Agroterrorism is a concept of biowar where the agriculture is targetted, the crops can be infested with the introduced alien agents.

3. AGROTERRORISM
Presentation by,
MR. GURU P. N.

4. Agricultural Bioterrorism
(Agroterrorism)
• Biological Warfare –Use of disease to harm or
kill military/civilians, food, or livestock
• Agroterrorism – Intentional Attack on
Agriculture Infrastructure- Bio Weapons

5. Relevant Terms
• Reservoir – the species or location where the disease
organism is typically found, often asymptomatic
• Zoonotic – A disease with an animal reservoir that can be
passed to humans
• Contagious – Disease or agent that can be passed from
one person to another
Levels of contagiousness: high, moderate, low, none
Indirect transmission (insect or animal vector)
Specific activity (venereal, blood borne)
• FAD – Foreign Animal Disease
– Diseases that are not naturally in the U.S. or were eliminated from
the U.S. after an eradication effort
– Trade as well as health issues
• Quarantine - To stop the movement of animals into or out
of an area. To isolate an individual, herd, area, state,
nation, etc.

6. Biological WarfareBiological Warfare
The intentional use of micro-organisms orThe intentional use of micro-organisms or
toxins derived from living organisms totoxins derived from living organisms to
produce death or disease in humans,produce death or disease in humans,
animals and plantsanimals and plants
Bio-terrorism isBio-terrorism is
the random use ofthe random use of
these weaponsthese weapons
against the publicagainst the public
With the purpose ofWith the purpose of
demoralizing ademoralizing a
country, exactingcountry, exacting
revenge, and/orrevenge, and/or
affecting policyaffecting policy

7. Potential Targets for Biological Weapons
• Humans
– Pathogenic diseases
– Vector-borne diseases
– Zoonotic diseases
– Toxins
• Food
• Animals
• Plants
• Materiel

8. Potential Bioterrorism Agents
(CDC categories)
• Easily transmitted from person-to-person
• High mortality rates
• Potential for major public health impact
• Can cause panic and social disruption
• Requires special action for public health
preparedness
• Anthrax, Botulism, Plague, Smallpox ,
Tularemia, Viral hemorrhagic fevers (Ebola,
Marburg, Lassa, Machupo)
Category A

9. Potential Bioterrorism Agents
(CDC categories)
• Moderately easy to disseminate
• Moderate morbidity and low mortality rates,
• Brucellosis, Glanders, Meliodosis, Psittacosis,
Q Fever, Typhus fever, Viral encephalitis
Toxins (bacterial and plant), Food Safety,
Water Safety
Category BCategory B

10. Potential Bioterrorism Agents
(CDC categories)
• Emerging pathogens
• Could be engineered for mass dissemination
• Available, easy production and dissemination
• Potentially high morbidity and mortality
• Major health impact
• Nipah (Nipah virus), Hantavirus (Hantavirus)
Category CCategory C

11. Biological Agents asBiological Agents as WeaponsWeapons..
• Sythian arrows dipped in blood of decomposing bodies (400 BC)Sythian arrows dipped in blood of decomposing bodies (400 BC)
• Diseased bodies in water suppliesDiseased bodies in water supplies
• Saliva from rabid dogs in artillery shells (Poland, 1650)Saliva from rabid dogs in artillery shells (Poland, 1650)
• Smallpox infected clothing or blanketsSmallpox infected clothing or blankets
• Nomadic Mongols catapult bubonic plague-infested bodies into theNomadic Mongols catapult bubonic plague-infested bodies into the
Genoese trading post in the Crimea.Genoese trading post in the Crimea.
• German Glanders effortsGerman Glanders efforts
• Japanese Imperial Units 731 and 100Japanese Imperial Units 731 and 100
Excludes “Biocrimes”Excludes “Biocrimes”
• Anthrax mailingsAnthrax mailings
• Ricin mailingsRicin mailings

12. Food and Water Borne BiocrimesFood and Water Borne Biocrimes
(1932 - Present)(1932 - Present)
‘‘96 - Diane Thompson--Dallas hospital….96 - Diane Thompson--Dallas hospital….ShigellaShigella in pastries (12 ill)in pastries (12 ill)
‘‘95 - Debora Green---Kansas City….Ricin in meals (1 ill)95 - Debora Green---Kansas City….Ricin in meals (1 ill)
‘‘84 - Rajneeshees---Oregon...84 - Rajneeshees---Oregon...SalmonellaSalmonella on salad bar (751 ill)on salad bar (751 ill)
‘‘70 - Eric Kranz---Montreal…70 - Eric Kranz---Montreal… Ascriis suumAscriis suum in food (4-5 ill)in food (4-5 ill)
------------
‘‘66 - Dr. Mitsuru Suzuki---Japan…66 - Dr. Mitsuru Suzuki---Japan…S. typhiS. typhi in food (ca.412 ill / 12 dead)in food (ca.412 ill / 12 dead)
‘‘39 - Kikuko Hirose---Japan…39 - Kikuko Hirose---Japan…SalmonellaSalmonella in pastries (12 ill)in pastries (12 ill)
‘‘36 - Tei-Sabro Takahashi---Japan…36 - Tei-Sabro Takahashi---Japan…Sal.Sal. in pastries (10 ill / 4 dead)in pastries (10 ill / 4 dead)
‘‘32 - Prince Mikasa---Japan…Cholera in fruit (0 ill)32 - Prince Mikasa---Japan…Cholera in fruit (0 ill)
<1200 ill & 16 dead<1200 ill & 16 dead

13. • Must be presented as aMust be presented as a respirable aerosolrespirable aerosol
ThereforeTherefore
• Preparation and weaponization mayPreparation and weaponization may jeopardize viabilityjeopardize viability
• Aerosols are dependant onAerosols are dependant on meteorological conditionsmeteorological conditions
However...However...
• Contagious agentsContagious agents can be delivered without weaponizationcan be delivered without weaponization
• Some agents can be spread bySome agents can be spread by vectorsvectors
Implications and Constraints for the Bioweaponeer
MagicMagic
InvolvedInvolved
Little or No Magic InvolvedLittle or No Magic Involved

14. Possible Indicators of a BW/BT AttackPossible Indicators of a BW/BT Attack
• Disease entity not naturally-occurring in the areaDisease entity not naturally-occurring in the area
• Multiple disease entities in same patients (mixed agent attack)Multiple disease entities in same patients (mixed agent attack)
• Large # of military and civilian casualties (inhabit same area)Large # of military and civilian casualties (inhabit same area)
• Data suggestive of a massive point source outbreakData suggestive of a massive point source outbreak
• Apparent aerosol or cutaneous route of invasionApparent aerosol or cutaneous route of invasion
• High morbidity and mortality relative to # at riskHigh morbidity and mortality relative to # at risk
• Localized or circumspect area for illnessLocalized or circumspect area for illness
• Low attack rates for personnel working with filtered air or closedLow attack rates for personnel working with filtered air or closed
ventilation systemsventilation systems
• Dead sentinel animals of multiple speciesDead sentinel animals of multiple species
• Absence of a competent natural vector in area of outbreakAbsence of a competent natural vector in area of outbreak
• Severe disease in previously healthy populationSevere disease in previously healthy population

15. Diseases often mentioned in the context of Biological WarfareDiseases often mentioned in the context of Biological Warfare
Human DiseasesHuman Diseases
• SmallpoxSmallpox
• CholeraCholera
• ShigellosisShigellosis
ZoonosesZoonoses
• AnthraxAnthrax
• BrucellosisBrucellosis
• CoccioidomycosisCoccioidomycosis
• VEE/EEE/WEEVEE/EEE/WEE
• Marburg/EbolaMarburg/Ebola
• HistoplasmosisHistoplasmosis
• Rift Valley feverRift Valley fever
• MelioidosisMelioidosis
• GlandersGlanders
• PlaguePlague
• PsittacosisPsittacosis
• Q feverQ fever
• TularemiaTularemia
• Lassa feverLassa fever
Animal DiseasesAnimal Diseases
• African SwineAfrican Swine
FeverFever
• ** Foot &** Foot &
MouthMouth
• Fowl plagueFowl plague
• NewcastleNewcastle
• RinderpestRinderpest
Plant DiseasesPlant Diseases
• Wheat Stem RustWheat Stem Rust
• Rice BlastRice Blast
• Pathogenic Plant FungiPathogenic Plant Fungi
• Karnal BuntKarnal Bunt
• BotulismBotulism
• SEBSEB
• RicinRicin
ToxinsToxins

16. The Silent EnemyThe Silent Enemy
BW AttackBW Attack
Incubation PeriodIncubation Period
Clinical SignsClinical Signs
Mass CasualtiesMass Casualties
The longer a BWThe longer a BW
attack goesattack goes
undetected orundetected or
unrecognized, theunrecognized, the
more serious itmore serious it
becomes.becomes.
PreventionPrevention
Impact
Early detectionEarly detection
and effectiveand effective
intervention isintervention is
criticalcritical

17. An economic assault on ourAn economic assault on our
national security andnational security and
infrastructureinfrastructure
WhyWhy Agricultural TargetsAgricultural Targets ????

18. Agroterrorism is defined as the intentional introduction
of animal or plant pests or the cultivation or production
of pathogenic bacteria, fungi, parasites, protozoans,
viruses, or their toxic products for the purposes of
causing poultry, livestock, crop, soil, or human disease,
poisoning, or death. This could occur through
introducing pests intended to kill food crops, spreading a
virulent disease among confined feedlots where animals
are given high protein rations to prepare them for
slaughter, poisoning civil or agricultural water sources or
food supplies, or using food-borne pathogens to cause
human disease (Foxell 2001).
DEFINED…..DEFINED…..

19. AGROTERRORAGROTERROR
 The purpose of agroterror is to causeThe purpose of agroterror is to cause
economic destructioneconomic destruction
 Decrease the faith in the safety ofDecrease the faith in the safety of
the food supplythe food supply
 Decrease the availability of foodDecrease the availability of food
 A vehicle for the dissemination of aA vehicle for the dissemination of a
chemical or biologic agentchemical or biologic agent

20. GovernmentGovernment
IndustryIndustry AcademiaAcademia
Basic andBasic and
Applied R&DApplied R&D
NationalNational
StateState
LocalLocal

21. Biological Threat
Countermeasures
• Vaccines
• Prophylaxis
• Treatments
•Enhanced resistance
• Coordination / Training
• Biosecurity
• Response & Preparation
• Containment
• Decontamination
• Disposal
• Indemification
• Incident
Management
• Consequence
Management
• Intelligence
• Risk Assessment
• Surveilance
• Regulatory Safeguards
before
after
Attack
Reactive Measures
Proactive MeasuresProactive Measures

22. Indiana Law recognizes
agroterrorism as
• A crime – Class C Felony
• A weapon of mass destruction

23. An Agroterrorism Event
Estimated Losses (Intentional or not)
• $1.8 billion for slaughter of animals
• $1.0 billion to disinfect farms
• $658 million for livestock disposal
• $78 million for business recovery
• $21 million for marketing support
• $4 billion loss for agriculture industry
• A 20% loss to the state’s $107 billion
tourism industry

24. A unique sectors lossesA unique sectors losses…….…….
Farms are geographically disbursedFarms are geographically disbursed
••Routine transportation and commingling in productionRoutine transportation and commingling in production
and processing systemand processing system
••International trade is often tied to disease-free statusInternational trade is often tied to disease-free status
••U.S. vets and scientists lack experienceU.S. vets and scientists lack experience
Possible Agroterrorism ScenariosPossible Agroterrorism Scenarios
Chemical-use of a crop duster for aerial distributionChemical-use of a crop duster for aerial distribution
of an irritating agent.of an irritating agent.
Biological –introduction of a pathogen to contaminateBiological –introduction of a pathogen to contaminate
livestocklivestock
Explosive–destruction of a anhydrous plant withExplosive–destruction of a anhydrous plant with
intent to propel chemical gases into the airintent to propel chemical gases into the air

25. Possible Delivery Source
• Point Source Delivery
– Letter or Package
– Sprayer
• Vectors
– United States experiments with Yellow Fever
spread by infected mosquitoes
– Japanese use plague infected fleas in China
• Upwind Line Delivery
– Highly modified crop duster or rooftop dispersion
– Issues of inversion and dilution
• Human Carrier
– “Person-to-person” – Suicidal Delivery
– Only certain agents are transmissible
(Pneumonic Plague, Smallpox)

26. Florida’s Agroterrorism Experience
Florida has had no known intentional case of
agroterrorism to date. The potential is huge,
however. Most cases of invasive, destructive
plants, animals and insects have either been
accidental or “acts of God.”
Water hyacinth: introduced in 1800s.Water hyacinth: introduced in 1800s.
Soybean rust - probably blown to the US fromSoybean rust - probably blown to the US from
Venezuela by Hurricane Ivan in 2004.Venezuela by Hurricane Ivan in 2004.

27. At cattle farms:
(i) animal quarantine procedures,
(ii) blood testing of new arrivals,
(iii)control of human movement onto the farm,
(iv) Control of vermin,
(v) farm locations, and
(vi) movement of vehicles onto the farm.

28. SELECTION CRITERIA FOR ANTILIVESTOCK AND
ANTIPOULTRY BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Selection criteria for the most dangerous antilivestock and antipoultry biologic
agents. The selected animal agent should have the following characteristics:
1. Highly infectious and contagious
2. Good ability to survive in the environment
3. Predictable clinical disease pattern, including morbidity
and mortality
4. Pathogenic for livestock or poultry
5. Available and easy to acquire or produce
6. Attributable to a natural outbreak, ensuring plausible
deniability
7. Not harmful to perpetrator
8. Easily disseminated
The selection of the animal virus and means of dissemination are key factors
in antilivestock biological weapons.

29. 1. Foot-and-mouth disease virus
2. Classical swine fever virus
3. African swine fever virus
4. Rinderpest virus
5. Rift Valley fever virus
6. Avian influenza virus
7. Velogenic viscerotropic Newcastle disease (VVND) virus
8. Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus
9. Bluetongue virus
10. Sheep and goat pox viruses
11. Pseudorabies virus (Aujeszky’s disease)
12. Vesicular stomatitis virus
13. Teschen disease virus (porcine enterovirus 1)
14. Porcine enterovirus type 9
15. Lyssaviruses and rabies viruses
16. Lumpy skin disease virus
17. Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus
18. African horse sickness virus
19. Bacillus anthracis (anthrax)
20. Chlamydia psittaci (ornithosis, psittacosis, chlamydiosis)
21. Cowdria ruminantium (heartwater, cowdriosis)
22. Screwworm (myiasis)

30.  Colletotrichum coffeanum var. virulans
 Dothistroma pini
 Erwinia amylovora
 Ralstonia solanacearum
 Puccinia graminis
 Sugarcane Fiji disease virus
 Tilletia indica
 Xanthomonas albilineans
 Xanthomonas campestris pv. citri
 Sclerotinia sclerotiorum
 Peronospora hyoscyami de Bary f. sp. Tabacina
(Adam) skalicky
 Claviceps purpurea
Animal and plant pathogens currently being
Considered as BA…………

31. INDIA
(A)Bacterial and Fungal Pathogens
i) Bacterial wilt and ring rot in potato (Clavibacter michiganensis sub sp.
sepedonicus).
ii) Fire blight in apple and pear (Erwinia amylovora).
iii) Black pod in cocoa (Phytophthora megakarya).
iv) Powdery rust in coffee (Hemelia coffeicola).
v) Sudden death in oak (Phytophthora ramorum).
vi) South American leaf blight in rubber (Microcyclus ulei).
vii) Vascular wilt in oil palm (Fusarium oxysporum f sp. elaedis).
viii) Soybean downy mildew (Peronospora manshurica).
ix) Blue mold in tobacco (P. hyocyami sub sp. tabacina).
x) Tropical rust in maize (Physopella zeae).

32. INDIA
(B) Virus, Viroid and Phytoplasma
i) Barley stripe mosaic virus.
ii) Coconut cadang-cadang (Viroid).
iii) Palm lethal yellowing (Phytoplasma).
(C) Plant Parasitic Nematodes
i) Pine wood nematode (Bursaphelenchus xylophilus).
ii) Red ring nematode in coconut (Rhadinaphelenchus cocophilus).
(D) Insect Pests
i) Mediterranean fruit fly (Ceratitis capitata).
ii) Cotton boll weevil (Anthonomus grandis).
iii) Russian wheat aphid (Diuraphis noxia).

33.  USDA APHIS (Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service), Riverdale.
 Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication
Organization (READEO)
 Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) stations

34. LEGAL PROHIBITION OFLEGAL PROHIBITION OF
AGROTERRORISMAGROTERRORISM
Punishment for Committing an Act ofPunishment for Committing an Act of
AgroterrorismAgroterrorism
Possessing Animal PathogensPossessing Animal Pathogens
Detecting Terrorist ConspiraciesDetecting Terrorist Conspiracies

36. Legislative and Regulatory FrameworkLegislative and Regulatory Framework
(A)NationalNational
i) Destructive Insects and Pests Act, 1914i) Destructive Insects and Pests Act, 1914
ii) Plant Quarantine (Regulation of Import intoii) Plant Quarantine (Regulation of Import into
India) Order, 2003.India) Order, 2003.
iii) Environment Protection Act (EPA), 1986iii) Environment Protection Act (EPA), 1986
iv) Biological Diversity Act, 2002iv) Biological Diversity Act, 2002
v) GM Cropsv) GM Crops
vi) Disaster Management Act, 2005vi) Disaster Management Act, 2005

37. (B) International
1. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phyto-sanitary Measures. This Agreement, commonly
known as SPS Agreement of WTO.
2. Global Developments in the wake of SPS
Agreement of WTO. Recently, the Department of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry of the Commonwealth of
Australia established Biosecurity Australia
3. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
4. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)

38. National Organisation
Indian Council of Agricultural Research ICAR
International Organisations
(A)World Trade Organization (WTO)
(B) Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)

39. Guidelines for Biological Disaster Management—
Agroterrorism
1. Legislative and Regulatory Framework
2. Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
(A) Integrated Pest Surveillance System
(B) Intelligence Gathering and Secured
Dissemination of Information
3. Prevention and Early Detection
4. Preparedness
5. Capacity Development
6. Documentation
7. Research and Development

40. Biosecurity......Biosecurity......
““A set of management practices which when followedA set of management practices which when followed
correctly reduce the potential for the introduction andcorrectly reduce the potential for the introduction and
spread of disease causing organisms onto, and betweenspread of disease causing organisms onto, and between
sites.”sites.”
Three Key Levels of BiosecurityThree Key Levels of Biosecurity
Conceptual BiosecurityConceptual Biosecurity
Structural BiosecurityStructural Biosecurity
Operational BiosecurityOperational Biosecurity

41. Conceptual BiosecurityConceptual Biosecurity
Involves Site planningInvolves Site planning
Location e.g proximity to other farms, transport etc.Location e.g proximity to other farms, transport etc.
Almost impossible to change once committed without very highAlmost impossible to change once committed without very high
costcost
Structural BiosecurityStructural Biosecurity
Concerns the design of the farm and buildings.Concerns the design of the farm and buildings.
Includes house design (easy to clean), site layout and security.Includes house design (easy to clean), site layout and security.
Expensive to change once built.Expensive to change once built.
Operational BiosecurityOperational Biosecurity
The points involved with day to day running of the site.The points involved with day to day running of the site.
Includes routine disinfection, control of visitors, source of stock etc.Includes routine disinfection, control of visitors, source of stock etc.
Can be modified at low cost according to requirementsCan be modified at low cost according to requirements

42. Control areas foe peoples...Control areas foe peoples...
 limit staff movementslimit staff movements
 avoid visitorsavoid visitors
 control site trafficcontrol site traffic
 spray vehiclesspray vehicles
 adequate protective clothingadequate protective clothing
 BOOTSBOOTS
 hand washinghand washing
 showersshowers For site.....For site.....
 Effective cleaning andEffective cleaning and
disinfectiondisinfection
 adequate turnaround timeadequate turnaround time
 include houses, aprons,include houses, aprons,
equipmentequipment
 use a closed water systemuse a closed water system
 carry out water sanitisationcarry out water sanitisation