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Computer & Network  Hacker Exploits Step-by step Part 2
Stages of An Attack ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
IP Fragmentation Attacks
IP Fragmentation ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Penetration – IP Fragments
Attacker Firewall IP=10.1.1.1 IP=10.2.1.10 Port 80 Port 23 IDS Penetration – IP Fragments Server
IP Fragmentation Attacks ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Penetration – IP Fragments tcp ip ip
tcp ip ip Normal IP Fragmentation Penetration – IP Fragments To support different transmission media, IP allows for the breaking up of single large packets into smaller packets, called fragments. The higher‑level protocol carried in IP (usually TCP or UDP) is split up among the various fragments. ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp
Tiny Fragment Attack Penetration – IP Fragments tcp ip ip Make a fragment small enough so that the TCP header is split between two fragments. The port number will be in the second fragment. ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp ip
Tiny Fragment Attack ,[object Object],[object Object],Penetration – IP Fragments
Tiny Fragment Attack ,[object Object],[object Object],Penetration – IP Fragments
Attacker Firewall IDS Penetration – IP Fragments Fragment 1 (part of tcp header) Fragment 2(rest of  tcp header) Tcp port unknown All IP fragments are re-assembled  Server ip tcp ip tcp
IP Fragment Overlap Attack ,[object Object],tcp ip ip Penetration – IP Fragments ip tcp ip tcp
Attacker Firewall IDS Penetration – IP Fragments Fragment 1 (Packet is for port 80) Tcp port 80. OK! All IP fragments are re-assembled  Fragment Overlap attack  ‑ In the second fragment, lie about the offset from the first fragment. When the packet is reconstructed at the protected server, the port number will be overwritten.   Fragment 2 (Packet says  is for port 80), however, I have an offset, say 12, and After overlaying, the TCP header will read port 23! Second IP fragment was just a fragment of the first. That is OK too! Server ip tcp ip tcp
IP Fragment Attack Tools ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Penetration – IP Fragments
Fragrouter ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Penetration – IP Fragments
Sniffers
Sniffers ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Sniffers ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
HUB Blah,  blah ,  blah Blah,  blah ,  blah Blah,  blah ,  blah Blah,  blah ,  blah BROADCAST ETHERNET
HUB Blah,  blah ,  blah Blah,  blah ,  blah Blah,  blah ,  blah Blah,  blah ,  blah BROADCAST ETHERNET
SWITCH Blah blah blah Blah,  blah ,  blah SWITCHED ETHERNET
Sniffers ,[object Object]
Snifferz ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Used by hackers ,[object Object]
Sniffer uses in attack ,[object Object]
Sniffit ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Sniffer Defense ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Session Hijacking HUNT
Session Hijacking ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Session Hijacking ,[object Object]
Alice Eve Alice telnets to do some work.. Eve is on a segment of the lan where she can sniff, or on a point in the path. Bob
Alice Eve Alice telnets to do some work.. Attacker can monitor and generate packets with the same sequence number. “ Hi, I am Alice” Eve uses a session hijacking tool to observe the session.  at Eve's command, the session hijacking tool jumps in and continues the session with Bob. Attacker can kick Alice off and make any changes on B. The logs will show that Alice made the changes  Bob
Alice Eve Session Hijacking: Ack Storms If the attacker just jumps in on a session, starting to spoof packets, the sequence numbers between the two sides will get out of synch As the two sides try to resynchronize, they will resend SYNs and ACKs back and forth trying to figure out what's wrong, resulting in an ACK storm SYN (A, SNa) ACK (SNb) SYN (B, SNb) ACK (SLNa) SYN(A,Sna) ACK(SNb) Bob
ACK Storm ,[object Object],[object Object]
Session Hijacking Tools ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
HUNT’s ARP Spoofing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Alice Eve MAC=CC.CC “ ARP w.x.y.z is at DD.DD” “ ARP a.b.c.d is at EE.EE” Ip=w.x.y.z MAC=BB.BB Ip=a.b.c.d MAC=AA.AA Eve send a Gratuitous ARP broadcast message Bob
Other Session Hijacking Tools ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Other Session Hijacking Tools ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
 
Session Hijacking Defenses ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Where to get secure shell? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Domain Name System (DNS) Cache Poisoning
DSN Cache Poisoning ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
www.ebay.com www.ebay.com www.ebay.com www.ebay.com Client Local Nameserver Root Name Server .com Name Server ebay.com Name Server Referral to .com Referral to ebay.com The Answer! 216.32.120.133 Clients use a "resolver" to access DNS servers Most common DNS server is BIND, Berkeley Internet Name Domain DNS servers query each other
DNS Cache Poisoning ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
DNS Cache Poisoning ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Alice, a happy bank customer Evil Attacker Dns.bank.com name server Alice wants to access. Dsn.good.com Alice’s unsuspecting DNS Server Dns.evil.com, Evil’s DNS server owned by evil www.bank.com, Alice’s online bank.
DNS Cache Poisoning Alice Dsn.good.com Evil Dns.evil.com www.bank.com Dns.bank.com STEP 1: Any.evil.com STEP 2: Any.evil.com STEP 3: store the query ID
DNS Cache Poisoning Alice Dsn.good.com Evil Dns.evil.com www.bank.com Dns.bank.com STEP 4: www.bank.com STEP 6: Spoofed ans: www.bank.com=w.x.y.z STEP 5: www.bank.com STEP 7: www.bank.com= w.x.y.z
DNS Cache Poisoning Alice Dsn.good.com Evil Dns.evil.com www.bank.com Dns.bank.com STEP 8: www.bank.com? In Cache: www.bank.com= w.x.y.z STEP 9: w.x.y.z STEP 10: Let’s Bank!!!!
DNS Cache Poisoning Defense ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
DNS Cache Poisoning Defense ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
 
Rootkits

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Best!

  • 1. Computer & Network Hacker Exploits Step-by step Part 2
  • 2.
  • 4.
  • 5. Attacker Firewall IP=10.1.1.1 IP=10.2.1.10 Port 80 Port 23 IDS Penetration – IP Fragments Server
  • 6.
  • 7. tcp ip ip Normal IP Fragmentation Penetration – IP Fragments To support different transmission media, IP allows for the breaking up of single large packets into smaller packets, called fragments. The higher‑level protocol carried in IP (usually TCP or UDP) is split up among the various fragments. ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp
  • 8. Tiny Fragment Attack Penetration – IP Fragments tcp ip ip Make a fragment small enough so that the TCP header is split between two fragments. The port number will be in the second fragment. ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp ip tcp ip
  • 9.
  • 10.
  • 11. Attacker Firewall IDS Penetration – IP Fragments Fragment 1 (part of tcp header) Fragment 2(rest of tcp header) Tcp port unknown All IP fragments are re-assembled Server ip tcp ip tcp
  • 12.
  • 13. Attacker Firewall IDS Penetration – IP Fragments Fragment 1 (Packet is for port 80) Tcp port 80. OK! All IP fragments are re-assembled Fragment Overlap attack ‑ In the second fragment, lie about the offset from the first fragment. When the packet is reconstructed at the protected server, the port number will be overwritten. Fragment 2 (Packet says is for port 80), however, I have an offset, say 12, and After overlaying, the TCP header will read port 23! Second IP fragment was just a fragment of the first. That is OK too! Server ip tcp ip tcp
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19. HUB Blah, blah , blah Blah, blah , blah Blah, blah , blah Blah, blah , blah BROADCAST ETHERNET
  • 20. HUB Blah, blah , blah Blah, blah , blah Blah, blah , blah Blah, blah , blah BROADCAST ETHERNET
  • 21. SWITCH Blah blah blah Blah, blah , blah SWITCHED ETHERNET
  • 22.
  • 23.
  • 24.
  • 25.
  • 26.
  • 27.
  • 29.
  • 30.
  • 31. Alice Eve Alice telnets to do some work.. Eve is on a segment of the lan where she can sniff, or on a point in the path. Bob
  • 32. Alice Eve Alice telnets to do some work.. Attacker can monitor and generate packets with the same sequence number. “ Hi, I am Alice” Eve uses a session hijacking tool to observe the session. at Eve's command, the session hijacking tool jumps in and continues the session with Bob. Attacker can kick Alice off and make any changes on B. The logs will show that Alice made the changes Bob
  • 33. Alice Eve Session Hijacking: Ack Storms If the attacker just jumps in on a session, starting to spoof packets, the sequence numbers between the two sides will get out of synch As the two sides try to resynchronize, they will resend SYNs and ACKs back and forth trying to figure out what's wrong, resulting in an ACK storm SYN (A, SNa) ACK (SNb) SYN (B, SNb) ACK (SLNa) SYN(A,Sna) ACK(SNb) Bob
  • 34.
  • 35.
  • 36.
  • 37. Alice Eve MAC=CC.CC “ ARP w.x.y.z is at DD.DD” “ ARP a.b.c.d is at EE.EE” Ip=w.x.y.z MAC=BB.BB Ip=a.b.c.d MAC=AA.AA Eve send a Gratuitous ARP broadcast message Bob
  • 38.
  • 39.
  • 40.  
  • 41.
  • 42.
  • 43. Domain Name System (DNS) Cache Poisoning
  • 44.
  • 45. www.ebay.com www.ebay.com www.ebay.com www.ebay.com Client Local Nameserver Root Name Server .com Name Server ebay.com Name Server Referral to .com Referral to ebay.com The Answer! 216.32.120.133 Clients use a "resolver" to access DNS servers Most common DNS server is BIND, Berkeley Internet Name Domain DNS servers query each other
  • 46.
  • 47.
  • 48. Alice, a happy bank customer Evil Attacker Dns.bank.com name server Alice wants to access. Dsn.good.com Alice’s unsuspecting DNS Server Dns.evil.com, Evil’s DNS server owned by evil www.bank.com, Alice’s online bank.
  • 49. DNS Cache Poisoning Alice Dsn.good.com Evil Dns.evil.com www.bank.com Dns.bank.com STEP 1: Any.evil.com STEP 2: Any.evil.com STEP 3: store the query ID
  • 50. DNS Cache Poisoning Alice Dsn.good.com Evil Dns.evil.com www.bank.com Dns.bank.com STEP 4: www.bank.com STEP 6: Spoofed ans: www.bank.com=w.x.y.z STEP 5: www.bank.com STEP 7: www.bank.com= w.x.y.z
  • 51. DNS Cache Poisoning Alice Dsn.good.com Evil Dns.evil.com www.bank.com Dns.bank.com STEP 8: www.bank.com? In Cache: www.bank.com= w.x.y.z STEP 9: w.x.y.z STEP 10: Let’s Bank!!!!
  • 52.
  • 53.
  • 54.