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Case Study Analysis: Briefly identify Hewlett-Packard's ‘strategic agenda’, i.e. what are
the fundamental questions and problems that concern organizations and their successful
development” (2002).
Overview of the Company
Hewlett Packard is the world's leading producer of test and measurement
instruments and the world's third largest computer company. It has become a major
player in the personal computer market, and at in a 1999 survey was the sixth biggest in
terms of market share, having moved up from fourteenth largest in 1992. It is also the
second largest player in the computer workstations market, and holds the dominant
position in the laser printer business.
The company was the only major computer manufacturer which remained profitable
during the recession. The corporation employs 96,200 staff worldwide, of which 20,200
are employed in Europe and 2,000 in the UK (in the UK Computer Systems
Organization). Underpinning the Hewlett Packard culture is the HP Way, developed by
founders Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard, which emphasizes clearly stated and agreed
overall objectives but gives people the freedom to work towards these goals in ways they
determine best for their own areas of responsibility (1999).
The HP Way is probably best illustrated from a number of words and concepts extracted
from Hewlett Packard’s own publications. These are love of the product, love of the
customer, innovation, quality, open communication, commitment to people, trust,
confidence, informality, teamwork, sharing, openness, autonomy, responsibility ( 2001).

2. Other pillars of the HP Way include an emphasis on selecting individuals on the basis of
their creativity and their enthusiasm, and the need for cooperation between organizational
levels. A sophisticated performance management process and clear organizational values,
together with a single status culture, has brought strong identification with the company
on the part of employees.
Hewlett Packard breaks up units that grow beyond a certain benchmark. Hierarchy and
status are taboo. Even the company president only reluctantly took that title. Any "perks"
or status symbols are immediately dispensed with. The plants are periodically polled
anonymously to ensure that the company lives up to its ideals (1992). The organization
has traditionally had a decentralized structure, but with the growth of the computer
business a more centralized approach was taken to reflect the systems nature of the
business.
Background of the Case Study
Mark Hurd is credited to be one of the forerunners who tried to turn around a sprawling,
$90 billion technology company, following years of lackluster performance. One year
after he took the job as chief executive officer at Hewlett Packard, following the forced
departure of the flashy but flawed Carly Fiorina, Mr. Hurd has started to revive the
fortunes of a legendary Silicon Valley firm.
The new chief executive is an understated operations geek, the type of manager that
excels at HP, the epitome of an engineering-driven company. “Vision without execution
is nothing,” he says. “Whenever anyone asks me about vision, I get very nervous. You've
got to be able to tie it back to strategy; you've got to tie accountability to things.” Mr
Hurd prefers to stand when he talks rather than sit; he wears crisply knotted ties while his
managers are allowed open-collared shirts. At 49 years old, his hair is cropped short and
every strand is perfectly in place, as one might expect from a man who spent the past 25
years ascending the ranks of a century-old business in Dayton, Ohio called NCR—
originally National Cash Register.
When Mark Hurd joined Hewlett-Packard, what he found was a firm spread thin with
many units losing money and propped up by the sales of printer-ink cartridges. Its
activities spanned both the consumer and business market, selling everything from high-
end software to flat-panel television screens. Yet instead of shedding business units, Mr.
Hurd has decided to (in his words) “double down” on his bets, and simply do more of the
same, but better.
Over the past year he has reorganized HP into three main divisions: enterprise computing
and services; general tech hardware (such as PCs, handheld devices and the like); and
imaging and printing. The company hopes to capitalize on trends such as computing on

3. the move, and the growing demand for printing, including sophisticated commercial
printing.
Clearly-defined corporate values, vision, and strategic planning are the key
elements in the remarkable growth achieved by Hewlett-Packard. For nearly half a
century, revenue and earnings have grown at a consistent rate of 20% per year, propelling
HP from a small manufacturer to the ranks of the leading multinationals (1997).
The first strength of Hewlett Packard’s planning process is vision.
Their strategic planning is guided by a clear vision of what Hewlett-Packard is and where
the company heading. This broad sense of direction focuses the company’s many product
groups and divisions. It helps explain the sustained success Hewlett Packard had since
their inception.
This vision is communicated in several ways. In part it reflects what they call the
"HP Way." These are a set of five values enunciated by their founders. They are: (1) trust
and respect for individuals, (2) commitment to high level achievement and contribution,
(3) uncompromising integrity, (4) teamwork, and (5) flexibility and innovation.
Hewlett Packard’s planning is also guided by more specific long-range goals.
These are called Hoshins. Hoshin is a Japanese word meaning "a shining piece of metal
that points the direction," in other words--a compass (1997). These Hoshins are not
hollow pronouncements. They're deeply felt business objectives that cascade down
through the organization. Each business unit translates the Hoshin into terms that reflect
its own mission.
The second strength of Hewlett-Packard’s strategic planning is that it's
decentralized. Hewlett-Packard has nearly 112,000 employees in 110 nations. Their
marketing reaches even more places. Hewlett Packard sells over 87,000 products and
services in 250 countries. No central office could manage detailed projections for all
these far-flung units, thus the need for decentralization. The results of this decentralized
approach have been impressive.
Their product divisions are fully functioning global businesses with their own
research and development, marketing, administration, sales and support. They form the
nucleus of Hewlett-Packard, and are the primary drivers of its growth and profitability.
So Hewlett Packard’s planning is multi-business.
The third strength of Hewlett Packard’s strategic planning process is that it
emphasizes innovation. This commitment shapes all the company’s plans and their
devotion to research and development. And it's been one of the keys to the company’s
success in the rapidly changing world of high technology.
The next and fourth strength of Hewlett Packard’s planning process is that it is
responsive to the needs and expectations of their customers. This quality, like the others
already mentioned, is crucial to the company’s success. The company believes that they

4. will continue to grow only if they go beyond simply satisfying the needs of their clients
and work to delight them.
The fifth strength of strategic planning at Hewlett Packard is that it is constant. It's
driven by the calendar and by events. And this too has been a secret of the company’s
success. As a result of this approach the company is always in a planning mode. Hewlett
Packard reinforces this planning process by measuring, at each stage, the progress made
toward their objectives. They also reinforce this planning by linking employee
compensation -- and other regular activity -- to results.
Analysis and Discussion
In each and every line of business, the entrepreneurs compete with each other is
the sale of their products or services. Thus, we can see that competition is basic in a
system. This is seen in the case of Hewlett Packard. The institution of free public
enterprise implies freedom on the part of any entrepreneur to enter any field of business
and to compete with those already established therein for the favor of the buyers in the
market.
Competition is a risk that the company has to face. What the company needed to do was
to implement the right strategies to be able to overcome this competition. In the case of
Carly Fiorina, she wasn’t able to guide the company to overcome this risk, as well as
many others.
Risk is always present in private enterprise. Of greatest importance is the risk of complete
failure – of bankruptcy – in which case the entrepreneur stands to lose all of his
investment. In the case of the sole proprietorship or partnership he may possibly also lose
his personal property and savings ( 2001). This is one risk that a company would never
want to face. All other risks that are not properly managed would eventually lead to this.
If Hewlett Packard was not able to make a good turnaround, it would have started to go
bankrupt, or at least one of its branches would have.
This risk is apt to be greater when a new business is being launched than after it is well
established. A similar danger exists, however, when an old concern fails to keep abreast
of the times and loses out to newer, more wide awake competitors (2001). Herein we see
again the role of competition in bringing a business up or down. And Mr. Hurd has
brought Hewlett Packard up – from his reorganization of the company to integration, this
new chief executive has definitely played his cards right.
At all times a firm must be aware of the risks that are inherent in competition – chances
for loss through shifts in the price level, changes in style and fashion, and the appearance
of substitutes on the market that sometimes render present models obsolete. Consumers
could switch from an ordinary printer to a three-in-one printer although the ordinary
printer is still a new one and has no defects. Also, consumers could switch to a cheaper
printer of another competing brand but with the same quality. There is always a risk
involved in the use of substitutes for materials formerly used.

5. The appearance of innovative competition in the past couple of decades has markedly
enhanced the risk aspects of entrepreneurship in all economic areas. Two other factors are
noteworthy as contributors to risk. These are automation, which involves the substitution
of mechanical for human effort with a frequently resulting reduction in cost; and
electronic data processing through the use of computers, which permits of the assembling
and use of large amounts of vital information by management.
With the proliferation of technology-oriented businesses, it is appropriate to first take a
look at the distinguishing characteristics of this type of enterprise. First is the nature of
technology itself, as an asset of the business and also as a vital ingredient of the product
delivered. The second characteristic relates to the various options available for profitable
utilization of the technology assets, and the role that these options can play in the
development of an effective strategy for the business ( 1998).
These two characteristics differentiate technology-driven businesses from others, such as
retail establishments, restaurants, various service providers, and so on. The failure to
recognize these very real differences can serve to limit the potential for success in these
businesses. This is not so a problem with Hewlett Packard as the company knows that it
is a largely technologically driven company.
For those companies unable or unwilling to utilize either or both of these factors, the risk
of falling behind competitively may be serious. Good thing Hewlett Packard is already
utilizing these. It is really a must for companies to be technologically adept.
Technology is one of the most accessible assets available to the entrepreneur. In addition
to the obvious approach of inventing the technology oneself, there are many outside
sources, such as other businesses, colleges and universities, government agencies, and
individuals.
There are also, it should be added, a multiplicity of methods for tracking down
technology from these other sources, including catalogs, trade shows, agents, and both
for-profit and nonprofit institutions. It is also worth noting that while these assets are not
usually available on a no-cost basis, the financial terms for access can be very attractive,
with little or no up-front payment required in some cases (1998).
Probably the most common application of technological assets is to serve as the basis for
the captive manufacture of a product for sale. In some cases, this involves a new product;
in others, it involves a new, and presumably better, way of manufacturing an existing
product. In either case, commercialization of the technology will yield financial benefits,
either through sales of a new product, in the first instance, or through higher margins on
sales of existing products, in the second instance. While both may entail technological
risk, the new product option will also involve market risk. Nevertheless, this is the most
common entrepreneurial approach to the commercialization of technological assets
(1998).

6. Increases in technology have resulted in increased skill levels for some practices and
processes, and deskilling in others. At Hewlett Packard, engineers must move from
repairing individual personal computers and printers to working on networks, a
significant jump in skill level (1999).
In an increasing number of instances, especially in this global economy, technological
assets are finding use as "trading chips" in joint ventures or strategic alliances. Consider,
for example, the case of an entrepreneur seeking to utilize a new technology on a
worldwide basis.
In one's home country the technology can be applied as discussed in the preceding
paragraphs; however, in an area of the world where the company does not now operate,
the approach is considerably more complex. One approach that has been taken by some
entrepreneurs is to develop a joint venture with an organization that already has a market
position in the area in question. The technology owned by the entrepreneur will serve as
all or part of the equity contribution to the joint venture, and the partner's market position
will account for another portion of the equity in the venture. This, of course, is only one
example of joint ventures (JVs) or alliances wherein an effective business strategy entails
the use of technology instead of financial assets (2001).
Advances in technology have therefore dramatically altered the basis of competition in
many industries, most especially that which deals with technology. The rate of
technological change--that is, the introduction of new technology such as 'personal
computers, cellular phones, fibre optics, the Internet, massive databases, LANs (local
area networks), artificial intelligence, virtual reality, satellite transponders and
teleconferencing' --has shortened product life cycles and development cycles (1999).
This is so true in Hewlett Packard wherein products become obsolete only in a manner of
months. Consumers then are always looking for something new. What is bought six
months ago could be considered by the consumer as obsolete and therefore would need a
new replacement. This is not questionable since at the rate technology is driving change
in our society, it is virtually everyday that new products are invented.
The speed of technological diffusion--the rate at which technological information is
absorbed into the industry--is also increasing, encouraging copying and increased
competition in the form of 'me too' players. These issues have large implications for
organizations which are technology-intensive, such as Hewlett Packard.
In many large companies with diversified product lines, Hewlett-Packard included, the
concept of decentralization has been extended to the point where each product line
becomes the basis of a more or less semi-autonomous division. In such a situation the
responsibility for designing, producing, and selling its product line and of making a profit
is given to the division management. The General Motors Corporation, General Electric
Company and IBM are just some of the companies that follow this practice.

7. The rationale behind this practice is that these companies have become too large and their
product line too varied for a centralized management to supervise satisfactorily. Each
division therefore acts as though it were an independent company.
All large companies, however, do not look with favor on such a practice of division
within the organization. Other large companies favor the adoption of a functional type of
control structure. With this sort of arrangement, a company’s physical operations may be
dispersed, but the managerial control for all of its different operations is centralized. This
means that a single sales force sells all of its different products and manufacturing plants
are directed from the home office.
Such an arrangement focuses the responsibility centering on the president of the
company. In a large company, this does not sound very good. This concentration of
responsibility may overburden the chief executive with supervisory duties, leaving him
too little time for creative thinking and acting. It also tends to create a shortage of
potential managers because of the centralizing authority at the top.
What has contributed much to the success of Hewlett Packard when Mr. Hurd took over?
Mainly it is his decision making process that has helped the company survive and prosper
despite increasing competition. He all but made the right decisions for the company.
In the past few years a number of things have come into being that have brought the
decision-making process into a sharper focus. Form the purely mechanical side, the rapid
and extensive development of high-speed computers and data processing procedures have
added immeasurably to the quantity of information available to the executive (2001).
This would specifically enable Mr. Hurd to base his decisions on far greater amounts of
relevant data than ever before. By having vast amount of information regarding a certain
matter, Mr. Hurd would be able to analyze and pick the right choice, thus making correct
decisions which are for the good of the company.
The ability to make correct decisions in business has long been recognized as a prime
attribute of successful management and there is therefore a need for inquiry into the
decision-making process. With the growth of large corporations, with their vast resources
in the areas of finance, productive capacity, and manpower, and the increased tempo of
competition, the possible consequences of unwise decisions, both on the companies
involved and on the economy generally, have served to focus attention on further
research and studies on the topic (2001).
Hewlett Packard is seen by practitioners and academics as a people management
benchmark, yet there are still concerns raised about integrating the rapidly changing
business imperatives with the human resource systems to create a measure of continuity
and consistency (1999).
Hewlett Packard could be described as having a unique 'cultured' soft model of human
resource management, in that HR considerations were an intrinsic part of the corporate

8. strategy and management style, rather than being grafted onto it. This created a situation
where HRM permeated the culture of the organization, and the whole way in which
people operated, becoming 'owned' by everyone, not the HR function itself--'the
ownership of managing people and practicing the HP Way (which is already described in
the previous paragraphs) is a line management-owned function' (senior manager).
For instance, the Managing Director articulated the six key processes for the organization
as 'customer focus, planning process, order generation, product generation, order
fulfillment, people fulfillment'. The emphasis placed in this model on development,
fulfillment, and quality is indicative of the soft model.
In Hewlett Packard, people considerations were seen as a fundamental component of the
business strategy itself. According to the case study, by making managers and the sales
force more accountable and by encouraging cross-selling, the firm has increased the
amount of extra products it sells alongside its hardware. The business strategy employed
by Mr. Hurd focuses not only on processes but on people as well. This proved to be
suited well to the company and its employees.
An important factor concerning the implementation of performance management
processes is the degree of change the organization is undergoing and the experience of
change the organization has had. At Hewlett Packard, operating in the computer business
for twenty-five years has given the firm a long history of change management and a
decentralized management style, which has resulted in a flexible performance
management system, able to cope with changing circumstances.
With this continuity and consistency, the expectations of employees remain relatively
stable. The enduring culture, exemplified by the HP Way, also provides continuity in
terms of values which in turn reinforce desired behaviours (1999).
A number of factors appear to have contributed to this turnaround that is happening to
Hewlett Packard under the management of Mr. Hurd. Apart from market changes, new
product launches, and cost-cutting measures, the level of bureaucracy within the
company was also attacked. A company that had been started by entrepreneurial
engineers, advisers urged that it had become too centralized.
In addition, new ideas were being squashed if they appeared too unorthodox. Hewlett
Packard’s response was to return to a decentralized structure that gave freedom back to
the individual business units. This decentralization arguably helped one business division
to take off in business terms and capture a significant proportion of a new product market
( 1999).
The achievements of an organization are the result of the combined efforts of each
individual in the organization working toward common objectives. These objectives
should be realistic, should be clearly understood by everyone in the organization, and
should reflect the organization's basic character and personality ( 1992). These sentences
clearly mirror what is happening at Hewlett Packard under Mr. Hurd as chief executive.

9. Conclusion
Organization means that management endeavors to achieve its objectives by
directing the efforts of the people under its supervision. This procedure is a necessity
whether it be a large or a small company. This has been taken seriously by Mr. Hurd as
chief executive of Hewlett Packard. While the success of a Hewlett Packard may be
attributed to many other causes, the skills with which Mr. Hurd directs and manages the
organization is one of the major factors in the positive end result.
Probably the most foremost responsibility of management at all levels, but
especially top management – that of Mr. Hurd, is the making of decisions. In many, if not
most, instances, the decisions that chief executive officers have involve the making of
choices between two or more alternative courses of action. The company therefore rests
on whether Mr. Hurd will choose the right decision or not. Thankfully, Mr. Hurd has
enough experience and perhaps plenty of references that enabled him to make the right
decisions and helping Hewlett Packard succeed
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10. The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
A failure in decision support system and human factors management
by Jeff Forrest
Metropolitan State College
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the environmental and human decision making factors that were
associated with the launching of the Space Shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986.
Shortly after launch, the Shuttle exploded destroying the vehicle and all crew members.
The cause and contributing factors that lead to the Challenger tragedy are explored in
detail. Focus is placed on NASA's use of a group decision support system (GDSS)
meeting to make the decision to launch.
Examples are included that show how contributing factors such as multiple priorities and
demands influenced NASA from operating in a responsible and ethical manner. Proof
that NASA used a flawed database in its GDSS and how it mismanaged the GDSS
meeting is also offered. Finally, the inability of each GDSS member to vote anonymously
on the decision to launch is discussed as a critical factor that, had it been allowed,
probably would have prevented the Challenger tragedy.
THE SHUTTLE 51-L MISSION

11. Environmental Factors- Societal Impacts
The Space Shuttle Challenger 51-L was the 25th mission in NASA's STS program. On
Jan. 28, 1986, STS 51-L exploded shortly after liftoff, destroying the vehicle and all of its
seven crew members.
The STS 51-L mission was to deploy the second Tracking and Data Relay Satellite and
the Spartan Halley's Comet observer. Paramount to this mission was crew member S.
Christa McAuliffe - the first Space Shuttle passenger/observer participating in the NASA
Teacher in Space Program (cf. [1]). Ms. McAuliffe would have conducted live
educational broadcasts from the Shuttle and transmitted them to classrooms throughout
the world.
The loss of life and the unique position that symbolized Christa McAuliffe as the first
civilian working as a teacher in space had a profound impact on society and its attitude
toward NASA and the U.S. Space programs.
As this article will explore, the tragic decision to launch STS 51-L was based on long
term contributing factors and the use of a flawed group decision support system that was
further aggravated by its related mismanagement. The outcome of this action created
costs to society in terms of life, resources and public mistrust. NASA subsequently
experienced years of setback for its related scientific research and operations.
BACKGROUND
Human Factors - Contributing to a Tragedy
Although the destruction of the Shuttle Challenger was caused by the hardware failure of
a solid rocket booster (SRB) "O" ring, the human decision to launch was, in itself,
flawed. The resolution to launch was based upon faulty group decision support
information and further aggravated by the related mismanagement of that information.
However, as in most transportation accidents, there are usually other contributing factors
that help to create an environment leading to mistakes and failures. Therefore, a brief
review of the contributing factors leading to the Challenger destruction is in order.
Environmental Factors - Demands on the Space Shuttle
The process of "selling" the American public and its political system the need for a
reusable space transportation system began in the late 1960's. Conceptually, the Space
Shuttle was introduced during the crest of the successful Apollo mission. Unlike the
Apollo mission, the Space Shuttle was approved as a method for operating in space,
without a firm definition of what its operational goals would be ([2] pg. 3). Here is the
first contributing factor. The Shuttle was developed as a utility without a firm application.
Therefore, support for such a project, both politically and economically, was not very
strong. To gain political support it was sold as a project with a "quick payoff" (cf., [2]).
Additional support was gained by offering the Shuttle program to the military as a means
to increase national security and to industry as a tool to open new commercial
opportunity. Scientists argued to the American people that the Shuttle would be an
"American Voyage" ([2] pg. 10) with great scientific gain. Globally, the Shuttle was sold
as a partnership with the European Space Agency (ESA) and as a means to improve
national and social relations by combining peoples of different nationalities, races and
sexes who would serve as crew members.
The process used to develop economic, political and social support for the shuttle
introduced the second contributing factor called heterogeneous engineering. That is, the
Shuttle engineering and management decisions were made to meet the needs of

12. organizational, political, and economic factors as opposed to a single entity mission
profile with specific goals ([2] pg. 9). Once functional, the Shuttle became exposed to
operational demands from a multitude of users. The Shuttle now had to live up to
NASA's promises. Coordinating the needs of political, commercial, military, international
and scientific communities placed immense pressures on the Shuttle management team.
First, political pressure to provide a reliable, reusable space vehicle with rapid turn
around time and deployment seriously hindered the ability for effective systems
integration and development. Secondly, it was not feasible to construct any complete
management support systems (MSS) that could consider all of the factors associated with
such a diverse group of environmental variables. Third, additional uncertainty and low
NASA employee moral was created when the Reagan Administration pushed for the
Shuttle to be declared "operational" before the "developmental" stage had been
completed [2].
After spending billions of dollars to go to the moon, Congress expected the Shuttle
program to be financially self-supportive ([2] pg. 15). This forced NASA to operate as a
pseudo commercial business. Therefore, the environment within NASA preceding the
Challenger launch was one of conflict, stress, and short cuts [2].
NASA
Decision Support System (DSS) - Environmental Effects
The probability for disaster was growing higher as increasing demands were being placed
on NASA just prior to the Challenger launch [2]. A false sense of security was felt by
NASA officials, with twenty-four successful Shuttle missions to their credit. Just prior to
the STS 51-L launch, NASA was an organization filled with internal strife and territorial
battles([3], pg. 412). Mangers operated in an environment of "overload and turbulence"
[3]. In short, NASA was characterized as having a "disease " ([3] pg.414) of decay and
destruction.
As incredible as it may seem, it would appear that NASA had no formal DSS program
initialized for the Shuttle operations before the Challenger launch. Evidence is strong that
decisions were made primarily by "satisficing" and conscious "muddling through."
Specific characteristics of decision making at the time consisted of short cuts,
compromise and operational heuristics ("operational heuristics; to cannibalize existing
parts" as defined by Jarman and Kouzmin [3] pg. 414). In short, NASA was operating in
a phase of semi-uncontrolled decision making while trying to serve the military, industry
and international research organizations with a space vehicle that had been declared
operational before completion of the developmental stage [4].
NASA used decision making by default as its primary DSS. Its organizational boundary
was highly political and open for manipulation by any entity that could exert political
power. Upon declaring the Shuttle "operational," the Reagan Administration removed the
motivation of NASA employees to manage and left them with the impression that
decision making would be made by directive from political sources.
The declaration of "operational" status was the critical turning point for NASA and its
management of Shuttle operations. Complacency began to grow among employees and
safety considerations were traded for time spent on keeping the Shuttle on schedule and
"the client of the day" satisfied. This was the environment just before the launch of STS
51-L.
THE DECISION TO LAUNCH

13. Group Decision Support System (GDSS) - Situational Analysis
A group support system did exist between NASA and related developers of the Shuttle.
Focus in this discussion will be placed on Thiokol - the subcontractor directly responsible
for the development of the SRB "O" rings. The GDSS system between NASA and
Thiokol consisted of same-time/different-place conference rooms equipped with a
connected and distributed computer interface. Speaker phones with audio only were also
available.
On the evening of January 27, 1986, Thiokol was providing information to NASA
regarding concerns for the next day's planned launch of STS 51-l. Thiokol engineers were
very concerned that the abnormally cold temperatures would affect the "O" rings to
nonperformance standards. The mission had already been canceled due to weather, and,
as far as NASA was concerned, another cancellation due to weather was unthinkable ([4]
pg. 23). Both parties were already aware that the seals on the SRB needed upgrading but
did not feel that it was critical. Though the information provided by the GDSS (with an
associated expert system) showed that the "O" rings would perform under the predicted
temperatures, Thiokol engineers questioned their own testing and data that were
programmed into the GDSS. Thus on the eve of the Challenger launch, NASA was being
informed that their GDSS had a flawed data base.
At this point, NASA requested a definitive recommendation from Thiokol on whether to
launch. Thiokol representatives recommended not to launch until the outside air
temperature reached 53º F. The forecast for Florida did not show temperatures reaching
this baseline for several days. NASA responded with pressure on Thiokol to change their
decision. NASA's level III manager, Mr. Lawrence Mulloy, responded to Thiokol's
decision by asking, "My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?" ([4]
pg. 24).
After this comment the Thiokol representatives requested five minutes to go off-line from
the GDSS. During this period the Thiokol management requested the chief engineer to
"take off his engineering hat and put on his management cap," suggesting that
organizational goals be placed ahead of safety considerations [4]. Thiokol reentered the
GDSS and recommended that NASA launch. NASA asked if there were any other
objections from any other GDSS member, and there was not.
Group Support System - Critical Analysis
There is little doubt that the environment from which NASA and its affiliated developers
operated provided an opportunity for significant human error. Nevertheless, NASA and
Thiokol had a "golden" opportunity to avoid disaster during their GDSS meeting before
the STS 51-L launch. The following factors are offered as potential explanations for what
created the flawed GDSS and the associated mismanagement of its information:
First, Thiokol was aware of the "O" ring problem at least several months before the
Challenger launch. However, the goal was to stay on schedule. NASA was made aware
of the problem but it was "down-played" as a low risk situation. Here is the first element
of flawed information that was input into the GDSS. If NASA had been aware of the
significance of the "O" ring situation, they probably would have given more credence to
the advice of the Thiokol engineers' recommendations. However, the data transmitted
during the GDSS meeting from Thiokol did say that it would be safe to launch for the
forecasted temperatures. NASA was frustrated over the conflicting advice from the same
source.

14. Second, the decision to delay a Shuttle launch had developed into an "unwanted" decision
by the members of the Shuttle team [5]. In other words, suggestions made by any group
member that would ultimately support a scheduled launch were met with positive support
by the group. Any suggestion that would lead to a delay was rejected by the group.
Third, all members of the GDSS felt that they should live up to the "norms" of the group.
Although the Thiokol engineers were firm on their recommendation to scrub the launch,
they soon changed their presentation of objections once threatened with the possibility of
being expelled from the program (as suggested by a NASA administrator who was
"appalled" at a company that would make such a recommendation based on the data
available) [5].
Fourth, Thiokol became highly susceptible to "groupthink" when they requested a break
from the GDSS. At this point they became insulated, conducted private conversations
under high stress and were afraid of losing potential future revenue should they disagree
with NASA. All these factors are considered prime to the formulation of "groupthink"
[5].
Fifth, all parties were afraid of public and political response to another launch
cancellation (there had already been six cancellations that year). Each party began to
rationalize that past success equaled future success [5].
Finally, the GDSS was seriously flawed. As already mentioned, the data base contained
erroneous information regarding the "O" rings. Ideas, suggestions and objections were
solicited but not anonymously. Individuals who departed from the group norms were
signaled out as unwelcome members. An agenda was never defined and NASA was
therefore surprised by the Thiokol presentation. Conflict management was avoided by
NASA's domination of the entire meeting. NASA, at times, became very assertive and
intimidating. Considering NASA's attitude, no group member or individual was willing to
be held accountable for any comment or decision [5].
The setting for such an important GDSS meeting was also ineffective. Considering that a
speaker phone and CPU modem was used, it was easy for NASA to down-play the
personal opinions of the Thiokol engineers. If the meeting could have been held at the
same place for all members, the outcome might have been different. At the end of the
meeting NASA, very reluctantly, suggested that they would still cancel the launch if
Thiokol insisted. No response from Thiokol was made and the NASA officials could not
see the expression of "self-censorship" that was being communicated on the face of each
Thiokol engineer [5].
Perhaps the most significant flaw in the GDSS was when Thiokol requested a private five
minute meeting with its own members. Up to this point Thiokol had stayed with its
recommendation to cancel the launch. Once disconnected, Thiokol became an isolated
member and the GDSS failed altogether. Once reconnected, Thiokol had changed its
position and offered the go ahead to launch without any objection.
CONCLUSIONS
The Critical Human Factor - Need for Voting Tool
Many conclusions may be drawn as to the primary cause and contributing factors
associated with the Challenger tragedy. It is the opinion of this author that regarding the
GDSS and decision to launch the ability of each member to have voted anonymously was
the key factor that would have maintained the integrity of the GDSS and the quality of
the decision.

15. It has been shown that just after Thiokol's presentation to NASA, most of the GDSS
group members were very concerned with the "O" ring situation and believed that the
opinions expressed by Thiokol engineers were cause for serious consideration of launch
cancellation [5]. However, only selected senior officials were allowed to vote their
"opinion", which they did verbally and at the request of NASA. From the research
conducted on this paper, the author believes that had a universal anonymous vote been
conducted of the total GDSS membership, a decision to cancel the launch would have
been made.
The factors which lead to the Challenger incident can be traced back to the inception of
the shuttle program. NASA and Thiokol failed to maintain a quality assurance program
through MSS, as was initiated on the Apollo program, due to multiple source demands
and political pressures. The GDSS used for the launch decision contained inaccurate data.
Engineering members of the GDSS did not believe in the testing procedures used to
generate the data components in the GDSS. And, the entire meeting was mismanaged.
The decision to launch the Challenger Shuttle and its subsequent destruction had a major
affect on society and the management of our space program. Challenger's unique mission
and the death of Christa McAuliffe opened the door for discussion and research on how
managers use DSS to make decisions that will affect public trust.
AFTERMATH
Ethics and MSS/DSS - Human Factors Management
A complete discussion of ethical decision making is beyond the scope of this article.
However, the question of how NASA and Thiokol managed ethical considerations is
central to the decision to launch the Challenger Shuttle and, therefore, deserves a brief
overview.
The first area of ethical concern is the area of information accuracy. The fact that both
NASA's and Thiokol's managers had little regard to the concerns of Thiokol's engineers
is very distressing. All members of the group made a decision knowing that the decision
was based on flawed information. A second concern is that the decision made put safety
last and operational goals first. Only one member of the GDSS expressed serious concern
for the potential loss of life [5]. Additionally, open and free communication before and
during the GDSS meeting was discouraged through such group dynamics as mind
guarding, direct pressure and self-censorship [5]. Individuals who know of a situation
that, unless acted upon with integrity might cause social harm, have a responsibility to
contact any authority that will manage and control that situation in the best interest of the
public ([4] "Whistleblowing, pg. 34).
Human factors analysis and management science have begun to define the incorporation
of MSS/DSS as a socially responsive way of conducting business ([6] pg. 826). This is
especially true for government agencies and large public projects like the Shuttle
program. It could be argued that GDSS technology had not evolved to the level of
effectiveness that was needed to support the Challenger project. The success of the DSS
used in the prior Apollo mission shows that this was not the case. In the Challenger
program social and ethical decision making was discarded for the sake of cost, schedule
and outside environmental demands.