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For the Demo…
please download and install the following
apps on your mobile device
1
Security
Imperative for
iOS / Android
Apps
ISACA Sacramento
July 2013
Who are we?
• Kartik Trivedi (kartik@symosis.com)
– Co-founder of Symosis – Application & Mobile security
– 13 Years in Info Sec – Security Assessments, Penetration
testing, Compliance & Training
– Free Mobile App Security / Training Eval
• Lenin Aboagye (laboagye@io.com)
– Director, Information Security & Compliance, IO
– Cloud / Mobile security expert
– Media & Television, Education, Health, Real Estate and
Energy industries experience
3
Agenda
Introduction
iOS / Android Apps Top Risks
Countermeasures
Mobility in Data Center
4
Audience Poll
5
• What mobile OS do
you mostly use?
• How many of you are
involved with mobile
security, privacy,
audits?
• Any mobile developers
/ architects?
• Does your employer
have mobile presence?
There is an App for that!
6
There is an App for that!
• Pay bills
• File income taxes
• Pay property tax
• Scan & Shop
• Deposit checks
• Transfer money
• Store medical records
• Refill prescription
• Manage health information
• Remember your meds
• Book flight / hotel
• Medscape / pharmacopia
7
• Small Business Payroll
• Pay invoice
• Location based check in
• Personal finance
• Investments & 401k
• Health & Fitness
• Productivity
• Facebook / twitter
• Place bets on sports
• Utilities
• Store passwords
• Document storage
From 2013-2017, the app economy will
double from $72B USD to $151B USD
8
What do Attackers Want?
• Credentials - To your
device, To external
services (email, banking,
etc)
• Access to your device •
Sniff your connections,
Use your device (botnets,
spamming), Steal trade
secrets or other sensitive
data
9
• Personal Data - Full Name,
SINSSN, Address book data •
Location data
• Cardholder Data - Card
Numbers, Expiration, CVV
• Health Data - Prescription
information, medical records,
procedure summary
• Corporate Data - IP, Design
Docs
Security Concerns
• Side Channel Data Leakage
• Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
• Weak Server Side Controls
• Insecure Data Storage
• Client Side Injection
• Poor Authorization and
Authentication
• Improper Session Handling
• Security Decisions Via Untrusted
Inputs
• Broken Cryptography
• Sensitive Information Disclosure
• Hardcoded password/keys
• Privacy compliance
• Identity exposure
10
• Activity monitoring and data retrieval
• Unauthorized dialing, SMS, and payments
• Unauthorized network connectivity (data
exfiltration or command & control)
• UI (unique identifier) impersonation
• System modification (rootkit, APN proxy
configuration)
• Mobile Malware
• Criminals Target and Infect App Stores
• Social-Engineering
• Geolocation compromise
• Security Regulatory Compliance
• Device Risk
• Application management
• Installation of un-verified / unsigned 3rd
party apps
Agenda
Introduction
Mobile Apps Top Risks
1. Side Channel Leakage
2. Insecure Transport / Server Controls
3. Insecure Data Storage
4. Privacy
Countermeasures
Mobility in Data Center
11
1. Side Channel Data Leakage
Data leakage via platform defaults, use of third
party libraries, logging, etc
• Property List Files
• SnapShot (ie- iOS backgrounding)
Sometimes result of programmatic flaws
Demo 1: Plist File
Tools: iExplore, Reflection
Device: iPhone 5, IOS 6 latest version, iPhone 4,
IOS 5
13
14
15
Facebook Plist Mobile Security Hole
Allows Identity Theft
LinkedIn Plist identity theft
16
DropBox Plist Security hole
17
Demo 2: Snapshots
Tools: iExplore, Reflection
Device: iPhone 5, IOS 6 latest version, iPhone 4,
IOS 5
18
Agenda
Introduction
Mobile Apps Top 3 Risks
1. Side Channel Leakage
2. Insecure Transport / Server Controls
3. Insecure Data Storage
4. Privacy
Countermeasures
Mobility in Data Center
19
2. Insecure Transport/Server Controls
Failing to encrypt sensitive
network traffic consisting of
sensitive data
Insecure server controls -
web, application and
backend API - can lead to
security compromise
Demo 3: Insecure Transport
Tools: MITM Proxy, Reflection
Insecure Transport
21
Tumblr – Password sent unencrypted
22
23
Unencrypted Cookies over HTTP in Instagram iOS App
24
26
Demo 4: Insecure Server Configuration
Tools: MITM Proxy, Reflection
Insecure Server Configuration / Authentication
Bypass
27
28
TOC
Mobile Platform Risks
Mobile Apps Top 3 Risks
1. Side Channel Leakage
2. Insecure Transport / Server Controls
3. Insecure Data Storage
4. Privacy
Countermeasures
Mobility in Data Center
29
3. Insecure Data Storage
Locally stored data both on native and browser
based apps that includes
• SQLite
• Cache files
• Keychain – Is this really secure?
30
Demo 5: SQLite / Cache files
Tools: iExplore, Reflection
SQLite / Cache files
If time permits…
Hacking the Keychain
Tools: Jailbroken device, SSH, keychain_dump
31
JackThreads stores personal + financial
info in SQLite file
32
Unencrypted Cache with Master
Password in Keeper
33
34
TOC
Mobile Platform Risks
Mobile Apps Top 3 Risks
1. Side Channel Leakage
2. Insecure Transport / Server Controls
3. Insecure Data Storage
4. Privacy
Countermeasures
Mobility in Data Center
35
4. Privacy
36
Privacy Threat & Impact
• UDID, Mac Address, Device ID
• Location Training
• Usage Tracking - Google, Flurry, Mobclix
• Contacts Access & Sharing
• Shares / Uploads Phone Number
• 3rd Party Connections – Facebook, twitter
37
Path uploads your entire iPhone address book to
its servers
38
39
WhatsApp sends messages
unencrypted over HTTP
40
Risk & Impact: High
Sensitive Data exposure
• Username & password
• PII, SSN, Health Information
• Device ID, Application configuration
• Account Number, Credit Card, Financial Information
Loss of Data Confidentiality & Integrity
Data Tempering, Impersonation
Man-in-the-Middle (MITM attack)
Unauthorized access to application data or functionality
Privacy Violations / reputation damage
Session replay, impersonation
Agenda
Introduction
Mobile Apps Top Risks
Countermeasures
1. Disable side channel data leakage
2. Use HTTPS and secure IOS Safe methods
3. Insecure Data storage
4. Privacy
Mobility in Data Center
42
Side Channel Data Leakage
Start by identifying all potential side channel data
which includes
• Plist files
• Snapshots
• System / keystroke logs
• Web caches
• Cut-and-paste buffers
Do not store sensitive data (e.g., credentials,
tokens, PII) in property list files. Use iOS Keychain
43
Disable Snapshots (3 Options)
Set the key window’s hidden property to YES
[ UIApplication sharedApplication ].keyWindow.hidden = YES;
Using the applicationWillResignActive delegate method
(void)applicationWillResignActive:(UIApplication *)application{[
UIApplication sharedApplication ].keyWindow.hidden = YES;}
Use the applicationDidEnterBackground method.
(void)applicationDidEnterBackground:(UIApplication *)application
{[ UIApplication sharedApplication ].keyWindow.hidden = YES;}
44
Disable Other Leakage
Disable Cache - Set the autocorrectionType property to
UITextAutocorrectionNo for UITestField
Disable Logs – Disable NSLog and NSAssert
Disable keystroke logging & cut-and-paste buffer for the
most sensitive data, to prevent it from being stored in
plaintext on the device.
Disable Insecure HTTP - Use NSURLConnection along with
canAuthenticateAgainstProtectionSpace
45
Use HTTPS and Secure IOS Methods
Protect sensitive data leaving the device using secure
HTTPS and SSL
IOS: Do not only use NSURL or NSURLConnection . Use
NSURLConnection along with
canAuthenticateAgainstProtectionSpace
Syntax:
canAuthenticateAgainstProtectionSpace
(BOOL)connection:(NSURLConnection
*)connection
canAuthenticateAgainstProtectionSpace:
(NSURLProtectionSpace
*)protectionSpace
Use Secure cookie flag
Set-Cookie:
AuthenticatedID=nNTzKhxV10bzwW1vMfZXhqVGxWX
h4D8QrkynxV2QMqv2K032WS02!-2076712369;
path=/; /secure
In Java Servlet 3.0, use the following in web.xml
<session-config> <cookie-config>

<secure>true</secure>
 </cookie-
config></session-config>
Use Secure Data Storage
Store sensitive data on the server instead of the client-end
device.
Delete Programmatically - Incorporate an application-specific
"data kill switch" into their products, to allow the per-app
deletion of their application's sensitive data when needed
Assume that shared storage is untrusted
Only collect and disclose data which is required for business
use of the application
48
Encrypt Sensitive Data
Data Protection API - set the NSFileProtectionKey on an
existing file
Keychain – Sensitive data like passwords and keys should be
stored in the Keychain and not in insecure locations like plist
files
CCCrypt & javax.crypto.* package for Android - provides
access to AES, DES, 3DES
SQLCipher (IOS & Android) - transparent 256-
bit AES encryption of database files
49
Ensure Privacy
50
Strategic Recommendations
• Establish common set of security requirements.
Perform periodic security scans and audits
• Invest in security education for all stakeholders
• Perform server side data validation and
canonicalization
• Define and deploy secure configuration
• Do not log credentials, PII and other sensitive data
• Design and implement all apps under the assumption
that the user’s device will be lost or stolen
• Review all third party libraries before use
51
Agenda
Mobile Platform Risks
Mobile Apps Top 3 Risks
Countermeasures
Mobility in Data Center
52
Mobility in the Data Center
Factoring the Data Center into the secure
Mobility design equation
IT Cloud Security Stack
You Need to Know Your Data Center
How secure and resilient are your applications?
Cloud Demand
When you add the pressure of mobility,
the data center becomes mission critical.
DCOS Capabilities
Data Center needs visibility, intelligent control and security.
Let’s consider a day in the life of our 9-digit friend.
DCOS Capabilities
Rest-based API’s
Dynamic Workload Shifting
Easy SDDC Integration
Complete Integration:
Physical, Environmental and
Logical Cloud Stack Layers
Challenge and Opportunity
Mobility is challenging the Data Center, but the mobility tools have to
be built with strong security design considerations:
Proximity
Location
Context
Remote Kill-Switch
Multi-factor Authentication
Encryption
Policy Drive Intelligent Control®
Demo
Thanks You!
Questions?
kartik@symosis.com / laboagye@io.com
Ask us about FREE Mobile Apps Security Service &
Training Eval!!
62

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Security Imeprative for iOS and Android Apps

  • 1. For the Demo… please download and install the following apps on your mobile device 1
  • 2. Security Imperative for iOS / Android Apps ISACA Sacramento July 2013
  • 3. Who are we? • Kartik Trivedi (kartik@symosis.com) – Co-founder of Symosis – Application & Mobile security – 13 Years in Info Sec – Security Assessments, Penetration testing, Compliance & Training – Free Mobile App Security / Training Eval • Lenin Aboagye (laboagye@io.com) – Director, Information Security & Compliance, IO – Cloud / Mobile security expert – Media & Television, Education, Health, Real Estate and Energy industries experience 3
  • 4. Agenda Introduction iOS / Android Apps Top Risks Countermeasures Mobility in Data Center 4
  • 5. Audience Poll 5 • What mobile OS do you mostly use? • How many of you are involved with mobile security, privacy, audits? • Any mobile developers / architects? • Does your employer have mobile presence?
  • 6. There is an App for that! 6
  • 7. There is an App for that! • Pay bills • File income taxes • Pay property tax • Scan & Shop • Deposit checks • Transfer money • Store medical records • Refill prescription • Manage health information • Remember your meds • Book flight / hotel • Medscape / pharmacopia 7 • Small Business Payroll • Pay invoice • Location based check in • Personal finance • Investments & 401k • Health & Fitness • Productivity • Facebook / twitter • Place bets on sports • Utilities • Store passwords • Document storage
  • 8. From 2013-2017, the app economy will double from $72B USD to $151B USD 8
  • 9. What do Attackers Want? • Credentials - To your device, To external services (email, banking, etc) • Access to your device • Sniff your connections, Use your device (botnets, spamming), Steal trade secrets or other sensitive data 9 • Personal Data - Full Name, SINSSN, Address book data • Location data • Cardholder Data - Card Numbers, Expiration, CVV • Health Data - Prescription information, medical records, procedure summary • Corporate Data - IP, Design Docs
  • 10. Security Concerns • Side Channel Data Leakage • Insufficient Transport Layer Protection • Weak Server Side Controls • Insecure Data Storage • Client Side Injection • Poor Authorization and Authentication • Improper Session Handling • Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs • Broken Cryptography • Sensitive Information Disclosure • Hardcoded password/keys • Privacy compliance • Identity exposure 10 • Activity monitoring and data retrieval • Unauthorized dialing, SMS, and payments • Unauthorized network connectivity (data exfiltration or command & control) • UI (unique identifier) impersonation • System modification (rootkit, APN proxy configuration) • Mobile Malware • Criminals Target and Infect App Stores • Social-Engineering • Geolocation compromise • Security Regulatory Compliance • Device Risk • Application management • Installation of un-verified / unsigned 3rd party apps
  • 11. Agenda Introduction Mobile Apps Top Risks 1. Side Channel Leakage 2. Insecure Transport / Server Controls 3. Insecure Data Storage 4. Privacy Countermeasures Mobility in Data Center 11
  • 12. 1. Side Channel Data Leakage Data leakage via platform defaults, use of third party libraries, logging, etc • Property List Files • SnapShot (ie- iOS backgrounding) Sometimes result of programmatic flaws
  • 13. Demo 1: Plist File Tools: iExplore, Reflection Device: iPhone 5, IOS 6 latest version, iPhone 4, IOS 5 13
  • 14. 14
  • 15. 15 Facebook Plist Mobile Security Hole Allows Identity Theft
  • 18. Demo 2: Snapshots Tools: iExplore, Reflection Device: iPhone 5, IOS 6 latest version, iPhone 4, IOS 5 18
  • 19. Agenda Introduction Mobile Apps Top 3 Risks 1. Side Channel Leakage 2. Insecure Transport / Server Controls 3. Insecure Data Storage 4. Privacy Countermeasures Mobility in Data Center 19
  • 20. 2. Insecure Transport/Server Controls Failing to encrypt sensitive network traffic consisting of sensitive data Insecure server controls - web, application and backend API - can lead to security compromise
  • 21. Demo 3: Insecure Transport Tools: MITM Proxy, Reflection Insecure Transport 21
  • 22. Tumblr – Password sent unencrypted 22
  • 23. 23
  • 24. Unencrypted Cookies over HTTP in Instagram iOS App 24
  • 25.
  • 26. 26
  • 27. Demo 4: Insecure Server Configuration Tools: MITM Proxy, Reflection Insecure Server Configuration / Authentication Bypass 27
  • 28. 28
  • 29. TOC Mobile Platform Risks Mobile Apps Top 3 Risks 1. Side Channel Leakage 2. Insecure Transport / Server Controls 3. Insecure Data Storage 4. Privacy Countermeasures Mobility in Data Center 29
  • 30. 3. Insecure Data Storage Locally stored data both on native and browser based apps that includes • SQLite • Cache files • Keychain – Is this really secure? 30
  • 31. Demo 5: SQLite / Cache files Tools: iExplore, Reflection SQLite / Cache files If time permits… Hacking the Keychain Tools: Jailbroken device, SSH, keychain_dump 31
  • 32. JackThreads stores personal + financial info in SQLite file 32
  • 33. Unencrypted Cache with Master Password in Keeper 33
  • 34. 34
  • 35. TOC Mobile Platform Risks Mobile Apps Top 3 Risks 1. Side Channel Leakage 2. Insecure Transport / Server Controls 3. Insecure Data Storage 4. Privacy Countermeasures Mobility in Data Center 35
  • 37. Privacy Threat & Impact • UDID, Mac Address, Device ID • Location Training • Usage Tracking - Google, Flurry, Mobclix • Contacts Access & Sharing • Shares / Uploads Phone Number • 3rd Party Connections – Facebook, twitter 37
  • 38. Path uploads your entire iPhone address book to its servers 38
  • 40. 40
  • 41. Risk & Impact: High Sensitive Data exposure • Username & password • PII, SSN, Health Information • Device ID, Application configuration • Account Number, Credit Card, Financial Information Loss of Data Confidentiality & Integrity Data Tempering, Impersonation Man-in-the-Middle (MITM attack) Unauthorized access to application data or functionality Privacy Violations / reputation damage Session replay, impersonation
  • 42. Agenda Introduction Mobile Apps Top Risks Countermeasures 1. Disable side channel data leakage 2. Use HTTPS and secure IOS Safe methods 3. Insecure Data storage 4. Privacy Mobility in Data Center 42
  • 43. Side Channel Data Leakage Start by identifying all potential side channel data which includes • Plist files • Snapshots • System / keystroke logs • Web caches • Cut-and-paste buffers Do not store sensitive data (e.g., credentials, tokens, PII) in property list files. Use iOS Keychain 43
  • 44. Disable Snapshots (3 Options) Set the key window’s hidden property to YES [ UIApplication sharedApplication ].keyWindow.hidden = YES; Using the applicationWillResignActive delegate method (void)applicationWillResignActive:(UIApplication *)application{[ UIApplication sharedApplication ].keyWindow.hidden = YES;} Use the applicationDidEnterBackground method. (void)applicationDidEnterBackground:(UIApplication *)application {[ UIApplication sharedApplication ].keyWindow.hidden = YES;} 44
  • 45. Disable Other Leakage Disable Cache - Set the autocorrectionType property to UITextAutocorrectionNo for UITestField Disable Logs – Disable NSLog and NSAssert Disable keystroke logging & cut-and-paste buffer for the most sensitive data, to prevent it from being stored in plaintext on the device. Disable Insecure HTTP - Use NSURLConnection along with canAuthenticateAgainstProtectionSpace 45
  • 46. Use HTTPS and Secure IOS Methods Protect sensitive data leaving the device using secure HTTPS and SSL IOS: Do not only use NSURL or NSURLConnection . Use NSURLConnection along with canAuthenticateAgainstProtectionSpace Syntax: canAuthenticateAgainstProtectionSpace (BOOL)connection:(NSURLConnection *)connection canAuthenticateAgainstProtectionSpace: (NSURLProtectionSpace *)protectionSpace
  • 47. Use Secure cookie flag Set-Cookie: AuthenticatedID=nNTzKhxV10bzwW1vMfZXhqVGxWX h4D8QrkynxV2QMqv2K032WS02!-2076712369; path=/; /secure In Java Servlet 3.0, use the following in web.xml <session-config> <cookie-config>
 <secure>true</secure>
 </cookie- config></session-config>
  • 48. Use Secure Data Storage Store sensitive data on the server instead of the client-end device. Delete Programmatically - Incorporate an application-specific "data kill switch" into their products, to allow the per-app deletion of their application's sensitive data when needed Assume that shared storage is untrusted Only collect and disclose data which is required for business use of the application 48
  • 49. Encrypt Sensitive Data Data Protection API - set the NSFileProtectionKey on an existing file Keychain – Sensitive data like passwords and keys should be stored in the Keychain and not in insecure locations like plist files CCCrypt & javax.crypto.* package for Android - provides access to AES, DES, 3DES SQLCipher (IOS & Android) - transparent 256- bit AES encryption of database files 49
  • 51. Strategic Recommendations • Establish common set of security requirements. Perform periodic security scans and audits • Invest in security education for all stakeholders • Perform server side data validation and canonicalization • Define and deploy secure configuration • Do not log credentials, PII and other sensitive data • Design and implement all apps under the assumption that the user’s device will be lost or stolen • Review all third party libraries before use 51
  • 52. Agenda Mobile Platform Risks Mobile Apps Top 3 Risks Countermeasures Mobility in Data Center 52
  • 53. Mobility in the Data Center Factoring the Data Center into the secure Mobility design equation
  • 55. You Need to Know Your Data Center How secure and resilient are your applications?
  • 56. Cloud Demand When you add the pressure of mobility, the data center becomes mission critical.
  • 57. DCOS Capabilities Data Center needs visibility, intelligent control and security. Let’s consider a day in the life of our 9-digit friend.
  • 58. DCOS Capabilities Rest-based API’s Dynamic Workload Shifting Easy SDDC Integration Complete Integration: Physical, Environmental and Logical Cloud Stack Layers
  • 59. Challenge and Opportunity Mobility is challenging the Data Center, but the mobility tools have to be built with strong security design considerations: Proximity Location Context Remote Kill-Switch Multi-factor Authentication Encryption
  • 61. Demo
  • 62. Thanks You! Questions? kartik@symosis.com / laboagye@io.com Ask us about FREE Mobile Apps Security Service & Training Eval!! 62

Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. Please make a selection by clicking on the
  2. What mobile OS do you mostly use?How many of you are responsible for mobile security?Any iOS or Android developers / architects?Tech management? Auditors?Security testers / QA?How many are involved with mobile device management, policy development and/or security?When you hear mobile security, what do you think of first? MDM/BYOD/MAM?
  3. Mobile App Growth
  4. http://appnationconference.com/main/research/By far, the largest contributor to this number will be app-enabled commerce, supplemented by forecasted revenue from downloads, in-advertising and virtual goods
  5. Please make a selection by clicking on the
  6. Side channel data leakage applies to data leakage via platform defaults, use of third party libraries, logging, etc. In order to provide the visual iOS has been proven to capture and store snapshots.This occurs when a device suspends (rather than terminates), when either the home button is pressed, or a phone call or other event temporarily suspends the applicationPlist is a structured text file that contains essential configuration information for a bundled executable
  7. H&amp;R blockCheck Images Cached
  8. A PLIST (Property List) file is an XML file that holds application properties. Some applications store sensitive information in the plist files including authentication credentials, PIN and oAUTH tokensPlist files can be found in several location in the application directory . An example location and plist file content storing sensitive authentication credentials are shown on the screen
  9. http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/security-hole-exposes-android-ios-to-facebook-identity-theft/11356
  10. http://blog.scoopz.com/2012/04/07/linkedin-ios-app-also-vulnerable-to-plist-identity-theft/
  11. http://thenextweb.com/mobile/2012/04/06/security-hole-in-facebook-ios-app-doesnt-require-jailbreak-or-theft-and-dropbox-has-it-too/
  12. H&amp;R blockCheck Images Cached
  13. Please make a selection by clicking on the
  14. Web sites and servers sometimes have improperly configured SSL certificates. This causes warning messages which are often ignored by the users. This results in users Phishing attacks where users end up providing personal information and private data to malicious websites that look like legitimate applicationsApplications that fall back or can be forced out of an encrypting mode can also be abused by attackers resulting in insecure communication. This is common on sites that operate on both HTTP and HTTPS services, or by the implementation of older versions of SSL on the web server that are vulnerable to downgrade attacks.
  15. http://blogs.denverpost.com/techknowbytes/2012/02/09/southwest-airlines-iphone-app-vulnerable-to-hackers-study-says/3264/
  16. http://www.mobilemag.com/2012/12/06/security-threat-unencrypted-cookies-in-instagram-ios-app/
  17. In 2011, it was discovered that Android devices transmitted data and AuthToken session cookie via insecure HTTP. AuthToken is not bound to any session or device and thus would allow an adversary to access any personal data which is made available through the service API. This includes Google calendar, picasa and contact information for that user. For more Reference: http://www.uni-ulm.de/in/mi/mitarbeiter/koenings/catching-authtokens.htmlThe issue here is the use of insecure HTTP channel which allows network eavesdropping of the authToken and user data
  18. http://www.theverge.com/2012/2/14/2798008/ios-apps-and-the-address-book-what-you-need-to-know
  19. http://www.databreaches.net/?p=25428
  20. Please make a selection by clicking on the
  21. InsecureData Storage applies to the locally stored data by the mobile applications. There are two types of mobiles apps - native apps and browser based apps. Native apps are apps that is installed in the handset, processes data locally and may connect to the internet for updates or sending user specific information to the server. Example: Gaming apps, News apps, etc. Browser based apps are apps that are accessible via mobile browser. This vulnerability applies to both categories of apps.Most apps stores user specific information on mobile devices. This data may be stored in clear text and may includeUsername and passwordPII, SSN, Health InformationDevice ID, Application configurationAccount Number, Credit Card, Financial Information
  22. http://blog.fox-it.com/2013/04/05/security-advisory-unencrypted-storage-of-confidential-information-in-keeper-password-data-vault-v5-3-for-ios/
  23. http://blog.agilebits.com/2012/04/06/oauth-dropbox-and-your-1password-data/
  24. Please make a selection by clicking on the
  25. http://www.truste.com/blog/2012/03/02/mobile-app-privacy-policies-are-now-the-law/
  26. https://www.demworks.org/blog/2013/05/instant-messaging-smartphones-whatsapps-lack-security
  27. http://thenextweb.com/insider/2012/06/06/linkedins-ios-app-collects-and-sends-names-emails-and-meeting-notes-from-your-calendar-back-in-plain-text/
  28. Insecure transport layer protection is considered a high risk security vulnerabilityThe impact could includeLoss of Data Confidentiality &amp; Integrity when sensitive information is revealed to the attackerData Tampering when attacker modifies application traffic and force user accept itMan-in-the-Middle (MITM attack) if an attacker diverts all traffic through an insecure channelImpersonation if the attacker hijacks user account
  29. Please make a selection by clicking on the
  30. To disable snapshots, use one of the 3 solutions provided1. Set the key window’s hidden property to YES. This will cause whatever content is currently displayed on the screen to be hidden, resulting in a blank screenshot where any content would normally reside.    [ UIApplicationsharedApplication ].keyWindow.hidden = YES;Bear in mind that, if you have any other views behind the current view, these may become visible when the key window is hidden. Ensure that you are adequately hiding any other windows when performing this action.
  31. Disable the auto-correct feature for any sensitive information, not just for password fields. Since the keyboard caches sensitive information, it may be recoverable. For UITextField, look into setting the autocorrectionType property to UITextAutocorrectionNo to disable caching. Set UITextField to OFF to prevent caching altogetherAdd an enterprise policy to clear the keyboard dictionary at regular intervals. This can be done by the end user by simply going to the Settings application, General &gt; Reset &gt; Reset Keyboard Dictionary
  32. It is recommended to use NSURLConnection along with canAuthenticateAgainstProtectionSpace. The syntax is shown on the screen
  33. To protect the authorization token when set in a cookie the application should be specifying the /secure directive. This will result in the application sending that specific cookie only over an HTTPS connection. In Java Servlet 3.0 or newer environment, secure cookie flag is enforced using a the web.xml configuration setting shown on screen
  34. Avoid local storage on the device.If local storage is required, encrypt data securelyData is encrypted on IOS and Android platform using several ways includingData Protection API (iOS)Keychain (iOS)Common Crypto (iOS)Sqlite (iOS &amp; Android)Java Crypto (Android)
  35. Please make a selection by clicking on the
  36. How well do you know your Data Center?How secure and resilient are your applications?Visibility TransparencyMeasurabilityControl AwarenessProactive
  37. How well do you know your Data Center?How secure and resilient are your applications?Visibility TransparencyMeasurabilityControl AwarenessProactive
  38. Rest-based API’s that provides feeds on power, cooling, physical security, etc..Ability to shift workloads to different geographical locations on physical security breachesEasy integration with SDDC softwareComplete Integration of the physical, environmental &amp; logical layers of cloud stack
  39. With great power comes great responsibility: Design considerations for mobile ApplicationProximity-based access controlMulti-factor authentication Location-aware access controlContext-based accessRemote app and data kill-switchSensitive credentials stored server sideConfigurable TTLSensitive cached data stored in encrypted volume(e.g keychain for IO.OS)