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Why is Security
Management So Hard?
inaz2
2016/12/09
第1回 セキュリティ共有勉強会
About me
• inaz2
• https://twitter.com/inaz2
• Security engineer & Python programmer
• Blog: ももいろテクノロジー
• http://inaz2.hatenablog.com/
2
Question
• You are an incident responder in the company
• There’s nobody who doesn’t make a mistake
• Assume each employee makes a mistake with a 1% possibility
• One day, the attacker sent malicious mails to 100 employees
• What is the probability of one or more incidents occurring?
3
Answer
63%
4
Make it zero?
• There’s nobody who doesn’t make a mistake
• Even if the mistake rate goes 1% -> 0.1%, it occurs with a 9.5%
probability
• But if the number of mails was one, it occurs only with a 1%
probability
• It is important to reduce attack surfaces
• Network separation also reduces the risk of severe incidents
5
Who responds to the incident?
• Employee will open a malicious mail in the near future
• The most important is how we handle it
• How to find it? What to do with the suspicious PCs? What kind of
logs are there? What is the root cause of infection? How to mitigate
it? Who writes a report?
• Do you throw all things away to someone?
• IPA サイバーセキュリティ経営ガイドライン解説書
• http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/economics/csmgl-kaisetsusho.html
6
More issues
7
Maintenance
• OK, the system is completed. Then, who supports it?
• New vulnerability will be found
• Network environment will be changed
• The responsible person will be moved
• We need to manage all of our systems continuously
• Even if there are legacy systems
• Security management is like a fixed cost
8
Incident invisibility
• The detail of incidents is often not shared with other groups
• It is difficult to let them take care of it
• But it is real that someone handles incidents day by day
9
Cloud services are secure?
• Yes, if all of us never make a mistake
10
Cloud services are secure?
• Yes, if all of us never make a mistake
11
Secrets
• We must keep other’s privacy
• We shouldn’t publish found issues until it is fixed
• Information disclosure is a sensitive matter
• Furthermore, you may receive no acknowledgement
• Requires a high sense of ethics and high stress tolerance
• Like a soldier
12
Recap
• It is important to think about how we handle incidents
• It is not so easy to manage all of our systems continuously
• Have an imagination about incidents just you don’t know
13
Reference
• AWS で不正アクセスされて凄い額の請求が来ていた件 -
yoyaのメモ
• http://d.hatena.ne.jp/yoya/20150404/aws
• 初心者がAWSでミスって不正利用されて$6,000請求、泣き
そうになったお話。 - Qiita
• http://qiita.com/mochizukikotaro/items/a0e98ff0063a77e7b694
• AWSアカウントに関する不正使用を整理してみた
• http://www.slideshare.net/naotokatsumi/20150221-aws-
accountsabuse-44977667
14
Thank you!
inaz2
15

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Why Security Management Is So Difficult: Reducing Risk Through Proper Planning

  • 1. Why is Security Management So Hard? inaz2 2016/12/09 第1回 セキュリティ共有勉強会
  • 2. About me • inaz2 • https://twitter.com/inaz2 • Security engineer & Python programmer • Blog: ももいろテクノロジー • http://inaz2.hatenablog.com/ 2
  • 3. Question • You are an incident responder in the company • There’s nobody who doesn’t make a mistake • Assume each employee makes a mistake with a 1% possibility • One day, the attacker sent malicious mails to 100 employees • What is the probability of one or more incidents occurring? 3
  • 5. Make it zero? • There’s nobody who doesn’t make a mistake • Even if the mistake rate goes 1% -> 0.1%, it occurs with a 9.5% probability • But if the number of mails was one, it occurs only with a 1% probability • It is important to reduce attack surfaces • Network separation also reduces the risk of severe incidents 5
  • 6. Who responds to the incident? • Employee will open a malicious mail in the near future • The most important is how we handle it • How to find it? What to do with the suspicious PCs? What kind of logs are there? What is the root cause of infection? How to mitigate it? Who writes a report? • Do you throw all things away to someone? • IPA サイバーセキュリティ経営ガイドライン解説書 • http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/economics/csmgl-kaisetsusho.html 6
  • 8. Maintenance • OK, the system is completed. Then, who supports it? • New vulnerability will be found • Network environment will be changed • The responsible person will be moved • We need to manage all of our systems continuously • Even if there are legacy systems • Security management is like a fixed cost 8
  • 9. Incident invisibility • The detail of incidents is often not shared with other groups • It is difficult to let them take care of it • But it is real that someone handles incidents day by day 9
  • 10. Cloud services are secure? • Yes, if all of us never make a mistake 10
  • 11. Cloud services are secure? • Yes, if all of us never make a mistake 11
  • 12. Secrets • We must keep other’s privacy • We shouldn’t publish found issues until it is fixed • Information disclosure is a sensitive matter • Furthermore, you may receive no acknowledgement • Requires a high sense of ethics and high stress tolerance • Like a soldier 12
  • 13. Recap • It is important to think about how we handle incidents • It is not so easy to manage all of our systems continuously • Have an imagination about incidents just you don’t know 13
  • 14. Reference • AWS で不正アクセスされて凄い額の請求が来ていた件 - yoyaのメモ • http://d.hatena.ne.jp/yoya/20150404/aws • 初心者がAWSでミスって不正利用されて$6,000請求、泣き そうになったお話。 - Qiita • http://qiita.com/mochizukikotaro/items/a0e98ff0063a77e7b694 • AWSアカウントに関する不正使用を整理してみた • http://www.slideshare.net/naotokatsumi/20150221-aws- accountsabuse-44977667 14