Plutonium Recycling and East Asian Security by Henry Sokolski

1. Plutonium Recycling and
East Asian Security
By
Henry Sokolski
Executive Director, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center

2. Why worry about power reactor plutonium?
 The public has been led to believe that power reactors of the light
water reactor (LWR) type are “proliferation resistant”
 It also has been told that the plutonium LWRs produce can't be used
to make nuclear weapons
 Global promoters of nuclear energy say:
 World Nuclear Association (2015): "reactor-grade plutonium is entirely
unsuitable for use in a bomb”
 US Nuclear Energy Institute (2014): "plutonium generated as a byproduct
of the commercial fuel cycle poses little risk of proliferation,”
 They are unconcerned that civilian plutonium stockpiles are growing
globally, that Japan has 10.8 tons on its soil and plans to make up to 8
more tons a year, or that China is considering recycling just as much

3. But US nuclear weapons scientists have a very
different view
 Dr. Goodwin’s presentation makes clear that reactor-grade plutonium
can be used to make militarily effective bombs:
The United States has stated this publicly since 1976 but not very loudly
Defenders of plutonium use have pointed to the problems this
material would pose if it was used in a crude, 1945 implosion device
But since 1945, weapon scientists have well learned how to
circumvent these problems
Also, we now know from the more efficient bombs the British, French,
and Pakistanis first tested and the advanced designs the Swedes and
Iraqis perfected that proliferators today would use technology much
more advanced than that used in the first nuclear bomb

4. Unfortunately, a standard power reactor produces
lots of plutonium that can be used for bombs
 A standard 1 GWe light water reactor (LWR)—the main type used world-
wide and in East Asia – provides roughly 200 kilograms of nuclear explosive
plutonium at each refueling. This is enough for 50 bombs.
 At each refueling, 1/3rd of the core can be removed with about 100 kgs of
near-weapons grade plutonium in it – enough for roughly 20 bombs
 The LWR can also be operated to make as much as 150 kgs of weapons-
grade plutonium – enough for roughly 30 bombs--every 10 months
 More details can be found in a report by the Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory, "Verifying the Agreed Framework," April 2001

5. In fact, President Reagan proposed in 1987 using a
civilian LWR to make weapons plutonium for bombs
Source: http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?DisplayPage=output.cfm&File_Id=5482
5

6. A word on safeguards for plutonium
 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Mission
Statement says the agency’s role “is to deter the proliferation of nuclear
weapons by detecting early the misuse of nuclear material or technology.”
 The IAEA sets the conversion time of plutonium into insertable bomb cores at
1 to 3 weeks.
 The IAEA's timeliness detection goal – the goal for how often to inspect–
though, is set at 4 weeks, i.e., longer than the projected conversion time.
 With stockpiled plutonium, then, deterrence through detection, which is the
purpose of safeguards, is simply not possible.

7. What East Asian security experts and officials think
of each other's plutonium programs reflects these
points
 Chinese worry
 Japan's program "will put Japan and its neighboring countries and the whole world at risk"
 US might allow ROK to recycle plutonium under the US-ROK civilian nuclear cooperative agreement
 Japanese worry
 RoK might recycle when they "have no need to do so"
 China might buy a French copy of Rokkasho and stockpile nuclear explosive plutonium
 South Koreans worry
 That they are "sandwiched" between nuclear arming states -- North Korea, Japan and China
 Japanese say: Our neighbors should understand that we are "special" and would never arm
 Chinese say: We would only recycle for peaceful purposes and besides already are a weaponsstate
 South Koreans say: We have at least as much right to recycle as Japan

8. A Way Out: Nuclear experts' letter to US Secretary of
Energy Moniz, September 8, 2015
"It would be particularly advantageous to US nonproliferation
objectives to end the US MOX program now…
More broadly, there is an opportunity to ask not only Japan,
but South Korea and China to join in a decision to defer
commercial plutonium-based fuel activities…
None of these activities make economic sense. A
simultaneous announcement would help these governments
deal with their plutonium recycling interest groups. Indeed,
we believe that such an announcement at the upcoming
Nuclear Security Summit next Spring would contribute a
historic step to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.”