives Kleist out
of Leipzig

(2) Winzegorode, Yorck and Blücher
attack Ney, who is retreating on
Lützen to “bait the trap”

(3) Napoleon springs the trap with a
double envelopment. Marmont’s
Grande Batterie devastates

(4) Wittgenstein counterattacks

(5) Napoleon puts in the Guard,
driving the Allies from the ﬁeld

Wittgenstein and Blücher were in danger of suffering
another defeat on the scale of Austerlitz, but the green
and exhausted French troops, who had been marching
and ﬁghting all day long, could not follow through. In
addition, darkness was closing in as night approached.
This allowed the allied force to retreat in good order.
The lack of French cavalry meant there would be no
pursuit.
Wikipedia

Napoleon reached the field at 2:30 P.M. He
found the situation critical. Ney’s weary and
shaken corps was on the point of dissolution,
while Marshal Bertrand had halted his advance
a g a i n s t B l ü c h e r ’s l e f t o n d i s c o v e r i n g
Milodoradovich approaching Zeitz. Marmont,
too, was hard pressed by the Allies. It was a
moment calling for personal leadership---and
Napoleon proved more than equal to the
occasion. Riding among the wavering conscripts,
the Emperor exhorted and cajoled them back
into their ranks and then repeatedly led them up
toward the enemy. The effect of his presence was
almost magical. New confidence and resolution
flooded back into his troops. “This was probably
the day, of his whole career, on which Napoleon
< LUTZEN
incurred the greatest personal danger on the field
of battle,” recorded Marmont. “He exposed
himself constantly, leading the men of defeated
IIIrd Corps back to the charge.” From all sides
rang cries of “Vive l’Empereur!” “Hardly a
wounded man passed before Bonaparte without
saluting him with the accustomed vivat. Even
those who had lost a limb, who would in a few
hours be the prey of death, rendered him this
homage.”
< ZEITZ Chandler, p. 884

BATTLE OF LUTZEN BATTLE OF LUTZEN
Situation About 1100, 2 May 1813 Situation About 1830, 2 May 1813

1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1

BATTLE OF LUTZEN BATTLE OF LUTZEN
Situation About 1100, 2 May 1813 Situation About 1830, 2 May 1813

1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1

The Allies went hurriedly to the
rear….Lacking cavalry, Napoleon could not
pursue effectively.
French losses seem to have been
approximately 20,000; Allied, 20,000. Though
the effective Allied propaganda system claimed
that Napoleon had been completely surprised
and practically defeated, the legend of
Napoleonic invincibility was largely re-
established.
Esposito & Elting, MAP 129

Soldiers, I am pleased with you!
You have fulﬁlled my hopes! In a
single day you have overturned all
these murderous conspiracies. We
shall throw these Tartars back to
their dreadful country that they
ought not to have left. Let them stay
in their frozen deserts, home of
slavery, barbarism and corruption
where man is reduced to the level of
a beast.

--Napoleon--
3 May 1813

(30,000)

(84,000)

(96,000)
(115,000)

Leaving Ney’s crippled corps at Lützen to reorganize, Napoleon followed (0300, 3 May)
the Allied retreat….having the initiative and superior forces, on 4 May he began forming
a second army...under Ney. Initially, Ney would secure Torgau...and raise the siege of
Wittenberg. Concurrently, he would constitute a potential threat to Berlin, which--
Napoleon hoped--would cause the Prussians to break away northward. In that case, the
Emperor should be able to destroy the Allies in detail; in the meantime, he would
continue his drive on Dresden. (30,000)

(84,000)

Lützen
(96,000)
(115,000)

(30,000)
On 7 May, the Allies began recrossing the Elbe.
Russian attempts to destroy the Dresden bridges were
(84,000)
bungled, the French advance guard capturing a good
many pontons.

Lützen
(96,000)
DRESDEN (115,000)

BERLIN

(30,000)

(84,000)

Lützen
(96,000)
DRESDEN (115,000) Breslau
…(9 May), in a brilliant, surprise assault crossings, utilizing
captured pontons and the wreckage of a stone bridge,
Napoleon seized two bridgeheads on the east bank at
Dresden. The Allies, already worried by Ney’s activities,
withdrew tamely.
After much squabbling (the Prussians wanted to cover
Berlin; the Russians, Breslau and Warsaw), the Allies
decided to attempt another battle before retreating behind
the Oder River. A strong position east of Bautzen was
selected, and Russian engineers were sent ahead to prepare
it.

BERLIN

(30,000)

(84,000)

Bautzen
Lützen
(96,000)
DRESDEN (115,000) Breslau
…(9 May), in a brilliant, surprise assault crossings, utilizing
captured pontons and the wreckage of a stone bridge,
Napoleon seized two bridgeheads on the east bank at
Dresden. The Allies, already worried by Ney’s activities,
withdrew tamely.
After much squabbling (the Prussians wanted to cover
Berlin; the Russians, Breslau and Warsaw), the Allies
decided to attempt another battle before retreating behind
the Oder River. A strong position east of Bautzen was
selected, and Russian engineers were sent ahead to prepare
it.

Deutsch: Schlacht bei Bautzen 1813. Napoleon auf einem weißen Pferd, umgeben von seinen Ofﬁzieren, empfängt einen Boten.
English: Battle of Bautzen (1813). Napoleon on white horse surrounded by his ofﬁcers, receives a messenger.

Wittgenstein drew his men up in two strong defensive lines along a 10-kilometre front, with strongpoints in
villages and along ridges.

By the 19th, Bonaparte had set up his plan to pin the enemy to their lines and then bottle them up with
Ney's men but, concerned that the Prusso-Russians had more men on the field than they actually had, the
emperor would not spring his trap until they had been softened up.

The next day the attack began around midday. Hours of heavy fighting saw the French overpowering the
first defensive lines and seizing the town of Bautzen itself.

By nightfall, the French were ready to cut the defenders off from their line of retreat but Ney became
confused and his faulty positioning left the door open for the Allies to escape.

Fighting on the 21st was hard and after several hours the initial success of the renewed French attacks
began to lose impetus.

Again Ney became distracted by tactical matters - the seizing of the village of Preititz - and lost sight of the
strategic importance of his sealing the Allies in.

By 4pm, however, the Prusso-Russians were being pushed back and when the Imperial Guard was sent in
they began an all-out retreat.

While Bautzen was a success for Bonaparte it was not a decisive result. Both armies lost some 20,000 men
but Ney's failure to cut the line of retreat robbed the French of complete victory.

http://www.napoleonguide.com/battle_bautzen.htm

! the Blöserwasser is a marshy stream running
through the Allied positions before joining
the Spree

! the Allies planned to contain Napoleon’s
attack; then to counterattack, envelop his left
ﬂank, and drive him into the mountains along
the Austrian frontier

Blöserwasser

the Spree


! Napoleon’s main concern was to ﬁx and
distract the Allies long enough for Ney’s
enveloping maneuver (which could not be
delivered in strength before 21 May) to
develop

Blöserwasser

the Spree


! Napoleon’s main concern was to ﬁx and
distract the Allies long enough for Ney’s
enveloping maneuver (which could not be
delivered in strength before 21 May) to
develop

Blöserwasser
! the Allied position being too strong for a
frontal attack, he spent the morning of the
20th maneuvering his left and center into
their assault positions

! 1200- the French artillery opened heavily

! 1500-Oudinot conﬁrmed the tsar’s fears by
driving deep into the ridges on the Allied left

! 1700-Macdonald and Marmont pinched out
Bautzen, forcing Miloradovich to retire

r
ve
Ri
e
re
Sp

SYMBOL FOR MARSHY GROUND

BATTLE OF BAUTZEN BATTLE OF BAUTZEN
Situation Early 20 May 1813 and Situation at Noon 21 May 1813, Allied
Advance of Napoleon’s Forces Prior to Dark Routes of Withdrawal and French Pursuit

For the 21st, Napoleon ordered Oudinot to attack
vigorously at daybreak, so as to distract all possible
enemy troops. Macdonald would support him;
Marmont and Soult would stand ready to extend
Ney’s attack. Ney would seize Dresha, then

r
ve
advance toward Weissenberg. Subsequent

Ri
e
developments are difﬁcult to unravel.

re
Sp


Ney energetically snarled the situation….Despite
splendid ﬁghting, Blücher and Yorck were steadily
driven in, Maison penetrating southward through
Plieskowitz.
However, Kleist managed to drive the DRESHA

r
unsupported Souham back on Gleina, and Ney lost

ve
Ri
his remaining wits….Almost trapped, but keeping

e
re
Sp
their men under tight control, Blücher and Yorck
slipped out past Ney.

WEISENBERG


DRESHA

r
ve
Ri
e
re
Sp

Pleading lack of cavalry, Ney hesitated to pursue….
Hoping to retrieve Ney’s failure, at 1600 Napoleon WEISENBERG

thrust at the Allied center with the Guard and
Latour-Maubourg, but the Allies were already
withdrawing in good order. Each side had lost
approximately 20,000 men; Napoleon’s only
trophies were wrecked guns and wounded
prisoners. He had planned an annihilating hammer
blow, but, because of Ney’s blunderings, had won
only an ordinary victory.
Esposito and Elting, MAP131


Why did the Emperor agree to an armistice after he had won two important
battles and had the enemy on the run? Scores of his detractors, following
Baron Jomini’s malicious lead, have gleefully pointed out that, such was the
deplorable state of the allied forces, had he continued his pursuit...he would
have won his “decisive victory” to finish the war.
Whew!
The Allies had indeed suffered heavy casualties but the reverse side of the
coin was that ample reinforcements would soon fill the gaps….Defeat had
resulted in retreat, not rout…..
And the French army? Notwithstanding inspired and incredibly brave
battle performances the cost in men, horses, weapons, ammunition and
materiel had been heavy. Time was necessary to repair the damage and rest
the troops. Above all Napoleon desperately needed more horses….Without
the tactical impetus provided by trained cavalry and fast-moving artillery
Napoleon was unlikely ever to find that elusive “decisive battle.”

Asprey, pp. 304-305

Even supposing his army was
combat-ready [on 4 June] which it
was not, an end-play around the
enemy’s right at Schweidnitz would
have been not only a formidable but a
dangerous undertaking.
Asprey, p. 305

at the beginning of
the armistice
4 June

Even supposing his army was
combat-ready [on 4 June] which it
was not, an end-play around the
enemy’s right at Schweidnitz would
have been not only a formidable but a
dangerous undertaking. Schweidnitz
Asprey, p. 305

at the beginning of
the armistice
4 June

I want peace which is of more
concern to me than to anyone else…
but I shall not make either a
dishonorable peace or one that
would bring an even more violent
war within six months.

--Napoleon to General Savary
Dresden
12 June 1813

Battle of Dresden
26-27 August 1813

IV. Dresden

✦ Napoleon was well aware that he couldn’t count on his
south German allies and especially his father-in-law
Francis, the emperor of Austria

✦ “...Napoleon was not dealing so much with the
Austrian emperor as with a very shrewd, cunning,
unscrupulous and altogether nasty piece of work
named Klemens von Metternich”-Asprey, p. 306

✦ 26 June-at Dresden, Metternich, Austria’s 40-year-old
foreign minister, maintaining the façade of neutrality,
offered his services as peacemaker

✦ his terms: in return for peace, France must agree that

✦ the Grand Duchy of Warsaw be given to Russia

✦ Prussia gets her 1806 boundaries, including the fortress of
Danzig

✦ the Confederation of the Rhine be dissolved

✦ Austria would get Dalmatia (the “Yugoslav” coast),
Salzburg and Tyrol, and the Venetian provinces Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich
Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Fürst von Metternich-Winneburg zu Beilstein

1773 – 1859

Napoleon was understandably furious--if this was the result of his
winning two important battles, what would have been the result had he
lost them? “Everything makes me think that Austria...would like to
proﬁt from [present] circumstances to recover her losses in recent
wars….It appears...she had deployed 60,000-80,000 soldiers at Prague.”
As one result he was forming a large corps at Würzburg under Marshal
Augereau’s command.

Asprey, pp.307-308

at the beginning of
the armistice
4 June

< AUGEREAU
PRAGUE

at the end of the armistice
16 August

BERLIN

The Emperor appears to have formulated his
plan of action only shortly before the reopening
of the campaign. Eventually he conceived of a
two-part plan. ...the French army would be
generally divided into two wings. The larger
(numbering the 200,000 men...would adopt a OUDINOT
strategic defensive based upon the Saxon capital at the beginning of
of Dresden….Dresden itself, with its great the armistice
depots and camps, formed the kingpin of the 4 June
entire system…. The second part of the army
was entrusted to Oudinot, he was given
command over almost 120,000 men...this force
was intended to launch a heavy attack
northward against Berlin and thereafter tackle
Bernadotte’s army.
In this scheme we can detect traces of the
original master plan of April, as well as a DRESDEN

vindictive desire to see a disloyal monarch and a
treacherous ex-marshal heavily punished.

Chandler, p. 902

at the end of the armistice
16 August

“[Napoleon] suddenly realized that a golden opportunity to rout the
Army of Bohemia was presenting itself. With almost all his forces
drawn up to the south of Dresden, Schwarzenberg was exposing
his communications to a sudden blow through Königstein and
Pirna.
op. cit, p. 904

“If this plan was to succeed it was vital that:
1) St Cyr should continue to defy and pin the
Allies at Dresden until Napoleon’s master stroke
could fully develop
2) It was also important that Macdonald should
succeed in keeping Blücher fully occupied away to
the east,
3) and that Oudinot should continue to dominate
Bernadotte to the south of Berlin.

“In the event, however,complications arose on all these sectors
which eventually ruined the plan’s implementation.”
op. cit, p. 905

Day Two
The Allied plan for the battle on the 27th was to mass two thirds of their strength in the center,
leaving generals Bianchi and Wittgenstein with approximately 25,000 apiece to hold the left and
right wings respectively.

Day Two

For his part, Napoleon was planning a holding action in the center and a double envelopment of
the enemy ﬂanks...

Day Two

The French attack on the right opened at six in the morning.
[It] quickly drove Wittgenstein’s sodden and dispirited troops
out of the Blasewitz woods and began to bend back the right of
the Allied line.

Day Two

Murat was making famous progress on the other ﬂank. Bianchi
proved incapable of withstanding the fury of Marshal Victor’s
attack; his line broke, and a large part of his command found…
their backs to the swollen Weisseritz….As the key bridge at
Plauen had already fallen into French hands, the Allied center
was relegated to the role of helpless spectators as Bianchi’s men
were driven into the river….my midafternoon the Allied left
had ceased to exist. Thirteen thousand prisoners fell into
French hands in the sector, and all the rest of Bianchi’s troops
were dead or scattered.

Day Two

However, the battle in the center was not
going so well for the severely
outnumbered St. Cyr and Marmont.
Three assaults failed...and when Napoleon
rode back to Dresden at 4:00 P.M. he
fully anticipated a third day’s ﬁghting on
the morrow.

Day Two

The Allied commanders, however, had
experienced enough….a cannonball
narrowly missed the Tsar Alexander, and
this narrow escape dampened what little
ardor the Allied high command could still
muster….Accordingly, orders were issued
for an overnight retreat toward Bohemia.

Day Two

Over the two days’ ﬁghting the Allies had
lost some 38,000 men; the French had
emerged lightly with barely 10,000
casualties. It appeared that the legend of
French invincibility had been fully re-
established.
Chandler, pp. 910-911

Victory at Dresden, but…

Early on the 28th , French patrols had found nothing at Dresden but a handful of
rear guards facing them. Napoleon had at once set about organizing a pursuit; if
only Vandamme could reach Teplitz ahead of the enemy, the Army of Bohemia
would be hopelessly trapped amid the mountains. However the Emperor was far
from well; furthermore, distressing details of Oudinot’s failure against Bülow on
the 23rd had now reached headquarters. No sooner had these been assimilated
than news of another blow arrived. In complete disobedience of his orders, it
appeared that Macdonald had rashly pushed ahead over the Katzbach
[River]pursuing Blücher…. By the end of the 26th , Macdonald’s army had
suffered a severe and costly defeat (losing 15,000 prisoners and 100 cannon)
completely reversing the strategic situation…. Napoleon’s success at Dresden
was already being overshadowed by the failures of his subordinates on other
sectors. His mind ﬁlled with the need to devise new measures to offset these
setbacks, Napoleon returned to Dresden on the afternoon of the 28th , leaving the
pursuit of Schwarzenberg to his underlings.

After the Battle of Dresden and Situation
of 30 August During Battle of Kulm

“In the absence of the master, the French pursuit of the various columns of the
Allied army proceeded with fair élan but insufﬁcient coordination. As a result
Vandamme’s corps became increasingly isolated….falling back toward Kulm. Here
on the 30th , he suddenly...found himself beset from the rear….with only 32,000
troops...to oppose 54,000 Allies...although over half his men escaped the
commander of 1st Corps and 13,000 of his troops fell into Allied hands….
Chandler, p.912


“In the absence of the master, the French pursuit of the various columns of the
Allied army proceeded with fair élan but insufﬁcient coordination. As a result
Vandamme’s corps became increasingly isolated….falling back toward Kulm. Here
on the 30th , he suddenly...found himself beset from the rear….with only 32,000
troops...to oppose 54,000 Allies...although over half his men escaped the
commander of 1st Corps and 13,000 of his troops fell into Allied hands….
Chandler, p.912

KULM


OUDINOT

MACDONALD

Situation Evening of 30 Aug 1813 After
Vandamme’s defeat at Kulm

In the Allied camp, of course, there was much rejoicing fraught with heartfelt
relief….Thus Dresden joined Lützen and Bautzen on the growing list of
practically valueless French victories.
Chandler, p.912
OUDINOT

MACDONALD

Situation Evening of 30 Aug 1813 After
Vandamme’s defeat at Kulm

The Trachtenberg Plan was concocted by Allied commanders [at this point]. The plan
advocated avoiding direct engagement with the French emperor, Napoleon I. This resulted
from fear of the Emperor's now legendary prowess in battle. Consequently the Allies
planned to engage and defeat the French Marshals and Generals separately, and thus
weaken his army while they built up an overwhelming force even he could not defeat. It was
decided upon after a series of defeats and near disasters by the Coalition at Napoleon's
hands at the battles of Lützen, Bautzen and Dresden. The plan ultimately worked and at the
Battle of Leipzig, where the Allies had a considerable numerical advantage, the Emperor
was soundly defeated and driven out of Germany, across the Rhine back into France itself.
The plan was the work of the Austrian chief of staff of the allied coalition, Radetzky.*

Wikipedia
* In whose honor the Radetzky March was named. It will become the military theme song of 19th century Austria.

More generally, like Hitler’s from December 1941, Napoleon’s inherent
weaknesses had become more apparent from mid-1813, once he faced
united opposition in the Sixth Coalition, and the Formation of the Seventh
Coalition in 1815 was part of this process. Indeed, war followed politics.
Once Austria, Prussia, Russia and Britain cooperated effectively, as they
did from 1813, Napoleon was rapidly defeated, although his own
inappropriate and indifferently executed strategy in 1813 contributed
greatly to the defeat. The Waterloo campaign was a reprise of the situation
in 1813-1814, Napoleon’s assumption that a military victory could translate
into political success was seriously ﬂawed. It reﬂected a failure to
understand the general European context as well as the limitations of
French resources and will.

Black, The Battle of Waterloo, p. 152

Napoleon Part 2, session v The Sixth Coalition

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