This document discusses using an overlapping generations model to analyze the welfare effects of different fiscal closure options for financing the pension reform in Poland in 1999. The reform transitioned the pension system from a defined benefit pay-as-you-go system to a combination of notional defined contribution and funded defined contribution systems. The model will compare the welfare effects across generations and over time for five different fiscal closure options to finance the gap created by contributions staying in the pay-as-you-go system. The analysis will provide insight into which fiscal closure option has the best effects on savings, labor supply, output, and overall welfare.
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Welfare effects of the pension system reform
1. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Welfare effects of the pension reforms
Krzysztof Makarski 12 Joanna Tyrowicz23 Jan Hagemejer23
with the assistance of Agnieszka Borowska and Karolina Goraus
1Warsaw School of Economics
2Faculty of Economics, University of Warsaw
3Economic Institute, National Bank of Poland
ISCEF - 2014 - Paris
1 / 37
2. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
The big(ger) picture
A (too) broad scientific project at the University of Warsaw
OLG modeling of the pension system reform in Poland
(Our intended) Contributions:
1 fiscal closures have welfare effects (Pareto efficient reform?)
2 labor market effects when intensive and extensive margin is combined
with indivisibility of labor
3 political stability of pension reforms
We have (almost) completed (1), still work on (2) and (3)
Today: welfare effects of various fiscal closures for 1999 reform in
Poland (PAYG DB ⇒ FDC + NDC)
2 / 37
3. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
The big(ger) picture
A (too) broad scientific project at the University of Warsaw
OLG modeling of the pension system reform in Poland
(Our intended) Contributions:
1 fiscal closures have welfare effects (Pareto efficient reform?)
2 labor market effects when intensive and extensive margin is combined
with indivisibility of labor
3 political stability of pension reforms
We have (almost) completed (1), still work on (2) and (3)
Today: welfare effects of various fiscal closures for 1999 reform in
Poland (PAYG DB ⇒ FDC + NDC)
2 / 37
4. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
The big(ger) picture
A (too) broad scientific project at the University of Warsaw
OLG modeling of the pension system reform in Poland
(Our intended) Contributions:
1 fiscal closures have welfare effects (Pareto efficient reform?)
2 labor market effects when intensive and extensive margin is combined
with indivisibility of labor
3 political stability of pension reforms
We have (almost) completed (1), still work on (2) and (3)
Today: welfare effects of various fiscal closures for 1999 reform in
Poland (PAYG DB ⇒ FDC + NDC)
2 / 37
5. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
The big(ger) picture
A (too) broad scientific project at the University of Warsaw
OLG modeling of the pension system reform in Poland
(Our intended) Contributions:
1 fiscal closures have welfare effects (Pareto efficient reform?)
2 labor market effects when intensive and extensive margin is combined
with indivisibility of labor
3 political stability of pension reforms
We have (almost) completed (1), still work on (2) and (3)
Today: welfare effects of various fiscal closures for 1999 reform in
Poland (PAYG DB ⇒ FDC + NDC)
2 / 37
6. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
Questions
How different fiscal closures of the pension system reform affect
welfare?
welfare effect of the reform (aggregate and across generations)
extent and timing of fiscal adjustment for different fiscal closures
pensions
general equilibrium effects
3 / 37
7. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
Questions
How different fiscal closures of the pension system reform affect
welfare?
welfare effect of the reform (aggregate and across generations)
extent and timing of fiscal adjustment for different fiscal closures
pensions
general equilibrium effects
3 / 37
8. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
Questions
How different fiscal closures of the pension system reform affect
welfare?
welfare effect of the reform (aggregate and across generations)
extent and timing of fiscal adjustment for different fiscal closures
pensions
general equilibrium effects
3 / 37
9. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
Questions
How different fiscal closures of the pension system reform affect
welfare?
welfare effect of the reform (aggregate and across generations)
extent and timing of fiscal adjustment for different fiscal closures
pensions
general equilibrium effects
3 / 37
10. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
Questions
How different fiscal closures of the pension system reform affect
welfare?
welfare effect of the reform (aggregate and across generations)
extent and timing of fiscal adjustment for different fiscal closures
pensions
general equilibrium effects
3 / 37
11. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
What do we do?
Things we really care for:
private and public savings (inter-temporal choice) + time inconsistency
labor supply decision (intra-temporal choice) + retirement age
pension system + pension system reform
inter-generational transfers + utility to compare welfare across time with
changing demographics
calibrating the model closely
Things we simplify:
production sector (just standard CB production function with
depreciation)
labor market (elastic labor supply now, will become “indivisible” labor in
extension)
input data (demographics, life-cycle patterns, etc.)
no heterogeneity within cohorts
4 / 37
12. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
What do we do?
Things we really care for:
private and public savings (inter-temporal choice) + time inconsistency
labor supply decision (intra-temporal choice) + retirement age
pension system + pension system reform
inter-generational transfers + utility to compare welfare across time with
changing demographics
calibrating the model closely
Things we simplify:
production sector (just standard CB production function with
depreciation)
labor market (elastic labor supply now, will become “indivisible” labor in
extension)
input data (demographics, life-cycle patterns, etc.)
no heterogeneity within cohorts
4 / 37
13. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
What do we do?
Things we really care for:
private and public savings (inter-temporal choice) + time inconsistency
labor supply decision (intra-temporal choice) + retirement age
pension system + pension system reform
inter-generational transfers + utility to compare welfare across time with
changing demographics
calibrating the model closely
Things we simplify:
production sector (just standard CB production function with
depreciation)
labor market (elastic labor supply now, will become “indivisible” labor in
extension)
input data (demographics, life-cycle patterns, etc.)
no heterogeneity within cohorts
4 / 37
14. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
What do we do?
Things we really care for:
private and public savings (inter-temporal choice) + time inconsistency
labor supply decision (intra-temporal choice) + retirement age
pension system + pension system reform
inter-generational transfers + utility to compare welfare across time with
changing demographics
calibrating the model closely
Things we simplify:
production sector (just standard CB production function with
depreciation)
labor market (elastic labor supply now, will become “indivisible” labor in
extension)
input data (demographics, life-cycle patterns, etc.)
no heterogeneity within cohorts
4 / 37
15. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
What do we do?
Things we really care for:
private and public savings (inter-temporal choice) + time inconsistency
labor supply decision (intra-temporal choice) + retirement age
pension system + pension system reform
inter-generational transfers + utility to compare welfare across time with
changing demographics
calibrating the model closely
Things we simplify:
production sector (just standard CB production function with
depreciation)
labor market (elastic labor supply now, will become “indivisible” labor in
extension)
input data (demographics, life-cycle patterns, etc.)
no heterogeneity within cohorts
4 / 37
16. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
What do we do?
Things we really care for:
private and public savings (inter-temporal choice) + time inconsistency
labor supply decision (intra-temporal choice) + retirement age
pension system + pension system reform
inter-generational transfers + utility to compare welfare across time with
changing demographics
calibrating the model closely
Things we simplify:
production sector (just standard CB production function with
depreciation)
labor market (elastic labor supply now, will become “indivisible” labor in
extension)
input data (demographics, life-cycle patterns, etc.)
no heterogeneity within cohorts
4 / 37
17. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
What do we do?
Things we really care for:
private and public savings (inter-temporal choice) + time inconsistency
labor supply decision (intra-temporal choice) + retirement age
pension system + pension system reform
inter-generational transfers + utility to compare welfare across time with
changing demographics
calibrating the model closely
Things we simplify:
production sector (just standard CB production function with
depreciation)
labor market (elastic labor supply now, will become “indivisible” labor in
extension)
input data (demographics, life-cycle patterns, etc.)
no heterogeneity within cohorts
4 / 37
18. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
What do we do?
Things we really care for:
private and public savings (inter-temporal choice) + time inconsistency
labor supply decision (intra-temporal choice) + retirement age
pension system + pension system reform
inter-generational transfers + utility to compare welfare across time with
changing demographics
calibrating the model closely
Things we simplify:
production sector (just standard CB production function with
depreciation)
labor market (elastic labor supply now, will become “indivisible” labor in
extension)
input data (demographics, life-cycle patterns, etc.)
no heterogeneity within cohorts
4 / 37
19. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
What do we do?
Things we really care for:
private and public savings (inter-temporal choice) + time inconsistency
labor supply decision (intra-temporal choice) + retirement age
pension system + pension system reform
inter-generational transfers + utility to compare welfare across time with
changing demographics
calibrating the model closely
Things we simplify:
production sector (just standard CB production function with
depreciation)
labor market (elastic labor supply now, will become “indivisible” labor in
extension)
input data (demographics, life-cycle patterns, etc.)
no heterogeneity within cohorts
4 / 37
20. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
What do we do?
Things we really care for:
private and public savings (inter-temporal choice) + time inconsistency
labor supply decision (intra-temporal choice) + retirement age
pension system + pension system reform
inter-generational transfers + utility to compare welfare across time with
changing demographics
calibrating the model closely
Things we simplify:
production sector (just standard CB production function with
depreciation)
labor market (elastic labor supply now, will become “indivisible” labor in
extension)
input data (demographics, life-cycle patterns, etc.)
no heterogeneity within cohorts
4 / 37
21. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Motivation
What do we do?
Things we really care for:
private and public savings (inter-temporal choice) + time inconsistency
labor supply decision (intra-temporal choice) + retirement age
pension system + pension system reform
inter-generational transfers + utility to compare welfare across time with
changing demographics
calibrating the model closely
Things we simplify:
production sector (just standard CB production function with
depreciation)
labor market (elastic labor supply now, will become “indivisible” labor in
extension)
input data (demographics, life-cycle patterns, etc.)
no heterogeneity within cohorts
4 / 37
22. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
Roadmap
1 Motivation
2 Model
3 Calibration
4 Welfare effects of fiscal closures
5 Summary
5 / 37
23. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
Model overview
OLG model with endogenous labor and savings
Heterogeneity across cohorts (mortality and labor productivity)
No heterogeneity within cohorts
Agents have time inconsistent preferences
Exogenous retirement age and demographics
Competitive producers with CD production function
Pension system + pension system reform
Inter-generational transfers + utility to compare welfare across time with
changing demographics
Different fiscal closures (to do fiscal rules)
Calibrated to the Polish economy
6 / 37
24. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
What we do not know before modeling?
1999 reform: DB PAYG ⇒ NDC + FDC = partially funded DC
part of contributions stay in the PAYG system (SIF)
part of contributions shifted away (OPFs) + fiscal tension today
lower replacement rates + ease fiscal tension in future
comparing the steady states is not enough - transitory welfare effects
BUT SIF gap needs to be financed ⇒ possible fiscal closures with own
welfare effects
five closures: lump sum, labor tax, consumption tax, debt + labor tax,
debt + consumption tax
we cannot tell ex ante
which fiscal closure is better?
effect for savings, labor supply and output?
Comparing steady states (baseline and reform) is not enough ⇒ need to
analyze the whole path
Which closure in the baseline?
7 / 37
25. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
What we do not know before modeling?
1999 reform: DB PAYG ⇒ NDC + FDC = partially funded DC
part of contributions stay in the PAYG system (SIF)
part of contributions shifted away (OPFs) + fiscal tension today
lower replacement rates + ease fiscal tension in future
comparing the steady states is not enough - transitory welfare effects
BUT SIF gap needs to be financed ⇒ possible fiscal closures with own
welfare effects
five closures: lump sum, labor tax, consumption tax, debt + labor tax,
debt + consumption tax
we cannot tell ex ante
which fiscal closure is better?
effect for savings, labor supply and output?
Comparing steady states (baseline and reform) is not enough ⇒ need to
analyze the whole path
Which closure in the baseline?
7 / 37
26. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
What we do not know before modeling?
1999 reform: DB PAYG ⇒ NDC + FDC = partially funded DC
part of contributions stay in the PAYG system (SIF)
part of contributions shifted away (OPFs) + fiscal tension today
lower replacement rates + ease fiscal tension in future
comparing the steady states is not enough - transitory welfare effects
BUT SIF gap needs to be financed ⇒ possible fiscal closures with own
welfare effects
five closures: lump sum, labor tax, consumption tax, debt + labor tax,
debt + consumption tax
we cannot tell ex ante
which fiscal closure is better?
effect for savings, labor supply and output?
Comparing steady states (baseline and reform) is not enough ⇒ need to
analyze the whole path
Which closure in the baseline?
7 / 37
27. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
What we do not know before modeling?
1999 reform: DB PAYG ⇒ NDC + FDC = partially funded DC
part of contributions stay in the PAYG system (SIF)
part of contributions shifted away (OPFs) + fiscal tension today
lower replacement rates + ease fiscal tension in future
comparing the steady states is not enough - transitory welfare effects
BUT SIF gap needs to be financed ⇒ possible fiscal closures with own
welfare effects
five closures: lump sum, labor tax, consumption tax, debt + labor tax,
debt + consumption tax
we cannot tell ex ante
which fiscal closure is better?
effect for savings, labor supply and output?
Comparing steady states (baseline and reform) is not enough ⇒ need to
analyze the whole path
Which closure in the baseline?
7 / 37
28. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
What we do not know before modeling?
1999 reform: DB PAYG ⇒ NDC + FDC = partially funded DC
part of contributions stay in the PAYG system (SIF)
part of contributions shifted away (OPFs) + fiscal tension today
lower replacement rates + ease fiscal tension in future
comparing the steady states is not enough - transitory welfare effects
BUT SIF gap needs to be financed ⇒ possible fiscal closures with own
welfare effects
five closures: lump sum, labor tax, consumption tax, debt + labor tax,
debt + consumption tax
we cannot tell ex ante
which fiscal closure is better?
effect for savings, labor supply and output?
Comparing steady states (baseline and reform) is not enough ⇒ need to
analyze the whole path
Which closure in the baseline?
7 / 37
29. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
What we do not know before modeling?
1999 reform: DB PAYG ⇒ NDC + FDC = partially funded DC
part of contributions stay in the PAYG system (SIF)
part of contributions shifted away (OPFs) + fiscal tension today
lower replacement rates + ease fiscal tension in future
comparing the steady states is not enough - transitory welfare effects
BUT SIF gap needs to be financed ⇒ possible fiscal closures with own
welfare effects
five closures: lump sum, labor tax, consumption tax, debt + labor tax,
debt + consumption tax
we cannot tell ex ante
which fiscal closure is better?
effect for savings, labor supply and output?
Comparing steady states (baseline and reform) is not enough ⇒ need to
analyze the whole path
Which closure in the baseline?
7 / 37
30. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
Consumers
Are free to choose how much to work, but only until ¯J (forced to retire)
Optimize lifetime utility derived from leisure and consumption
Uj(cj,t, lj,t) = uj(cj,t, lj,t) + β
J−j
s=1
δs πj+s,t+s
πj,t
u (cj+s,t+s, lj+s,t+s) (1)
subject to
(1 + τc,t)cj,t + sj,t + τj + υt = (1 − τι
j,t − τl,t)wj,tlj,t ← labor income
+ (1 + rt(1 − τk,t))sj,t−1 ← capital income
+ (1 − τl,t)pι,j,t + bj,t ← pensions + bequests
where u(c, l) = φ log(c) + (1 − φ) log(1 − l)
8 / 37
31. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
Producers
maximize
Yt − wtLt − (rk
t + d)Kt subject to Yt = Kα
t (ztLt)1−α
where the path of {z}∞
t=0 is exogenous (calibrated to AWG, by EC)
Interest rate
interest rate on capital rk
t = MPK − d, endogenous
(riskless) interest rate on government debt to be rG
t = 0.33 · rk
t
households (and pension funds) by public debt inelastically
returns on savings yield a linear combination of risky and risk-less
9 / 37
32. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
Producers
maximize
Yt − wtLt − (rk
t + d)Kt subject to Yt = Kα
t (ztLt)1−α
where the path of {z}∞
t=0 is exogenous (calibrated to AWG, by EC)
Interest rate
interest rate on capital rk
t = MPK − d, endogenous
(riskless) interest rate on government debt to be rG
t = 0.33 · rk
t
households (and pension funds) by public debt inelastically
returns on savings yield a linear combination of risky and risk-less
9 / 37
33. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
Public finances
SIF collects social security contributions and pays out pensions
subsidyt = τι
t · wtLt −
J
j= ¯J
bj,tπj,tNt−j (2)
any debt/surplus in SIF is government debt/surplus
Government
collects taxes on earnings, interest and consumption + υ
spends fixed amount of GDP/money + services debt
long run debt/GDP ratio fixed
to finance pension system can use taxes or debt ⇐ fiscal closures
10 / 37
34. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
Public finances
SIF collects social security contributions and pays out pensions
subsidyt = τι
t · wtLt −
J
j= ¯J
bj,tπj,tNt−j (2)
any debt/surplus in SIF is government debt/surplus
Government
collects taxes on earnings, interest and consumption + υ
spends fixed amount of GDP/money + services debt
long run debt/GDP ratio fixed
to finance pension system can use taxes or debt ⇐ fiscal closures
10 / 37
35. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
Pension systems
initial steady state: PAYG Defined Benefit (DB), τι
t = τDB
after the original reform: NDC + FDC (two pillars) τ = τI + τII
NDC = contributions indexed with growth of payroll + benefit
actuarially fair + post retirement indexation with 20% of payroll growth
FDC = contributions earn interest + benefit actuarially fair + post
retirement also earn interest
11 / 37
36. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
Pension systems
initial steady state: PAYG Defined Benefit (DB), τι
t = τDB
after the original reform: NDC + FDC (two pillars) τ = τI + τII
NDC = contributions indexed with growth of payroll + benefit
actuarially fair + post retirement indexation with 20% of payroll growth
FDC = contributions earn interest + benefit actuarially fair + post
retirement also earn interest
11 / 37
37. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
Pension systems
initial steady state: PAYG Defined Benefit (DB), τι
t = τDB
after the original reform: NDC + FDC (two pillars) τ = τI + τII
NDC = contributions indexed with growth of payroll + benefit
actuarially fair + post retirement indexation with 20% of payroll growth
FDC = contributions earn interest + benefit actuarially fair + post
retirement also earn interest
11 / 37
38. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
Pension systems
initial steady state: PAYG Defined Benefit (DB), τι
t = τDB
after the original reform: NDC + FDC (two pillars) τ = τI + τII
NDC = contributions indexed with growth of payroll + benefit
actuarially fair + post retirement indexation with 20% of payroll growth
FDC = contributions earn interest + benefit actuarially fair + post
retirement also earn interest
11 / 37
39. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
How do we know what is "better"? LSRA!
Lump Sum Redistribution Authority as Nishiyama & Smetters (2007)
1 Run the no policy change scenario ⇒ baseline
2 Run the policy change scenario ⇒ reform
3 For each cohort compare utility, compensate the losers from the winners
4 If net effect positive ⇒ reform efficient
5 Run reform again, with the compensation, to observe GE effects
What is baseline?
Always the same: births, mortality, productivity and retirement age
Pension reform: baseline = PAYG DB | reform = NCD + FDC
12 / 37
40. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
How do we know what is "better"? LSRA!
Lump Sum Redistribution Authority as Nishiyama & Smetters (2007)
1 Run the no policy change scenario ⇒ baseline
2 Run the policy change scenario ⇒ reform
3 For each cohort compare utility, compensate the losers from the winners
4 If net effect positive ⇒ reform efficient
5 Run reform again, with the compensation, to observe GE effects
What is baseline?
Always the same: births, mortality, productivity and retirement age
Pension reform: baseline = PAYG DB | reform = NCD + FDC
12 / 37
41. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Model
How do we know what is "better"? LSRA!
Lump Sum Redistribution Authority as Nishiyama & Smetters (2007)
1 Run the no policy change scenario ⇒ baseline
2 Run the policy change scenario ⇒ reform
3 For each cohort compare utility, compensate the losers from the winners
4 If net effect positive ⇒ reform efficient
5 Run reform again, with the compensation, to observe GE effects
What is baseline?
Always the same: births, mortality, productivity and retirement age
Pension reform: baseline = PAYG DB | reform = NCD + FDC
12 / 37
42. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Calibration
Roadmap
1 Motivation
2 Model
3 Calibration
4 Welfare effects of fiscal closures
5 Summary
13 / 37
43. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Calibration
Baseline: no of births (20 year olds):
Demographic projection (2060), constant afterwards (conservative)
14 / 37
45. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Calibration
Baseline: old age dependency ratio
Demographic projection (2060), constant afterwards
16 / 37
46. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Calibration
Baseline: labor augmenting technological progress
Historical data, projection from AWG, new steady state at 1.7%
17 / 37
47. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Calibration
Baseline: retirement age
Historical data, assumed (based on law) afterwards
18 / 37
48. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Calibration
Baseline (outcomes): pension benefits in GDP
Aging plus decreasing labor force
19 / 37
49. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Calibration
What the reform does - replacement rates (relative to
baseline)
Pensions are substantially reduced by PAYG DB → DC
Fiscal closure matters little and initial cohorts unaffected
20 / 37
50. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Calibration
Calibration to replicate 1999 economy
Preference for leisure (φ) matches participation rate of 56.8%
Replacement rate (ρ) matches benefits/GDP ratio of 5%
Contributions rate (τ) matches SIF deficit/GDP ratio of 0.8%
Labor income tax (τl) set to 11% to match PIT/GDP ratio
Consumption tax (τc) set to match VAT/GDP ratio
Capital tax (τk) de iure = de facto
The initial capital
21 / 37
52. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Welfare effects of fiscal closures
Roadmap
1 Motivation
2 Model
3 Calibration
4 Welfare effects of fiscal closures
5 Summary
23 / 37
53. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Welfare effects of fiscal closures
Results
SIF deficit resulting from the reform is financed ...
... by labor tax or consumption tax
⇒ debt share in GDP is held constant, so are taxes, but τl or τc is adjusted
among all the living
... by debt which is later repaid with labor or consumption tax
⇒ debt share in GDP grows to a threshold of 70%, with all taxes held
constant, then debt gets automatically reduced to 45% of GDP
exponentially, τc or τl is adjusted for living then onwards
... by lump sum taxes on all living generations
⇒ debt share in GDP and tax rates are held constant, υ is adjusted among
all the living
24 / 37
54. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Welfare effects of fiscal closures
Results
SIF deficit resulting from the reform is financed ...
... by labor tax or consumption tax
⇒ debt share in GDP is held constant, so are taxes, but τl or τc is adjusted
among all the living
... by debt which is later repaid with labor or consumption tax
⇒ debt share in GDP grows to a threshold of 70%, with all taxes held
constant, then debt gets automatically reduced to 45% of GDP
exponentially, τc or τl is adjusted for living then onwards
... by lump sum taxes on all living generations
⇒ debt share in GDP and tax rates are held constant, υ is adjusted among
all the living
24 / 37
55. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Welfare effects of fiscal closures
Results
SIF deficit resulting from the reform is financed ...
... by labor tax or consumption tax
⇒ debt share in GDP is held constant, so are taxes, but τl or τc is adjusted
among all the living
... by debt which is later repaid with labor or consumption tax
⇒ debt share in GDP grows to a threshold of 70%, with all taxes held
constant, then debt gets automatically reduced to 45% of GDP
exponentially, τc or τl is adjusted for living then onwards
... by lump sum taxes on all living generations
⇒ debt share in GDP and tax rates are held constant, υ is adjusted among
all the living
24 / 37
57. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Welfare effects of fiscal closures
Results: Distribution of welfare effects
Welfare: all closures, no time inconsistency
26 / 37
58. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Welfare effects of fiscal closures
Results: Decomposition of welfare effects
Decomposition - consumption tax (left) and
debt/consumption tax (right)
27 / 37
59. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Welfare effects of fiscal closures
Results: Decomposition of welfare effects
Decomposition - labor tax (left) and debt/labor tax (right)
28 / 37
65. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Welfare effects of fiscal closures
Results: Time inconsistency
Time inconsistency - matters little for capital
Capital - consumption tax closure and debt closure with consumption tax
34 / 37
66. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Welfare effects of fiscal closures
Results: Time inconsistency
Time inconsistency - preserves the general findings
Welfare - consumption tax closure and debt with consumption tax closure
35 / 37
67. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Summary
Roadmap
1 Motivation
2 Model
3 Calibration
4 Welfare effects of fiscal closures
5 Summary
36 / 37
68. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Summary
Generally, 1999 reform is welfare enhancing
Overall effects positive
Majority comes from DB->DC change
Fiscal closure matters for (cohort) composition effects
Pensions fall which implies that considerable redistribution across
cohorts needed
Introduction of funded DC makes debt desirable (redistributes)
To do
Log utility: taxes affect labor supply only marginally (GHH preferences)
Endogenous retirement
37 / 37
69. Welfare effects the pension reforms
Summary
Generally, 1999 reform is welfare enhancing
Overall effects positive
Majority comes from DB->DC change
Fiscal closure matters for (cohort) composition effects
Pensions fall which implies that considerable redistribution across
cohorts needed
Introduction of funded DC makes debt desirable (redistributes)
To do
Log utility: taxes affect labor supply only marginally (GHH preferences)
Endogenous retirement
37 / 37