241585426 cases-vii

Get Homework/Assignment Done
Homeworkping.com
Homework Help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Research Paper help
Online Tutoring
click here for freelancing tutoring sites
FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D. VALISNO, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, and VICENCIO CAYABA, respondents.
Francisco A. Lava, Jr. for petitioners.
Diosdado B. Ramirez for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; RULES OF COURT; APPLICATION IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS IN A SUPPLETORY
CHARACTER OR WHENEVER PRACTICABLE OR CONVENIENT ALLOWED. — The Land Registration Act (Act 496) does not provide for a pleading
similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, how ever, allow s the application of the rules contained therein in land
registration proceedings in a suppletory character or wheneverpracticable and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of the land registration
case, this Court in Duran vs. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the application for registration of therein appellants upon a motion to dismiss
filed by five (5) oppositors, it having been indubitably show n that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be
registered in appellant's name had previously been registered in the names of the oppositors. To have allow ed the registration proceeding to run its
usual course w ould have been a mere exercise in futility.
2.ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA; REQUISITES. — There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For said
principle to apply: (a) the former judgment must be final, (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
parties, (c) it must be a judgment on the merits and (d) there must be betw een the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of
cause of action. There is, betw een the registration case under consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUSION OF A CO-OWNER DOES NOT RESULT IN A DIFFERENCE OF PARTIES; CASE AT BAR. — The inclusion of private
respondent Cayaba's co-ow ner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a difference in parties betw een the tw o
cases. One right of a co-ow ner is to defend in court the interests of the co-ow nership. (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th
Edition, p. 258) Thus, w hen private respondent Cayaba defended his ow nership over the land in question, he w as doing so in behalf of the co-
ow nership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove ow nership w as the deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr.
Epifanio Q. Verano in his and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE AND THE SAME CAUSE SHOULD NOT BE TWICE LITIGATED ALTHOUGH TWO DIFFERENT FORMS OF ACTION ARE
EMPLOYED; CASE AT BAR. — While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief
therein raise the issue of ow nership. In effect, it is in the nature of an action reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently,
betw een the tw o cases there is identity of causes of action because in accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ow nership and the
same is true in registration cases. Registration of title in one's name is based on ow nership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude
other persons fromow nership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directed against particular persons,
w hile in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is directed against the w hole w orld. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. In fact, this Court
held in Dais v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, (51 Phil. 896) that the answ er in a cadastral proceedings partake of an action to recover title, as real
rights are involved therein. It is only the form of action w hich is different. "But the employment of tw o different forms of action, does not enable one to
escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be tw ice litigated."
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT WHICH DECIDED THE FIRST CASE DOES NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE OF EQUAL JURISDICTION WITH COURT
WHICH DECIDED THE SECOND CASE. — It does not matter that the first case w as decided by a court of general jurisdiction, w hile the second case is
being heard by one of a limited jurisdiction, such as a registration court. It is enough that the court w hich decided the first case on the merits had validly
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite of res judicata.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULING IN THE ABELLERA CASE; ABANDONED. — If, as the Abellera case, 74 Phil. 284, held that res judicata can be set up
by a claimant to defeat the alleged right of another claimant, w hat usefulpurposewould be served by allow ing a party to present evidence of ow nership
over the land sought to be registered w hen the finalresult w ould necessarily be in favor of the claimant w ho had set up the defense of res judicata? And
supposing the land registration court finds that the party against w hom the principle of res judicata operates does have a better right or title to the land,
w hat happens to the principle ofres judicata? Can a court sitting as a land registration court in effect, annul a final judgment of another court of general
jurisdiction? To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and convenience, is to grant the dismissal of either the application for
registration or the opposition thereto, once it has been indubitably show n, as in the case at bar, that one or another is barred by a prior judgment. The
ruling in the Abellera case, should therefore be, as it is, hereby abandoned.
D E C I S I O N
FERNAN, J p:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari w ith prayerfor a temporary restraining order are tw o [2] orders issued by respondent judge in Land Registration
Case No. Branch II-N204 of the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, entitled, "Application for Registration of Title, Vicenc io Q.
Cayaba, Applicant, versus Flordeliza Valisno and Honorio D. Valisno, Oppositors," the order dated July 2,1980, dismissing the opposition filed by
petitioners on the ground of res judicata, and the order dated September 19, 1980, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follow s:
On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and Honorio Valisno purchased from the legal heirs of Agapita V. Blanco, namely, Guillermo,
Guillermo, Jr., Manuel and Rosario, all surnamed Blanco, tw o parcels of land, particularly described as follow s:
[a]"a tract of land situated at Sitio Sisim, Barangay Cabaruan, Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of
Five Thousand (5,000) square meters or fifty (50) meters facing the Provincial Road by one hundred (100) meters long; bounded
on the North by Pedro del Rosario, on the South by Alberto Tungangui, on the East by the Provincial Road; and on the West, by
Terreno del Estado, now Matias del Rosario;"
and,
[b]"a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of Six Thousand Tw o Hundred
Fifty (6,250) square meters or fifty (50) meters at the east side by one hundred tw enty-five (125) meters at the North and South;
bounded on the north by Matias del Rosario, on the south by Alberto Tungangui, on the east by Agapita Blanco and on the w est
by Cauayan Diversion Road and Matias del Rosario. " [Annex "B", Petition, pp. 41-42, Rollo.]
Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described parcels of land in their name for taxation purposes and exercised exclusive possession thereof in
the concept of ow ners by installing as caretaker one Fermin Lozano, w ho had his house built thereon.
On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba, claiming to be the ow ner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his
and one Bienvenido G. Noriega's favor on June 30, 1967 by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano, ousted Fermin Lozano from poss ession of the land. He
subsequently erected a six-door apartment on said land.
On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela a complaint against private respondent for recovery of
possession of said parcels of land. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Branch II-895, w as in due time resolved in favor of petitioners w ho w ere
declared ow nersthereof, On appeal, how ever, by private respondent to the then Court of Appeals, the appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R,
the appellate court in a decision promulgated on January 19,1978, reversed the decision of the low er court and dismissed the complaint of petitioners on
a finding that:
"Firstly, the 'land in question described in the complaint and sketched in Exhibit C . . . by Dr. Guillermo Blanco,' is completely
different from the land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of the appellant, their respective area and boundaries being completely
dissimilar.

"Clearly, w e failto see anything in the evidence of the appellees showing that their property encroaches, much less covers that of
the property presently occupied by the appellant, except the self -serving sketch prepared by the appellees' ow n w itness, Dr.
Blanco, We refuse to give any w eight to this piece of evidence because it w as prepared by someone w ho 'has an incentive to
exaggerate or give false color to his statement or to suppress or prevent the truth or to state w hat is false. [Deering v. Wisona
Harvester Workers, 155 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 238].
"Therefore, as the land occupied by the appellant has not been successfully identified w ith that described in the complaint, the
instant action should have been dismissed outright, in view of the provision of Article 434 of the New Civil Code w hich reads .
'Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on
the w eakness of the defendant's claim.'
as w ell as the doctrine enunciated in a long time of decision [sic] starting from Lim Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 343.
"Secondly, it is undisputed that the appellant is the present occupant of the land since he purchased the same from Tomasita F.
Verano on June 30, 1967, having constructed a six-door apartment in the premises w hich he lets to both transients and residents
of the locality. Being the actual possessor of the property, he, therefore, possesses it w ith a just title and he need not show or
prove w hy he is possessing the same. [Arts. 433 and 541 of the New Civil Code].
"Finally, betw een the evidence of the appellees and that of the appellant, We unhesitatingly choose the latter in the matter of
identifying the property in question because it is a vicinity plan [Exhibit "8"] show ing the position of the land in relation not only to
the properties adjoining the same but also w ith know n boundaries and landmarks in the area. On the other hand, the appellees'
evidence, particularly the description in Tax Declaration No. 17009, is unreliable, since the area and boundaries of the property
are mere estimations, reached thru pure quess-w ork. [Smith Bell & Co. vs. Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 879]. Expressing the same
sentiment, one noted authority states:
'The proposition that in identifying a particular piece of land its boundaries and not the area are the main factors to be considered
holds true only w hen the boundaries given are sufficiently certain and the identity of the land proved by the boundaries clearly
indicates that an erroneous statement concerning the area can be disregarded.' [Bilog, Effective Judicial Implementation of Land
and Forestry Laws, Fourth Advanced Course for Municipal Courts (1971), cit. Paterno v. Salud, L-15620, September 30, 1963]."
(Annex "C-1," Petition, pp. 5355, Rollo.]
A petition for review on certiorari of said decision filed by petitioners before this Court w as denied due course.
Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent filed before the Court of First Instance of Isabela an application for registration in his name of
the title of the lands in question, basing his entitlement thereto on the aforementioned deed of sale as w ell as the decision of the appellate court in CA-
G.R. No. 60142-R, [Annex "A", Petition, pp. 32-40, Rollo).
On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the application. [Annex "B", Petition, p. 41, Rollo] Private respondent, how ever, moved for the
dismissal of said opposition on the ground that the same is barred by a prior judgment, i.e., the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R.
Despite the opposition of petitioners to said motion to dismiss, the low er court issued the first of the assailed orders dismissing the petitioner's opposition
on the ground of res judicata [Annex "E", Petition, p. 83, Rollo] When their motion for reconsideration w as denied, petitioners filed the instant petition,
raising as grounds therefor the follow ing:
"RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS'
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, WHICH IS HIGHLY IRREGULAR IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISREGARDING THE PRECEDENT OF ABELLERA VS. FAROL THAT RES
JUDICATACANNOT BE SET UP IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT THE REQUISITES FOR RES JUDICATA EXIST IN THE CASE
AT BAR, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A MOTION TO DISMISS OPPOSITION IS PROPER IN A LAND REGISTRATION
CASE, AND THATRES JUDICATA MAY BE RAISED IN SAID MOTION TO DISMISS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS HEREIN OF THEIR DAY IN COURT, SPECIALLY IN
THE FACE OF STRONG INDICATIONS, ALREADY IN THE RECORD, THAT RESPONDENT CAYABA IS ACTUALLY TRYING
TO SECURE TITLE TO WHAT REALLY IN THE LAND OF THE PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING HIS ORDERS OF JULY 2, 1980 [ANNEX "E"] AND SEPTEMBER 19, 1980 [ANNEX "H"]. (pp. 18-19, Rollo)
On April 1, 1981, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their briefs. Petitioners did so on August 26, 1981. Private
respondent, on the other hand, failed to file his brief w ithin the given period w hich expired on October 9,1981. Thus, the case w as considered submitted
for decision w ithout the brief of private respondent.
On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the motion to amend application filed by Bienvenido G. Noriega, Sr., thru counsel, in LRC Case No. Br. II-
N-204, praying that he be included as co-applicant to the land sought to be registered.
In the course of our study of pertinent jurisprudence, We observe that the situation obtaining in the case at bar, i,e., a motion to dismiss the opposition
having been filed and more importantly, granted, is indeed unique and peculiar. But w hile this may be so, it is not highly irregular as petitioners w ould
characterize it.
Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, how ever, allow sthe application of the rules contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory character or w henever practicable
and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of
the application far registration of therein appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been indubitably show n that the court a
quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be registered in appellants' name had previously been registered in the names of the
oppositors. To have allow ed the registration proceeding to run its usual course w ould have been a mere exercise in futility. The same consideration
applies to the case at bar.

It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answ er w ith a counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the c ounterclaim w ould be
considered a complaint, this time w ith the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, w ho becomes def endant in the counterclaim
may either then answ er the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. The latter choice w as w hat respondent
Cayaba opted for. Although as We have earlier said, such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity that petitioners
complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it being unauthorized.
The case of Abellera vs. Farol 74 Phil. 284, heavily relied upon by petitioners needs re-evaluation. In said case, Mr. Justice Bocobo, speaking for the
Court, ruled that "w hile in a cadastralcase, res judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of another claimant, nevertheless,
prior judgment can not be set up in a motion to dismiss." Concurring in said opinion w ere then Chief Justice Yulo and Associate Justices Moran and
Ozaeta. Mr. Justice Paras dissented, saying "in my opinion, Rule 132 in connection w ith Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, instead of prohibiting expressly
authorizes the low er court in land registration or cadastral proceedings to entertain a motion for dismissal on the ground of res judicata or prescription,
Of course, the dismissal of petitioner's claim w ill not necessarily or automatically mean adjudication of title to the individual respondents but it w ill
certainly facilitate the consideration of their claims w hich cease to be contested. Prompt disposal of cases or such claims is the main purpose of said
rules. Let there be no retrogression in the application of sound rules and doctrines." (Ibid, pp. 286-287) In support of his opinion, Justice Paras cited the
cases of Menor v. Quintana, 56 Phil, 657, Versoza v. Nicolas, 29 Phil. 425 and Santiago v. Santos, 54 Phil. 619, w herein the Court invariably ruled that a
"finaljudgment in an ordinary civil case determining the ow nership of certain land is res judicata in a registration case w hen the parties and the property
are the same as in the former case. " [Menor v. Quintana, supra.]
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must
be betw een the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. [Carandang v, Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The
decision in C.A. G.R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court w hich had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
There is, betw een the registration case under consideration and the previous civilaction for recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-ow ner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a
difference in parties betw een the tw o cases, One right of a co-ow ner is to defend in court the interests of the co-ow nership, [Paras, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus, w hen private respondent Cayaba defended his ow nership over the land in question, he w as
doing so in behalf of the co-ow nership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove ow nership w as the deed of sale
executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is his and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.
With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that the land sought to be recovered by petitioners are the very same parcels of land being
sought to be registered in Cayaba's and Noriega's names.
While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise the issue of
ow nership, In effect, it is in the nature of an action reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently, betw een the tw o cases there
is identity of causes of action because in action reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ow nership and the same is true in registration
cases. Registration of title in one's name is based on ow nership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other persons from
ow nership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directed against particular persons, w hile in the latter
proceedings, the exclusion is directed against the w hole w orld. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. In fact, this Court held in Dais v.
Court of First instance of Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the answ ersin a cadastralproceedings partake of an action to recover title, as real rights are involved
therein. It is only the form of action w hich is different. "But the employment of tw o different forms of action, does not enable one to escape the operation
of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be tw ice litigated." [Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 590 and the cases cited
therein, Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 76; Aguilar v. Tuason Co., 22 SCRA 690; Albano v. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411; Sumarariz v. Development Bank of
the Phil., 21 SCRA 1378; Abes, et al. v. Rodil, et al., 17 SCRA 824; Cayco, et al. v. Cruz et al., 106 Phil. 68; Ma. Garcia de Lim Toco v. Go Pay, 81 Phil.
258; San Diego v. Cardona, et al., 70 Phil. 281].
It does not matter that the first case wasdecided by a court of general jurisdiction, w hile the second case is being heard by one of a limited jurisdiction,
such as a registration court, It is enough that the court w hich decided the first case on the merits had validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite of res judicata.
If, as the Abellera case, supra, held that res judicata can be set up by a claimant to defeat the alleged right of another claimant, w hat useful purpose
w ould be served by allow ing a party to present evidence of ow nership over the land sought to be registered w hen the finalres ult w ould necessarily be in
favor of the claimant w ho had set up the defense of res judicata? And supposing the land registration court finds that the party against w hom the
principle of res judicata operates does have a better right or title to the land, w hat happens to the principle of res judicata? Can a court sitting as a land
registration court in effect, annul a final judgment of another court of general jurisdiction?
To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and convenience, is to grant the dismissal of either the application for registration or the
opposition thereto, once it has been indubitably show n, as in the case at bar, that one or the other is barred by a prior judgment. The ruling in the
Abellera case, should therefore be, as it is, hereby abandoned.
Petitioners complain that by dismissing their opposition, respondent court had denied them their day in court. It is w ellto remind petitioners that they had
their day in court in Civil Case No. Branch II-895 as w ell as C.A. G.R. No. 60142-R, w here their claim over the land in question w as fully aired and
ventilated.
The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent Cayaba [in behalf of the co-ownership] with respect to the land under consideration had been put to
rest in C.A. G.R. No. 60142-R. Said decision having attained finality, the same remains the law of the case betw een the parties.
Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in dismissing petitioners' opposition, such dismissal must be aff irmed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
DOROTEA DAIS, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAPIZ, ET AL., respondents.

Jose Y. Torres, for petitioners.
Jose Altavas, for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. HEIRS; RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN AN ACTION INVOLVING INHERITANCE. — The heirs have the right to intervene in an action
involving some of the property of the hareditas jacens of a decedent w hen they believe that the acts of the judicial administrator are prejudicial to
their interests.
2. CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. — Act No. 496, know n as the Land Registration Act, contains no
special rule as to the procedure to be follow ed in contesting the sufficiency of answ ers in cadastral registration proceedings, or in determining
w hether their dismissal w ill lie; therefore the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable.
3. ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF ANSWERS IN CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; GROUNDS. — When tw o persons claim the ow nership of one
and the same cadastrallot, both of them are claimants and opponents at the same time, and their respective answ ers cannot be dismissed by the
court except upon the grounds mentioned in sections 101 and 127 of Act No. 190, to w it, default at the trial, failure to prosecute, or defectsprovided
by the law as grounds for demurrer.
4. ID.; ANSWERS; DISMISSAL; JURISDICTION. — In ordering that the answ er presented by the judicial administrator of an intestate
estate in the name of the heirs be stricken out, notw ithstanding the latters' objection and for a cause not provided by law as a ground for dismissal,
the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction, for it is necessary not only that it have jurisdiction over the subject matter in litigation and the parties
but that it have authority over each and every one of the essential particulars of the action.
D E C I S I O N
VILLA-REAL, J p:
This is a petition for a w rit of certiorari filed by Dorotea Dais et al., against the Court of First Instance of Capiz, Seventeenth Judicial
District, Jose Altavas and Jose Morente, in w hich it is prayed that an order be issued to the respondent judge requiring him to certify and transmit to
this court an exact and complete transcription of the record, decision and proceedings in cadastralproceeding No. 18 (G. L. R. O. Record No. 714),
entitled the Director of Lands vs. Justo Abiertas et al., concerning the portion referring to lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136, for review by this Supreme
Court; and that after hearing both parties, judgment be rendered declaring the judicial orders of the Court of First Instance of Capiz dated July 25,
1927, August 8, 1927, and September 22, 1927, as w ell as the judgment-rendered by the same court on September 29, 1927, and all other
proceedings had in connection therew ith, void and of no effect.
The facts appearing fromthe pleadings and documentary evidence attached thereto, presented in this case, are hereinafter set forth in
the order of their occurrence.
In the course of the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Serapion Dais, civil case No. 988 of the Court
of First Instance of Capiz, Manuel Arnaldo w as appointed administrator of the estate. For the payment of some of the debts of the deceased, said
administrator w as authorized to sellcertain parcels of land of said estate; w hereupon he sold lots Nos. 1132 and 1136 in the formprescribed by the
law , to Antonio Habana, w hich sale w as approved by the court on February 15, 1926. The herein petitioners or some of them objected to such
approval and filed a motion for reconsideration on March 6, 1926, w hich w as denied on March 10,1926. They appealed accordingly on April 6,
1927, and the same w as denied on August 1, 1927, on the ground that it w as not presented w ithin the time prescribed by section 783 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, because more than tw enty days had elapsed since the orders appealed from had been entered. It appears from the order
denying said appeal that the appellants contend that the time w ithin w hich said appeal should be taken must be counted from the date of the
notification of said orders and not from the date on w hich they w ere entered.
On May 20, 1926, Manuel Arnaldo filed an answ er in the cadastral proceeding No. 18 (G. L. R. O. Record No. 714), in the name of
Serapion Dais's heirs, claiming title to lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136 of said proceeding. Jose Morente also filed an answ erclaiming title to lots Nos.
1132 and 1136. Jose Altavas also filed an answ er claiming title to lot No. 626.
Before the hearing of the case, and in pursuant of a motion of the claimants Jose Altavas and Jose Morente, respectively, w ith the
consent of Manuel Arnaldo, as judicial administrator of Serapion Dais's intestate estate, the respondent court ordered the answ ers presented by
said administrator in the name of Serapion Dais's heirs w ith respect to lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136 stricken out.
Dissatisfied w ith this order striking out their answ er, the heirs of Serapion Dais presented a motion for reconsideration, objecting to the
motions to strike out their answ er and praying that the order of July 25, 1927, granting said motions, be annulled. The motion for reconsideration
being denied, the movants, heirs to Serapion Dais, took formal exception to said order, and gave notice of their intention to appeal to this court,
and, to perfect their appeal, filed the proper bill of exceptions, w hich w as disapproved by the court on the motion of claimants Jose Altavas and
Jose Morente.
After the afore-mentioned answers presented by the Judicial administrator Manuel Arnaldo on behalf of the heirs of Serapion Dais anent
lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136, had been stricken fromthe record of the cadastralproceeding, the court proceeded to the hearing of the answ ers of
Jose Altavas and Jose Morente in regard to the said lots, after w hich the respondent court rendered a judgment on September 29, 1927,
adjudicating lot No. 626 to the spouses Jose Altavas and Socorro Laserna, and lots Nos. 1132 and 1136 to Jose Morente and Patria Altavas.
There are tw o principal questions to be determined in the present instance, to w it:
1. Have the petitioners the right to intervene in a cadastralproceeding for the purpose of objecting to the striking out of an answ er filed by
the judicial administrator of the intestacy of the petitioners' predecessor in interest, claiming several parcels of land as the property of said estate,
w hen the aforementioned administrator consents to its being stricken out?
2. And in case they have, has the respondent judge exceeded his pow ers in ordering that the answ er be stricken from the record, over
the objection of the said petitioners?

In relation to the first question, article 657 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 657. The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death."
And article 661 of the same Code says:
"ART. 661. Heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death."
Interpreting the above quoted legal provisions, this court has held in various decisions that the rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death; in other w ords, the heirs immediately succeed to the dominion, ow nership and possession of the
property of their predecessor. (Quison vs. Salud, 12 Phil., 109; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434;
Beltran vs. Doriano, 32 Phil., 66; Bondad vs Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Velazco vs. Vizmanos, 45 Phil., 675; vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317.) The fact that the
law provides for the appointment of a legal administrator for the liquidation of the deceased's property, and the partition of his hareditas
jacens among his heirs, does not deprive the heirs of the right to intervene in the administration of said property for the protection of their interests.
On the contrary section 714 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in connection w ith section 722 of the same Code, requires that the w ritten consent and
approval of the heirs be obtained for the sale of the deceased's property in order to pay his debts and the costs of administration. This provision
show s that, notw ithstanding the appointment of a judicial administrator, the heirs have a right to intervene w hen they believe the administrator's
acts are prejudicial to their interest. And it cannot be said that the administrator answ ers w ith his bond for any damage he may cause to the
interests of the estate, since such bond might not be sufficient to cover said damages.
For the reasons above stated, w e are of opinion that the heirs have a right to intervene in a cause involving certain property of the
decedent's hareditas jacenswheneverthey believe the legal administrator's acts are prejudicial to their interests. The second question to determine
is w hether or not the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering that the answ ers filed by the legal administrator in the name of the heirs
be stricken out, said administrator having consented against the opposition of said heirs.
In determining the first question, w e have seen that the heirs have a right to intervene w hen they believe that the acts of the judicial
administrator of the property of the hareditas jacens of their predecessorin interest are prejudicial to their interests. The petitioners have made use
of this right in the present proceedings, opposing the dismissal and taking exception to the order granting the motion filed to that end.
The answ ersin cadastralproceedings partake of the characterof an action to recover title, as real rights are claimed therein. According
to section 10 of Act No. 2347, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are of a suppletory nature in land registration cases. Since Act No. 496,
know n as Land Registration Act, contains no specialrule as to the procedure to be follow ed in impugning the sufficiencyof the answers in cadastral
proceedings nor in determining w hether or not they must be dismissed, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable. According to
the said Code, complaints can only be dismissed by a failure to prosecute, by default, by abandonment, or by defects provided by the law as
grounds for a demurrer (Secs. 101 and 127, Act No. 190). When tw o personsclaim the ow nership of one and the same cadastral lot, both of them
are claimants and opponents at the same time, and their respective answers cannot be dismissed by the court w ithout the presence of any of said
circumstances; and a motion for dismissal that is not based on any of said grounds does not confer jurisdiction on the court to dismiss the
complaint, and if it does so, it exceeds its pow ers.
In this case, the motion presented by Jose Altavas, claimant of lot No. 626, praying for the dismissal of the answ er filed by the judicial
administrator, Manuel Arnaldo, on behalf of the heirs of the deceased Serapion Dais, w ith reference to the same lot, is based on the allegation that
said lot never pertained to the mass of property of said decedent, and that it had never been in the possession of said administrator. The motion
presented by Jose Morente for the dismissal of the answ ers presented by the judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Serapion Dais on
behalf of the latter's heirs, w ith reference to lots Nos. 1132 and 1136, is based on the claim that said lots w ere sold by the said administrator w ith
the approvaland authority of the court. Neither of these grounds is found among those mentioned by the present law of civil procedure as causes
for dismissal. It is true that the judicial administrator agreed to the dismissal asked for, but the heirs, in w hose name he had presented said
answ ers, objected to it, and presented a motion for reconsideration in time, w hich wasdenied by the respondent court. In view of such opposition of
the heirs, w ho are interested parties in the case, the court should not have ordered the dismissalof the said answers, but should have proceeded to
the trial on the merits of the lots in question w ith the intervention of said heirs.
In ordering the dismissal of the answ ers presented by the judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Serapion Dais, in the name of
the latter's heirs, notw ithstanding their opposition and for a cause not provided by law as a ground for dismissal, the respondent court did really
exceed its jurisdiction; because it is not enough that a court have jurisdiction over the subject matter in litigation and the parties, but it is necessary
that it have authority in and over each and every one of the essential particulars of the case.
In the case of Larrobis vs. Wislizenus and Smith, Bell & Co. (42 Phil., 401), this court laid dow n the doctrine that the erroneous exercise
of interlocutory pow ersis irregular and justifies the institution of certiorariproceedings. And on page 104 of volume 11 of Corpus Juris , the follow ing
rule may be found:
". . . But it has been held that 'any departure fromthe recognized and established requirements of law , how ever close
the apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, w hich has the effect to deprive one of a constitutional right is as
much an excess of jurisdiction as w here there is an inceptive lack of pow er.' "
In dismissing the answ er presented by the judicial administrator, Manuel Arnaldo in the name of the heirs of the deceased Serapion Dais,
over their objection, and in finally deciding the case on the merits aw arding the controvertedlots to their adversaries, without hearing said heirs, the
court not only exceeded its jurisdiction, but also deprived them of their constitutionalright to be heard before being deprived of their property rights,
and its proceedings w ere in this sense, void and of no effect.
The appeals taken by the petitioners from the orders w hich are the subject of this proceeding w ere denied by the respondent judge;
hence, said petitioners have no other adequate and speedy remedy in law to protect their rights other than a w rit of certiorari.
It is, therefore, proper to grant, as w e do hereby grant, the remedy sought, and the decree of the Court of First Instance of Capiz of July
25,1927, ordering the dismissal of the answ ers concerning lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136 filed on behalf of the petitioners in cadastral proceeding
No. 18 (G. L. R. O. Record No. 714) is set aside, as w ell as the orders dated August 8, 1927, and September 22, 1927, denying the motion for
reconsideration and the appeal respectively, and the judgment of the same court dated September 29, 1927, aw arding lot No. 626 to the spouses
Jose Altavas and Socorro Laserna and the lots Nos. 1132 and 1136 to the spouses Jose Morente and Patria Altavas, w ith all the orders rendered
in connection w ith said decision, w ithout costs. So ordered.
JOSE O. DURAN and TERESA DIAZ VDA. DE DURAN, applicants-appellants, vs. BERNABE OLIVIA, FE ALMAZAN, HEIRS
OF VICENTE GODESANO, MANUEL ARCE and ESPERANZA SALUD, oppositors-appellees.

Reyes & Dy-Liacco for applicants-appellants.
German G. Vilgera for oppositors-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; RULES OF COURT APPLICABLE TO LAND AND CADASTRAL CASES IN A SUPPLETORY
CHARACTER. — By express provision of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the rules contained therein apply to land registration and cadastral cases in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient (Dulay vs. The Director of Lands, 53 Off. Gaz., p. 161). The Land Registration Act does
not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. As a motion to dismiss is necessary for the expeditious termination of land
registration cases, said motion contained in the Rules of Court can be availed of by the parties.
2. ID.; ID.; FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE; HOMESTEAD PATENT AND SALES PATENT; EFFECT OF REGISTRATION UNDER THE LAND
REGISTRATION ACT. — The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally settle the titles to land and put to stop
any question of legality of title thereto. That being the purpose of the law , there would be no end to litigation if every property coveredby torrens title may
still be relitigated in a subsequent land registration proceedings. Pursuant to this purpose, a homestead patent once registered under the Land
Registration Act, can no be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, and any title issued thereon is null and void. The same may be said of a sales
patent. Once a certificate of title is issued under the Land Registration Act in lieu of a sales patent, the land is considered registered under the Torrens
system and the title of the patentee become indefeasible.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE WITHOUT POWER TO DECREE AGAIN REGISTRATION OF LAND ALREADY DECREED. — A Court
of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for
the same land is null and void. This is so, because w hen once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is
already a res judicata binding on the w hole w orld, the proceeding being in rem. The court has no pow er in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud
and w ithin the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of the
first registered ow ner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the w orld that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the latter
applicant is chargeable w ith notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title so that he has no right w hatsoever to apply for it. To declare
the later title valid w ould defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system w hich is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It w ould
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the efficacy of the registration law . (Rojas et al., vs. The City of Tagaytay, et al. 106 Phil., 512; 60
Off. Gaz., 820.)
D E C I S I O N
LABRADOR, J p:
This is an appeal from tw o orders dated July 31, 1959 and September 12, 1959, both of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
Hon. Perfecto R. Palacio, presiding, rendered in Land Registration Case No. N-564; G.L.R. Rec. No. N-7544, entitled "Jose O. Duran and Teresa
Diaz vda. de Duran, applicants, versus Bernabe Olivia, Fe Almazan, Heirs of Vicente Godesano, Manuel Arce and Esperanza Salud, oppositors."
The order of July 31, 1959 is for the dismissal of the land registration case for lackof jurisdiction of the low er court with respect to Lots Nos. 3, 6, 7,
9 and 15, and that dated September 12, 1959 w ith respect to Lots Nos. 12 and 16.
On December 3, 1953, Jose O. Duran and Teresa Diaz vda. de Duran filed an application for the registration in their names of sixteen lots (denominated
in said application as Lots Nos. 1 to 16, inclusive) under Plan PSU-128386 in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. On April 20, 1954, the case
w as heard initially and on May 5, 1954, the oppositors filed their opposition to the application. On August 27, 1958, the oppositors filed a motion to
dismiss the application on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of the lots respectively claimed by them, because said lots
are already registered and certificates of title have been issued thereon in their names. They attached to the motion to dismiss the follow ing: Original
Certificate of Title No. 2342, in the name of Bernabe Olivia (covering Lot 6); Original Certificate of Title No. 2343, in the name of Fe Almazan (covering
Lot 7); Original Certificate of Title No. 514, in the name of Manuel Arce (covering Lots Nos. 9 and 15); Original Certificate of Title No. 433, in the name of
Esperanza Salud (covering Lot No. 16); and Original Certificate of Title No. 7439, in the name of Heirs of Florencio Godesano (covering Lots Nos. 3 and
12). The applicants filed their objection to said motion, alleging that the reasons for the motion to dismiss do not appear in the application but are mere
assertions of the parties and that the trial court has jurisdiction to consider the application even though the lots subject matter thereof are already
covered by certificatesof title. After a reply to the opposition w as filed by the oppositors, the low er court resolved the motion to dismiss and rendered
successively the tw o orders of dismissal appealed from. Hence this appeal.
The applicants-appellants assign tw o errors of the low er court, to w it:
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AND GRANTING THE OBJECTORS-APPELLEES'
MOTION TO DISMISS THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION WITH RESPECT TO LOTS 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 15 and 16
ALTHOUGH IT WAS BASED MERELY ON THE SUPPOSED FACTS ALLEGED IN THE SAID ITSELF; AND
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPLICATION WITH RESPECT TO LOTS 3, 6, 7, 9, 12,
15 and 16 FOR ALLEGED LACK OF JURISDICTION UPON PUBLIC LAND PATENTS GRANTED TO THEM."
In support of their first assignment of error, appellants claim that oppositors-appellees can not avail of a motion to dismiss in a land registration case and
that the application and the titles do not show similar identities betw een the lots covered by said titles and those applied for in these proceedings.
The first assignment of error can not be sustained. By express provision of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the rules contained therein apply to land
registration and cadastral cases in a suppletory character and w henever practicable and convenient (Dulay v. The Director of Lands, Vol. 53 O.G. p.
161). The Land Registration Act does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. As a motion to dismiss is necessary for
the expeditious termination of land registration cases, said motion contained in the Rules of Court can be availed of by the parties in this case.

With respect to the alleged failure of the oppositors-appellees to prove similar identities of the lots covered by the titles and those applied for, We have
examined the certificates of title and the application, and We concur with the finding of the trial court that the lots covered by said titles are the same as
some of those applied for by the appellants. We, therefore, find no justification for reversing the orders appealed from based only upon the firs t
assignment of error.
Appellants argue in support of their second assignment of error that a certificate of title based upon a mere homestead, sales or free patent covering
private land is null and void; that it is the decree of registration, not the certificate of title w hich confers the character of incontestability of title; that the
appellants have been deprived of their property w ithout hearing; and that the cases cited in the order of the low er court do not apply to the case at bar.
Consequently, they claim that the low er court possessesjurisdiction to try and decide the instant land registration proceedings even w ith respect to the
lots already covered by certificates of title.
Appellants' claim is w ithout merit, if w e have to consider that a patent once registered under Act No. 496 becomes indefeasible as a torrens title (Manalo
v. Lukban, et al., 48 Phil., 973).
"Sec. 122. — Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States
or to the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private
corporations, the same shall be brought forthw ith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands . . .
After due registration and issue of the certificate and ow ner'sduplicate, such land shallbe registered land for all purposes
under this Act." (Act 496)
The primary and fundamentalpurpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally settle the titles to land; to put to stop any question of legality of
title thereto. That being the purpose of the law , there w ould be no end to litigation if every property covered by Torrens title may still be relitigated in a
subsequent land registration proceedings. Pursuant to the above purpose, w e have held in a long line of decisions that a homestead patent once
registered under the Land Registration Act can not be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and that any title issued thereon is null and void.
"A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens
title, and cannot thereafter be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in a cadastral case. Any new
title w hich the cadastralcourt may order to be issued is null and void and should be cancelled. All that the cadastral court
may do is to make correction of technicalerrorsin the description of the property contained in its title, or to proceed to the
partition thereof if it is ow ned by tw o or more co-ow ners." (Ramoso v. Obligado, et al., 70 Phil., 86; See also
Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil., 558; El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil., 17; Republic v. Carle, et al., G.R. No. L-
12485, July 31, 1959; Samonte et al., v. Descallar, et al., G.R. No. L-12964, Feb. 29, 1960).
The same may be said of a sales patent. Once a certificate of title is issued under the Land Registration Act in lieu of a sales patent, the land is
considered registered under the Torrens system and the title of the patentee becomes indefeasible.
As the title of the respondents, w ho hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follow s that the Court of First
Instance has no pow er or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of the
respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas, et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24, 1959,
in w hich this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
"As thus, view ed,the pivotalissue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the low er court. All the other contentions
of respondent regarding possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, w hile perhaps valid in an appropriate
ordinary action, as to w hich we here express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a quo, sitting as land
registration court, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in favor of
respondent city, of a lot already previously decreed and registered in favor of the petitioners.
"In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been w ell-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction
to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the
same land is null and void. 1 This is so, because w hen once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the
land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the w hole world, the proceedings being in rem. The court has no
pow er in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and w ithin the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in
favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of first registered ow ner in the
Registration Book is a standing notice to the w orld that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the later
applicant is chargeable w ith notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title so that he has no right
w hatsoever to apply for it. To declare the later title valid w ould defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system w hich is to
quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It w ould undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the
efficacy of the registration law . 2
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. With costs against appellants.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J.,
took no part.
MAMERTA DE LA MERCED, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, EZEQUIEL M. SANTOS and AMPARO
MACAPAGAL, respondents.
Meliton Pajarillaga for petitioner.
Esteban C. Manuel for respondents.
SYLLABUS

1. LAND TITLES, REGISTRATION OF; VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION UNDER ACT 496; WHAT DECREE QUIETS TITLE TO AND BINDS THE
LAND. — In voluntary registrations under Act 496, it is the decree of registration to be issued by the Land Registration Commissioner, w hich shall be the
basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently by the corresponding register of deeds, that quiets title to, and binds the land.
2. ID.; PUBLIC LANDS; ENTRY IN REGISTRATION BOOK NECESSARY TO EFFECT REGISTRATION. — In cases of public land, the property is not
considered registered, until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the registry of deeds has been accomplished.
3. ID.; ID.; CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; WHEN TITLE BECOMES VESTED ONCE REGISTERED, LAND NOT LOST BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.
— In the absence of fraud, title to land in a cadastralproceeding is vested on the ow ner, upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or
adjudication by the cadastral court, w ithout such appealbeing perfected; and from that time the land becomes registered property w hich cannot be lost
by adverse possession.
D E C I S I O N
BARRERA, J p:
This is an appeal fromthe decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the original decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (in Civil Case No.
946), upholding the right of ow nership of Ezequiel Santos over Lot No. 395 of the Rizal (Nueva Ecija) Cadastre.
As may be gathered from the extant records, the facts of the case are:
In a complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dated May 3, 1952, w hich w as later amended, Ezequiel Santos (and his w ife) claiming
ow nership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court denied December 26, 1923 in favor of his father, sought
recovery of ownership and possession thereof from the named defendants, andof the landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 1950-
1956.
Defendants, in their answ er, resisted plaintiffs' claim and asserted their ow nership over said property as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No.
3462 issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced on October 10, 1931 and their continuous possession ofthe land for more than 30 years.
In the course of the proceedings, Mamerta de la Merced, a legitimate daughter of Juan de la Merced, w as allow ed to intervene and make common
cause w ith the defendants.
On January 16, 1957, the court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs after making a finding that Lot No. 395 w as part of the Original Certificate of Title
No. 425, issued on May 30, 1916 in the name of the spouses Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal, parents of plaintiff Ezequiel Santos; that
in a decision rendered by the cadastral court on December 26, 1923 (Cad. Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281), the said lot w as also adjudicated in
favor of the conjugal partnership of Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal; that pursuant to said decision, the cadastral court issued on
December 17, 1925 an order for the issuance of a certificate of title for the said property; that on December 8, 1926, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
1971 w as issued in the name ofEzequiel Santos in lieu of Original Certificate of Title No. 425 w hich w as cancelled; that on December 28, 1926, the
cadastral courtdeclared lot 395 public land, as a consequence of w hich Juan de la Merced, after filing a homestead application therefor, w as able to
obtain Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 on October 10, 1931. Holding that the cadastral court had no jurisdiction to issue the order declaring the lot
public land, and, therefore, the same as w ellas the certificate of title issued thereafter w as null and void, thecourt ordered the cancellation of OCT No.
3462 in the name of Juan de la Merced; directed defendants to vacate Lot No. 395 ofthe Rizal Cadastre and surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs;
and to pay the latter as the landlord's share, 50 cavans of palay yearly for the agricultural years 1950 to 1956 or their equivalent, and costs of the suit;
and the receiver to deliver to plaintiffs the palay in his custody representing the harvest for the agricultural years 1953-1955.
Upon defendants' motion for reconsideration, however, the promulgation of the decision w as ordered suspended and the case w asre-set for hearing for
reception of additional evidence.
On August 6, 1957, the court amended its original decision, thus:
"The plaintiffs now admit that the litigated 'Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, is outside the parcel of land described
in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1971 and Original Certificate of Title No. 425, both of w hich cover Lot 396'. They, how ever,
claim ow nership over said Lot 395 by virtue of the decision rendered on December 26, 1923 in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 21, entitled 'Government of the Philippines versus Justo Abacan, et al.,' (Exh. A-1), and the other dated December 17,
1925 directing the issuance of a decree pursuant to said decision (Exh. V-2, p. 10, rec. ofexhibits).
"No decree has yet been issued pursuant to the said order, Exhibit B-2, much less w as there a title issued in the name ofthe
plaintiffs over the said lot.
"The defendants, on the other hand, predicate their claim of ow nership over the said lot of Original Certificate of Title No. 3462
issued on October 10, 1931 in favor of Juan de la Merced, their predecessor-in-interest, pursuant to a homestead patent issued
on September 15, 1931 (Exh. 1, for the defendants and intervenor), contending that the decision of December 26, 1923,
adjudicating the lot to the plaintiffs, w as still subject to review since there w as no decree issued pursuant thereto.
"The position of the defendants and intervenor w ould have been correct if there w as actually a petition for review of the
decision of December 26, 1923, or a new trial or a reopening of the case concerning Lot No. 395. The fact of the matter is that
Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 w as issued pursuant to a homestead patent long after Lot No. 395 w as declared a public
land in a decision dated March 29, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28,
1926 at Manila for Cabanatuan City (Exh. 4) states that Lot No. 395, together w ith Lots Nos. 394 and 2044, w as declared a public
land and w as the object of a homestead application by the respective concessionaires (p. 21, rec.of exhibits). . . .
"It w ould seem that the cadastral court in the same cadastral cases No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281, entitled Government ofthe
Philippines vs. Justo Abacan, et al. erroneously re-opened the hearing of Lot 395 w hich w as already adjudicated in favor of the
plaintiff by the decision dated December 26, 1923 (Exh. A-1, and A-2, pp. 2 and 5, rec. of exhibits) and decreed that lot 395 is

public land. The same cadastral court should have taken judicial notice of the said decision and the other promulgated therein for
the issuance of a decree in favor of the plaintiffs over Lot 395 (Exh. B-2)."
While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the public domain, the Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant the
homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, it declared nevertheless that, inasmuch as no title w as actually issued therefor, the said lot
may be acquired by adverse possession. And, as defendantshad been in possession of the property for over20 years, they weredeclared to have
acquired the right over the same by prescription. The complaint w as consequently ordered dismissed; OCT No. 3462 cancelled and a new one
issued to defendants in lieu thereof; and plaintiffs w ere directed to vacate the one-third portion of Lot No. 395 occupied by them, and to pay the
costs.
Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, in its decision of July 20, 1960, sustained the contention of appellants on the
basis of the doctrine laid dow n by this Court in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abural (39 Phil. 997), that upon the finality of the
decree by the cadastral court, adjudicating ow nership of the land, the title thereto becomes incontrovertible and may no longer be acquired by
prescription. And, as the land w as no longer part of the public domain w hen the homestead patent w as obtained by Juan de la Merced, the same can
not prevail over the cadastral court's decree ofregistration of Lot No. 395 in favor of appellant Santos' predecessor.
Hence, the filing of the instant petition for review of the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals.
The questions actually raised by the present appeal are: What is the effect of the order of the cadastral court of December 26, 1923 adjudicating the lot
in favor of Santos, and the subsequent order dated December 17, 1925, directing the issuance of a certificate of title to Inocencio Santos? Did those
orders constitute registration under the law even though the corresponding certificate of title has not been issued? In the affirmative, could the property
thereby affected still be lost by adverse possession?
For purposes of resolving the above questions, these salient facts must be considered:
By virtue of the final decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 21, dated December 26, 1923, Santos' title to Lot No. 395 w as
definitely confirmed as against the w hole w orld, including the Government;
That the same cadastral court issued a decree dated December 19, 1925 declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final and directing the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office to issue the certificate of title to Inocencio de los Santos, although no such certificate w as actually issued;
That under date of December 28, 1926, the cadastral court, without reopening the case, declared the same Lot 395 public land as a result of w hich Juan
de la Merced, after due application, w as able to obtain therefor a homestead patent and OCT No. 3462 on October 10, 1931;
That as found by the Court of Appeals, Juan de la Merced, until his death in 1931, w as the overseer of Inocencio de los Santos for a big portion of land
w hich included Lot 395 in question and w as, therefore, a trustee for said lot at the time he applied for it as a homestead;
That the complaint for recovery of ow nership and possession w as filed in 1952.
There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public, by specific provision of Act 496, the act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey and affect the same, and such registration shallbe made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. (Sec. 122, Act
496). In other w ords, in cases of public lands, the property is not considered registered until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the
registry of deeds had been accomplished.
With respect to private lands, how ever, the pertinent provisions of Act 496 are:
"SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse
claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shallbe entered. Every decree ofregistration shallbind
the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exception stated in the follow ing section. It shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,
notice or citation, or included in the general description 'To all w hom it may concern'. Such decree shall not be opened by
reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgment or decrees; subject, how ever, to the rightof any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review w ithin one year after
entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one
year, every decree or certificateof title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. . . ."(Emphasis supplied.)
"SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office (now Land Registration Commissioner). . . . The decree shall be stated in a
convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of titles hereinafter mentioned." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is apparent from the foregoing provisions that a decree of registration and a certificate of title, under Act 496, are tw o different things. And it is the
decree of registration, to be issued by the Land Registration Commissioner, w hich shall be the basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently
by the corresponding register of deeds, that quiets title to and binds the land.
But, it must be remembered that the abovementioned provisions apply only to voluntary registration under the Land Registration Act. With respect to
lands titled through compulsory proceedings, the Cadastral Act prescribes:
"SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any convenient place w ithin the province in w hich the lands are situated or at such
other place as the court, for reasons stated in w riting and filed w ith the record of the case, may designate, and shall be conducted
in the same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of First Instance and shall be governed by the same rules.
Orders of default and confession shallalso be entered in the same manner as in ordinary cases in the same court and shall have
the same effect. Allconflicting interestsshallbe adjudicated by thecourt and decrees aw arded in favor of the persons entitled to
the lands or the various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basis for original certificates of title in
favor of said persons which shallhave the same effect as certificates of title granted on application for registration of land under
the Land Registration Act. . . . " (Emphasis supplied.)
Confronted w ith the question of w hen title to the land in a cadastral proceeding is vested, this Court, in the case of Government ofthe Philippine
Islands vs. Abural, 1 said:

"After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates ow nership in favor of one of the claimants. This
constitutes the decision — the judgment — the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The second action is the
declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office. Such order is made if w ithin thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken
from the decision. This again is judicial action, although to a less degree than the first.
"The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office. This office has been instituted 'for the due
effectuation and accomplishment of the law s relative to the registration of land.' (Administrative Code of 1917, sec. 174.) . . . .
"The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree
w hen finalis the base of the certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office is a ministerial act. The
date of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and all that is left to be
performed is the mere formulation of the technical description. . . . .
"As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the passageof the
thirty-day period allow ed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of thecourt adjudicating
ow nership w ithout any step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the
judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is
the special provision providing for fraud."
Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ow nership on the land is vested upon the ow ner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the
decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, w ithout such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title w ould then be necessary for
purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land w here courtproceedings w ould no longer be necessary.
As w e have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after
the decision adjudicating ow nership to him of the said property had already become final, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said
cadastral proceedings, title of ow nership on the said adjudicatee w as vested as of the dateof the issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for all
intents and purposes, had become, from that time, registered property w hich could not be acquired by adverse possession.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, w ith costs against petitioner Mamerta de la Merced. So ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-35778. January 27, 1983.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners, vs. HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI,
Bataan I, and LUISITO MARTINEZ, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-35779. January 27, 1983.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners, vs. HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI,
Bataan, Branch I, and THELMA TANALEGA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Benjamin M. Reyes for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES; CADASTRAL ACT; ABSENCE OF SUCCESSFUL CLAIMANTS; PROPERTY DECLARED PUBLIC LAND; CASE AT
BAR. — In a cadastral proceeding any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of the petition ss required by Sec tion 9 of Act No.
2259 to file an answ eron or before the return day or w ithin such further time as may be allow ed by the court. In the absence of successfulclaimants, the
property is declared public land. In the case at bar, private respondents apparently either did not file their answersin the aforesaid cadastralproceedings
or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they w ere then occupying. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public
lands, and its decision had already become final and conclusive.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; RES JUDICATA; CADASTRAL PROCEEDING; PARTIES PRECLUDED FROM RE-LITIGATING FINALLY DECIDED
ISSUES. — A cadastralproceeding is one in rem and binds the w hole w orld. Under the doctrine of res judicata, parties are precluded from re-litigating
the same issues already determined by final judgment. (Yusingco vs. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 589, 602).
3. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES; JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES; CASUAL CULTIVATION OF THE LAND DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE POSSESSION UNDER CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP. — The possession of public land how ever long the period thereof may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations w ith regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ow nership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the
State. (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195.) A mere casualcultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession
under claim of ow nership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.

4. ID.; ID.; APPROVAL OF SURVEY PLANS BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS; A STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF MANDATORY CHARACTER. —
Section 34-A of R.A. No. 6389 relied upon by respondents applies only to lands subject of tenancy relation w hich are expropriated and sub-divided in
favor of new amortizing-owner-beneficiaries. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its
technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value. (Director of Lands vs. Reyes. supra).
D E C I S I O N
DE CASTRO, J p:
The tw o (2) above-entitled petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972 issued by the CFI of Bataan,
Branch I, in LRC No. N-210, and in LRC No. N-206, respectively, involve a common issue. For convenience, they are hereby decided jointly.
G.R No. L-35778
On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed w ith the low er court an application for registration of title under Act 496 of one (1) parcel of land,
situated in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan, containing an area of 323,093 square meters, more or less.
On July 7, 1972 the low er court issued an order of general default except as to the Republic of the Philippines and the Province of Bataan.
On July 24, 1972, the Republic of the Philippines filed w ith the low er court an opposition to the application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a
portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not subject to private appropriation.
On September 16, 1972, the low er court issued an order reading:
"Considering the testimony of the Provincial Forester Leonides B. Rodriguez during the hearing of August 8, 1972 that this land,
subject matter of this application, w as a subject of cadastral proceeding and that this land w as assigned as Lot No. 626 (Tsn,
August 3, 1972, page 41), this case is ordered re-opened and the Land Registration Commissioner is directed to submit his report
and/or comment as to w hether this lot is covered by the Mariveles Cadastre w ithin five (5) days from receipt hereof."
xxx xxx xxx
On October 5, 1972, the Commissioner of Land Registration submitted to the low er court a report stating:
"That the parcelof land applied for registration in the above-entitled case is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of
Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case no. 19, LTC Cad. Record No. 1097."
xxx xxx xxx
Records show that in the hearing of this case in the low er court, applicant Luisito Martinez, 62 years old, testified that he is the ow ner of the land applied
for, having inherited the same from his parents, consisting of 32 hectares, more or less; that he started possessing the land in 1938; that about 8
hectares of the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that kamoteng kahoyis also planted thereon; that he declared the land for
taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the records w ere lost during the w ar, and that possession w as continuous, open, undisturbed and in the
concept of ow ner.
Another w itness, Antonio Reyes, 67 years old, testified that he is the overseer of Luisito Martinez; that the area of his land is 32 hectares, more or
less; that since 1938, applicant has possessed this land; that eight (8) hectares of land is devoted to palay, and his son Manuel Reyes and Silvestre
Garcia are the ones tilling the land, and the harvest is shared alike betw een applicant, on one hand, and Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia, on the
other; that eighteen (18) hectares, more or less, is planted to vegetables.
While another w itness, Silvestre Garcia, 60 years old, testified that he w orked on the land of the applicant since 1932 w hich is 32 hectares, more or less;
that said Luisito Martinez inherited the land from his parents; that he plants palay only on four (4) hectares; that there are 42 mango trees on the land.
G.R. No. L-35779:
On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration under Act No. 496 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan,
docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-206, L.R.C. Rec. No. N-41884, of tw o (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of Camaya, municipality of
Mariveles, province of Bataan, containing an area of 443,297 square meters, more or less, and 378,506 square meters, more or less, respectively, and
more particularly described and identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre, covered by Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and (LRC) SWO-13431,
respectively.
On March 21, 1972, the corresponding notice of initial hearing w as duly issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration.
On March 21, 1972, the low er court ordered the Bureau of Lands to submit a report w ithin ten (10) days if the land subject of the application has been
issued patents or is the subject of any pending application for the issuance of patents. Likew ise, the low er court directed the Commissioner of Land
Registration to submit w ithin the same period his report if the land applied for has been issued a title or is the subject of a pending decree.
On May 23, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed a report in the low er court, stating that the parcels of land applied for
registration "do not appear to have been passed upon and approved by the Director of Lands as required by Section 1858 of the Revised Administrative
Code." Later, on July 24, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed in the low er court another report or manifestation stating
"that Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and 13431, LRC Case No. N-206, LRC Record No. N-41884, w hen plotted on the Municipal Index Map on file in the
Commission does not appear to overlap w ith any previously titled property under Act 496; that the plan and records of said Land Registration application
w ill be subjected to further examination as soon as the decision to be rendered by this Honorable Court is received in this Commission to determine
w hether or not a patent or title has in the meantime been issued in order to avoid duplication or overlapping of titles."
At the hearing on June 21, 1972, on motion of the applicant's counsel, the low er court issued an Order of General Default against all persons, w ith the
exception of the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, represented by the Office of the provincial fiscal, and the oppositor Eliseo Martinez
represented by Atty. Angelino Banzon, w ho w ere directed to file their respective oppositions.

On July 7, 1972, the provincial fiscalfiled his opposition in behalf of the Directors of Lands and of Forestry, alleging that the parcels of land applied for
are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation.
Thereafter, the case w as tried. The applicant, Thelma Tanalega (respondent herein), testified in her behalf, and presented tw o (2) w itnesses, namely,
Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, and Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, as w ellas her documentary evidence in support of her application for registration.
On the other hand, Fiscal Arsenio Roman appeared for the government, and submitted documentary proof in support of the opposition filed by the
provincial fiscal's office in this case.
At the hearing of this case in the low er court, applicant Thelma Tanalega, 27 years old, testified that she had possessed the land "openly, adversely,
notoriously and in the concept of ow ner since February2, 1970 w hen the said land w as sold to her by Elisa Llamas w ho allegedly possessed this land"
in the same manner since 1935; that the applicant had paid for the taxes of the land for the years 1970-1972.
Another w itness, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, testified that his parents w ere the ones w orking on the land before 1935 and due to the illness of his
parents, on their request to ow ner Elisa Llamas, he became overseer up to 1970 w hen the same w as sold to applicant; that 16 hectares of these lands
w ere planted to palay w hile others w ere devoted to pasture land and planting vegetables.
Witness Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, w ho testified that since childhood, he had know n Elisa Llamas to be the ow ner of the land applied for; that
she w as the one managing the planting and improving of the land; that he used to see Leopoldo de Guzman and another one also named Agapito del
Rosario w orked on the 16 hectares portion of the land; that Elisa Llamas informed him that in 1970 she sold the land to Thelma Tanalega.
At the hearing on August 24, 1972, Fiscal Arsenio Guzman w ho is appearing for the government, submitted a certification dated July 3, 1972 of
Leonidas B. Rodriguez, District Forester of Balanga, Bataan (Exhibit 3) w hich states "that the tract of land situated at Barrio Camaya, Mariveles, Bataan
containing an approximate area of EIGHTY TWO HECTARES more or less, as show n and described in the attached photostat copy of Plans in tw o
sheets, as surveyed forThelma Tanalega, et al., w as found to be w ithin the Alienable and Disposable Block, Project 4-B, Mariveles, Bataan, certified by
the Director of Forestry as such on February 16, 1972."
The applicant did not present as w itness her predecessor-in-interest, Elisa Llamas, to testify on the alleged possession of the land. The applicant also
failed to present Guillermo Ramirez, w ho was hired by her as overseer and her alleged tenants. Not a single tenant w as presented as w itness to prove
that the applicant had possessed the land as ow ners.
In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in tw o separate decisions, dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972, confirmed the titles to
subject parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of applicants Luisito Martinez and Thelma Tanalega, now respondents herein.
In the instant petitions for review , the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, argued that Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre w as declared
public land by the decision of the Cadastral Court dated October 11, 1937 and such being the case, the low er court is w ithout jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the application for voluntary registration under Act 496. Petitioner likew ise stressed that the lands in question can no longer be subject
to registration by voluntary proceedings, for they have already been subjected to compulsory registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act.
The petitions are meritorious and reversal of the questioned decisions is in order.
It is notew orthy that as per the report of the Commissioner of Land Registration, 1 the land subject matter of the instant proceedings "is entirely inside
Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No. 1097"; that some portions of Lot No.
626 w ere decreed and titles w ere issued therefor; and that "portion declared Public Land as per decision dated October 11, 1937."
In a cadastralproceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of the petition is required by Section 9 ofAct No. 2259 to file
an answ eron or before the return day or w ithin such further time as may be allow ed by the court, giving the details required by law , such as: (1) Age of
the claimant; (2) Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot numbers, as the case may be; (3) Name of the barrio and municipality,
tow nship or settlement in w hich the lots are situated; (4) Names of the ow nersof adjoining lots; (5) If claimant is in possession of the lots claims and can
show no expressgrant of the land by the Government to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answ er need state the length of time property w as
held in possession and the manner it w as acquired, giving the length of time, as far as know n, during w hich his predecessors, if any, held possession;
(6) If claimant is not in possession or occupation of the land, the answ er shall set forth the interest claimed by him and the time and manner of its
acquisition; (7) If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value; and (8) Encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the names of
adverse claimants as far as know n. In the absence of successful claimants, the property is declared public land.
In the instant cases, private respondents apparentlyeither did not file their answ ersin the aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their
claims over the portions they w ere then occupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims w ould have been issued to them.
The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision had already become final and conc lusive.
Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land, under the doctrine of res judicata. A cadastral proceeding is
one in rem and binds the w hole w orld. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final
judgment. 2
Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the lands subject matter of the instant cases, the same
must necessarily fail. It is to be noted that in the instant cases evidence for the respondents themselves tend to show that only portions of the entire area
applied for are cultivated. A mere casualcultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ow nership. In
that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. The possession of public land how ever
long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations w ith regard to public land
does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ow nership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State. 3 Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and adverse
possession in the concept of ow ners of the entire area in question during the period required by law .LLjur
Apart from the foregoing, the survey plans submitted by petitioners w ere not approved by the Director of Lands but by the Land Registration
Commission. The Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans in this particular case. Section 34-A of R.A. No.
6389 relied upon by respondents applies only to lands subject of tenancy relation w hich are expropriated and sub-divided in favor of new amortizing-
ow ner-beneficiaries.The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical description are
duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value. 4
WHEREFORE, the decisions dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972 of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I should be, as they are
hereby reversed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., concurs in the result.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 91797. August 28, 1991.]
WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, respondents.
Quijano & Padilla for petitioner.
Jose Teodorico V. Molina for intervenor-oppositor.
Santiago & Santiago for private respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BIDIN, J p:
From the decision rendered by respondent court dated November 27, 1989, declaring respondent Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas) as
the registered ow nerof the disputed parcel of land, petitioner Widow s and Orphans Association, Inc. (Widora), interposes this petition for review seeking
to annul the aforesaid judgment and prays that the case be remanded to the trial court and there be tried on the merits.
The facts, as found by respondent court, are as follow s:
"On August 27, 1974, respondent Widora filed LRC Case No. Q-336 before the respondent (trial) court an application for
registration of title of a parcel of land as show n in Plan LRC (SWO)-15352. Widora alleged that the parcel of land is covered by
Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136, dated April 25, 1894, issued in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
Later, on June 14, 1978, Widora filed an amended application for registration of the said parcel of land. It alleged that the
parcelof land is situated at Malitlit-Uoogong, Quezon City, w ith an area of 156 hectares, more or less, described in plan No. LRC
(SWO)-15352; and that the applicant acquired said property from the heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro on December 12, 1954.
The amended application prayed that said parcel of land be ordered registered in the name of Widora.
"On August 25, 1978, respondent Dolores Molina filed an opposition, claiming ow nership over 12 to 14 hectares of Lot 8 (LRC)
SWO-15352, and praying for a decree of registration over said portions of Lot 8.
"On October 24, 1978, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging, among others, that respondentcourt had no
jurisdiction over the case, the land being applied for having been already registered under the Torrens System and in the
name of Ortigas under TCT 77652 and TCT 77653.
"On April20, 1979, the respondent (trial) court issued an order directing the applicant to prove its contention that TCT 77652 and
TCT 77653 are not proper derivatives of the originalcertificates of titles fromw hich they were purportedly issued, and setting the
case for hearing on June 28, 1979, at 8:30 a.m.
"On June 27, 1979, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion for reconsideration of said order of April 20, 1979, alleging that a Torrens title
becomes indefeasible after a year and that the same becomes conclusive upon the entire w orld; that the Land Registration
Commission itself has advised the court that the 156 hectare property sought to be registered is covered by valid and subsisting
titles in the name of Ortigas; that Courts of First Instance and the appellate courts in previous cases had sustained the Ortigas
titles over the land in question.
"On October 3, 1979, the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Ortigas w as denied by the respondent (trial) court, but the latter
set the motion to dismiss for hearing on October 18 and 19, 1979 at 8:30 a.m., for the purpose of enabling the applicant to prove
its contention that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 are not proper derivatives of the original certificates of title from w hich they w ere
purportedly issued.
"The parties presented their testimonial and documentary evidence before the respondent (trial) court in support oftheir respective
positions.
"On March 30, 1988, the respondent (trial) court denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner Ortigas, holding, among others, that
TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 on their face show that they w ere derived fromOCT 337,19,336,334, pursuant to Decree 1425; that if
there w as error in the correct number of OCT on said titles, no step or measure to rectify the same w as taken; that Decree No.
1425 show sthat it covers a total area of only 17 hectares, more or less, located in Sta. Ana, Manila, w hich w as four kilometers
aw ay fromthe land subject of the application for registration which coversan area of156 hectares, more or less, described in plan
No. LRC SWO-15352 situated at Malitlit-Uoogong, Quezon City; that the contention of Ortigas that Decree No. 1425 covers an

area in Manila and also a part of Rizal is not credible, or if this w ere true then the area of said Rizal portion should appear on the
face of said decree of registration, w hich is not the case; that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 w ere not derived from any
decree of registration, and that the said TCTs, being null and void, cannot be used as basis to contest the right of the applicant to
apply for registration over the subject land. The order of March 30, 1988, in its dispositive portion stated:
'WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Omnibus Motion dated October 4, 1978 and Motion to Dismiss,
dated, October 23, 1978 filed by oppositor Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership are both DENIED for lack ofmerit;
w hile this Court's order of September 15, 1978 directing the City Assessor of Quezon City to issue a separate tax
declaration corresponding to the 12 or 14 hectares which is an undivided portion of the land applied for registration and
now belonging to the said Dolores V. Molina; further, authorizing the City Treasurer ofQuezon City to accept the
corresponding realty taxes due thereon; and further the said Dolores V. Molina is a]low ed to intervene in this
proceedings, is hereby affirmed; likew ise, the City Treasurer is directed to accept the w hole of the taxes due on the
property subject of the instant petition from applicants Widow s & OrphansAssociation, Inc., as prayed for in its
Manifestation With Motion subject to the right of the oppositor Dolores V. Molina as contained in this Court's
order of September 15, 1978.
"On April 26, 1988, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order of March 30, 1988, taking exception to
the ruling that TCT No. 77652 AND 77653 are null and void, and alleging, among others, that respondent (trial) court had no
jurisdiction to hear an application for registration of a previously registered land; that the parcels ofland applied for are covered by
TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 in the name of Ortigas; that the parcels of land covered by TCT 77652 and 77653 are w ithin the
parcel of land covered by OCT 351; and that OCT 351 is a copy of Decree No. 1425 issued on April 26, 1905. The motion for
reconsideration prayed the respondent court to reconsider its order of March 30, 1988 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction
over the application for registration, the parcels of land subject thereof being already covered by Torrens Certificates of Title.
"On May 19, 1989, the respondent (trial) court issued an order, denying the motion for reconsideration of Ortigas, and setting the
hearing on the merits on July 26, 1989, . . . for the 'eventual presentation of the parties' respective evidence respecting their
alleged ow nership of the property subject of this petition." (Rollo, pp. 24-26).
Not satisfied, respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before respondent court praying for the annulment of the
March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 orders of the trial court. It also prayed that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the land registration case.
On November 27, 1989, respondent court rendered the decision sought to be review ed, the decretal portion of w hich reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus of petitioner Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership is
GRANTED. The orders of March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, in LRC Case
No. Q-336, are REVERSED and ANNULLED, and said LRC Case No. Q-336 is DISMISSED. The injunction issued by the Court,
per Resolution of August 8, 1989, is made permanent." (Rollo, p. 35)
Based on the plan and other evidence submitted by respondent Ortigas at the hearing of its application for preliminary injunction to enjoin the
trial court fromproceeding w ith the hearing of LRC Case No. Q-336, respondent court held that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653, albeit reflecting their origins
as OCT Nos. 337,19, 336, and 334, are actually derivatives of OCT No. 351, the latter having been issued pursuant to Decree 1425 and that since OCT
351 is allegedly a copy of Decree 1425, the mere fact that the original copy of Decree 1425, or a certified copy thereof, can no longer be located or
produced, does not mean that Decree 1425 covering the lots embraced in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 w as not issued. Concluding,
respondent court said: cdll
"It may be that TCT 77652 and 77653 do not show on their face (sic) that they were derived from OCT 351. But the fact remains,
as show n above, that the parcel of land covered by OCT 351 embraced the parcels of land, Lots 7 and 8, of TCT 77652 and
77653. There w as, therefore, a mistake in the entries in TCT 77652 and 77653 w hen the same referred to OCTs 337,19, 336, 337
(sic) and 334, as their source, for the correct OCT, insofar as Lots 7 and 8 are concerned, should be OCT 351." (Rollo, p. 27)
In this petition, petitioner WIDORA avers that the respondent Court of Appeals has decided question of substance contrary to law and the applicable
decisions of this Court because:
I
"THE COURT OF APPEALS INSISTED IN UPHOLDING THE EXISTENCE OR VALIDITY OF TCTs 77652 and 77653 DESPITE
THE ABSENCE OF A SUPPORTING DECREE OF REGISTRATION.
II
"THE QUESTIONED DECISION UTILIZED SECONDARY EVIDENCE DESPITE THE EXISTENCE AND AVAILABILITY OF THE
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT.
III
"THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ENJOIN THE TRIAL ON THE MERITS OF LRC NO. Q-
336 SINCE JURISDICTION RESIDES WITH THE RTC ACTING AS A LAND REGISTRATION COURT."
In essence, it is the contention of petitioner that respondent court's grounds and reasoning in support of its findings that respondent Ortigas is the
registered ow nerof the disputed property are baseless in law and fact. Petitioner argues that respondent court erred in sustaining the validity of TCTs
Nos. 77652 and 77653 despite the absence of a supporting decree ofregistration and instead utilized secondary evidence,OCT 351 w hich is supposedly
a copy of decree 1425. Petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 is itself existing and available at the Register of Deeds of Manila and on its face show s
that it covers a parcel ofland w ith an area of only 17 hectares in Sta. Ana, Manila w hile the parcel of land applied for contains an area of 156 hectares,
located at Malitlit-Uoogong, Quezon City, four (4) kilometers aw ay from Sta. Ana, Manila and is certified by the Bureau of Lands and the
Bureau of Forestry as alienable and disposable.
Respondent Ortigas claims that respondent court committed no error in rectifying the mistake in the entries in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 as regards
their sources and or origins arguing that the correction was justified by the fact that the plan of OCT 351 coincides w ith the parcels of land covered by
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653; that OCT 351 w as issued pursuant to Decree 1425 and that OCT 351 is a copy of the Decree itself. Cdpr

241585426 cases-vii

Empfohlen

Empfohlen

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Andere mochten auch

Andere mochten auch (14)

Ähnlich wie 241585426 cases-vii

Ähnlich wie 241585426 cases-vii (20)

Mehr von homeworkping4

Mehr von homeworkping4 (20)

Kürzlich hochgeladen

Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)

241585426 cases-vii