1. Decreasing Vulnerability to Conflict in
Arab Countries through Rural
Development
Clemens Breisinger, Jean-Francois Maystadt, Olivier Ecker, Perrihan Al-Riffai
Development Strategy and Governance Division
International Food Policy Research Institute
IFPRI-IFAD Workshop
International Fund for Agricultural Development, Rome; January 19, 2012

2. Arab world is the most conflict-affected
region in the world
“How is it that countries in the Middle East and North Africa could
face explosions of popular grievances despite, in some
cases, sustained high growth and improvement in social
indicators?”

3. At least six key questions emerge…
• Getting the baseline right
– Did the social indicators in the Arab world really improve?
– Did economic factors play a role in the Arab Awakening at
all?
– Which policies and investments can improve those social
indicators, for example food security?
• Linking conflict, rural development and food security
– Is the Arab world “special” when it come to development
and conflict (Arab Exceptionalism)?
– Are there specific links between conflict, rural development
and food security in the Arab world?
– How can rural and agricultural interventions be leveraged
for improving the resilience of the rural poor to conflicts?

4. IFPRI runs two IFAD-supported projects to
find answers to these questions
Decreasing vulnerability to
conflict through rural
development
• Descriptive: Conflict
typology & narratives
• Quantitative:
– Cross-country
– Country-specific, using
ACLED and other geo-
referenced data
– Project-level analysis
• Fieldwork, Interviews
and Consultations

5. Workshop Agenda
9:00-9:15 Welcoming remarks
9:15-10:00 Beyond the Arab Awakening: Policies and investments
for poverty reduction and food security
(Clemens Breisinger and Perrihan Al-Riffai)
10:00-10:30 Is there an Arab exceptionalism when it comes to
conflict? Preliminary findings from cross-country
analysis (Jean-Francois Maystadt)
10:30-11:00 Coffee break
11:00-11:30 Atlas for rural development and conflict: An interactive
GIS-based tool for mapping and analysis (Olivier Ecker)
11:30-12:00 Climate change and civil war in Somalia: Does drought
fuel conflict through livestock price shocks?
(Olivier Ecker)
12:00-12:30 Discussion and ways forward

6. Social indicators may not have improved to the
extend official data suggest
The Arab growth-nutrition puzzle
Source: Breisinger et al. 2011. http://www.ifpri.org/publication/economics-arab-awakening

7. What is the extend of food insecurity?

8. Risk of food insecurity (at the macro level)
Source: Breisinger et al. 2012. “Beyond the Arab Awakening.” IFPRI Food Policy Report 25.

9. Risk of food insecurity (at the micro level)
Source: Breisinger et al. 2012. “Beyond the Arab Awakening.” IFPRI Food Policy Report 25.

10. Risk of food insecurity in Arab world
(plus Iran and Turkey)
Source: Breisinger et al. 2012. “Beyond the Arab Awakening.” IFPRI Food Policy Report 25.

11. Economics did play a role in the Arab Awakening
Percentage of people dissatisfied
with their standard of living
Yemen
Iraq
Lebanon
Mauritania Morocco
Syria
Sudan Libya Bahrain
Algeria
Jordan
Djibouti Saudi Arabia
Egypt Tunisia UAE
Kuwait
Qatar
GDP per capita (PPP, current international $)
Source: Based on Gallup World Poll (2011) and WEO (2011) data.
Note: Bubble size: Number of dissatisfied people. Color scale: Change in level of dissatisfaction (time period between first and last surveys undertaken in the country;
last survey: 2010, first survey: 2005-2009): green: decrease; orange and red: increase, with red: increase at an annual growth rate of at least 2 percentage points.

12. Which policies and investments can
improve social indicators, food security?

13. Growth has to become more pro-poor in
Arab countries, also in agriculture
Dep. var.: Sector VA Agricultural and non- Sector value added
Total GDP growth
prevalence change share (% agricultural growth growth
in child stunting of GDP) 1 2 3 4 5 6
Growth (per capita)
GDP 100.0 -0.11 *** -0.11 ***
AgVA 19.4 -0.40 *** -0.47 *** -0.28 ** -0.34 ***
Non-AgVA 80.6 -0.07 *** -0.07 **
MaVA 19.9 -0.43 *** -0.52 ***
InVA 14.3 0.05 0.10
SeVA 46.4 -0.02 0.00
GDP * Arab-TI 100.0 0.04
AgVA * Arab-TI 15.3 1.05 ** 1.32 **
Non-AgVA * Arab-TI 84.7 0.00
MaVA * Arab-TI 13.3 0.00
InVA * Arab-TI 25.0 -0.08
SeVA Arab-TI 46.4 -0.28
Initial stunting level -0.29 *** -0.29 *** -0.31 *** -0.30 *** -0.30 *** -0.30
Observations 406 406 402 402 402 402
F-value 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4
R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.04
R-squared adjusted 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.11
Source: Breisinger et al. 2012. “Beyond the Arab Awakening.” IFPRI Food Policy Report 25.
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

14. One reason why agriculture is not as pro-poor in
Arab countries is because it’s no longer the
major source of income for the poor

15. Public spending in Arab countries is
high compared to other world regions
Source: based on Breisinger et al. 2012. “Beyond the Arab Awakening.” IFPRI Food Policy Report 25.

16. But, there is scope for improving the efficiency of
public spending, especially in social sectors
Source: Breisinger et al. 2012. “Beyond the Arab Awakening.” IFPRI Food Policy Report 25.
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

17. Three focus areas for a food secure
Arab world without poverty
• Improve data and capacity for evidence-based
decision making
• Foster growth that enhances food security
– At macro level
– At household level
• Revisit the efficiency and allocation of public
spending
Arab countries are heterogeneous and strategies
have to be country specific

18. Conflict, food security, poverty and rural
development: What are the linkages?

19. Workshop Agenda
9:00-9:15 Welcoming remarks
9:15-10:00 Beyond the Arab Awakening: Policies and investments
for poverty reduction and food security
(Clemens Breisinger and Perrihan Al-Riffai)
10:00-10:30 Is there an Arab exceptionalism when it comes to
conflict? Preliminary findings from cross-country
analysis (Jean-Francois Maystadt)
10:30-11:00 Coffee break
11:00-11:30 Atlas for rural development and conflict: An interactive
GIS-based tool for mapping and analysis (Olivier Ecker)
11:30-12:00 Climate change and civil war in Somalia: Does drought
fuel conflict through livestock price shocks?
(Olivier Ecker)
12:00-12:30 Discussion and ways forward

20. Is There an Arab Exceptionalism
When It Comes to Conflict?
Preliminary Findings from Cross-Country Analysis
Jean-Francois Maystadt, Clemens Breisinger, Jean-Francois Trinh Tan
Presented by
Jean-Francois Maystadt

21. Outline
1. Introduction
2. Conceptual Framework
3. Is there an Arab exceptionalism? Applying the
Collier-Hoeffler framework
4. Arab exceptionalism: A puzzle to be explained
5. Preliminary conclusions, discussion and further
work

22. 1. Introduction: The costs of conflict
• -2.2% GDP growth/year of conflict (Collier 2007)
• 21 years to recover pre-war GDP level (Collier
2007)
• ESCWA: -17.5% per capita GDP/year of conflict
• ESCWA: Major backwards in MDGs
• Micro : Health, education, assets, physical and
political capital, particularly for the most
vulnerable (children, women, marginalized, etc)

23. The Arab World at a crossroad
• “Power vacuum” : Particularly at risk
• But no determinism … also opportunities
Major causes of conflicts and which
preventive measures?
How best to accompany such political
transition?

24. 2. Conceptual framework
 ‘Motivation’
Grievances, Inequality, Polarization, etc.
 ‘Opportunity’
Opportunity cost to participate to violence depends on
alternative sources of income, the potential loss and
rewards (therefore capacity for leaders to finance)
 ‘Polity’
Poor governance and lack of political inclusion
State capacity to repress or “pay for peace”

25. Collier and Hoeffler (2004, OEP)
On a sample of 161 countries between 1960 and 2000
 ‘Opportunity’ (‘greed’) matters, not ‘Motivation’
(‘grievance’)
 Per capita income, GDP growth rate, male secondary
education enrolment (-)
 Population (+), Primary export commodities (+, non-
monotonic)
 Inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization and
religious fractionalization are not significant (only ethnic
dominance)
 The role of ‘Polity’ is not investigated and may be a
source of bias

26. 3. Arab Exceptionalism?
Sorli et al. (2005, JCR) : 1960-2000
• Log(GDP per capita), economic growth : <0
• Ethnic dominance
• No MENA specific effect : “Conflict is quite well
explained by a general model of civil war” (p.160)
Shortcomings:
• Sample of 90 countries (excl. e.g. Libya, Somalia,
Yemen)
• No Fixed Effect (Djankov and Reynal-Querol,
forthcoming REStat)
• Predictive power 30% lower compared to SSA

27. Applying the Collier-Hoeffler framework
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Major Major Major Major
Conflict Conflict Conflict Conflict
Log of GDP per capita -0.310*** -0.377*** -0.391*** -0.322***
[0.101] [0.101] [0.118] [0.0962]
Log of GDP per capita*MENA 0.087 -0.490*
[0.288] [0.286]
MENA 0.826*** -10.35** 2.156
[0.285] [4.998] [2.735]
GDP growth -4.314*** -4.591*** -5.652*** -6.326***
[1.412] [1.422] [1.522] [1.466]
GDP growth*MENA 6.181** 10.28***
[2.941] [2.992]
Cold War 2.807*** 2.843*** 2.695*** 2.825***
[0.386] [0.393] [0.392] [0.393]
Ethnic dominance 0.475* 0.397 0.440* 0.495**
[0.254] [0.256] [0.265] [0.203]
Log of population 0.443*** 0.466*** 0.412*** 0.496***
[0.0804] [0.0840] [0.0987] [0.0831]
Log of population*MENA 0.607*** 0.109
[0.228] [0.166]
Observations 3,452 3,452 3,452 4,600
Note: Including Collier-Hoeffler non-significant variables , i.e. Primary Commodity Exports ,
Primary Commodity Exports (squared), Ethnic Fragmentation, Geographical Dispersion

28. 4. Arab exceptionalism: a puzzle
 Something specific to explain in the Arab world
 Collier and Hoeffler framework is inadequate
 Possible explanations?
 Omitted variables: institutions inherited from the past,
historical grievances, etc (country fixed effects)
 Where the growth is coming from? (‘Opportunity’)
 Agricultural versus non-agricultural growth
 Youth bulges
 Better proxy for natural resource dependency (e.g. oil)
 Where the growth is going to? (‘Motivation’)
 Inequality
 Micro and Macro Food Security Index (FSI)
 Political dimension? (‘Polity’)

29. Main empirical model
 Economic growth is the only robust finding in Collier
and Hoeffler (2004)
 Arab exceptionalism is confirmed!
 ‘Opportunity’
 Sectoral growth does not matter
 Youth bulges (share of urban male aged 15-24 over the
urban (or male) population aged 15) : no region-specific
effect
 Oil, gas, ores and minerals exports to GDP or dependency
(>40%) . Oil dependency increases conflict in a non-
monotonic way but the effect is totally driven by the Arab
world

30. Main empirical model
 ‘Motivation’
 Gini coefficient is uncorrelated to conflicts but known to
poorly capture time-varying sources of grievances
 Macro and Micro Food Security Indexes significantly
increase the risk of major conflicts in Arab world
 ‘Polity’
 Economic and political discrimination against minorities
increase conflicts but not specifically for Arab countries
 Past transitions to full democracy and autocracy reduce the
risk of conflicts (using policyIV data, Persson and Tabellini
2006 AER)

31. Beyond Collier-Hoeffler framework
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4) (5)
Major Major Major Major Major Major
Conflict Conflict Conflict Conflict Conflict Conflict
GDP growth (t-1) -0.120** -0.197*** -0.0722 -0.25 -0.048 -0.0413
[0.0516] [0.0660] [0.170] [0.119] [0.0809] [0.0839]
GDP growth*MENA (t-1) 0.265*** 0.727 0.373*** 0.113 0.252
[0.079] [0.689] [0.129] [0.219] [0.161]
Child stunting (t-1) 0.000428 0.0000146
[0.00143] [0.00141]
Child stunting*MENA 0.0119* 0.0111*
[0.007] [0.0068]
Child mortality (t-1) 0.000134
[0.0002]
Child Mortality*MENA 0.0008
[0.0005]
P-value (0.128)
Food security index (t-1) -0.0407
[0.0462]
Food security index*MENA 0.412*
[0.216]
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,896 4,896 536 2,616 1,456 2,958
Number of ccode 140 140 130 130 139 131

32. Beyond Collier-Hoeffler framework (6) (7) (8) (9)
Major Major Major Major
Conflict Conflict Conflict Conflict
GDP growth (t-1) -0.339** -0.335** -0.116* -0.117*
[0.139] [0.143] [0.0623] [0.0621]
GDP growth*MENA (t-1) 0.437*** 0.434** 0.180** 0.117
[0.158] [0.175] [0.0791] [0.0958]
Oil rents (t-1) 0.00265
[0.00227]
Oil rents*MENA (t-1) -0.00847*
[0.00445]
Oil rents squared (t-1) -3.81E-05
[3.33e-05]
Oil rents squared*MENA 0.000114**
[5.00e-05]
Oil dependency (t-1) -0.00876
[0.0298]
Oil dependency*MENA 0.0902*
[0.0486]
Pol. Transition to democracy (t-1) -0.00337***
[0.00103]
Pol. Transition to democracy*MENA -0.0256***
[0.00849]
Pol. Transition to autocracy (t-1) -0.0019
[0.00218]
Pol. Transition to autocracy*MENA -0.0189***
[0.00637]
Time dummies YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,087 2,087 4,452 4,461
Number of ccode 73 73 131 131

33. Further works
 Robust to non-linear model, Lagging effects?
 Robust to the implementation of a dynamic model ?
 Dealing with missing values (unbalanced panel)
 …
 Preliminary results from 2SLS-FE model point to the
vulnerability of food net importers to changes in food
international prices for food insecurity and in turn, to
the risk of conflict

34. Preliminary conclusions on the main
Arab-specific correlates of war
 Food insecurity matters for conflicts in the Arab world
 Transition to democracy is welcomed but the
transition period is risky
 Oil dependency increases the risk of conflict
Limits:
 Not a paper on the Arab Awakening : only valid for
major conflict events
 Cross-country analysis misses the heterogeneity (e.g.
the role of environmental factors in Somalia or Sudan)
But what could these results mean for particular
countries, at a particularly challenging time in history
(risky but potentially providing new opportunities)?

35. Improving food security
 Avoid fiscally unsustainable and not well targeted
measures (e.g. subsidies)
 Smart mix of policies, investments and targeted
programs in the areas of trade, agriculture, water,
health and education
 Economic growth that generates export revenues and
benefits the poor and investments in education are
key
 Country-level analysis and strategies are needed, in
the case of Yemen for example a 7-Point action plan
has been developed

36. How to use oil revenues?
 Oil revenues create fiscal space and should in
principle be wealth enhancing
 ‘Paying for peace’ has become unsustainable, given
increased repression (e.g. social media) and
redistribution costs (e.g. youth and food prices)
 But, many Arab countries show “Dutch disease”
symptoms, including low economic diversification and
governance issues
 Oil rents should be directed to pro-poor growth
enhancing investments, such as infrastructure and
education, and to targeted transfers to the most food
insecure populations

37. Workshop Agenda
9:00-9:15 Welcoming remarks
9:15-10:00 Beyond the Arab Awakening: Policies and investments
for poverty reduction and food security
(Clemens Breisinger and Perrihan Al-Riffai)
10:00-10:30 Is there an Arab exceptionalism when it comes to
conflict? Preliminary findings from cross-country
analysis (Jean-Francois Maystadt)
10:30-11:00 Coffee break
11:00-11:30 Atlas for rural development and conflict: An interactive
GIS-based tool for mapping and analysis (Olivier Ecker)
11:30-12:00 Climate change and civil war in Somalia: Does drought
fuel conflict through livestock price shocks?
(Olivier Ecker)
12:00-12:30 Discussion and ways forward

38. Towards a comprehensive spatial database:
Atlas for Rural Development and Conflict: An
Interactive GIS-Based Tool for Mapping and Analysis
Jose Funes
Presented by
Olivier Ecker

39. Spatial Patterns of Rural Development
and Conflict (Work in Progress)
1. Regional overview:
a. Population & urbanization
b. Infrastructure & market access
c. Economic activity
d. Vegetation
e. Conflicts
2. Conflicts—National perspective:
a. Sudan
b. Somalia

40. Workshop Agenda
9:00-9:15 Welcoming remarks
9:15-10:00 Beyond the Arab Awakening: Policies and investments
for poverty reduction and food security
(Clemens Breisinger and Perrihan Al-Riffai)
10:00-10:30 Is there an Arab exceptionalism when it comes to
conflict? Preliminary findings from cross-country
analysis (Jean-Francois Maystadt)
10:30-11:00 Coffee break
11:00-11:30 Atlas for rural development and conflict: An interactive
GIS-based tool for mapping and analysis (Olivier Ecker)
11:30-12:00 Climate change and civil war in Somalia: Does drought
fuel conflict through livestock price shocks?
(Olivier Ecker)
12:00-12:30 Discussion and ways forward

41. Climate Change and Civil War in Somalia: Does
Drought Fuel Conflict through Livestock Price Shocks?
Jean-Francois Maystadt, Olivier Ecker, Athur Mabiso
Presented by
Olivier Ecker

42. Overview
1. Introduction
2. Linkages between drought, livestock prices,
and civil conflict in the context of Somalia
3. Identification strategy and empirical model
4. Empirical results
5. Robustness checks and identifying
assumptions
6. Conclusions and policy implications

43. Climate Change and Civil War in Somalia
 Extreme weather events have become more frequent and
more severe due to climate change (IPCC 2011).
 Historical data suggest strong linkages between warming and
civil war in Africa (Burke et al. 2009; Hsiang et al. 2011).
 Economic factors drive civil conflict (Collier & Hoeffler 1998,
2004; Blattman & Miguel 2010).
 Economic channel (opportunity costs): Expected income from
participating in conflict relative to conventional activities
(Miguel et al. 2004; Bruckner & Ciccone 2010; Ciccone 2011)
 Do droughts fuel conflict through lowering the opportunity cost
for engaging in conflict?
 Given that the livestock sector is the mainstay of the economy,
are drought-induced shocks on livestock prices the main driver
of conflict onsets?

44. Civil Conflict-Drought Relationship
 Both droughts and violent civil conflicts have drastically increased
in Somalia in recent years.
 Evidence indicate that there is also a spatial overlap of (drought-
induced) hunger and poverty and occurrence of violence.
 Drought (and famine) is a slow-onset and large-area disaster,
affecting large shares of the rural population concurrently.
 Coping mechanisms are limited because of widespread poverty
and impaired clan support and due to absent public safety nets,
lacking credit and insurance markets, etc.
 Selling productive assets (particularly livestock) is often the only
remaining alternative.
 And, engaging in conflict to make an own living at the expense of
others may appear opportunistic for some people.
 Somalia’s stateless order facilitates self-seeking behavior.

45. Variation in Conflict Events and Droughts Over Time
Conflicts No. of violent conflicts per month Temperature Drought Index (TDI) TDI
100 0
80 -0.4
60 -0.8
40 -1.2
20 -1.6
0 -2
1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9 1 5 9
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

46. Conflicts and Drought-Induced Hunger
Violent conflicts by province, 1997- Estimated food security conditions, 4/2011
2010
Source: Based on ACLED data (2011). Source: FEWSNET/FSNAU (2012).

47. Livestock Prices-Drought Relationship
 In the case of Somalia, household incomes can be proxied by
changes in livestock prices.
 The livestock sector is central to the (rural) economy:
 About 40% of national GDP
 Almost 90% of agricultural GDP
 More than 50% of all export earners
 Source of food and income for more than 60% of the
population
 In pastoral livelihoods, 50-80% of the poor’s income
 Livestock prices are largely supply driven and thus prone to
weather shocks.
 During drought, price depression is amplified by market
information asymmetry.

48. Empirical Model (Opportunity Cost Approach)

49. Data and Measurement

50. Effects of Droughts on Violent Conflicts
Reduced-form regression:
No. of conflicts
Temperature Drought Index (TDI) 0.969***
(0.289)
F-value 2.03***
R-squared 0.081
Observations 2,340
No. of regions 18
→ More droughts lead to more violent conflicts.

51. Effects of Droughts on Livestock Prices and
Their Effects on Violent Conflicts
Two-stage regression
First stage Cattle price Goat price Camel price
Temperature Drought Index (TDI) -0.124*** -0.073*** 0.006
(0.035) (0.024) (0.033)
Second stage No. of conflicts
Cattle price -11.13***
(4.984)
Goat price -15.69***
(7.460)
Camel price 186.9
(996.1)
F-value (of the first stage) 5.62*** 5.01*** 6.87***
R-squared 0.345 0.258 0.284
Underidentification test 13.72*** 9.80*** 0.04
Weak identification test 12.81 9.04 0.03
Root mean square error 5.725 5.554 59.75
Observations 1,289 1,585 1,560
No. of regions 17 18 18

52. Livestock Price-Drought and
Livestock Price-Conflict (Semi-)Elasticities
Temperature Drought
No. of conflicts
Index (TDI)
Increase of TDI by one standard deviation
Cattle price -3.7% 0.58
Goat price -6.3% 0.70
Increase of TDI due to an additional drought month associated with a
temperature rise of 0.63⁰C
Cattle price -8.2% 1.28
Goat price -13.9% 1.55
IPCC A1B scenario: 1.8-4.3⁰C increase by 2100
 Increase in drought months by 3-7
 Increase in violent conflicts by 4-7

53. Robustness of Estimation
 Results are entirely driven by changes in temperature,
and the TDI is a good measure for identifying droughts.
 The model is robust to alternative specifications,
controlling for potential effects of time lags and leads,
time sensitivity, and seasonality.
 Neighborhood effects seem not to matter for conflict
onsets (given the available data)
 Normalization of livestock prices does not compromise
our results.

54. Validity of Identifying Assumptions
 Test statistics (F-test, weak instrumental var. test) suggest
that the TDI is a strong instrument of livestock prices.
 Yet the possibility that droughts affect conflicts through
channels of transmission other than livestock prices
(e.g., non-livestock income) cannot be ruled out
completely.
 However, tests of the validity of the exclusion restrictions
do not reveal effects transmitted through other channels.
 Possible violation: Effects of food aid on conflict
→ Biases into both directions are conceivable.
 But previous studies (Dorosh et al. 1995, Kirwan &
McMillan 2007, Mabuza et al. 2009) suggest weak links

55. Conclusions and Policy Implications
 Droughts fuel civil conflicts through livestock price shocks in
Somalia.
 Climate change adaptation strategies contribute to conflict
prevention.
 Building resilience through establishing effective coping
mechanisms and generating and diversifying income earning
opportunities is critical for both conflict prevention and climate
change adaptation.
 In the shorter run, income support, weather insurance schemes,
market interventions, and investments along the livestock value
chain can help to mitigate the impacts of droughts.
 More research is particularly needed to analyze practical policy
options and programs in terms of their effectiveness to
strengthen resilience in (semi-)pastoralist livelihoods.

56. Discussion and Ways Forward
Moderated by
Clemens Breisinger

57. Next steps
• Cross country analysis report
• Expansion of case study countries to 5
– Sudan: natural resources and conflict
– Lebanon: rural development and IDPs
– Yemen: conflict impact and options for transition
– Egypt: preventing conflict through subsidies?
– Syria:…
– Other:…
• ARC Atlas development – inclusion of IFAD data?
• Field trips with interviews

58. Natural resources & conflict in South
Kordofan and Sudan
1. How do changes in environmental conditions affect
conflict?
 Are pastoralist areas more vulnerable to clashes over the
use of pasterland among settled communities and agro-
pastoralist groups?
 How may the development objectives of mechanized
farming and local investment lead to tensions with
pastoralist communities and rain-fed small farmers?
2. How do massive human and animal displacements
affect environmental degradation and in turn, the
risk of conflict?

59. Food policies for conflict prevention:
The case of food subsidies in Egypt
 Motivation: Food policies may reduce the risk of
conflict but with a very high opportunity cost and with
possible negative effects in terms of obesity and
micronutrient malnutrition
 Research Questions:
(1) What is the impact of food policies on the risk of
conflict (violence)?
(2) Which policies are suitable to reduce conflict, create
inclusive growth, and improve people’s nutrition and
overall well-being?

60. Impacts of Conflict-induced Displacement on Inequality
among Refugees and the Hosting Population and Policy
Options for Inclusive Development
 Possible study country: Lebanon; refugees: Palestinians, Iraqis (Syrians)
 Exclusion is critical in terms of economic (e.g., markets, employment,
land), social (e.g., health, education, basic infrastructure), and political
aspects.
 Grievances occur among the refugee population, between refugees and
the hosting population, and among the hosting population living near the
camps (partly because of increased competition over resources).
 So, what are the impacts of displacement among and within the
populations? In particular, what are the effects on economic and social
inequality (i.e. potential source of new conflicts)?
 What are effective policy options for refugee integration and mutually
beneficial development?