1. Paying for ideal discretion
Paying for ideal discretion
a framed field experiment on working time arrangements
M. Smyk & J. Tyrowicz & L. van der Velde
FAME|GRAPE, Warsaw School of Economics, University of Warsaw
Family life and the changing world of work
September 2022

2. Paying for ideal discretion
Motivation
The notion of ideal worker
(Davies and Frink 2014, McNall et al. 2009, Guillaume and Pochic 2009, Kauffeld et al. 2004, Batt and Valcour 2003)
Providing flexibility on demand is expected
(Williams 2001, Chung 2020)
Asking for flexibility is penalized (and gendered)
(Vandello et al. 2013, Blair-Loy et al. 2013, Brescoll et al. 2013)

3. Paying for ideal discretion
Motivation
The notion of ideal worker
(Davies and Frink 2014, McNall et al. 2009, Guillaume and Pochic 2009, Kauffeld et al. 2004, Batt and Valcour 2003)
Providing flexibility on demand is expected
(Williams 2001, Chung 2020)
Asking for flexibility is penalized (and gendered)
(Vandello et al. 2013, Blair-Loy et al. 2013, Brescoll et al. 2013)
Goldin (2014) hypothesis
(Cortes and Pan 2019)

4. Paying for ideal discretion
Motivation
The notion of ideal worker
(Davies and Frink 2014, McNall et al. 2009, Guillaume and Pochic 2009, Kauffeld et al. 2004, Batt and Valcour 2003)
Providing flexibility on demand is expected
(Williams 2001, Chung 2020)
Asking for flexibility is penalized (and gendered)
(Vandello et al. 2013, Blair-Loy et al. 2013, Brescoll et al. 2013)
Goldin (2014) hypothesis
(Cortes and Pan 2019)
Not a forgone conclusion: worker autonomy
(Hayman 2009, Peters et al. 2009, Shagvaliyeva and Yazdanifard 2014, Angelici and Profeta 2020)

5. Paying for ideal discretion
Our contribution
Test the notion of ideal worker in a context of flexibilizing Working Time Arrangements
We ask
Should ideal worker be rewarded for availability?
Is this premium gender-specific?

6. Paying for ideal discretion
Our contribution
Test the notion of ideal worker in a context of flexibilizing Working Time Arrangements
We ask
Should ideal worker be rewarded for availability?
Is this premium gender-specific?
Field vignette experiment (2 × 2 design) on a change in working time arrangements (WTA)
Vignettes for initiator of change in WTA: employer vs employee
Vignettes for workers: women vs men

7. Paying for ideal discretion
The survey
Schematic of the survey
Introduction
Vignette
Experiment
Social
norms
Own time
valuation
Final
questions

8. Paying for ideal discretion
The survey
Schematic of the survey
Introduction
Vignette
Experiment
Social
norms
Own time
valuation
Final
questions
Vignette Experiment → Next slides

9. Paying for ideal discretion
The survey
Schematic of the survey
Introduction
Vignette
Experiment
Social
norms
Own time
valuation
Final
questions
Social norms
H-W and W-H conflict following Netemeyer et al. (1996)
Gender norms and pref. for ineq. following ISSP

10. Paying for ideal discretion
The survey
Schematic of the survey
Introduction
Vignette
Experiment
Social
norms
Own time
valuation
Final
questions
Own time valuation
Participants choose how much time they want to finish the survey
Comply →↑ $ failure to comply →↓ $

11. Paying for ideal discretion
The survey
Schematic of the survey
Introduction
Vignette
Experiment
Social
norms
Own time
valuation
Final
questions
Final questions
Demographics: age, gender, education, managerial experience, income
Importance of 16 life values → tease out importance of work and family

12. Paying for ideal discretion
The survey
Vignette experiment
A worker currently works in a regular, fixed schedule, five days a week
Three occupations: hairdresser, lawyer, sales person Meet the characters

13. Paying for ideal discretion
The survey
Vignette experiment
A worker currently works in a regular, fixed schedule, five days a week
Three occupations: hairdresser, lawyer, sales person Meet the characters
Two separate treatments
Genders of employee : man or woman
Who requests change: Employer OR employee

14. Paying for ideal discretion
The survey
Vignette experiment
A worker currently works in a regular, fixed schedule, five days a week
Three occupations: hairdresser, lawyer, sales person Meet the characters
Two separate treatments
Genders of employee : man or woman
Who requests change: Employer OR employee
We asked:
1 How should wages change? (increase, no change, fall)
2 How much should wages increase (fall)? → quasi continuous variable
3 What do you think most people will answer?

15. Paying for ideal discretion
The survey
Vignette experiment ll
Randomization
Treatments were randomized such that
Each subject responds to 3 out of 4 possible combinations
We exploit within and between subject variation

16. Paying for ideal discretion
The survey
Vignette experiment ll
Randomization
Treatments were randomized such that
Each subject responds to 3 out of 4 possible combinations
We exploit within and between subject variation
Manipulation checks
3 questions: a) hours worked, b) days worked, c) who requests flexibility
One extra dollar for answering correctly
∼ 40% subjects failed at least one question

17. Paying for ideal discretion
Results
The sample
Full Sample: 963 vignettes from 321 subjects
Preferred sample: 570 vignettes from 190 subjects
51.6% were women, on average 38.8 years, 55% with tertiary education
54% has had managerial (wage bargaining) experience
No significant difference across treatments → randomization ok Details

18. Paying for ideal discretion
Results
The sample
Full Sample: 963 vignettes from 321 subjects
Preferred sample: 570 vignettes from 190 subjects
51.6% were women, on average 38.8 years, 55% with tertiary education
54% has had managerial (wage bargaining) experience
No significant difference across treatments → randomization ok Details
Preferred sample is more educated than FS Details

19. Paying for ideal discretion
Results
Hypotheses
H1a: Employee requesting more discretion →↓ wage
H1b: Employer requesting more discretion →↑ wage
H2 : Women face smaller wage decline than men → family-devotion schema

20. Paying for ideal discretion
Results
Treatment effects: How should wages change?
Employee
Employer
Men
Women
Treatment:
Initiator
Treatment:
Gender Employee
0 2.5 5 7.5 10
Percent
Wages should fall
Employee
Employer
Men
Women
Treatment:
Initiator
Treatment:
Gender Employee
0 20 40 60 80
Percent
Wages should not change
Employee
Employer
Men
Women
Treatment:
Initiator
Treatment:
Gender Employee
0 10 20 30 40
Percent
Wages should increase

21. Paying for ideal discretion
Results
Treatment effects: How much should wages change?
Employee
Employer
Men
Women
Treatment:
Initiator
Treatment:
Gender Employee
0 10 20 30 40
USD per month
Employee
Employer
Men
Women
Treatment:
Initiator
Treatment:
Gender Employee
0 1 2 3 4 5
Percent of initial wage

22. Paying for ideal discretion
Results
Treatment effects: linear regressions
in USD per month in %
(1) (2) (3) (4)
T: employer = 1 17.27*** 18.05*** 2.94*** 2.87***
(4.87) (6.54) (0.56) (0.69)
T: woman= 1 -2.97 -0.11 0.14 0.44
(4.87) (5.30) (0.37) (0.54)
T: employer × woman 10.23* 8.96 0.11 -0.02
(6.16) (7.43) (0.62) (0.93)
Subject FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 570 570 570 570
R2 0.10 0.54 0.13 0.58
Notes: SE clustered at individual level in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate p-values < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
Potential confounders Heterogeneity

23. Paying for ideal discretion
Results
What is the social norm?
Majority is ... ... in favor of a change ... in favor of a raise
(1) (2) (3) (4)
T: employer = 1 0.097** 0.098** 0.11*** 0.096**
(0.042) (0.049) (0.040) (0.046)
T: woman= 1 -0.043 -0.011 -0.040 -0.0072
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
T: employer = 1 × T: woman= 1 0.074 0.034 0.082 0.050
(0.052) (0.057) (0.051) (0.056)
Proposed change
Wage decline 0.55*** 0.56** 0.024 0.015
(0.17) (0.26) (0.13) (0.15)
Wage increase 0.57*** 0.56*** 0.59*** 0.58***
(0.055) (0.083) (0.055) (0.080)
Subject FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 570 570 570 570
P(y=1) 0.360 0.360 0.326 0.326
Notes: SE clustered at individual level in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate p-values < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1

24. Paying for ideal discretion
Conclusions
Conclusions
Very robust effects for initiator treatment
No effects for the gender of the worker, regardless of initiator
Effects are small (approx. 20$ per month, or 3% of initial wages)

25. Paying for ideal discretion
Conclusions
Conclusions
Very robust effects for initiator treatment
No effects for the gender of the worker, regardless of initiator
Effects are small (approx. 20$ per month, or 3% of initial wages)
Partial confirmation of ideal worker
Employees should be penalized after requesting WTA
Employers should not always compensate for requesting WTA

26. Paying for ideal discretion
Conclusions
Conclusions
Very robust effects for initiator treatment
No effects for the gender of the worker, regardless of initiator
Effects are small (approx. 20$ per month, or 3% of initial wages)
Partial confirmation of ideal worker
Employees should be penalized after requesting WTA
Employers should not always compensate for requesting WTA
Lack of gender angle → consistent with Goldin (2014)

27. Paying for ideal discretion
Conclusions
Questions or suggestions?
Thank you!
w: grape.org.pl
t: grape org
f: grape.org
e: lvandervelde@grape.org.pl

28. Paying for ideal discretion
Conclusions
References I
Angelici, M. and Profeta, P.: 2020, Smart-working: Work flexibility without constraints, CESifo Working Papers 8165, CESifo.
Batt, R. and Valcour, P. M.: 2003, Human resources practices as predictors of work-family outcomes and employee turnover,
Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 42(2), 189–220.
Blair-Loy, M., Williams, J. C. and Berdahl, J. L.: 2013, Cultural schemas, social class, and the flexibility stigma: Cultural
schemas and social class, Journal of Social Issues 69(2), 209–234.
Brescoll, V. L., Glass, J. and Sedlovskaya, A.: 2013, Ask and ye shall receive? the dynamics of employer-provided flexible work
options and the need for public policy, Journal of Social Issues 69(2), 367–388.
Chung, H.: 2020, Gender, flexibility stigma and the perceived negative consequences of flexible working in the UK, Social
Indicators Research 151(2), 521–545.
Cortes, P. and Pan, J.: 2019, When Time Binds: Substitutes for Household Production, Returns to Working Long Hours, and
the Skilled Gender Wage Gap, Journal of Labor Economics 37(2), 351–398.
Davies, A. R. and Frink, B. D.: 2014, The origins of the ideal worker: The separation of work and home in the united states
from the market revolution to 1950, Work and Occupations 41(1), 18–39.
Goldin, C.: 2014, A grand gender convergence: Its last chapter, American Economic Review 104(4), 1091–1119.
Guillaume, C. and Pochic, S.: 2009, What would you sacrifice? access to top management and the work–life balance, Gender,
Work & Organization 16(1), 14–36.
Hayman, J. R.: 2009, Flexible work arrangements: Exploring the linkages between perceived usability of flexible work schedules
and work/life balance, Community, work & family 12(3), 327–338.

29. Paying for ideal discretion
Conclusions
References II
Kauffeld, S., Jonas, E. and Frey, D.: 2004, Effects of a flexible work-time design on employee-and company-related aims,
European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 13(1), 79–100.
McNall, L. A., Masuda, A. D. and Nicklin, J. M.: 2009, Flexible work arrangements, job satisfaction, and turnover intentions:
The mediating role of work-to-family enrichment, Journal of Psychology 144(1), 61–81.
Netemeyer, R. G., Boles, J. S. and McMurrian, R.: 1996, Development and validation of work–family conflict and family–work
conflict scales., Journal of Applied Psychology 81(4), 400–410.
Peters, P., Den Dulk, L. and Van Der Lippe, T.: 2009, The effects of time-spatial flexibility and new working conditions on
employees’ work–life balance: The dutch case, Community, Work & Family 12(3), 279–297.
Shagvaliyeva, S. and Yazdanifard, R.: 2014, Impact of flexible working hours on work-life balance, American Journal of
Industrial and Business Management 2014.
Vandello, J. A., Hettinger, V. E., Bosson, J. K. and Siddiqi, J.: 2013, When equal isn’t really equal: The masculine dilemma of
seeking work flexibility, Journal of Social Issues 69(2), 303–321.
Williams, J.: 2001, Unbending gender: Why family and work conflict and what to do about it, Oxford University Press.

30. Paying for ideal discretion
Appendix
Introducing the characters
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31. Paying for ideal discretion
Appendix
Preferred sample composition
Gender of employee Initiator
Men Women Employee Employer
Age 38.76 38.88 38.65 38.87
% of women participants 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.52
Managerial experience 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53
Education
% with primary education 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05
% with secondary education 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.38
% with tertiary education 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.56
Income level
% can afford some luxury 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.43
% can make ends meet 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.44
% cannot afford living 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13
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32. Paying for ideal discretion
Appendix
Who passed the manipulation checks?
By individual By vignette
(1) (2)
Age 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Female subject 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.03)
Managerial experience 0.03 0.04
(0.06) (0.04)
Educ: secondary 0.21** 0.09
(0.10) (0.06)
Educ: tertiary 0.34*** 0.20***
(0.10) (0.06)
Income: enough 0.03 0.06*
(0.06) (0.04)
Income: not enough 0.13 0.10*
(0.09) (0.06)
T: employer = 1 0.03
(0.03)
T: woman= 1 -0.01
(0.03)
T: employer = 1 × T: woman=1 -0.01
(0.05)
Observations 321 963
Pr(no mistakes) 0.59 0.79
Back

33. Paying for ideal discretion
Appendix
Other results
Relevant
Family-work conflict
Not relevant
Occupation of character
Demographics (gender, age, managerial experience, income)
Own valuation of time flexibility
Gender norms
Inequality aversion
Aspirations related to work and family
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34. Paying for ideal discretion
Appendix
Treatment effects: heterogeneity
-20
0
20
40
USD
per
month
T: employer = 1 T: woman= 1 T: employer = 1 # T: woman= 1
-2
0
2
4
6
in
%
of
wage
T: employer = 1 T: woman= 1 T: employer = 1 # T: woman= 1
Full sample Estimate 90% CI By gender Women Men
By education Less than tertiary Tertiary By managerial exp. Yes No
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