Case Study 2 Food Banks Canada Revisiting Strategy 2012 Gene Des.docx

Case Study 2 Food Banks Canada: Revisiting Strategy 2012*
Gene Deszca Tupper Cawsey School of Business and
Economics, Wilfrid Laurier University It had been five years
since Katharine Schmidt had taken over as Executive Director
of Food Banks Canada in late 2007. The organization had made
significant progress in that time. Donations of food and funds at
the national level were up substantially, strong and committed
staff members were now in place, the organization’s advocacy
activities for the hungry were being received positively and they
were becoming better known and respected for their work.
However, the reality was that they were still a small
organization when compared with the size of other national not-
for-profits, and the size of a number of the affiliate
organizations that they represented. There was so much that
needed to be done to address hunger issues in Canada. Were
they going about it in the best way and were they strategically
targeting the right sorts of activities? Schmidt may have
stimulated interest in the topic, but she wasn’t the only one
asking questions about “what next?” Five years seemed about
the right time for such a review. Food Banks Canada’s Board
and Member Council were generally very pleased with the
progress achieved under Schmidt’s leadership, but they too were
pondering what the organization’s next steps should be. The
Board had formally committed itself to conduct a strategic
review and develop a strategic plan for the 2012 to 2017 period.
As CEO, Schmidt knew the Board would look to her for
leadership on this matter The current federated structure offered
lots of potential, but Schmidt was troubled by how best to
reconcile the varying perspectives voiced by certain
stakeholders, particularly affiliated food banks. There had been
concerns raised privately regarding Food Banks Canada
expanding its strategic and operational roles, especially among
some of the large food banks. How should they strategically
address matters relative to food donations, fundraising, public

advocacy and capacity building at the member affiliate level?
What should be the roles of Food Banks Canada and what
should be the roles of the Provincial and Local affiliates? Were
they structured appropriately to deliver on these roles? Finally,
if changes needed to be made, how should Schmidt go about
managing them? What counted, of course, was the alleviation of
hunger for millions of people, not just the growth and health of
Food Banks Canada. As Schmidt reflected on their progress and
the options, she wondered “what recommendations should be
made to the Board and how should we approach the
implementation challenges?” Hunger in Canada The first food
bank in Canada opened its doors in 1981 in Edmonton, Alberta.
While food banks were originally intended to be a temporary
measure, the need for them continued—and in fact grew. Hunger
and poverty are inexorably interrelated and the number of
people visiting food banks in Canada on a regular basis has
continued to climb over the years. Almost 900,000 Canadians
were being assisted by food banks every month with 93,000
people accessing a food bank for the first time Food bank use
was 9% higher in 2010 than it was in 2009 and was the highest
level of food bank use on record 38% of those turning to food
banks are children and youth, 52% of households helped receive
social assistance and 18% have income from current or recent
employment 35% of food banks ran out of food during the
survey period as a result 55% of food banks cut back on the
amount of food provided to each household 79% of Canadians
believed that hunger was a problem in Canada† Though Canada
is a rich, developed country, hunger is a daily reality for a large
and growing number of citizens. The people helped include
families with children, employed people whose wages are not
sufficient to cover basic living essentials, individuals on social
assistance, and Canadians living on a fixed income, including
people with disabilities and seniors.‡ Programs run by food
banks that provide essential food and consumer care products
include soup kitchens (hot and cold meals), hamper and snack
programs, college- and university- based food programs for

poor students, and community kitchens and gardens. In addition,
the people who turn to food banks often need other types of
assistance. Some food banks have responded to such needs by
providing services such as skills training and job search
assistance, housing and childcare referrals, and community
advocacy. Most food banks and food programs depend heavily
on volunteers for much or all of their operational activities. In
fact, close to 50% of food banks are run solely by volunteers.
Their work is made possible through contributions from
individual donors, corporate sponsors, community support,
parent organizations, and Food Banks Canada. The issue of
hunger in Canada is being tackled predominantly through a
network of over 3000 + food agencies. All food banks in Canada
run independently with their own Boards of Directors and
charitable status. While the majority of food banks chose to be
part of the national organization—not all did. Eighty-five
percent of the individuals assisted by a food bank are assisted
through an affiliated organization to Food Banks Canada. Some
of the affiliated food banks, such as Daily Bread in Toronto or
the Greater Vancouver Food Banks Society were larger than
Food Banks Canada in terms of revenue, the volume of food
distributed, and staff levels, but the majority were smaller. Food
Banks Canada: History and Renewal§ The organization began as
a small group of local Canadian food banks that formed the
Canadian Association of Food Banks (CAFB) in 1987. The
original goal of the association was to better address household
food security by increasing public awareness, lobbying for
social policy change on behalf of food banks, and improving
access to food for those in need. Local food banks had existed
for years, but many had recognized that demand was increasing
and they needed to increase their coordination of efforts and to
deliver integrated messages across Canada on poverty and
hunger. Public awareness of the issues needed to be enhanced,
and many food banks wanted to increase their influence on
government policy. Further, many national food product
manufacturers and distributors asked for national systems for

the distribution of surplus food to Canadians struggling with
hunger. Some food bank managers believed efforts by the
national organization could increase the volume of food
available to agencies and provide for more efficient
coordination and distribution of the food to member agencies.
The formation of the Canadian Association of Food Banks was
seen as a step in this direction. The CAFB was governed by a
volunteer Board of Directors who were representatives from
food banks across Canada. Often the members of this group had
divided loyalties between what was best for the fight against
hunger in Canada and what was best for their home food bank.
By 2005, the majority of CAFB Board members believed that
the organization was failing to achieve what was possible.
Issues related to governance, vision, and mission dogged the
national organization. There appeared to be significant
challenges with coordination and integration of efforts across
the country. Awareness raising and policy lobbying activities
were not as effective as hoped. Donations to the national
organization appeared undeveloped. CAFB had inadequate
resources and uncertain objectives. The Board of the CAFB
recognized that change and revitalization were essential. It
conducted a strategic review in 2005–2006. After this review, it
voluntarily restructured itself (see Exhibit 2) and began the
process of rebranding of CAFB. The 2007 national board
governance model was designed to encompass broader skills
sets, be much more representative of local food banks, and
impartially pan-Canadian in its focus while having greater
autonomy for forward thinking and strategic implementation. As
a key part of their renewal agenda, the CAFB Board searched
for a new Executive Director and in the fall of 2007 hired
Schmidt. Her initial mandate was to lead the restructuring and
rebranding initiative, reenergize and guide the national
organization, and improve the resources at hand. The
organization was rebranded through this process from Canadian
Association of Food Banks to Food Banks Canada. By 2012, the
rebranding of the Canadian Association of Food Banks into

Food Banks Canada had made significant progress. Schmidt and
the Board had successfully reorganized its governance structure,
refocused the organization’s strategy, and hired a new staff
team to help her achieve a turnaround. The stated mission of
Food Banks Canada that was developed in 2007 was to meet the
short-term need for food and find long-term solutions to reduce
hunger.¶ As a result of the changes, Food Banks Canada had
increased its annual revenues from $1.0 million to over $4.6
million in donations, and delivered two times more donated
food per year to affiliated food banks than in 2007. In addition,
Food Banks Canada’s work in advocacy on hunger-related
issues had been advanced through their research, their annual
reports on food bank use, and expanded lobbying of the federal
government. These actions had heightened national awareness
and increased its influence with both the government and major
corporations involved with food. Positive media coverage that
accompanied the publication of these reports had played a
significant role in increased public awareness. By 2011, Food
Banks Canada had more fully developed a number of key
programs to advance its agenda. Three of the more significant
were: National Food Sharing System (NFSS)—this program
acquires and shares large industry donations of food and
consumer products and coordinates national-level and large-
scale food drives for the food bank network of more than 450
affiliate members across Canada. Hunger Count Reports—both
affiliated and non-affiliated members participate in these
research studies on the number of people accessing food banks.
These are published annually, distributed to the press and used
for government advocacy. Hunger Awareness Day—a national
initiative with food banks across the country participating,
which is designed to heighten public awareness of critical issues
related to food access and security for Canadians living on low
incomes. While Food Banks Canada had grown its profile and
was viewed by government and other important stakeholders as
a credible professional organization that was having a positive
impact, they wanted to do more to enhance their value to the

food bank community and the people they served. Direct work
on alleviating hunger was done directly by local food banks and
Schmidt pondered how best to assist them. In fact, the amount
of money and food raised by Food Banks Canada was relatively
small, when compared to the total amount of money donated to
and the total volume of food collected by local food banks.
Major food banks in Canada had more resources than the
national body and a few believed they were competing with
Food Banks Canada for donations and media attention in ways
that were not helpful to their mission. Katharine Schmidt
Schmidt saw her career path as one marrying her interest in
public service, food, and poverty issues. After a BA in Family
Studies, she spent ten years with the Ontario Ministry of
Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, culminating in
involvement with the Ministry’s strategic plan. Her work in
leadership development with rural groups prepared her to head
up a strategic initiative by the Ministry, seeking greater
cooperation among agricultural producers, food processors, food
distributors and retail channels for greater effectiveness within
the sector. A desire for personal change and development led
her to take a leave, and enroll in Wilfrid Laurier University’s
one-year MBA program. Upon graduation, she accepted
employment with the Canadian Federation of Independent
Grocers, on a one year secondment from the Ministry. This was
followed by a move to Food and Consumer Products Canada for
seven years. These seven years provided her with a broad
exposure to major firms, key influencers, and a heighted
awareness of the corporate side of the food sector. “It was a big
decision to leave government after 10 years. I believed it would
be a great experience to be able to work for a major national
industry advocacy group building on my experience with the
agri-food sector. Then, in 2004, I decided it was time for
another change—one that would allow me to apply my new
experience and contacts while getting back into helping people.
When the Food Bank of Waterloo Region was looking for a new
Executive Director, I jumped at the opportunity. While in that

role I began to really understand some the underlying causes of
hunger in Canada, I became aware of the need and importance
for a strong national organization that could advocate for
Canadians.” Schmidt’s work as Executive Director of the Food
Bank of Waterloo Region brought her directly into contact with
community needs related to household food security and access,
the food bank community, and the broader dynamics related to
the national food bank organization. She saw that a strong
national organization could provide leadership across the
country and that it could advocate with the federal government.
She was pleased with the decisions made by the membership of
CAFB at the 2006 annual general meeting to bring in a new
governance structure and new Board as steps to strengthen the
organization. The new Board of the national organization hired
Schmidt because of her successful performance as Executive
Director of the Food Bank of Waterloo Region and her
performance while working with Food and Consumer Products
Canada and earlier agencies and industry groups. Food Banks
Canada: A Federated Structure As part of the strategic initiative
of 2006, the Board of Food Banks Canada adopted a new
federated governance structure. The Canadian Association of
Food Banks (CAFB) had been an affiliation of independent food
banks run by representatives from each member food bank. As
one Board member recalled, “The governance issues facing the
CAFB were significant. As designed, each food bank affiliate
had a vote on major issues. Quebec had many more food banks
than any other province. That meant that Quebec had over a
thousand votes, Ontario had around 120 while Alberta had 2
votes, New Brunswick one and Nova Scotia one. Not only was
this not representative but it was almost unworkable.” Under the
new membership structure, rather than local food banks joining
Food Banks Canada directly, local food banks would join a
provincial association. Once they joined the provincial
association they would become affiliate members to Food Banks
Canada. The organization would seek input and involvement
from its membership by having each provincial association

identify two representatives who would be their nominees on
the Member Council. The Member Council was designed to help
ensure that the voices of food banks from across the country
were heard by the National Board, and vice versa. It was
intended that this body would play an important role in
facilitating communications and coordination between the
national organization and affiliated member organizations on
plans and programs being implemented across the country (see
Exhibit 2b). The 20 representatives on the Member Council
were drawn from the provincial bodies and affiliated food
banks. Many of the 20 representatives placed on Member
Council had been on the previous CAFB Board. Schmidt, as
CEO of Food Banks Canada (or her nominee) also sat on this
council. The new structure also had a reconstituted National
Board that focused on the strategy and governance of the
national body. The National Board initially had 16 members,
And participation on it shifted to individuals drawn from
corporate Canada, the food industry, and highly capable and
committed individuals with specific skills needed to advance
the interests of the national body (e.g., skills in finance, HR,
marketing, communications, strategy, and legal). In order to
have affiliate representation on the National Board, two
members were drawn from Member Council to serve on the
Board. The purpose of the reconstituted National Board was to
focus its attention on the advancement of the work of the
national organization, which they would be able to do with
increased independence, now that they were not there to simply
represent the issues of particular geographic areas (see Exhibit
2 and 2a). Moving Food Banks Canada Forward 2007–2012
Schmidt set out to build an effective management team. From
January 2008 to January 2012 she first reduced staff from five-
and-a-half full-time equivalent to two and one half. Then, over
a period of three years, she added eleven- and-a-half full-time
energetic, talented individuals committed to the food bank cause
(see Exhibit 3). Concurrent with the hiring of key personnel,
Schmidt led the rebranding effort. The name “Canadian

Association of Food Banks” implied a collectivity with little
central purpose or coordination. The new brand, captured by the
new name, Food Banks Canada, became critical to increasing
visibility with corporate partners and to symbolize the shift in
strategic direction. In early 2007, Food Banks Canada had little
visibility with the public or even the food industry. At that
time, all food banks strove for visibility and wanted to become
the recognizable representative for food and hunger in their
respective areas. While Food Banks Canada had complimentary
goals as that of the local organizations, some local food banks
perceived it as a competitor for recognition and attention, and
resources. Schmidt and the Board believed that their rebranding
initiative had met with some success. This was supported by an
independent branding study they had commissioned, but the
data showed it represented an ongoing challenge. When
affiliates marketed their activities under different names it
added to the confusion in the public’s mind as to who was doing
what when it came to providing food for those living in poverty.
If you were in Toronto, you would see the Food Banks Canada
logo but also that of Daily Bread Food Bank, North York
Harvest, and Fort York Food Bank. If you were in Minto,
Ontario, Food Banks Canada could be perceived to be
competing with the Minto Community Resources Centre, and so
on. This natural tension between needing to promote local needs
versus creating broader national awareness was often a source
of conflict. Some independent food banks’ staff questioned
whether they wanted Food Banks Canada to be the brand name
for hunger relief and what the benefit was to them. In addition
to talent building and rebranding, Schmidt spent time food
raising and developing systems to collect and distribute food
from national donors. When for example, Kraft Canada phoned
and said “We have 70 skids of a product for you if you pick
them up today,” Food Banks Canada needed the trucking
capacity to pick up the goods and then a fair system of
distribution of those goods to local food banks. Further, these
systems had to be acceptable to member food banks, address

risks in the food safety area, and minimize any waste that
occurred due to inefficient food handling. As one Food Canada
representative said; “a system was in place, but it was poorly
and ineffectively run. There were delays, and perhaps, a lack of
professionalism and expertise. At the same time, I would say
that, before the spike in gas prices in 2008-09, free
transportation was much more available to us, particularly via
trucking companies.” As a result of problems in this area, the
organization developed and implemented training programs on
food safety and handling that it operated nationally for people
working in food banks, particularly those from small agencies.
In 2011, this was the only program that Food Banks Canada
operated that was directly supported by federal government
money. While training provided part of the reason for the
improvement in food quality and quantity, a great deal of the
credit went to strengthened relationships with national food
companies and new, sophisticated systems for the collection and
redistribution of food donated at the national level. Schmidt
spent significant time food and fundraising. In 2009, Food
Banks Canada initiated a partner program for corporate
donors.** As a result, the amount of food raised at the national
level grew from 7 million pounds in 2008 to 14 million pounds
in 2011.†† A member of the leadership team stated, “National
and even international corporations want to work with an
organization that can handle food at the national level. Affiliate
members want Food Banks Canada to coordinate things better
and help them, but they also wanted to retain their autonomy
and manage corporate relationships on their own.” While
progress had been achieved with food supply, progress had also
been made in fundraising and related systems and procedures.
The Director of Development and Partnerships observed: “When
I started my role at Food Banks Canada there were no policies
or systems. There were a few large, supportive companies with
10 to12 of them giving $10,000 to $12,000 each. Now there are
40 to 50 firms with some giving as much as $50,000 to
$100,000. One company’s contribution is $250,000 per year”

(see Exhibit 4 for a summary of their financial position). In
2011, Food Banks Canada affiliate members’ food banks
provided direct services to 85% of the people accessing
emergency food programs nationwide. The food and money
supplied to them by Food Banks Canada totaled 7% (or 15
million pounds out of 200 million pounds of food) with the
remainder coming from food or fundraising initiatives at the
local or, to a much lesser extent, provincial level. Role of
Provincial Bodies By 2012 each of the ten provinces had a
provincial association, though these varied widely in their level
of development. A few provincial bodies had yet to obtain their
charitable status from the government and some had little to no
permanent staff. A key challenge Food Banks Canada faced was
to identify a strong case for the support of the work of certain
provincial bodies by donors. Food Banks Canada had a protocol
in place when it engaged with donors to ask them to provide
support at all three levels (local, provincial, national). However,
they were finding that national donor organizations preferred to
give nationally or locally, and were less interested in donating
to provincial bodies. Where to Now? Results of the Member
Survey‡‡ In the winter of 2011, 410 Canadian food banks were
surveyed. One hundred and seventy four surveys were
completed and analyzed by an independent survey research
firm. Seventy-eight percent of respondents were either a
member of a food bank Board, the executive director, or a
manager of a food bank. The survey reported that Food Banks
Canada was well known and well regarded by Canadian Food
Banks. Ninety-three % of respondents reported that Food Banks
Canada provided value in the fight against hunger in Canada
and 79% reported that their organizations received direct
support from Food Banks Canada. In general, respondents felt
that provincial food bank associations were performing well.
Eighty-two percent said they were satisfied with the
performance of the provincial associations. Their value lay in
direct help and in representing food issues to others. Larger
food banks were less likely to say they were “very satisfied”

with provincial associations. Of concern was the fact that 19%
of respondents reported that Food Banks Canada provided little
direct value to them. Those representing communities over
100,000 people saw the least amount of value in Food Banks
Canada to their organizations. Raising awareness of the hunger
issue in Canada, at all levels, was viewed as the top priority,
with 43% of respondents choosing raising awareness of the
hunger issue in their community as number one. This was
followed by raising awareness of the work the food bank
community does and developing fundraising campaigns in their
communities. The top priority for Food Banks Canada, while
still clear, was more debatable. Raising awareness of the hunger
issue in Canada was chosen as top priority by 29% of
respondents, followed by acquiring large-scale donations and
federal government advocacy. For the most part, program
participants were satisfied with the programs/activities Food
Banks Canada offered, and in particular, they valued their
participation in and use of HungerCount, Hunger Awareness
Day, and National Corporate programs. Some programs had
high awareness but low participation. More than half said they
were aware of but had never participated in programs/activities
like the Community Kitchen Fund or the National Membership
Conference. Respondents used the Food Banks Canada
newsletters and HungerCount and Hunger Awareness Day
materials but did not use the Online Resource Centre as much.
While respondents reported that they did not use nutrition
materials much, those materials were identified as the top
priority for new tool development. More materials on
fundraising and public service announcements were also
wanted. Client story books received the least amount of support.
Exhibit 5 reports on the top priorities identified in the survey.
Strategic Choices Being Considered Members of the Food
Banks Canada leadership team differed in where they thought
the organization should focus. One member of the leadership
team commented: “Over the next five years it will be critical
that we increase our efforts advocating at the federal level.

Capacity building within the Canadian food bank community is
also vital to ensure food is getting to those who need it most,
but we also need to maintain and enhance food acquisition and
distribution activities.” This focus reflected her belief that
“food donation programs with bigger organizations lent
themselves to being institutionalized and systematized and were
effectively underway, potentially freeing some resources for
other critical activities.” However, she recognized that such a
shift was not without risks and needed to be managed carefully,
so that donors did not feel ignored or undervalued. Another
member of the Leadership Team pointed out the challenges of
funding the future priorities based on donor interest and
preferences: For the foreseeable future, the organization needs
to be involved in both advocacy and food and fundraising,
including donations in-kind such as transportation services to
distribute food. Food is substantive and donors are often
interested in supporting food acquisition and sharing. We find
that policy development, research and government advocacy is a
more difficult “sell” to donors. Over 10 years, we might build
up an individual donor base interested in giving to a national
organization doing advocacy. But we are a long way from that.
With limited resources, and donors being interested in some
parts of our mandate more than in others areas, it will be
difficult as we move forward. A third perspective from another
member of Food Banks Canada’s leadership team believed that:
“If Food Banks Canada is going to maintain legitimacy, it has to
be seen as an organization that is about getting food to people.
It has to protect the charitable aspect of the food bank network
from getting lost in a social justice debate,§§ but at the same
time maintain an appropriate level of advocacy.” As a result
Food Banks Canada needed to be seen as raising food and
putting it in the hands of those in need, while retaining its
commitment to provide a focus on policy and legislative change.
Advocacy needed “to be approached in ways that do not alienate
corporate and political figures. As he put it, “Poking one’s
finger in another’s eye is not likely to produce support for one’s

cause.” He further believed that Food Banks Canada’s current
model was sustainable. The Board The current Food Banks
Canada National Board had 16 members, including two
representatives from provincial member food banks. The other
14 members were well connected with food producers and
government and had demonstrated their commitment, in part,
through their past contributions. Board members received no
compensation and all were asked to make a financial
commitment to Food Banks Canada, according to their means.
Board membership required a significant time commitment
which all members honored. They were well balanced in their
diversity of skills and backgrounds (accounting, finance,
marketing, communications, human resources, legal, business,
and nonprofit) and geographic representation. The general
sentiment of National Board members, national staff members,
and most of the affiliated organizations that were on the
Member Council, was that the National Board had developed
into a hardworking, well prepared, competent, independent, and
highly collegial group. Schmidt attended all Board and Board
committee meetings but was not a voting member of the Board.
Robin Garrett, elected in 2006 to the Board, became its Chair in
2011. She had a long involvement with the national organization
and its predecessor, beginning in the late 1990’s when she was
with the Food and Consumer Products Manufacturers
Association. She had 16 years of management experience
working with national and regional organizations and was
currently the President and CEO, Tourism Partnership of
Niagara. Garrett believed that Food Banks Canada had come a
long way but needed a stronger national presence to exercise
influence and attract resources: “The most successful federated
not-for-profits, in my belief, are those that have a strong
national organization, with clear roles throughout the
organization—from the front- line operators, through to the
provincial organizations, with the national organization on top.
It is about aligning and coordinating work, allocating and
maximizing resources so we can give back maximally.” Garrett

observed that the roles within the food bank community were
developing but that a shared understanding and agreement was
not yet fully developed. There was some discomfort at the
provincial level as to their roles and ability to deliver on
assigned roles. She noted that there were a couple of very
strong provinces (Nova Scotia and Quebec), but there were
others that were weak and some that had very little
infrastructure. In addition, food banks across the country varied
tremendously in their sophistication. Garrett believed the above
factors created anxiety over roles and concerns related to the
livelihood of paid staff members at the local and provincial
levels. These factors also gave rise to some resentment in larger
member organizations over the emergence of a strong national
body, and the power shift that this entailed. This, in turn,
created a real risk of turf wars. When it came to fundraising and
food raising campaigns, Garrett felt that the food banks needed
a common message, with Food Banks Canada playing both a
lead and coordinating role. You get better bang for your buck
when there is a clear national campaign focusing on people in
need. We can share resources and materials. There are 500 food
banks all doing fundraising campaigns. Can you imagine the
effectiveness gains and the savings that would be possible, if we
combined and integrated our efforts though a national
campaign? Food Banks Canada needs to launch national
campaigns. We need to go after national corporate donors for
such national campaigns. The message and materials need to be
developed nationally and then used at the local levels, with
Food Banks Canada synchronizing the campaigns. Wow, now all
Canadians would hear the same message. Wouldn’t it be
wonderful if there were a single web site for food banks where
money is raised? However, this was not a sentiment shared by
some of the strong food bank members and this expressed itself
in resentment over Food Banks Canada ramping up national
activities in some of these areas. They saw these as an intrusion
on provincial and local food bank responsibilities, where there
was a desire to own the direct connection with donors and the

delivery system. One of the side effects of this was that donor
lists developed by local food banks were not readily shared.
There were significant differences in systems and resources
among local food banks, which pointed to the need for capacity
building at the local and in some cases, provincial levels.
Garrett wondered if there needed to be different approaches to
service delivery, so that the smaller food banks could be
directly supported by the larger, more sophisticated bodies.
Once again, the issue was one of alignment. In the end she
believed that Food Banks Canada had to create initiatives in the
advocacy, food raising, fundraising, and capacity building areas
that demonstrated how it could add value to all, if roles were
clarified and aligned. Brian Fraser, appointed to the Board in
2009 and now Vice Chair, was a corporate lawyer and partner
with Gowlings, a major law firm. Fraser was asked for
assistance by Food Banks Canada on a branding issue. Pro bono
work, combined with a deep interest in what the national
organization was attempting to accomplish, along with exposure
to Schmidt, led to his recruitment to the National Board. Fraser
believed that the transformation of Food Banks Canada, and
even the Board, could be traced to the effectiveness of Schmidt
as the Executive Director. He stated that she had played a
constructive role in board member recruitment and had been
instrumental in building this strong and independent board,
providing it with excellent support while at the same time
welcoming careful critical assessment, and independent thought.
Fraser reported that a key risk area was the potential that
Schmidt might leave and the need to prepare for her successor.
He believed good progress had been made in the relationship
with the Member Council and with large food banks, such as
Toronto’s Daily Bread Food Bank. Given the small size and
limited resource base of Food Banks Canada, it had to
continually work to build its brand as the national “go to”
organization in matters related to hunger. One risk area he
mentioned was the competition in fundraising from non-
affiliated agencies who sought to raise money and food

contributions for the hungry. He believed that while some of
these were well intentioned, others were questionable as to
motive. As well, they created the risk for fragmentation
occurring in the food bank community. As for the future
strategic direction, Fraser’s view was that advocacy efforts,
which were currently at an early stage of development, should
receive increased attention. Capacity building of less capable
local food banks was the second priority that needed action,
because it would bring value directly to the food bank
community. Finally raising food and money continued to be
important because it was an ongoing challenge to keep the
attention and interest of food manufacturers, knowing what they
were looking for, and feeding their agenda in ways that were
also consistent with Food Bank Canada’s agenda. Fraser stated
that Food Banks Canada needed to be seen as an effectively run
national organization in order to appeal to the corporate
audience. Member Council Perspective The Member Council
representatives offered somewhat different perspectives on what
Food Banks Canada’s focus should be. One member who
expressed serious concern for the future direction was Dianne
Swinemar, Executive Director of Feed Nova Scotia. Swinemar
led one of the strongest provincial bodies and she was of the
belief that the role of those weak provincial bodies was in
urgent need of strengthening. Swinemar was hired in 1991 by
what was then a metro-based food bank operating in and around
Halifax. As such, its approach was similar to that of the much
bigger Daily Bread Food Bank in Toronto, Ontario. In 2002,
Nova Scotia food bank members met and restructured
themselves around a strong provincial model, placing Feed
Nova Scotia in the lead role and Swinemar as the CEO. They
rebranded themselves, took on a 24/7 help line, and took on
fund, food, and awareness raising for the province as a whole.
As a result of these changes, the effectiveness of these services
in Nova Scotia improved significantly. Swinemar believed this
was because the communities, donors, and smaller food banks
understood why these changes made sense. Swinemar had

played a leading role when Food Banks Canada restructured
itself, chairing the transition team at the time. She felt progress
had been made but she was also of the view that the current
National Board and staff were still really struggling to have
their actions match the vision identified at the time of Food
Banks Canada’s restructuring. Swinemar believed that the
missing ingredient was strong provincial organizations to
coordinate activities, and she did not believe Food Banks
Canada could successfully provide service and support to 400–
500 member agencies with such different levels of
sophistication. With the exception of Nova Scotia and Quebec,
Swinemar believed the provincial organizations had not
developed into the bodies envisioned at the time of the
reorganization and that Food Banks Canada was not
championing and supporting their evolution. It was her sense
that politics might be getting in the way of them integrating
their efforts in order to provide leadership and logistical
support and other ingredients needed to enable local
organizations and their volunteers to effectively deliver
services. She concluded that Food Banks Canada found it easier
to send messages and work directly with the front line, rather
than work with and build the capacity of the provincial bodies.
As a result, many provincial bodies were weak and some had no
staff and were barely on life support. Swinemar saw Canada as a
mosaic and believed that it would always be an uphill struggle
for Food Banks Canada to really become a vibrant national
organization, if it did not possess strong provincial arms. Wendi
Campbell, head of Food Bank of Waterloo Region and a
representative on the Member Council, was a trained and
experienced manager. After graduating from university with a
degree in English, she coordinated events for the Special
Olympics program in south-west Ontario and from there found
employment with the Food Bank of Waterloo Region in 1999.
When the executive director of her organization ran for
parliament in 2004, she met Schmidt who had been recruited as
the new Executive Director. Campbell reported that she had

enjoyed working with Schmidt and had learned a great deal
from her. Both recognized that Campbell lacked accounting and
finance skills and at the urging of Schmidt, Campbell enrolled
in the Laurier MBA program, graduating in 2008. When
Schmidt left the Food Bank of Waterloo Region, Campbell was
appointed the Executive Director. She saw her organization as a
high performing one, in part due to the governance structure
that had evolved over the years. It had an effective board that
was very policy oriented and a culture that promoted innovation
and risk taking. She noted that small food banks were
challenged to find the capacity to do things and their structure
and boards were often not up to the challenge. Campbell was
concerned with how to develop the capacity in these small food
banks. Campbell believed the changes implemented in 2005–
2006 had created a platform that had made the revival and
revitalization of the national body possible. Campbell had been
on the Board of Canadian Association of Food Banks when the
decision was made to refocus on the strategy, restructure, and
rebrand, and had been very supportive of Schmidt’s
appointment as Food Banks Canada’s Executive Director.
Campbell saw several positive changes as a result of these
decisions: As a local food bank, I am able to take Food Banks
Canada’s campaigns and use their messaging to help achieve my
goals. There is a major halo effect I can use and rely on. I don’t
see them as competing for resources, though some food banks
do. If Food Banks Canada gets funding from national
organizations that had previously funded me, I see that as a
corporate decision, not Food Banks Canada taking from me.
Many food banks don’t have the capacity to think that way.
They lack the resources. As an example of what Food Banks
Canada can do, I watched the last show of Oprah. Suddenly on
the show was an ad from Food Banks Canada. Amazing! This
was a new campaign, a new target market, and a move into
prime time awareness, going after a new demographic. Food
Banks Canada elevates the fight for food awareness to a new
level. Campbell was well aware of the issues and challenges

between some of the provincial associations and Food Banks
Canada. She believed that the challenges stemmed from the
diversity of sophistication of the provincial associations and the
varying ways that each province wanted Food Banks Canada to
interact with its food banks. Nova Scotia had a strong
provincially oriented governance structure and did not need
Food Banks Canada to go directly to the local food banks. They
believed that they should be the main contact and control point,
and should not be bypassed. In contrast, Saskatchewan had a
more loosely organized provincial association and a larger land
base and were supportive of Food Banks Canada having direct
interaction and support to their local food banks. However,
when it came to service delivery, Campbell preferred a regional
focus: There is some resistance now over what has happened
with Food Banks Canada. It seems there is some pressure to
return to a more provincially oriented model. Instead of this, we
need to focus on increasing the capacity of local food banks by
how they are linked with better resourced regional bodies.
Where to Next? Schmidt pondered the strategic choices facing
the organization. There were two main thrusts: providing access
to more food (through food/fundraising) and engaging in
research and advocacy. Should they continue to do what they
were currently doing, focus more on one of the areas, or were
there other things they should be doing? Schmidt had been
trying to position Food Banks Canada as an honest broker of
information and she also wanted to position the organization as
a solution provider. Schmidt noted that she believed that most
poverty groups had not been influential on issues that mattered
to them because they had taken a too aggressive activist
approach to advocacy and had turned off both senior levels of
government and the corporate sector. If Food Banks Canada was
to push policy change in the wrong way, there was the risk that
they would not get the ear of the federal and provincial
governments. However, hunger and poverty were growing in
Canada and becoming more pressing every day, suggesting that
concerted action was needed. Should Food Banks Canada stay

its current course in the advocacy area or should they approach
it differently? Could Food Banks Canada develop a reasoned
approach that others could and would buy into, which would
help significantly with the problems of poverty? Food Banks
Canada had also been doing some capacity building with local
food banks. Was this an area that deserved more of the national
organization’s energy? Some provincial bodies were struggling
to show that they added value. How might Food Banks Canada
work with them to find joint solutions? Schmidt knew that the
Board wanted to revisit and recalibrate where to focus the
strategy going forward. Board members felt good about the
progress that had been made, but there were important issues as
well as resource constraints. What advice should she give them
concerning the “where do we go next” question? What should be
their focus as they looked to the next 3–5 years? And how could
Schmidt recruit stakeholders (see Exhibit 6) to a single vision
when they all had strong ideas about what the national
organization should do? Exhibit 1 Historical Overview of Food
Banks Canada Exhibit 2 Organizational Structure Exhibit 2a
Food Banks Canada National Structure Exhibit 2b Food Banks
Canada National Structure: Member Council Note: Food Banks
Canada provides secretarial support (clerical and administrative
duties) for the Member Council and its committees, including
drafting of minutes, maintaining records, maintaining intranet
site, etc. Exhibit 3 Food Banks Canada Organizational
Structurel * French language skills Exhibit 4 Food Banks
Canada Summary Financial Information 2010 and 2011 Exhibit
5 Top Priorities Identified by the Food Bank Community
Exhibit 6 Stakeholder Overview
Solvencia Statistics485095050950Summer 2019Source: CEIC
Data - Summer 2019COUNTRY RISK
ANALYSISVIETNAM2003200420052006200720082009201020
1120122013201420152016Real GDP4.00%3.90%7.09%8.44%-
6.59%-7.05%-
0.69%0.69%3.45%4.00%5.13%6.10%2.30%ADOMESTIC

ECONOMY2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201
5201620172018GDP deflator %
change12.00%6.00%7.55%10.53%14.29%18.06%5.88%5.56%8.
42%11.65%11.30%11.72%15.38%DOMESTIC ECONOMY (
constant prices
)12.00%16.00%15.52%32.84%17.98%16.19%10.66%9.63%12.1
6%11.45%17.30%22.12%29.43%Nominal GDP ( local currency
billion
)57,786.8366,500.0877,314.8399,132.85106,025.57115,955.771
35,530.35155,820.01171,226.57186,207.59193,424.81205,300.4
0223,783.60245,215.77Nominal GDP %
change5.00%15.08%16.26%28.22%6.95%9.37%16.88%14.97%9
.89%8.75%3.88%6.14%9.00%9.58%20032004200520062007200
820092010201120122013201420152016Nominal GDP ( lc
billion
)50,00053,00057,00063,00072,00085,00090,00095,000103,0001
15,000128,000143,000165,000Real GDP ( local currency billion
)7.556.987.135.665.406.426.245.255.425.986.686.216.816.60Re
al GDP % GDP2474-7-7-4-1-1Domestic demand % change0286-
10-2-6-1-1Private consumption % change121311-64-100Public
consumption % change3111-8-11-3-3-2-2Gross fixed capital %
change82174-16-18-14-13-13Change in stockbuilding % GDP-
2-6-20-2-1-411Exports of goods and services %
GDP101912192-333Imports of goods and services %
change312221059-1011Change in net foreign balance %
GDP11-4-30-3400Real GNP ( lei billion
)688716764795741681653645645Real GNP % change1474-7-8-
4-1-1Real GDP growth rate %3.00%-7.55%2.15%-20.62%-
4.59%18.89%-2.80%-15.87%3.24%10.33%11.71%-
7.04%9.66%-3.08%Nominal GDP %
change232148455013036374646Real GDP
Index10392.45102.1579.3895.41118.8997.2084.13103.24110.33
111.7192.96109.6696.92Nominal GDP
Index105115.08116.26128.22106.95109.37116.88114.97109.891
08.75103.88106.14109.00109.58GDP
deflator101.94124.48113.82161.52112.1091.99120.25136.65106

.4498.5792.99114.1799.40113.06GDP deflator %
change1.94%24.48%13.82%61.52%12.10%-
8.01%20.25%36.65%6.44%-1.43%-7.01%14.17%-
0.60%13.06%Exchange
Rate1,0001,0251,0351,0651,1001,1751,3501,6501,95020202040
207021252250Rate of ER
depreciation5.3%2.5%1.0%2.9%3.3%6.8%14.9%22.2%18.2%3.6
%1.0%1.5%2.7%5.9%Nominal GDP ( $ billion
)57.7964.8874.7093.0896.3998.69100.3994.4487.8192.1894.829
9.18105.31108.98GDP4.23%4.85%9.15%9.77%10.24%2.14%-
0.70%2.82%4.11%3.36%5.03%6.06%6.86%-1.07%Nominal
GDP % change232148455013036374646Nominal GDP per
capita
$8,2559,06910,23712,50612,69612,74412,73511,76810,74811,0
8411,21011,53012,03812,250Deflator5%4%8%11%14%18%4%
3%5%7%13%12%14%15%BBALANCE of PAYMENTS ($
million)2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520
1620152018Trade Balance-1,130-411-1,577-2,494-4,000-
1,0501,0401,270300-500-1,500-4,000-3,850-2,500Merchandise
exports4,8826,1517,9108,0619,00010,50011,00012,00013,80014
00013500120001365013000586.1666666667Merchandise
imports-6,012-6,562-9,487-10,555-13,000-11,550-9,960-10,730-
13,500-14500-15000-16000-17500-155005.2781569966Balance
on Services, Income & Transfers-699-529-1,044-2,201-3,281-
2,107-75629403465-184-1,901-3,010-1,917Services & income
receipts8241,0081,4641,6521,4471,6292,2512,5942,7302,5902,7
692,2442,1502,750Exports of
services6978791,1301,1521,2861,5001,5711,7141,8001,7501,92
91,71415001850Interest
receipts12412031748614670650850900800800500600850Other
services & income
receipts291715155930303040403050500.1378571429Services &
income payments-1,737-1,832-3,133-4,448-5,197-4,352-3,077-
2,796-3,207-2,825-3,452-4,546-5,385-5,567Imports of services-
902-984-1,423-1,583-1,950-1,733-1,494-1,610-2,025-2,175-
2,250-2,400-2,625-2,325Interest payments-831-835-1,681-

2,831-3,197-2,460-1,433-1,006-992-450-802-1,646-2,235-
2,690Other services & income payments-4-12-29-33-50-160-
150-180-190-200-400-500-525-551Transfers,
net214295625594469616750830880700500400225900Private
transfers,
net103182320394269565600630630450400300125650Official
transfers,
net11111330520020051150200250250100100100250200320042
00520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016Curren
t Account-1,829-940-2,621-4,695-7,281-3,1579651,899703-35-
1,684-5,901-6,860-4,417Current Account-1829-940-2621-4695-
7281-31579651899703-35-1684-5967-6860-512.752Foreign
investment,
net144163966006421,9601,4801,6003,6501,8004704702501,400
20032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152
016Foreign Direct Investment (disbursed,
net)873414176005001,9001,4001,5003,50016503503503001250
-1130-411-1577-2494-4000-105010401270300-500-1500-4000-
3850750Portfolio equity investment, net-7375-
2101426080100150150120120-50150International financial
institutions137434-7-236-4502,1502,0005002525-150-
175301,250IMF0216-315-356-500850850250-75-75-75-100-
150850World Bank Group0100100006505005000-50-
50150250Other multilateral
creditors13711820812050650650200100100-25-2530150Paris
Club and other bilateral creditors8569348132-128-68-50-56-56-
65100150200150London Club956512777261,639-1,254-210-
297-300-3003501,0501,400380Credit flows70601222641139-
254-210-347-350-350200200100200Interest
arrears0000000000005080Short-term credits255055851,500-
1,00005050501508501250100Other private creditors (bond
markets)-4101,0001,500200-378-860-143-143-250-200-150-
150-250Resident lending abroad, net541-683430-
19481450929975975850825825-20-50Errors and omissions,
net15293-150-250-3505001001001000-250-350-500500Gold
reserve variation504206061798251,311786-367-1,242-150-

420870-906-144Reserves excluding gold (- = increase)734-520-
3341,9792,922-514-5,140-4,261-3,762-
1,9258092,3615,3061,081CEXTERNAL DEBT ($
million)2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520
1620172018Total External
Debt25,48526,10427,11128,31431,37732,79834,11633,54033,06
932,58632,08632,91134,39135,871Medium/Long term
debt25,23525,80426,75627,87429,43731,85833,17632,55032,02
931,49630,84630,82131,00132,351Short term
debt2503003554401,9409409409901,0401,0901,2402,0903,3403
,440Interest arrears0000000000005080Breakdown by creditor
:International financial
institutions18,55018,98418,97718,74118,29120,44122,44122,94
122,96622,99122,84122,66622,69623,946IMF3,5003,7163,4013,
0452,5453,3954,2454,4954,4204,3454,2704,1704,0204,870Worl
d Bank
Group8,5008,6008,7008,7008,7009,3509,8509,9009,9009,9009,
8509,8009,95010,200Other multilateral
creditors6,5506,6686,8766,9967,0467,6968,3468,5468,6468,746
8,7218,6968,7268,876Paris Club and other bilateral
creditors4,5854,6545,0025,1345,0064,9384,8884,8324,7764,711
4,8114,9615,1615,311London
Club1,5001,6202,2762,5834,7243,8633,6093,4493,1522,8522,65
23,7025,0525,352Medium/long
term1,2501,3201,9212,1432,7842,9232,6692,4592,1121,7621,41
21,6121,7121,912Short
term2503003554401,9409409409901,0401,0901,2402,0903,3403
,440Other private & institutional
creditors8508468561,8563,3563,5563,1782,3182,1752,0321,782
1,5821,4321,182DEXTERNAL ASSETS ($
million)2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520
1620172018Official Reserves excluding
gold9,63410,15410,4888,5095,5876,10211,24115,50219,26421,
18920,38118,01912,71311,6320000000000000Residents'
Deposits in International
Banks2502003005008501,200600500350350625625700850Gold

Reserves (in million
ounces)2.402.602.702.803.003.223.503.003.003.003.003.002.40
2.40Gold Reserve assets ($
million)1,2311,6512,2572,4363,2614,5725,3594,9923,7503,600
3,1804,0503,1443,000EDEBT SERVICE PAYMENT ($
million)2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520
1620172018Total debt servicing
obligations1680.81835.32880.94381.46147.35127.93899.93674.
23459.12751.12302.23045.64085.44940.3Interest payments
due830.81835.331680.882831.403197.322459.851432.871006.2
0992.07896.12802.151645.552235.422690.33Amortization paid
or
due85010001200155029502668246726682467185515001400185
02250FAMORTIZATION PAYMENTS
DUE2012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232
0242025Total principal repayments
due26682467185515001400185022502650235015601525115011
251075IMF00124200200250300350300200250250250300World
Bank
Group11810016219119325040045050050050025050100Other
multilateral
creditors400450280150172260250300350300300250250250Pari
s
Club500500250150185190300600850400250300350300London
Club950700565459500650750750000000Other private creditors
(bonds)700717474350150250250200350160225100225125GGL
OBAL ECONOMIC
DATA20052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201
620172018$ LIBOR (six-month,
average)1.26%1.20%3.20%6.00%4.19%2.50%1.20%1.00%1.00
%0.75%0.50%1.00%1.50%2.50%Gold Price
(US$/ounce)513635836870108714201531166412501200106013
5013101250Oil Price (Brent) in
$/barrel3041566672996279949649405275HGOVERNMENT
BUDGET200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152
01620172018(in LC

billion)2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520
1620172018Government
Revenues8950970011200122501125517393.365520329.5525233
73.00151600017125195502055033567.5428000Revenue895097
00112001225011255127501320013650160001712519550205502
220028000Government
Expenditures10401.629411970.014413916.669417843.91314550
185501355014000155501750034816.4658225502750036000Exp
enses9202.59540102601134014550185501355014000155501750
020880225502750036000BUDGET BALANCE-1452-
2270.0144-2716.6694-5593.913-3295-
1156.63456779.55259373.0015450-375-15266.4658-
20006067.54-
8000IINFLATION2005200620072008200920102011201220132
0142015201620172018Consumer price % change
average4.00%4.80%5.00%6.50%7.00%9.00%2.20%2.65%2.75%
6.00%6.50%8.00%8.00%9.50%JTRADE
DATA20052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201
620172018MERCHANDISE TRADE (total
trade)10,89412,71317,39718,61622,00022,05020,96022,73027,3
0028,50028,50028,00031,15028,500Total merchandise exports
($
million)4,8826,1517,9108,0619,00010,50011,00012,00013,8001
4,00013,50012,00013,65013,000Total merchandise imports ($
million)6,0126,5629,48710,55513,00011,5509,96010,73013,500
14,50015,00016,00017,50015,500Share of oil imports in total
imports25%25%27%30%29%31%34%38%40%40%35%32%30%
28%KPOPULATION20052006200720082009201020112012201
320142015201620172018Population
(million)77.1547.307.447.597.747.888.038.178.328.468.608.758
.90LCOUNTRY RISK RATINGS &
SPREADS20052006200720082009201020112012201320142015
201620172018EUROMONEY5558667074829510710087909011
5125INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR5355606570728590848084849598Secondary market
debt discount1518223542503525201815182235Spread over US

T Bill125145175225300450200175175150135145225350Spread
over US T
Bill125145175225300450200175175150135145225350MRisk
Indicators20052006200720082009201020112012201320142015
201620172018GDP (in US$ billion)Real GDP Growth rate (in
Local Currency)GDP Growth rate (in US$)GDP per capita
(US$)GDP per capita /dayRate of currency depreciationTrade
Balance (US$ million)External competitivenessTrade openness
ratio (X+M/GDP)Buddget Deficit-Surplus /GDP%Current
account/GDP
%NRATIOS2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201
5201620172018OSolvencyDebt/ExportsDebt/GDPReserves/Exte
rnal DebtShort-term Debt/Total
DebtPLiquidity2005200620072008200920102011201220132014
2015201620172018Principal Amortization/Exports %Net
Capital TransfersDebt servicing Ratio %Interest/Exports
%Reserves/Imports GS in %Reserves/Imports in Months
CoverageAverage external interest rate in %QCash-flow
ratio2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162
0172018Numerator:+ Official reserves assets including
Gold+XG&S+Undisbursed bank credits + Net transfers
)Denominator (debt service + MG&S + ST debt)Cash flow
ratio0.00Net Present Value of Future Debt
Repayment2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201
5201620172018201920202021202220232024202520262027Tota
l Amortization Each
Year8501000120015502950266824672668246718551500140018
502250000000000NPV (VAN) of future debt
repayments$25,825.00$24,825.00$23,625.00$22,075.00$19,125.
00$16,457.00$13,990.00$11,322.00$8,855.00$7,000.00$5,500.0
0$4,100.00$2,250.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.0
0$0.00$0.00CORRELATIONInflation/current account
deficitLIBOR/interest payments on foreign debtrisk
ratings/liquidity indicatorsrisk ratings/solvency
indicatorsSuggested GRAPHSInflationGDP real growthcurrent
account balanceCurrent Account/GDP %official reserve

assets/imports in monthsnominal debt
stockdebt/GDPDebt/ExportsDebt service/Exports of G&SCash-
flow ratioShort term Debt/Total debtShort term Debt/Reserve
assets
Solvencia Statistics
Solvencia- GDP and Inflation growth rates 2003-2016
GDP
Deflator
EX 1
Current Account
Exhibit 3: Solvencia- Current Account ($ million)
EX 2
Real GDP
GDP deflator % change
Solvencia- GDP Growth and Inflation rates
EX 3
Solvencia-Trade Balance in $ millions
2003-2016 (p)
EX 4
Official Reserves excluding gold
EX 5
Revenue
Expenses
Solvencia's Budget Gap
EX 6$25,825.00
850
2005
2005$24,825.00
1000
2006
2006$23,625.00
1200
2007
2007$22,075.00
1550
2008

2008$19,125.00
2950
2009
2009$16,457.00
2668
2010
2010$13,990.00
2467
2011
2011$11,322.00
2668
2012
2012$8,855.00
2467
2013
2013$7,000.00
1855
2014
2014$5,500.00
1500
2015
2015$4,100.00
1400
2016
2016$2,250.00
1850
2017
#REF!
2017
Liquidity - Country Risk Rating
Monthly Import Coverage
Euromoney Ranking
Exhibit 1: Correlation Between Solvencia's Euromoney Rating
and Liquidity
53
55

60
65
70
72
85
90
84
80
84
84
95
EX 7-1451.6294-2270.0144-2716.6694-5593.913-3295-
1156.63456779.55259373.0015450-375-15266.4658-
20006067.54
Inflation - Current Account Deficit Correlation
Inflation (%)
Current Account Deficit
Exhibit 2: Solvencia's Correlation Between Current Account
Deficit and Inflation
EX
82006200620072007200820082009200920102010201120112012
201220132013201420142015201520162016201720170.08
A Real GNP ( lei billion )
A Real GNP % change
A Nominal GDP % change
Real GDP Growth (RHS)
Inflation Rate (LHS)
Source: Solvencia National Bureau of Statistics
(%)
Exhibit 1: Inflation Rate and Real GDP Growth in Solvencia
2004-14
0.04
0.048
0.05
0.065
0.07

0.09
0.022
0.0265
0.0275
0.06
0.065
0.08
EX
910401.6294200511970.0144200613916.6694200717843.91320
08145502009185502010135502011140002012155502013175002
01434816.46582015225502016275002017
Government Revenue
Government Expenditure
Budget Deficit to GDP
Source: National Bureau of Statistics
(LC Bn)
Exhibit 2: Solvencia Goverment Revenue and Expenditure 2003-
2015
EX
10200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201
7
Exhibit 3: Current Account Deficit to GDP 2003-2015
EX
11200520052006200620072007200820082009200920102010201
12011201220122013201320142014201520152016201620172017
(LC Bn)
Exhibit 4: Solvencia's Net Errors & Omissions, and net
portfolio investment flows
2003-2015
Exhibit20051089410894200612713127132007173971739720081
86161861620092200022000201022050220502011209602096020
12227302273020132730027300201428500285002015285002850
02016280002800020173115031150
Debt to Export (RHS)
Debt to GDP (LHS)

Reserves to External Debt (LHS)
(LC Bn)
Exhibit 6: Solvencia's External Solvency Indicators 2003-15
18551500140018502250265023501560
Large bunching of debt repayments
(LC Bn)
Exhibit 5: Solvencia - Debt Principal Repayment Due 2010-17
20051089420061271320071739720081861620092200020102205
02011209602012227302013273002014285002015285002016280
00201731150
Debt Service Ratio (RHS)
Reserves to Monthly Import Coverage (LHS)
(Month)
Exhibit 7: Debt Service Ratio and Import Coverage 2003-15
513635836870108714201531166412501200106013501310
$ LIBOR (six-month, average)
LIBOR
Solvencia Interest Rate Payment
Exhibit 10: Correlation Between Solvencia's Interest Rate
Payment and LIBOR
53556065707285908480848495
Euromoney Rating - Solvency
Debt to Export Ratio
Euromoney Country Ranking
Exhibit 11: Correlation Between Solvencia's Solvency (Debt to
Export) and Euromoney Rating
10401.62942005200511970.01442006200613916.669420072007
17843.91320082008145502009200918550201020101355020112
01114000201220121555020132013175002014201434816.46582
015201522550201620162017
Government Revenue
Government Expenditure

(LC Bn)
2007
5,00%6,00%7,55%10,53%14,29%18,06%3,53%3,41%5,49%7,29
%12,62%12,07%13,85%14,86%
© CCMP – 2008- Solvencia : Country risk case study – Michel
Henry Bouchet – CERAM Business School- Global Finance
Center
1
Republic of Solvencia: Eurobond Request to Casino Bank
In The Face of Looming Crisis
This report is prepared in response to Casino Bank’s Board of
Directors’ request to
analyze Republic of Solvencia’s current and future country risk
situation, in relation to a
US$500 million sovereign bond issuance.
Based on our analysis, we believe that Solvencia is on the
verge of a looming

economic crisis with a large trade and current account deficit,
mounting external financing
requirements, high reliance on short-term floating rate debt,
lower debt servicing ability,
hence deteriorating creditworthiness. Therefore, rejecting the
request to underwrite the
Solvencia’s Eurobond is the best option for Casino Bank.
However, we might still underwrite Solvencia’s Eurobond
issuance, if the Government
of Solvencia provides its gold reserves as collateral. This
arrangement would create a win-win
opportunity for Solvencia and the investor community, while
mitigating the risk of
intermediation for Casino Bank.
I- Country Profile and Political Background
Solvencia is a country of roughly 18 million people, with a
rising but still low GDP per
capita of around US$1500. It went through a long struggle for
independence that ended in
1962. Gradual political reforms in the 1990s resulted in the
establishment of a bicameral
legislature in 2002. However, the political climate remains
rather volatile, social upheaval leads
to frequent mass demonstrations, and accusations of corruption
and unfair privatization
programs, frequently followed by harsh repression.
The opposition movement gained momentum to promote
institutional reforms in the

aftermath of the severe economic crisis that hit Solvencia in
2007, paving the way for
IMF/World Bank intervention. The IFIs imposed the
implementaion of a structural adjustment
program, including stabilizing the public accounts, controllng
domestic consumption and
encouraging exports, shrinking the balance of payments deficit,
as well as promoting political
normalization and good governance.
The economic recovery program led to substantial results.
Foreign direct investment flows
increased. Euromoney and Institutional Investor improved
Solvencia’s country risk ranking in
the mid-2000s. However, recent developments show that
Solvencia’s weak governance is a real
impediment to sustainable development. Rating agencies
recently downgraded Solvencia’s
country ranking.
Overall, our report concludes that there is no significant
improvement in Solvencia’s
commitment to implement deeply rooted institutional reforms
and to strengthen its efforts
towards fighting corruption and reaching sustainable
development.
II- Background: Economic Crisis in 1999-2009 and Recovery
Solvencia’s economic crisis was caused by several internal

structural weaknesses and
external factors. The main problems include exchange rate
overvaluation, growing financing
requirements due to a twin budget and external deficit, and
excessive debt burden. Deep
domestic imbalances led to a severe financial crisis in 2000 that
was triggered by the rise in
international interest rates and the spillover effect from the
Asian Crisis.
In the late 1990s, rigid exchange rate management has led to
worsening external
competitiveness (combined effect with skyrocketing inflation),
and excessive import reliance
which created large trade and current account deficits.
Overvalued exchange rate created three
Center
2
problems for Solvencia.
1. First, Solvencia lost its external competitiveness, because the
rate of currency
depreciation at that time was not enough to match rising
domestic prices. Export growth slowed
down while imports increased. Dynamic domestic demand led to
a mounting trade deficit.
2. The second problem was triggered by poor external debt

management. During the
period of 1999-2001, the period where Solvencia dragged down
into the crisis, Solvencia faced
US$ 3.7 billion of maturing external loans, almost three times
higher than the amount due
during the period of 1996-1998. This concentration of debt
payments and growing current
account deficit led to very large financing requirements that
could not be matched by new debt
and foreign investment. Consequently, official reserves dropped
by US$ 2.9 billion.
3. Besides structural weaknesses, Solvencia was also hit by
external factors which include
the rise in international interest rates and the spillover effect of
the Asian Crisis. The rise in
international interest rate has caused increasing interest
payments, especially from commercial
banks and private creditors due to floating interest rate
contracts. Solvencia had to pay US$ 2.1
billion of interest during 1999-2001, which is more than double
the interest payments during
1996-1998. External liquidity deterioration was amplified by
the spillover effect from Asian
Crisis, leading to capital flight. Cumulative Errors & Omissions
in the capital account reached
US$750 million in the three years 1998, 1999 and 2000.
The impact of the crisis itself was very harsh. Real GDP growth
(in Local Currency term)
dropped by 10% and 13% in 2000 and 2001, respectively.
Inflation skyrocketed to 115% at the
peak of the crisis in 2000, while the exchange rate depreciation
did not keep pace with

domestic prices. Current account deficit thus reached an all time
high of US$ 6.3 billion in 2000,
which pushed Solvencia to rely on its official reserves for
financing the deficit. Consequently,
international reserve assets dropped by US$840 million during
the year 2000.
The liquidity crisis led Solvencia to request a Standby
Arrangement (SBA) loan from the
IMF. The IMF intervention was necessary to strengthen the
official reserves and to restore the
investors’, creditors’ and trade partners’ confidence in
Solvencia. With strong support from the
US Treasury and France’s Direction du Trésor, the IMF
provided urgent cash injection of
US$ 500 million in 2000, and this was followed by another US$
250 million emergency loan in
the following year. The World Bank itself provided a US$650
million structural adjustment loan
in 2001. The Bank’s intention was to enhance the impact of the
IMF intervention and to provide
a social safety net to mitigate the severity of the stabilization
program. However, the loans
were not a “free lunch”. To be able to withdraw the financing,
Solvencia had to implement the
IFIs’ strict conditionality, i.e., a genuine shock therapy.
Devaluation of currency, liberalization of domestic economy,
and privatization of state
owned enterprise were the main IMF recipes. Devaluation of
currency has helped Solvencia
improve the current account position, through the J-Curve

pattern, while liberalization and
privatization aimed to attract foreign investors in Solvencia. As
a result, exports jumped in
2002, imports declined and the trade surplus reached US$1
billion, the first surplus after six
years of deficits! All in all, in 2002, the current account
position turned to positive territory,
international reserves increased, thus restoring Solvencia’s
creditworthiness.
Center
3
-10,0%
-8,0%
-6,0%
-4,0%
-2,0%
0,0%
2,0%
4,0%

6,0%
8,0%
10,0%
12,0%
-30000
-25000
-20000
-15000
-10000
-5000
0
5000
10000
15000
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
2015
(%
)
Source: Solvencia National Bureau of Statistics

Exhibit 1: Inflation Rate and Real GDP Growth in Solvencia
2004-14
Inflation Rate (LHS) Real GDP Growth (RHS)
III- The Country’s Potential (positive points)
Solvencia offers some positive elements that could lead to
economic and investment
opportunities and/or potentials. Amongst are the following:
Reforms being undertaken: After declaring its independence in
1962 the Republic of
Solvencia has undertaken a path of gradual reforms and
development. This improvement gave
birth to more liberal regulations: a bicameral legislature was
established in 2002.
Under the aegis of the IMF and World Bank, Solvencia carried
out normalization of
political system and efforts towards improvement of governance
starting in 2003.
International Institutions Monitoring: International community
encouraged the
Government to undertake structural economic and institutional
reforms in order to overcome
the obstacles to sustainable development and foreign investment
inflows. Governance
improvement, however, seems very fragile.

An open economy: Solvencia’s trade openness ratio is rather
large. By reducing
domestic demand and enhancing competitiveness, the country
could boost its export potential
and move to sustainable current account surplus. Trade and
services sectors can have a
positive impact on the country’s future economic performance,
given their linkages with other
economic activities.
Increase in FDI: As a result of the sale of a mobile telephone
license and partial
privatization of the state-owned telecommunication company,
Solvencia benefited from large
amount of FDI after 2000. These non-debt creating capital
inflows finance the current account,
contribute to economic and employment dynamism, while
promoting technology transfers.
Growing agricultural sector: Agriculture is a very important
part of the country’s
economy. While facing structural and institutional problems
with modernizing the industry,
favourable climate and good harvesting conditions resulted in
the improvement of GDP growth
since the crisis.
Dynamic (but not sustainable) economic momentum:
Solvencia’s robust
economic performance had a positive effect on the public
finance sector. The country benefited
from the global economic boom and accrued domestic
consumption and investment, hence a
surge in public revenues.

High potential of human capital: Solvencia enjoys large skilled
human capital as
well as young population.
Center
4
IV- The Economy after the Crisis: Losing the Growth
Momentum (negative points)
After the economic crisis and the implementation of IMF
structural economic policy
measures, Solvencia enjoyed moderate but sustainable GDP
growth between 5 and 7%, and
moderate inflation. Inflation witnessed a decreasing trend,
reaching an average level of 10%
between 2002 and 2006. Foreign investment activities also
started to pick up again,
attracting nearly US$10 billion of new FDI into the country
between 2001 and 2005, thanks to
the privatization program. Dynamic growth helped increasing
government’s revenues, leading
to a comfortable budget surplus between 2001 and 2004.
-15%

-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0
50 000
100 000
150 000
200 000
250 000
300 000
350 000

400 000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2014 2015
(L
C
Bn
)
2015
Government Revenue Government Expenditure
However, we believe this favorable economic development was
mainly driven by
external factors, namely strong growth in the global economy
and low interest rate
environment during the period of 2002-2006. The soundness of
economic fundamentals and
the commitment to long-term institutional and structural
reforms remain questionable. The
latest developments of Solvencia’s economy raise concerns.
Economic growth in 2008 is
expected to be only 3 %, or half of the growth seen in 2007.

Moreover, inflation rate also
started to pick up again to 22% in 2007 and probably around
30% in 2008, mainly due to
soaring oil prices and increasing domestic consumption. On the
investment side, high political
instability, terrorist attacks and harsh repression to
demonstration and political protest have
discouraged FDI. In 2006 and 2007, FDI inflows reached barely
US$500 million, and dropped
further in 2008.
Moreover, rising government expenditures contributed to a
return to budget deficit since
2006, fuelling inflation. After enjoying surplus on the
government budget in the period 2001-
2004, government budget returned to negative territory. All in
all, Solvencia did not benefit
from buoyant global economic growth and recent sharp trade
dynamism due to deteriorating
economic fundamentals.
V- Balance of Payment: Facing New Mounting Current Account
Deficit
From a country risk standpoint, Solvencia’s balance of payment
exhibits several sources of
concern. As we can notice between 1996 and 2000, a larger and
larger current account deficit
occurred mainly due to eroding external competitiveness, spill-
over effect caused by the Asian
crisis, and mounting imports due to overvalued exchange rate.

The main reason lying behind the growing trade deficit is not
only the surging oil prices
(and oil is the biggest part of Solvencia’s imported commodity),
but also unsustainable
Center
5
domestic private consumption and government expenditures.
Solvencia suffers basically from a
demand-led inflation and a cost-driven deficit.
On the revenue side, income from tourism revenues has been
witnessing severe problems
and have decreased due to travel warnings issued by UK, US,
and Japan as a response to the
political turmoil, instability, and several bomb threats in the
country’s capital, Solven City.
Private remittances also tend to decrease in 2008, in line with
the current threat of global
economic recession. This has greatly affected the current
account. However, good harvest
condition in recent years and diversifying export structure has
improved the export position,
but still not enough to cover the increase in imports and the
drop in tourism revenues. All in all,
trade deficit is wider and wider, reaching around $4,5 billion.
We expect the current account
deficit to reach US$5 billion in 2016, as much bas in the
previous year, equivalent to a record

high 10% of GDP!
-7000
-6000
-5000
-4000
-3000
-2000
-1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2014 2015 2016
Exhibit 3: Solvencia- Current Account ($ million)
VI- Twin Deficit Financing: Increase Reliance on External Debt

The country’s external liquidity situation has deteriorated in the
2004-2008 period due to
a combination of factors including the following: shrinking FDI
flows, decreasing current
account surplus, and a drop in external financing. Rising capital
flight compounded the problem.
In 2008, the current account deficit exploded, probably reaching
–US$2.7 billion, compared
with a surplus of around US$2 billion per year in the 2002-2003
period. In addition, the NE&Os
turned to negative territory, a proxy signal for capital flight.
Cumulative capital flight amounted
to a record US$1.35 billion! Accordingly, the country’s reserves
might drop by US$2 billion in
2008 alone to cover the mounting external financing
requirements.
Center
6
-1 000
-800
-600
-400

-200
0
200
400
600
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2014 2015
(L
C
Bn
)
Exhibit 4: Solvencia's Net Errors & Omissions, and net
portfolio investment flows
2003-2015
Portfolio equity investment, net Errors and omissions, net
Overall, our main concern stems from Solvencia’s protracted
disdain for prudent
macroeconomic management. There are converging signals that
the country is back to the pre-
crisis situation of excessive spending, growing deficits, and

rising inflation. Despite a high level
of international reserves, estimated at still around US$22.6
billion, current trends point again
toward looming liquidity problems.
Solvencia’s major sources of external debt are capital markets
and foreign creditors
including principally International Financial Institutions (IMF
and World Bank), official bilateral
creditors (i.e. Paris Club) and commercial banks (i.e. London
Club). Capital markets (bond
issuance) do not represent a large share of the country’s
external indebtedness.
The main risks of the debt structure of Solvencia, in our
opinion, are the growing reliance
on commercial bank borrowing, the bunching of principal
repayment between 2007 and 2009,
and liquidity tensions. The total proportion of commercial banks
borrowing in Solvencia’s total
debt reveals an increasing trend between 1996 and 2008, from
19% to 23% respectively. Since
interest rate from commercial banks loans is usually floating,
high reliance on this type of
financing makes Solvencia’s balance of payment very sensitive
to future upward changes in
interest rates.

Center
7
0
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
3 000
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
(L
C
Bn
)
Exhibit 5: Solvencia - Debt Principal Repayment Due 2010-17
Total principal repayments due
Large bunching of debt repayments

The second risk Solvencia faces is high principal loan
repayment in the period 2011-13,
with almost US$ 7.5 billion of loan maturing, even higher than
total debt service payment due
during the 1999-2001 economic crisis. This, in our view, is the
major challenge to Solvencia’s
economy in the future. Debt servicing concentration raises
concerns about Solvencia liquidity
and its ability (and willingness) to keep servicing its external
debt while financing imports. The
debt to export ratio will stand at 69% in 2008, compared with
56% in 2006. However,
according to our calculations, the reserves to import ratio will
remain at a comfortable 13
month level in 2008, well ahead of the safety threshold, which
is normally 6 months.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
0%

50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2014 2015
(L
C
Bn
)
Exhibit 6: Solvencia's External Solvency Indicators 2003-15
Debt to GDP (LHS) Reserves to External Debt (LHS) Debt to
Export (RHS)
In order to stem a further reserve decline and to restore the
international community’s
confidence in the country’s economy, Solvencia has requested a
new loan from IMF in 2007,

amounting to US$ 300 million and another US$ 100 million in
2008. This reveals the fact that
the Government of Solvencia has realized it might face liquidity
problems in the near future.
On the other hand, solvency is not (yet) a major risk for the
country. So far, the liquidity
Center
8
tension does not translate into solvency risk, as the Debt/GDP
ratio is comfortable at 40% in
2008, well below critical levels.
VII- Solvencia’s upcoming challenges for paving the way to
sustainable development,
external creditworthiness, and return to market access
Regarding the need for implementing market-based economic
policy measures, one
can highlight the following challenges Solvencia must tackle
over the 2008-2012 period:
1. Adopting market-based economic policies promoting

competitiveness and trade
openness
2. Cutting inefficient public expenditures and stimulating
privatization-driven revenues
to balance the budget
3. Focusing on tourism sector, more security and better services
4. Keeping cost-push inflation pressures at bay while
maintaining a competitive real
effective exchange rate with a floating exchange rate system,
aimed at supporting a
liberalization of the capital account, attracting further FDI and
stimulating
productivity growth.
5. Improving the current account balance by encouraging the
return of capital flight,
and boosting exports of goods and services.
VIII- Eurobond Project Request: To Float or Not To Float
Before concluding by providing the recommendation whether
we should underwrite or
not Solvencia’s Eurobond, there is a three-fold question we
have to answer: Is Solvencia’s
economy in the face of new economic problems…? If the
answer is positive, how sharp and
long will be these problems…? And will the government be
committed to take all the
necessary measures to move the country back to a track of
sustainable development?

We believe that Solvencia is on the verge of new economic
crisis, starting as early as
2013. The economic and financial tensions might be triggered
by populist policy choices and
imprudent financing strategy. We predict Solvencia will face
difficulties in servicing its debt,
considering that there will be much larger debt service payment
during 2008-2011, high
current account deficit, and dropping reserves to import ratio.
The country would then be
vulnerable to exogenous shocks such as soaring oil import
prices and rising rates of interest.
This might then push Solvencia into payment arrears and to debt
rescheduling. The crisis
could worsen due to bad governance. All of this situation will
dampen Solvencia’s economy.
We also observe that the IMF and the World Bank will be very
cautious not to extend new
loans to Solvencia without strong reform conditionality,
especially after taking into account its
weak governance.
All in all, we stress the need to speed up the pace of structural
and institutional
reforms and to implement the following sustainable
development priorities:
1. Addressing financial sector weaknesses, liberalizing the
capital account, improving the
regulatory framework and tackling labour market rigidities

2. Modernizing the industrial sector
3. Continuing the privatization program given that the state
retains a large presence
throughout the economy, including in the state-owned banks.
4. Increasing trade openness and diversifying the export base
regarding products and
markets;
5. Enhancing free trade with the EU and the USA
6. Improving living standards and creating jobs for the young
generation
7. Articulating a strategy to accelerate the structural
transformation of the economy
towards more skill-intensive sectors.
8. Implementing social and institutional reforms while
improving governance
Center
9
IX- Conclusion and recommendation to Casino Bank’s Risk
Committee
In conclusion, we recommend the Board of Directors not to
underwrite

Solvencia’s Eurobond. We believe that investment banks will be
reluctant to underwrite the
US$500 million bond and that bondholders will show little
appetite for a straight bond issue
despite its attractive yield.
From our standpoint, however, there might still exist an
opportunity to support the
Eurobond issue while mitigating the risk for Casino Bank. One
can request Government of
Solvencia to use the country’s gold reserves to guarantee the
Eurobond. Gold reserves will be
held by an independent party, such as the BIS or an escrow
account in a reputed financial
institution. With this arrangement, we believe, we can sell the
Eurobond of Solvencia in the
capital markets with promising fees for our bank, and favorable
risk/return ratio for
international investors.
1. Solvencia’s return to market access is premature given lack
of market-based
economic policy commitment and weak governance;
2. Market appetite might be tested with smaller bond (US$200
million) maturing after
the bunching of upcoming debt repayments;
3. Enhancing features will facilitate the success of the bond
issue: equity conversion
option, gold collateral, on-going monitoring of the IMF, cross-
default clause…

Center
10
G
row
th in
FD
I &
G
D
P
M
oderate grow
th FD
I. B
ond

issuing is the new
ballgam
e.
T
ourism
em
erging
Increase in FD
I
Solvencia’s ecom
om
y as a
w
hole is im
proving
B
udget and C
urrent account
deficit – H
igh inflation
R
ecession

From
2000/2001 and until
2008 w
e see a decrease in
inflation
Structural
adjustm
ent politics
D
ecrease in official reserves
A
sian C
risis – C
aught
by spillovereffect
H
igh inflation
E
conom
ic overheating
A
ppendix: Tim

eline - S
olvencia
E
conom
ical + Financial
crisis + B
udget &
C
urrent
account deficit + L
ow
1996
199
199
1999
2000
2001
2002
2008
2007
2005
2006
2003

2004
1995
L
ow
inflation,
increased term
s of trade
Stable grow
th
in FD
I
Center
11
Annexes
0,0%
5,0%
10,0%

15,0%
20,0%
25,0%
30,0%
0,00
2,00
4,00
6,00
8,00
10,00
12,00
14,00
16,00
18,00
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2014 2015
(M
on
th

)
Exhibit 7: Debt Service Ratio and Import Coverage 2003-15
Reserves to Monthly Import Coverage (LHS) Debt Service Ratio
(RHS)
Graph II: Correlation Between Solvencia's Interest Rate
Payment and LIBOR
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
0.00% 1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00%
LIBOR
So
lve
nc
ia

In
te
re
st
R
at
e P
ay
m
en
t
$ LIBOR (six-month, average) Linear ($ LIBOR (six-month,
average))
SOLVENCIA Case Study 2018-updated 23SOLVENCIA Case
Study 2018-updated 24SOLVENCIA Case Study 2018-updated
25SOLVENCIA Case Study 2018-updated 26SOLVENCIA Case
Study 2018-updated 33
Solvencia Statistics485095050950Summer 2019Source: CEIC
Data - Summer 2019COUNTRY RISK
ANALYSISVIETNAM2003200420052006200720082009201020
1120122013201420152016Real GDP4.00%3.90%7.09%8.44%-

6.59%-7.05%-
0.69%0.69%3.45%4.00%5.13%6.10%2.30%ADOMESTIC
ECONOMY2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201
5201620172018GDP deflator %
change12.00%6.00%7.55%10.53%14.29%18.06%5.88%5.56%8.
42%11.65%11.30%11.72%15.38%DOMESTIC ECONOMY (
constant prices
)12.00%16.00%15.52%32.84%17.98%16.19%10.66%9.63%12.1
6%11.45%17.30%22.12%29.43%Nominal GDP ( local currency
billion
)57,786.8366,500.0877,314.8399,132.85106,025.57115,955.771
35,530.35155,820.01171,226.57186,207.59193,424.81205,300.4
0223,783.60245,215.77Nominal GDP %
change5.00%15.08%16.26%28.22%6.95%9.37%16.88%14.97%9
.89%8.75%3.88%6.14%9.00%9.58%20032004200520062007200
820092010201120122013201420152016Nominal GDP ( lc
billion
)50,00053,00057,00063,00072,00085,00090,00095,000103,0001
15,000128,000143,000165,000Real GDP ( local currency billion
)7.556.987.135.665.406.426.245.255.425.986.686.216.816.60Re
al GDP % GDP2474-7-7-4-1-1Domestic demand % change0286-
10-2-6-1-1Private consumption % change121311-64-100Public
consumption % change3111-8-11-3-3-2-2Gross fixed capital %
change82174-16-18-14-13-13Change in stockbuilding % GDP-
2-6-20-2-1-411Exports of goods and services %
GDP101912192-333Imports of goods and services %
change312221059-1011Change in net foreign balance %
GDP11-4-30-3400Real GNP ( lei billion
)688716764795741681653645645Real GNP % change1474-7-8-
4-1-1Real GDP growth rate %3.00%-7.55%2.15%-20.62%-
4.59%18.89%-2.80%-15.87%3.24%10.33%11.71%-
7.04%9.66%-3.08%Nominal GDP %
change232148455013036374646Real GDP
Index10392.45102.1579.3895.41118.8997.2084.13103.24110.33
111.7192.96109.6696.92Nominal GDP
Index105115.08116.26128.22106.95109.37116.88114.97109.891

08.75103.88106.14109.00109.58GDP
deflator101.94124.48113.82161.52112.1091.99120.25136.65106
.4498.5792.99114.1799.40113.06GDP deflator %
change1.94%24.48%13.82%61.52%12.10%-
8.01%20.25%36.65%6.44%-1.43%-7.01%14.17%-
0.60%13.06%Exchange
Rate1,0001,0251,0351,0651,1001,1751,3501,6501,95020202040
207021252250Rate of ER
depreciation5.3%2.5%1.0%2.9%3.3%6.8%14.9%22.2%18.2%3.6
%1.0%1.5%2.7%5.9%Nominal GDP ( $ billion
)57.7964.8874.7093.0896.3998.69100.3994.4487.8192.1894.829
9.18105.31108.98GDP4.23%4.85%9.15%9.77%10.24%2.14%-
0.70%2.82%4.11%3.36%5.03%6.06%6.86%-1.07%Nominal
GDP % change232148455013036374646Nominal GDP per
capita
$8,2559,06910,23712,50612,69612,74412,73511,76810,74811,0
8411,21011,53012,03812,250Deflator5%4%8%11%14%18%4%
3%5%7%13%12%14%15%BBALANCE of PAYMENTS ($
million)2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520
1620152018Trade Balance-1,130-411-1,577-2,494-4,000-
1,0501,0401,270300-500-1,500-4,000-3,850-2,500Merchandise
exports4,8826,1517,9108,0619,00010,50011,00012,00013,80014
00013500120001365013000586.1666666667Merchandise
imports-6,012-6,562-9,487-10,555-13,000-11,550-9,960-10,730-
13,500-14500-15000-16000-17500-155005.2781569966Balance
on Services, Income & Transfers-699-529-1,044-2,201-3,281-
2,107-75629403465-184-1,901-3,010-1,917Services & income
receipts8241,0081,4641,6521,4471,6292,2512,5942,7302,5902,7
692,2442,1502,750Exports of
services6978791,1301,1521,2861,5001,5711,7141,8001,7501,92
91,71415001850Interest
receipts12412031748614670650850900800800500600850Other
services & income
receipts291715155930303040403050500.1378571429Services &
income payments-1,737-1,832-3,133-4,448-5,197-4,352-3,077-
2,796-3,207-2,825-3,452-4,546-5,385-5,567Imports of services-

902-984-1,423-1,583-1,950-1,733-1,494-1,610-2,025-2,175-
2,250-2,400-2,625-2,325Interest payments-831-835-1,681-
2,831-3,197-2,460-1,433-1,006-992-450-802-1,646-2,235-
2,690Other services & income payments-4-12-29-33-50-160-
150-180-190-200-400-500-525-551Transfers,
net214295625594469616750830880700500400225900Private
transfers,
net103182320394269565600630630450400300125650Official
transfers,
net11111330520020051150200250250100100100250200320042
00520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016Curren
t Account-1,829-940-2,621-4,695-7,281-3,1579651,899703-35-
1,684-5,901-6,860-4,417Current Account-1829-940-2621-4695-
7281-31579651899703-35-1684-5967-6860-512.752Foreign
investment,
net144163966006421,9601,4801,6003,6501,8004704702501,400
20032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152
016Foreign Direct Investment (disbursed,
net)873414176005001,9001,4001,5003,50016503503503001250
-1130-411-1577-2494-4000-105010401270300-500-1500-4000-
3850750Portfolio equity investment, net-7375-
2101426080100150150120120-50150International financial
institutions137434-7-236-4502,1502,0005002525-150-
175301,250IMF0216-315-356-500850850250-75-75-75-100-
150850World Bank Group0100100006505005000-50-
50150250Other multilateral
creditors13711820812050650650200100100-25-2530150Paris
Club and other bilateral creditors8569348132-128-68-50-56-56-
65100150200150London Club956512777261,639-1,254-210-
297-300-3003501,0501,400380Credit flows70601222641139-
254-210-347-350-350200200100200Interest
arrears0000000000005080Short-term credits255055851,500-
1,00005050501508501250100Other private creditors (bond
markets)-4101,0001,500200-378-860-143-143-250-200-150-
150-250Resident lending abroad, net541-683430-
19481450929975975850825825-20-50Errors and omissions,

net15293-150-250-3505001001001000-250-350-500500Gold
reserve variation504206061798251,311786-367-1,242-150-
420870-906-144Reserves excluding gold (- = increase)734-520-
3341,9792,922-514-5,140-4,261-3,762-
1,9258092,3615,3061,081CEXTERNAL DEBT ($
million)2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520
1620172018Total External
Debt25,48526,10427,11128,31431,37732,79834,11633,54033,06
932,58632,08632,91134,39135,871Medium/Long term
debt25,23525,80426,75627,87429,43731,85833,17632,55032,02
931,49630,84630,82131,00132,351Short term
debt2503003554401,9409409409901,0401,0901,2402,0903,3403
,440Interest arrears0000000000005080Breakdown by creditor
:International financial
institutions18,55018,98418,97718,74118,29120,44122,44122,94
122,96622,99122,84122,66622,69623,946IMF3,5003,7163,4013,
0452,5453,3954,2454,4954,4204,3454,2704,1704,0204,870Worl
d Bank
Group8,5008,6008,7008,7008,7009,3509,8509,9009,9009,9009,
8509,8009,95010,200Other multilateral
creditors6,5506,6686,8766,9967,0467,6968,3468,5468,6468,746
8,7218,6968,7268,876Paris Club and other bilateral
creditors4,5854,6545,0025,1345,0064,9384,8884,8324,7764,711
4,8114,9615,1615,311London
Club1,5001,6202,2762,5834,7243,8633,6093,4493,1522,8522,65
23,7025,0525,352Medium/long
term1,2501,3201,9212,1432,7842,9232,6692,4592,1121,7621,41
21,6121,7121,912Short
term2503003554401,9409409409901,0401,0901,2402,0903,3403
,440Other private & institutional
creditors8508468561,8563,3563,5563,1782,3182,1752,0321,782
1,5821,4321,182DEXTERNAL ASSETS ($
million)2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520
1620172018Official Reserves excluding
gold9,63410,15410,4888,5095,5876,10211,24115,50219,26421,
18920,38118,01912,71311,6320000000000000Residents'

Deposits in International
Banks2502003005008501,200600500350350625625700850Gold
Reserves (in million
ounces)2.402.602.702.803.003.223.503.003.003.003.003.002.40
2.40Gold Reserve assets ($
million)1,2311,6512,2572,4363,2614,5725,3594,9923,7503,600
3,1804,0503,1443,000EDEBT SERVICE PAYMENT ($
million)2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520
1620172018Total debt servicing
obligations1680.81835.32880.94381.46147.35127.93899.93674.
23459.12751.12302.23045.64085.44940.3Interest payments
due830.81835.331680.882831.403197.322459.851432.871006.2
0992.07896.12802.151645.552235.422690.33Amortization paid
or
due85010001200155029502668246726682467185515001400185
02250FAMORTIZATION PAYMENTS
DUE2012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232
0242025Total principal repayments
due26682467185515001400185022502650235015601525115011
251075IMF00124200200250300350300200250250250300World
Bank
Group11810016219119325040045050050050025050100Other
multilateral
creditors400450280150172260250300350300300250250250Pari
s
Club500500250150185190300600850400250300350300London
Club950700565459500650750750000000Other private creditors
(bonds)700717474350150250250200350160225100225125GGL
OBAL ECONOMIC
DATA20052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201
620172018$ LIBOR (six-month,
average)1.26%1.20%3.20%6.00%4.19%2.50%1.20%1.00%1.00
%0.75%0.50%1.00%1.50%2.50%Gold Price
(US$/ounce)513635836870108714201531166412501200106013
5013101250Oil Price (Brent) in
$/barrel3041566672996279949649405275HGOVERNMENT

BUDGET200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152
01620172018(in LC
billion)2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520
1620172018Government
Revenues8950970011200122501125517393.365520329.5525233
73.00151600017125195502055033567.5428000Revenue895097
00112001225011255127501320013650160001712519550205502
220028000Government
Expenditures10401.629411970.014413916.669417843.91314550
185501355014000155501750034816.4658225502750036000Exp
enses9202.59540102601134014550185501355014000155501750
020880225502750036000BUDGET BALANCE-1452-
2270.0144-2716.6694-5593.913-3295-
1156.63456779.55259373.0015450-375-15266.4658-
20006067.54-
8000IINFLATION2005200620072008200920102011201220132
0142015201620172018Consumer price % change
average4.00%4.80%5.00%6.50%7.00%9.00%2.20%2.65%2.75%
6.00%6.50%8.00%8.00%9.50%JTRADE
DATA20052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201
620172018MERCHANDISE TRADE (total
trade)10,89412,71317,39718,61622,00022,05020,96022,73027,3
0028,50028,50028,00031,15028,500Total merchandise exports
($
million)4,8826,1517,9108,0619,00010,50011,00012,00013,8001
4,00013,50012,00013,65013,000Total merchandise imports ($
million)6,0126,5629,48710,55513,00011,5509,96010,73013,500
14,50015,00016,00017,50015,500Share of oil imports in total
imports25%25%27%30%29%31%34%38%40%40%35%32%30%
28%KPOPULATION20052006200720082009201020112012201
320142015201620172018Population
(million)77.1547.307.447.597.747.888.038.178.328.468.608.758
.90LCOUNTRY RISK RATINGS &
SPREADS20052006200720082009201020112012201320142015
201620172018EUROMONEY5558667074829510710087909011
5125INSTITUTIONAL

INVESTOR5355606570728590848084849598Secondary market
debt discount1518223542503525201815182235Spread over US
T Bill125145175225300450200175175150135145225350Spread
over US T
Bill125145175225300450200175175150135145225350MRisk
Indicators20052006200720082009201020112012201320142015
201620172018GDP (in US$ billion)Real GDP Growth rate (in
Local Currency)GDP Growth rate (in US$)GDP per capita
(US$)GDP per capita /dayRate of currency depreciationTrade
Balance (US$ million)External competitivenessTrade openness
ratio (X+M/GDP)Buddget Deficit-Surplus /GDP%Current
account/GDP
%NRATIOS2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201
5201620172018OSolvencyDebt/ExportsDebt/GDPReserves/Exte
rnal DebtShort-term Debt/Total
DebtPLiquidity2005200620072008200920102011201220132014
2015201620172018Principal Amortization/Exports %Net
Capital TransfersDebt servicing Ratio %Interest/Exports
%Reserves/Imports GS in %Reserves/Imports in Months
CoverageAverage external interest rate in %QCash-flow
ratio2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162
0172018Numerator:+ Official reserves assets including
Gold+XG&S+Undisbursed bank credits + Net transfers
)Denominator (debt service + MG&S + ST debt)Cash flow
ratio0.00Net Present Value of Future Debt
Repayment2005200620072008200920102011201220132014201
5201620172018201920202021202220232024202520262027Tota
l Amortization Each
Year8501000120015502950266824672668246718551500140018
502250000000000NPV (VAN) of future debt
repayments$25,825.00$24,825.00$23,625.00$22,075.00$19,125.
00$16,457.00$13,990.00$11,322.00$8,855.00$7,000.00$5,500.0
0$4,100.00$2,250.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.0
0$0.00$0.00CORRELATIONInflation/current account
deficitLIBOR/interest payments on foreign debtrisk
ratings/liquidity indicatorsrisk ratings/solvency

Case Study 2 Food Banks Canada Revisiting Strategy 2012 Gene Des.docx

Case Study 2 Food Banks Canada Revisiting Strategy 2012 Gene Des.docx

Empfohlen

Empfohlen

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Ähnlich wie Case Study 2 Food Banks Canada Revisiting Strategy 2012 Gene Des.docx

Ähnlich wie Case Study 2 Food Banks Canada Revisiting Strategy 2012 Gene Des.docx (20)

Mehr von jasoninnes20

Mehr von jasoninnes20 (20)

Kürzlich hochgeladen

Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)

Case Study 2 Food Banks Canada Revisiting Strategy 2012 Gene Des.docx