Scope of Interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Under which circumstances Court can interfere with an award passed by the arbitral tribunal.

1. Scope of Interference under
Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act
:Prepared by:
H. S. MULIA
1

2. Disclaimer
Views expressed in this
document are for
information and
academic purpose only.
2

3. Under the Arbitration Act, 1940 an
award could be set aside on 3 grounds,
viz:
(a) that an arbitrator or umpire had
mis­conducted himself or the
proceedings;
(b) that an award had been made after
the issue of an order by the Court
superseding the arbitration;
(c) that an award had been improperly
procured or was otherwise invalid.
3

4. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 ('the Act') has done away with the
principle of mis­conduct as also “effect of
legal proceedings”. The statement of
objects and reasons of the Act provides
that one of the main objectives of the Act
was to give more power to the arbitrators
and reduce the supervisory role of the
court. Consequently, by and large, Courts
have disfavoured interference with awards
and have shown a definite inclination to
preserve the award as far as possible. 4

5. Section 34 of the Act reads as under:­
Application for setting aside arbitral award.­ (1)
Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may
be made only by an application for setting aside
such award in accordance with sub­section (2) and
subsection (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court
only if ­
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof
that ­
(i) a party was under some incapacity, or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the
law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing
any indication thereon, under the law for the time
being in force; or
5

6. (iii) the party making the application was not given
proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or
of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable
to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of
the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration:
Provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated from
those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral
award which contains decisions on matters not
submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or
6

7. (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or
the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, unless
such agreement was in conflict with a
provision of this Part from which the parties
cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement,
was not in accordance with this Part; or
(b) the Court finds that ­
(i) the subject­matter of the dispute is not
capable of settlement by arbitration under
the law for the time being in force, or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the
public policy of India.
7

8. Explanation 1—For the avoidance of any doubt, it is
clarified that an award is in conflict with the public
policy of India, only if,­
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected
by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section
75 or section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental
policy of Indian law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of
morality or justice.
Explanation 2—For the avoidance of doubt, the test
as to whether there is a contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a
review on the merits of the dispute.]
8

9. (2A) An arbitral award arising out of
arbitrations other than international
commercial arbitrations, may also be set
aside by the Court, if the Court finds
that the award is vitiated by patent
illegality appearing on the face of the
award:
Provided that an award shall not be
set aside merely on the ground of an
erroneous application of the law or by
re­appreciation of evidence.
9

10. (3) An application for setting aside may not
be made after three months have elapsed
from the date on which the party making that
application had received the arbitral award,
or, if a request had been made under section
33, from the date on which that request had
been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that
the applicant was prevented by sufficient
cause from making the application within the
said period of three months it may entertain
the application within a further period of
thirty days, but not thereafter.
10

11. (4) On receipt of an application under sub­
section (1), the Court may, where it is
appropriate and it is so requested by a party,
adjourn the proceedings for a period of time
determined by it in order to give the arbitral
tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral
proceedings or to take such other action as in
the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate
the grounds for setting aside the arbitral
award.
11

12. (5) An application under this section shall be
filed by a party only after issuing a prior
notice to the other party and such application
shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the
applicant endorsing compliance with the said
requirement.
(6) An application under this section shall be
disposed of expeditiously, and in any event,
within a period of one year from the date on
which the notice referred to in sub­section
(5) is served upon the other party.
12

13. In this case of ONGC v/s. Saw Pipes, 2003(5) SCC
705, Hon'ble Supreme Court expanded the scope of
“public policy” to include setting aside an award if it
was “patently illegal”. There are two notable
points:­
Firstly, it has expanded the scope of “public policy”
rather than keeping it limited, as laid down in
earlier judgments. It is not easy to discern what
“public policy” is and various courts have held that
“public policy” is an unruly horse.
Secondly, what is “patently illegal” is itself not
clear. To find out whether an award is “patently
illegal” or not, the court has to make a judicial
scrutiny of the arbitral award on merits. “Patently
illegal” is another unruly horse and may not always
be related to “public policy”.
13

14. Hon'ble Supreme Court in McDermott International
Inc. v/s Burn Standard Co. Ltd., 2006 (11) SCC 181
has held that...
“The 1996 Act makes a provision for the supervisory
role of courts, for the review of the arbitral award only
to ensure fairness. Intervention of the court is
envisaged in few circumstances only, like, in case of
fraud or bias by the arbitrators, violation of natural
justice, etc. the court cannot correct error of the
arbitrator again if it is desired. So, scheme of the
provisions aims at keeping the supervisory role of the
court at minimal level and this can be justified as
parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to
exclude the court’s jurisdiction by opting for arbitration
as they prefer the expediency and finally offered by it.”14

15. Various High Courts have also recognized that there
is a very limited scope of judicial review of arbitral
awards and held that the challenge to the award u/s
34 of the Act cannot be construed as an appeal
against the award. Even it is not permissible for the
court to correct the error of the arbitrator or grant
relief which is the subject of the dispute in the
arbitration.
Recently, in Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v/s.
ONGC, 2010 (11) SCC 296 Hon'ble Supreme Court
has laid down that:
15

16. It is true that if there is an error
apparent on the face of the award or
where the umpire had exceeded his
jurisdiction or travelled beyond the
reference, the Court can interfere, if the
conclusion of the arbitrator is based on a
possible view of the matter, the Court is
not expected to interfere with the award.
Court while considering challenge to
arbitral award does not sit in appeal over
the findings and decision of the
arbitrator 16

17. Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that an application under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 is a summary
proceeding not in the nature of a regular suit
– Canara Nidhi Ltd. v/s. M. Shashikala, 2019
SCC Online SC 1244. As a result, a court
reviewing an arbitral award under Section
34 does not sit in appeal over the award, and
if the view taken by the arbitrator is possible,
no interference is called for – Associated
Construction v/s. Pawanhans Helicopters
Ltd. (2008) 16 SCC 128.
17

18. “Error of Law apparent on the face of the
record” in Administrative Law has been
regarded as one of the grounds for invalidating
a judicial or quasi judicial matter under the writ
of certiorari. In Arbitration, if an award is
inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act
then it would amount to a patent error on its
face. Such an award is a nullity and would not
have any effect on law and hence can be
declared as void, incapable of being enforced.
Though this is a ground for setting aside an
award by the Court, nevertheless the person
against whom such award has been rendered
can itself resist the execution of such an award.18

19. An award that is patently in violation of a
statute or a statutory provision and can be
inferred on the face of the award, such award
cannot be said to be in the interest of the
common people or for the good of the people.
Moreover such an award would apparently
have negative impact on the administration of
justice and hence it can set aside as patently
illegal if it is contrary to:
a. fundamental policy of India;
b. the interest of India;
c. justice or morality;
d. if it is patently illegal. 19

20. The Supreme Court in Associate Builders v/s. Delhi
Development Authority, 2015 SCC (3) 49 has
elaborated as to what constitutes patent illegality.
According to the Court patent illegality shall include:
I. fraud or corruption;
II. contravention of substantive law;
III. error of law by the arbitrator;
IV. contravention of the arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 itself;
V. the arbitrator fails to give consideration to the
terms of the contract and usages of trade under
section 28(3) of the Act;
VI. arbitrator fails to give a reason for his decision.
20

21. Explanation I of Section 34(2) of the Act
provides that, for the purposes of this
section “an award is in conflict with the
public policy of India” only in the following
circumstances, namely:
When the award is contrary to the:­
­ award has been affected by fraud or
corruption and was in violation of Section
75 or 81 of the Act; or
­ in contravention of fundamental policy of
India; or
­ interests of India; or
­ in conflict with the most basic notions of
morality or justice. 21

22. These grounds have also been enumerated
by the Supreme Court in the case of
McDermott (supra) where the Court opined
that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of
1996 in order to ensure fairness, makes the
court a supervising agency for review of the
arbitral award.
Moreover the aim of the provision is to keep
the supervisory role of the court to a
restricted level. This in fact is justified since
the parties to the arbitration by opting for
arbitration make a conscious decision not to
include the court’s jurisdiction so as to
ensure expediency and finality. 22

23. The amendment was brought into
effect so as to limit the judicial
intervention of Courts in Arbitration.
This is so because the main idea for
adopting arbitration as a means for
settling disputes is speedy resolution
of disputes and if Courts are involved
in the process then it will only add to
the pendency and cots of the parties
to arbitration.
23

24. The Amendment to the Act has also
included Section 2A which provides for
patent illegality which is an additional
ground for setting aside an arbitral
award. This ground will be applicable
only to arbitrations taking place in India
and not to International Commercial
Arbitrations as can be interpreted from
the wording of the section which says
“other than International commercial
arbitration”.
24

25. Moreover a proviso is also appended
to subsection 2A which states that if
the court believes that there is an
erroneous application of Law, this
cannot be a sole basis for setting
aside the award. Under the Act of
1996, an award can only be
questioned under section 34 of the
Act. Mere erroneous finding by itself
cannot be the subject matter to the
award passed. 25

26. In the case of Ssangyong Engineering and
Construction v/s. National Highways Authority of
India, 2019 SCC Online SC 677, Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that the purpose of Section 34(2A)
of the Act is to deal with purely domestic awards,
which may also be set aside by the Court if the
Court finds that such award is vitiated by “patent
illegality appearing on the face of the award”.
In order to provide a balance and to avoid
excessive intervention, it is clarified in the proviso
to Section 34(2A) of the Act is, such “an award
shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an
erroneous application of the law or by re­
appreciating evidence”
26

27. The question is whether this amendment is
having retrospective effect or prospective
effect?
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Ssangyoung (supra) has held that
amendment in law by way of clarification
to avoid doubt, cannot be retrospective if
earlier law has been changed subsequently.
It is also held that this amendment would
only apply to applications made to the
Court on or after 23.10.2015, though
arbitration proceedings commenced prior
to coming into force of amended Act. 27

28. Question:­ Applicant furnishing proof of one of
grounds in Section 34(2)(a) of the A & C Act
and applicant filed affidavit of facts in this
regards ­ whether cross examination of
applicant who has challenged the award u/s
34(2)(a) of the A & C Act can be allowed?
Answer:­ Cross examination of person
swearing to affidavit cannot be allowed, unless
absolutely necessary.
M/s. Emkay Global Finance Services Ltd. V/s.
Girdhar Sondhi, AIR 2018 SC 3894.
28

29. Where a party has received notice and he does not
raise a plea of lack of jurisdiction before the Arbitral
Tribunal, he must make out a strong case why he did
not do so if he chooses to move a petition for setting
aside the award under Section 34(2)(a)(v) of the Act
on the ground that the composition of the Arbitral
Tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement
of the parties. If plea of jurisdiction is not taken
before the arbitrator as provided in Section 16 of the
Act, such a plea cannot be permitted to be raised in
proceedings under Section 34 of the Act for setting
aside the award, unless good reasons are shown.
Gas Authority of India Ltd. v. Keti Construction (I)
Ltd., (2007) 5 SCC 38. 29

30. The scope of interference of the court is very limited. The
court would not be justified in reappraising the material on
record and substituting its own view in place of the
arbitrator's view. Where there is an error apparent on the face
of the record or the arbitrator has not followed the statutory
legal position, then and then only it would be justified in
interfering with the award published by the arbitrator. Once
the arbitrator has applied his mind to the matter before him,
the court cannot reappraise the matter as if it were an appeal
and even if two views are possible, the view taken by the
arbitrator would prevail.
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v/s. L.K. Ahuja, 2004 (5) SCC 109;
Ravindra & Associates v/s. Union of India 2010 (1) SCC 80;
Madnani Construction Corpn. (P) Ltd. v/s. Union of India,
2010 (1) SCC 549; Associated Construction v/s. Pawanhans
Helicopters Ltd. 2008 (16) SCC 128; Satna Stone & Lime Co.
Ltd. v. Union of India, 2008 (14) SCC 785 and Navodaya Mass
Entertainment Ltd. v/s. J.M. Combines, 2015 (5) SCC 698. 30

31. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Parsa Kente Collieries Limited VS
Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan
Nigam Limited, 2019 (7) SCC 236
has held that when award is based
on little evidence or on evidence
which does not measure up in quality
to trained legal mind would not be
held to invalid.
31

32. LIMITATION:­
Sub­section (3) of Section 34 of the Act
provides that the aggrieved party must
apply for setting aside of the arbitration
award with a period of three months
from the date of making the award.
The said period of three months can be
condoned for a further period of 30
days if the applicant satisfies the court
that there was sufficient cause which
prevented him from making the
application. 32

33. In Union of India v/s. Popular Construction Company, 2001
(8) SCC 470 a question arose as to whether section 5 of the
Limitation Act would be applicable under section 34 of the
Act. The Court while arriving at a conclusion examined the
past history and purpose of the act and also what was the
intent of the legislature while framing the Law. One of the
cardinal purpose of the Act was to reduce intervention by
courts in the arbitration process. This objective is apparent in
section 5 of the Act. Moreover the intention of the legislature
can be deduced from the wording of the proviso of section 34
(3) of the Act which says “but not thereafter”. Hence it was
held that the expression would prevent the application of
section 5 of the Limitation Act due to the apparent exclusion
within the meaning of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act.
This judgment is followed in the case of Ganesharaju v.
Narasamma S. Ganesharaju v/s. Narasamma, 2013 (11) SCC
341 and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v/s. Tejparas Associates &
Exports (P) Ltd., 2019 (9) SCC 435.
33

34. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with the
“exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide” in a court
without jurisdiction, subject to satisfaction of certain
conditions. The question whether Section 14 of the
Limitation Act would be applicable to an application
submitted under Section 34 of the Act has been
answered by this Court in Consolidated Engg.
Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., 2008 (7) SCC 169 and
it has been held that It is well to remember that
Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not provide for a
fresh period of limitation but only provides for the
exclusion of a certain period. Having regard to the
legislative intent, it will have to be held that the
provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963
would be applicable to an application submitted under
Section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside an arbitral
award 34

35. In the case of Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v/s. Union
of India, 2019 (2) SCC 455 and Oriental Insurance
Com. Ltd. v/s. Tejparas Associates & Exports Pvt. Ltd.,
2019 (9) SCC 435, is has been held that Section 5 of
the Limitation Act has no application to a petition
challenging the arbitral award under Section 34 of the
Act. In the said decision however it is indicated that
Section 14 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an
application submitted under Section 34 of the Act
seeking for exclusion of certain period if the
application under Section 34 of the Act is at the first
instance filed within the limitation period provided
under Section 34(3) of the Act. The position of law
that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to
condone the statutory period under Section 34(3) of
the Act is well established and needs no reiteration.
35

36. Facts of the case:­
The fact deduced from the statement made by the
applicant are:­
Execution of the contractual work was completed
in the year 1995 and the claim remains alive till
27th
September, 1996. From 27th
September, 1996,
there has been no action on the part of the
applicant.
Record further suggest that there has been
correspondence from the respondent dated 2nd
July, 2007 and this correspondence does not
appear to be a letter or document which constitutes
promise to pay under Section 25(3) of the Indian
Contract Act.
Question:­ Whether such claim can be said to be
live claim?
36

37. After referring to provisions of Section 18 of the Contract
Act, it has been held that...
In order to have an acknowledgment in writing, this
must be done within the period of limitation and, after the
period of limitation, there will be no effect of
acknowledgment. This is one of the factors for existence of
the patently dead claim. Following the aforesaid Supreme
Court judgment and without further deliberations, I can
safely hold that the claim has become a dead one and
there is no need to refer a dead claim for adjudication, for
which the learned arbitrator cannot take up the task of
adjudicating a closed chapter. Accordingly, the Arbitration
Application is dismissed.
Ms. Sri Matha Manikeshawri Enterprises, Represented by
its Proprietor R. Srinath Reddy v/s. General Manager,
South Central Railways, 2011 Supreme (AP) 1153. 37

38. Facts of the case:­
The first dispute arose on 03.02.1975. As per
the arbitration agreement, Mr. A appointed his
arbitrator on 15.05.1975 and serve notice to
Mr.B requiring him to appoint his arbitrator
and they also appointed an Umpire
Accordingly arbitrators have been appointed.
The statement of claim was for recovery of
Rs.XYZ filed Mr.A before the arbitrators on
04.06.1976. On 23.03.1980, the arbitrators
rejected the claim of Mr.A. The award dated
23.03.1980 was challenged by Mr.A before the
Court. The Court dismissed the said petition
on 10.09.1984.
38

39. Until the rejection of above claim made by Mr.A,
on 23.03.1980, Mr.B did not raise any dispute with
regard to his claim of recovery of Rs.ABC made by
Mr.A on 08.08.1974 from Mr.B's running bill.
Thereafter, on 27.03.1980 Mr.B called upon Mr.A
to release the sum of Rs.ABC. On 22.09.1984, Mr.B
initiated proceedings under the Act, in respect of
claim of Rs.ABC by appointing its arbitrator and
also called upon Mr.A to appoint his arbitrator. The
arbitrators entered upon the reference on
01.02.1985 and they also appointed an Umpire.
Mr.B filed its statement of claim before the
arbitrators on 16.03.1985. The arbitrators by their
award dated 27.10.1985 accepted the claim of
Mr.B and passed an award for Rs.ABC in favour of
Mr.B 39

40. The second dispute arose out of another agreement
between the same parties. The dispute arose on
03.02.1975. Mr.B on 15.03.1975 appointed his
arbitrator and called upon Mr.A to appoint his
arbitrator. Mr.A appointed his arbitrator; and the
arbitrators in turn appointed the Umpire. The
arbitrators, however, could not enter upon the
reference.
Then Mr.B approached the civil court for the
appointment of arbitrators by invoking Sections 8 of the
Act. The civil court vide its order dated 10.09.1984
allowed the suit filed by Mr.B and directed parties to
appoint their arbitrators within 15 days therefrom.
Each party, accordingly, appointed arbitrators and the
appointed arbitrators entered upon reference. On
14.031985, Mr.B filed claim in the sum of Rs.PQR.
40

41. Question ­ Whether the claims filed by parties are time barred?
As far as the first dispute is concerned, on 08.08.1974, Mr.A
recovered an amount of Rs.ABC. The dispute with regard to claim of
Rs.ABC, thus, arose on 08.08.1974. Mr.Mr.A to appoint arbitrator
within three years therefrom or apply to the Court within this time.
However, it was after ten years on 22.09.1984 that Mr.B appointed
his arbitrator and called upon Mr.A to appoint his arbitrator.
Significantly, Mr.A had already made a claim of Rs.XYZ against Mr.B
and the dispute was referred to arbitration at the instance of Mr.A in
the year 1976. Although Mr.B contested the said claim of Mr.A before
the arbitrators but curiously no counter claim for Rs.ABC was made in
those proceedings. Arbitrators rejected the claim of Mr.A on
23.03.1980. But that does not improve the case of Mr.A in so far as
limitation is concerned as the limitation began to run from
08.08.1974. It was too late on 22.09.1984 for Mr.B to agitate the
claim of Rs.ABC for which the cause of action accrued on 08.08.1974.
Mr.B ought to have made counter claim before the arbitrators on or
before 07.08.1977 when Mr.A made a claim of Rs.XYZ. Therefore, the
claim of Rs.ABC of Mr.B raised for the first time after 10 years of
accrual of cause of action is apparently barred by time. 41

42. As far as second dispute is concerned...
Admittedly, the dispute in this regard arose between the parties
on 03.02.1975 and Mr.B on 15.03.1975 appointed his arbitrator
and gave notice to Mr.A requiring he to appoint his arbitrator.
Mr.A also appointed his arbitrator but the arbitrators could not
enter upon the reference. It was in the year 1979, then that Mr.B
approached the civil court by filing suit under Section 8 of the
Act which was allowed vide order dated 10.09.1984 directing
parties to appoint arbitrators within 15 days. In compliance
thereof, the parties appointed their arbitrators and on
16.03.1985 Mr.B filed his statement of claim for payment of
Rs.PQR.
Thus under Section 43(2) of the Act, the arbitration shall be
deemed to have commenced on 15.03.1975 i.e. well within time.
Merely because, the arbitrators could not enter upon reference
and Mr.B had to approach the civil court in the year, 1979 by
filing suit u/s 8 of the Act which was allowed on 10.09.1984 and
new arbitrators were appointed by the parties and statement of
claim was filed by the contractor on 14.03.1985, that would not
render Mr.B's claim of Rs.PQR time barred. 42

43. These facts are taken from the case decided by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Visakhapatnam Port Trust v/s. M/s
Continental Construction Company, 2009 (4) SCC 546.
Wherein, Section 37(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 was taken
into consideration. Section 37(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1940
reads as under:­
Section 37(3):­ For the purposes of this section and of the Indian
Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), an arbitration shall be deemed to
be commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement serves
on the other parties thereto a notice requiring the appointment of
an arbitrator, or where the arbitration agreement provides that the
reference shall be to a person named or designated in the
agreement, requiring that the difference be submitted to the person
so named or designated.
Section 37(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is pari materia to
section 43(2) of the Act. Which reads as under:­
For the purposes of this section and the Indian Limitation Act,
1908 (9 of 1908), an arbitration shall be deemed to be commenced
on the date referred in Section 21.
43

44. Since provisions contained u/s 37(3)
of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and
Section 43(2) of the Act are pari
materia, the ratio laid down in the
case of Visakhapatnam Port Trust
(supra) can be taken into
consideration while deciding an issue
of time barred claim and the counter
claim.
44

45. Sub­section 4 of Section 34:­
Remand to the Arbitral Tribunal.
Wherein it has been held that the
Court has no power under Section 34
of the Act is not to remand the matter
to the Arbitral Tribunal after setting
aside the arbitral award.
Kinnari Mullick v. Ghanshyam Das
Damani, 2018 (11) SCC 328. 45

46. Sub­section 5 of Section
34:­
The issue here is whether is
it the mandatory
requirement to issue prior
notice to the other­side and
an affidavit as provided u/s
34(5) of the A & C Act?
46

47. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar
v/s. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti, reported
in AIR 2018 SC 3862 has opined as under.
Contrasting to Section 34(5) with Section 80 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court
observed that unlike in the latter, the infraction of
the former leads to no consequence.
To construe such a provision as being
mandatory would defeat the advancement of
justice as it would provide the consequence of
dismissing an application filed without adhering to
the requirements of Section 34(5), thereby
scuttling the process of justice by burying the
element of fairness.
47

48. Sub­section 6 of Section 34 of the Act:­
Another significant incorporation is the
addition of sub­section 6 to section 34 which
provides the time limit for disposal of the
application. The intention behind
incorporating this sub­section is to promote
speedy resolution of disputes keeping in mind
the number of cases arising in commercial
arbitration. Hence sub­section 6 provides for
disposing the application as expeditiously as
possible before the expiry of one year from the
date on which a notice was given to the other
party. 48

49. In the case of State of Bihar v/s.
Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank
Samiti [State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya
Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti, 2018 (9)
SCC 472, Hon'ble Supreme Court
has held the period of one year
mentioned in the aforesaid sub­
section is directory
49

50. Thank
You
50