This document presents a case study of a domestic violence homicide that occurred in 2010 in Florida. It provides background information on the victim, B.R., and perpetrator, C.S., who had recently ended their relationship. C.S. began stalking B.R. through texts, social media, and in-person. B.R. reported the stalking to police and filed for a restraining order, which was denied. A few days later, C.S. murdered B.R. at a motel before killing himself. The case highlights risk factors like stalking, relationship separation, and the perpetrator's obsession with the victim. It also emphasizes the importance of coordinated community responses and empowerment-based

1. Best Practices and
Community Collaborations
to Prevent Domestic
Violence Homicides
InVEST Web-Based Training

2. The following case study is based on a review of law
enforcement reports, newspaper articles, and a telephone
interview with a relative of the perpetrator. Out of respect for
the victim, the perpetrator and their families, the initials of the
victim and perpetrator have been changed.
Faces of Fatality Volume II

3. In August 2010, B.R., age 22, was murdered by a
former intimate partner, C.S. age 27, who then took his
own life. The murder/suicide occurred five days after
B.R.’s ex-parte petition for an Injunction for Protection
Against Dating Violence was denied, and C.S. had
been served with notice of a hearing for the court to
determine whether to issue a final injunction.
B.R. moved to Florida in 2007 to attend school. She
graduated in May 2010 and was employed at the time
of her murder.
Background on victim and perpetrator
C.S. was born the same year his father died. As a
young child his mother was unable to care for him, and
he was raised by his maternal grandmother. As a
teenager, C.S. was placed in foster care because he
would not go to school.

4. According to his relative, C.S was a good student but
did not want to attend school because he was being
bullied. C.S. completed his GED and a technical
course In 2001 he began working and remained
employed by the same company until the
murder/suicide. C.S.’s supervisor reported that he was
a very good worker, never called in sick and was very
quiet.
Relationships
In January 2010, B.R. and C.S. met through an online
social networking site and began dating in
February, 2010. B.R. ended the relationship in April
2010, but they continued to remain friends and were
occasionally intimate. B.R.’s roommate reported that
C.S. continued to contact B.R. saying he wanted to be
with her, and

5. that she thought C.S. was obsessed with B.R.
In April 2010, C.S. met another woman through a
different online social networking site and they began
dating. She told law enforcement that they went out
together every week and that C.S. made videos of
them having sex on his cell phone. In her statement to
police, she stated that C.S. did not drink or use
drugs, and that they both were seeing other people
but he never mentioned B.R. by name. She said she
never saw any weapons and he did not seem violent.
C.S. did tell her that he had been in trouble with the
law as a teenager and was having problems with a co-
worker. She eventually discovered that C.S. was on a
large number of other social networking sites and that
he was seeing several other women, sometimes just
hours before they went out together.

6. She said that in August, 2010, she needed a
roommate and C.S. asked about moving in with her.
When they went out the day before the
homicide, C.S. told her he wanted to move in as her
boyfriend, and that he became angry and “started
acting jealous” when she said he could move in as a
roommate, not as her boyfriend.
Stalking
In August, 2010, C.S. began following B.R. to her
apartment complex, and began sending her
photographs and videos of him having sex with other
women. He sent her texts, telling her he could not
live without her and that he had nothing else to live
for. B.R. told C.S. that she wanted no further contact
with him and blocked his number, but his sexually

7. explicit messages continued. During the police
investigation, one of B.R.’s co-workers reported that
C.S. made multiple threats to kill himself or B.R. if he
could not be with her.
Eight days prior to the homicide, B.R. called the police
because C.S. was watching her from his car in the
parking lot of her apartment. She told officers that his
presence was “weird” but said she was not afraid, just
that she thought he was acting “creepy.” B.R. advised
police about the text messages and images she
received from C.S., but did not want to pursue charges.
She asked the officers to tell him to leave and not to
contact her again. The officers escorted C.S. off the
property and told him if he returned or continued to text
or call her he would be charged with a crime.

8. The following day B.R. went to the police department
to report that C.S. was stalking her. The officer called
C.S. and told him that charges had been filed against
him and not to contact B.R. The officer reported that
C.S. became upset and denied everything. B.R.
completed a victim statement reporting that C.S. told
her he would not stop texting or following her until she
went back to him or he found out she was not seeing
other men. She wrote that she had repeatedly told
him to stop contacting her, but he continued to send
texts that were sexually explicit and saying he could
not live without her and had nothing else to live for.
C.S. told her he saw her leave another person’s
apartment and accurately described what she was
wearing. B.R. further wrote that she started receiving
text messages from strangers responding to an
advertisement on Craig’s List under “Intercourse.”

9. The ad included her cell phone number and that said
she was “all about fun and games.” She began to
receive voice mail messages that sounded like heavy
breathing. She then received another text that she had
another ad placed on Craig’s List. B.R. stated that she
believed C.S. was responsible for placing the ads. In
her statement, B.R. said that she did not feel safe and
wanted to press charges or file for an injunction.
B.R. filed an ex parte petition for a temporary
Injunction for Protection Against Dating Violence on
August 23, 2010. In the petition she stated that she
was afraid to come out of the house because C.S.
watched the apartment, followed her and made
harassing phone calls. She further stated that she had
“been violated on the internet.” B.R.’s ex parte petition
was denied the next day, a court date was set for a

10. hearing on a final injunction, and C.S. was served
with the petition and notice of hearing.
The following day, police met B.R. to have her sign
the stalking complaint. She told the officer that she
had not heard from C.S. since they called him and
that they must have “scared him off.” She did not tell
the officer that her petition for a temporary injunction
had been denied.
The Homicide/Suicide
The day before the homicide, C.S. checked into the
motel where their bodies would later be found. That
night, he went out with the two other women
mentioned previously. One of the women reported
that he told her he had to pick up a friend from work
at 6:00 am.

11. While getting ready for work the morning of the
murder (at 4:45 a.m.), B.R.’s roommate heard her
say “Oh my God, really!” The roommate thought B.R.
was either on the phone or responding to a text. B.R.
then told her she was leaving for work and would see
her there. The roommate became concerned when
B.R. did not arrive at work, and after returning to their
apartment to look for her and attempting to call her
cell phone, she called the police at 7:58 a.m. B.R.’s
parents called law enforcement from their home state
expressing their concern that it was unlike her not to
go to work without calling her employer.
Law enforcement issued an alert for B.R.’s car and
tag number and requested a “ping” of her cell phone.
While no one had been able to reach her, there were

12. two hits from the “ping” both from that morning – both
from within the county. Law enforcement continued to
search for both B.R. and C.S. Law enforcement found
C.S.’s car in the parking lot of an apartment complex in
the area.
The next morning the motel manager discovered B.R.
and C.S.’s bodies in a room in the motel C.S. checked
into the day before, when there was no response to
calls regarding checking out. C.S., who tested positive
for cocaine, apparently shot B.R. and then shot and
killed himself. B.R’s car was in the motel parking lot.

13. Factors in the case that often
indicate increased risk include:
 B.R had broken off the relationship
 C.S stalked and cyber-stalked B.R.
 B.R attempted to make the separation
permanent by reporting the stalking to police
and filing a petition for an Injunction for
Protection Against Dating Violence.
 C.S. was reportedly obsessed with B.R.
 C.S. threatened to kill B.R. and himself if she
would not resume the relationship.
 C.S. tested positive for cocaine

14. “Each and every domestic violence homicide is
devastating and represents far more than a statistic in a
report. These are people whose lives were taken at the
hands of someone they once trusted, someone they once
loved. These are families and friends dealing with the loss
of a loved one, these are children left without a parent, and
in some cases, without both parents. All deserve answers.
Through the work of the statewide domestic violence
fatality review team we are better able to understand these
fatalities and look for the answers these families deserve.
We are honored to partner with the Office of the Attorney
General and work with the incredible professionals that
make up the statewide team. Their dedication and
commitment, coupled with the local domestic violence
fatality review teams will make a difference in the work to
end domestic violence deaths.”
-Tiffany Carr, President/CEO, Florida Coalition Against Domestic Violence

15. Training Objectives

16.  To increase the knowledge about the
InVEST Project
 To understand the risk factors for domestic
violence homicide
 To understand the benefits and concerns of
using assessment tools.
 To learn about the Coordinated Community
Response (CCR) model

17. InVEST Program
The Intimate Violence Enhanced
Service Team is a unique statewide
program designed to provide
intensive advocacy and assistance to
individuals identified to be in
potentially lethal situations.

18. Statewide Initiative
Implemented in 2006 in the four counties with the highest
DV homicide rates (FDLE):
Hubbard House/Duval County (Initiated by Jacksonville in 1998)
Peaceful Paths/Alachua County Harbor House/Orange County
SafeHouse of Seminole/Seminole County Safespace Inc./St. Lucie County
In 2009 additional sites began InVEST
 The Haven of RCS/Pinellas County Sheriff’s Department
 Safe Place and Rape Crisis Center/Sarasota Police Department
 The Shelter for Abused Women and Children/Collier County Sheriff’s Office
 The Spring of Tampa Bay/Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office
 Sunrise of Pasco/Pasco County Sheriff’s Office
 Women In Distress/Broward County Sheriff’s Office

19. Partnerships
 Because at-risk survivors of domestic
violence are often afraid to seek
services, many times they do not receive
safety planning or risk assessments.
 InVEST relies on law enforcement and
domestic violence centers to work
together in order to identify potential
participants.

20.  Individuals identified as high risk for
homicide are assisted by domestic violence
advocates and trained law enforcement
officers.
 Services are at no cost, empowerment-based
and dependent on the survivor’s desire to
participate.
 InVEST participants receive services and
advocacy throughout civil and/or criminal
processes and until their situation becomes
safe or they choose to exit the program.

21. What is Different
about InVEST?

22. Enhanced Services through InVEST:
 Non-traditional approach to advocacy by
community-based domestic violence
centers.
 Center initiates communication with the
survivor
 Abbreviated risk assessment conducted on
scene by law enforcement (voluntary for
survivor)
 Daily review of police reports using specified
criteria.

23. InVEST services are FREE and confidential.
Participation is completely voluntary.
 Services include:
Safety Planning and Domestic Violence Advocacy
Assistance in filing for Victim’s Compensation and
Relocation
Assistance in filing for a Domestic Violence
Injunction
Referrals for legal assistance
Information about other certified domestic
violence center services such as emergency
shelter and support groups.

24. Partnerships are guided by a
Memorandum of Understanding
 Teams include advocates, officers, and
civil/criminal systems working in a
comprehensive system of survivor safety
through batterer intervention models.
 Law Enforcement works to enforce batterer
accountability while DV advocates work to
create safety strategies with the survivor.
 Heavily rely on Coordinated Community
Response (CCR) models

25. Domestic Violence (DV)
Homicide in Florida

26. The Faces of Fatality June 2012 Report
 192 women, children and men lost their lives
during 2011 in Florida as a result of domestic
violence
 The FDLE Uniform Crime Report reflected that
domestic violence simple stalking increased
65.1%, and stalking is widely recognized as an
underreported offense. Stalking is a common
precursor to domestic violence/dating violence
homicide.
 In 21% of cases, there were known allegations by
the decedent of stalking by the perpetrator prior to
the homicide.

27. Domestic Violence (DV) Homicide in
Florida continued…
 92% of incidents involved a firearm.
 94% of perpetrators were male and most involved
males killing their female intimate partners.
 74% were intimate partner murder-suicides.
Females were the victims in 96% of these
intimate partner murder-suicides.
 Children witnessed the murder-suicide or found
the bodies of slain family members in 43% of the
cases.
 39 of the cases involved multiple murder victims;
of those, 34 were firearm related murder-suicides.

28. Coordinated Community
Response (CCR)

29. Coordinated Community Response
◦ The role each agency provides is
specific and specialized.
◦ CCR efforts are ongoing.
◦ Training and evaluation of the
coordinated community response is
ongoing.
◦ The outcome is focused on the shared
goals of survivor safety and batterer
accountability.

30. There are four key
beliefs that underlie the
commitment to a CCR:
The Wisconsin Coalition Against Domestic Violence CCR Toolkit

31.  Nolonger seen as the victim’s
problem.
 This
belief can mobilize the
community to ask what they
can do instead.

32.  Criminaljustice
professionals prepare to
move forward in holding
offenders accountable on the
evidence in the case not on
views/beliefs about the
victim.

33.  Communities should extend
outreach to victims in a way
that is safe instead of laying
the responsibility on the
victim to initiate reaching
out for services.

34.  Coordinated response to domestic
violence is also a form of CRIME
PREVENTION. Through the
coordinated response, the general
community becomes aware and
educated about the nature of the
crimes and the role society has in
dismantling all forms of domestic
violence.

35. POTENTIAL LETHALITY OF
STALKING
 An Intimate Partner Violence
study revealed that 76% of
women murdered and 85% of
attempted murders, the victim
had been stalked by their
partner beforehand.

36. CCR work in response to
enhancing the safety of
stalking victims and holding
offenders accountable
requires effective strategies
such as:

37. Collaborations among:
◦ Law Enforcement
◦ Prosecutors
◦ Victim Service Providers
◦ Criminal Justice Agencies
◦ Agencies serving children and
youth
◦ Faith Communities
◦ Animal Service Personnel

38. A Systemic Response
 Educate – Increase key partners and
victim awareness of stalking behavior and
risks
 Investigate – Identify patterns and modes
of stalking
 Communicate – Develop safe information
sharing and tracking systems.
 Prosecute – Increase criminal justice
response and hold offenders accountable
for their stalking behavior.

39. Empowerment-based Advocacy
The survivor has the best idea about how the
abuser thinks and what he is capable of.
Unless it is being publicly displayed (i.e. through
police reports), the most current information about a
batterer may not be known.
Someone with “all the signs” might never perform
lethal acts and someone with no outward signs may.
Showing independence: new job or promotion, car
purchase, start school.
Why do these increase someone’s risk?

40. Our Traditional Focus
 has been on helping survivors of
domestic violence leave their
relationships. This focus often
leads survivors who contact
agencies to believe we have
nothing to offer them beyond
emergency shelter.

41. Advocacy Beyond Leaving
 Contact might be part of a safety strategy.
Leaving is often a high risk decision.
 Many survivors have no choice about contact,
ordered by a court to share decision-making
about the children and to see him each time he
picks up the children for visitation.
 Even if visitation exchanges are made through
a visitation center or third party, a survivor
will still be in contact through her children as
she monitors how they are doing and listens to
them talk about visits with their father.

42. Approach to Advocacy
Please click on the link below this slide
and read the document titled, “Advocacy
Beyond Leaving.”

43. Ongoing Advocacy will
include:
Providing information on financial support available for
transportation
Providing advocacy in the injunction process, on
relocation, and with victims of crimes application
Providing advocacy with the criminal justice system or
any civil court process; interviews with law
enforcement; interviews with the local State Attorney’s
Office when applicable
Providing a 911 cell phone
Providing necessary legal referrals and other important
immediate resources (food, TANF, housing).

44. The most DANGEROUS and
INTIMIDATING time…
 The period between arrest and trial
can be especially dangerous and
intimidating for victims in cases of
intimate partner violence. The risk
may be even higher if the batterer
sees the case as evidence that the
victim is trying to leave the
relationship.

45. RISK ASSESSMENTS
 There are a variety of risk assessments
that are used to determine re-assault and
potential for homicide.
 These assessments give us a way of
communicating indications of potential
higher risk.
 Always be aware that there is no true
measurability or predictions as to when
someone may kill.

46. A REALISTIC APPROACH:
 A batterer may become lethal without
notice. A batterer does not decide
overnight to kill.
 Using an assessment may be helpful, but
it cannot determine up-to-the-minute
information about a batterer.
 We cannot predict what will happen, but
we want her to be aware of the danger of
homicide.

47. DANGER ASSESSMENT (DA)
 A tool used by advocates and community
partners to evaluate the likelihood of re-assault
in the short term or lethality in the long term.
Danger assessment is a continuous process of
risk management.
◦ Developed in 1985 to support the autonomy of
survivors as the expert in their situations. In 1989,
strangulation (often incorrectly referred to as
choking) was added to the assessment.
◦ The Duluth Model was the first organized community
collaborative response effort.

48. IMPORTANT:
FCADV recommends that full risk
assessments are completed only with an
advocate from a certified domestic violence
center because;
1) advocate privilege in Florida is specific in its
protections and,
2) any information from a report can be found
in public records or discovery…
The safety and privacy of the survivor may be
compromised if full risk assessments are
completed by non-certified domestic violence
center advocates.

49. Therefore,
 The following information about risk assessments
is provided to help community partners
understand the dynamics of risk assessments.
 Three recommended risk assessment questions
will follow to be used by law enforcement and
other InVEST community partners.
 Only Certified Domestic Violence Center
Advocates should be conducting full risk
assessments.

50. LAW
ENFORCEMENT
BEST PRACTICES
 911 Calls
 If the victim chooses to speak to the
hotline, please step away from the
victim so that his/her confidentiality can
be maintained.
 DO NOT inform the batterer of the Risk
Assessment.

51. FCADV recommended risk
assessments on scene:
 Has he/she ever used a weapon against you or
threatened you with a weapon?
 Has the perpetrator threatened to kill you or your
children?
 Do you think that the perpetrator is capable of
killing you?
 Yes to any of the three questions should result in an
automatic referral to InVEST/enhanced DV services.

52. Survivor Information
 Assure that you have the most up-to-date
contact information for the survivor.
 Do not rely on any information that may be in
the system already.
 Ask what address and phone number she may be
reached at.
 Ask the survivor if it’s safe to leave a message.

53. Emphasize necessity for
elevated alertness.
 Explain why you think she is at heightened
risk for re-assault or homicide.
 Ask how she feels about the information
you’ve shared with her.
 Be open to having a conversation about the
risks and benefits of getting additional
support.

54. Ongoing Safety Plans
10 Common Ideas to Address
1. How to get away if there is an emergency
2. How to get help if leaving is not an option
3. Where to go once she is away (if leaving)
4. How to be secure at a new location
5. How to keep a link to helpers/support network
6. How to keep children and pets safe
7. Protecting “what is yours” (bank accounts, email
accounts, personal property)
8. Safety at work and leisure
9. Anticipating/responding to batterer’s actions: who
to call, how to keep a paper trail of incidents and
the dates and times they occurred
10. Asking about technology

55. Remember…

56. Perception, Perception, Perception
 If the woman is very afraid and says she will
be killed or may be killed, then the
possibility of life-threatening violence is
present.
 It appears that the best approach to
screening for life-threatening violence is a
combination of the woman’s perspective and
the advocate’s assessment.
Safety Planning with Battered Woman: Complex lives/Difficult choices
Jill Davies, Eleanor Lyon and Diane Monti-Catania, 1998

57. THE PLAN belongs to the survivor.
 If
she doesn’t prepare it and make it
her own, it will not work.
 Itshould be reviewed as often as
there is a change such as court
rulings or filing for a divorce.
 Milestones that relates to the batterer.

58. Batterer behavior can not be
scientifically proven; any
batterer may become lethal at
any time.

59. “Determining key risk factors, over
and above a history of domestic
violence, that contribute to the
abuse that escalates to murder will
help us identify and intervene with
battered women who are most at
risk.”
- Jacquelyn C. Campbell, PhD, RN
Anna D. Wolf Endowed Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs ,Johns
Hopkins University School of Nursing

60. “Battered women are usually the best
evaluators of the potential for lethal
violence because they generally have
more information about the batterer
than anyone other than the batterer
himself.”
Barbara Hart
Minnesota Center Against Violence and Abuse

61. “Success is measured by
our efforts to reduce
isolation and to improve
options for safety.”
Family Violence Prevention Fund
http://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/userfiles/file/HealthCare/FVPF%20July%2029th%20Webinar.pdf

62. ACTIVITY FOR YOUR CCR
 Writedown 2 action steps or
things you and your agency can
do to work more closely together
with other agencies to implement
a coordinated community
response that will increase
survivor safety and offender
accountability and share it with
your CCR team.

63. Questions?
For additional information please contact:
FCADV’s Statewide InVEST Coordinator
(850) 425-2749
www.fcadv.org