Philippine Violent Elections 2022

Bonifacio Glenn G. Rivera, Jr.
Cum Laude, BA Political Science
A.Y. 2005-2009
University of the Philippines – Diliman
January 9, 2011
1 A previous version of this paper was submitted to Professor Amado M. Mendoza, Jr. of the Political Science
Department of the College of the Social Science Department of the University of the Philippines – Diliman on
October 13, 2008. Regarded as a major academic work of a Political Science student that is worthy of publication,
this research proposal was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements in Political Science 199 (Research in
Political Science). It is a purely original work and that no part or portion thereof has been plagiarized from any
existing literature on the subject. It has not been submitted previously for any other degree courses or paper
presentations.All sources of information had been properly acknowledged.
The Effects of Electoral Systems
on Rival-motivated
Legislative
Electoral Contestation
in New Democratic
and Transitional Regimes1

3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page…………………………………………………………………………………………1
Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………...........3
List of Tables……………....……………………………………………………………………..4
List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………………5
Section I The Research Problem...………………………………………………………...6
Problem Statement……………………………………………………………….6
Statement of the Objective….……………………………………………...........6
Theoretical Framework………………………………………………………….7
Definition of Terms……………………………………………………………....9
Axioms…………………………………………………………………………...13
Statement of the Hypotheses…………………………………………………...13
Section II Review of Related Literature…………………………………………………..14
Contested Elections……………………………………………………………..14
Electoral Protest………………………………………………………………...15
Electoral Violence………………………………………………………………18
Electoral Systems..……………………………………………………………...26
Institutions, Electoral Governance and Institutionalization…………………30
Section III Research Methodology…………………………………………………………34
Research Design………………………………………………………………...34
Time Dimension…………………………………………………………35
Population and Cases ………………………………………………………….37
Measurement……………………………………………………………………39
Conceptualization and Operationalization……………………………………45
Validity and Reliability of Measurements………………………………46
Construct and Content…………………………………………47
“Face”……………………………………………………………49
Criterion…………………………………………………………50
Data-Gathering Procedure……………………………………………………..54
Section IV Presentation, Analysis and Interpretation of Data…………………………...55
Data Processing…………………………………………………………………55
Data Analysis……………………………………………………………………55
Conclusion Parameters…………………………………………………………56
Internal and External Validity………………………………………….56
Appendix.......................................................................................................................................58
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………….62

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LIST OF TABLES
Table Title Page
1 Grounds in Contested Election Cases 16
2 Forms of Electoral Fraud 18
3 Violent Incidents and Their “Superficial” Causes in 19
Selected Countries’ Legislative Elections
4 New/Transitional Democracies according to Level of Freedom 21
5 Countries according to the Measure/Degree of Freedom and Conflict 21
6 Types of Conflict and Estimated Percentage of Cases 22
7 Legislative Electoral Systems 29
8 Units of Variation, Observation and Measurement 39
9 Concepts, Variables, Indicators and Measuring Instruments 42
10 Variables and Indicators 44
11 Sample Data Matrix Showing the Numerical Data Needed 55

5
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Title Page
1 Theoretical Framework 8
2 Radial Category: Legislative Electoral System 9
3 Radial Category: Contested Election 10
4 Typology of Regimes 11
5 Figure 5: Cross-sectional Graph of Electoral 36
Contestation for the 1990-2000 Electoral Period
6 Longitudinal Graph of Electoral Contestation for Four Electoral 36
Periods (1979-1989, 1990-2000, 2001-2011, 2012-2022)
7 Classical Category: Election 47
8 Radial Category: Rival-motivated Contested Election 48
9 Electoral Competition vs. Electoral Contestation 50
10 Electoral Competition, Electoral System and Electoral Contestation 51
11 Deriving the Values Added to the Initial Level of Institutionalization 52
12 Level of Institutionalization vs. Electoral Contestation 52

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SECTION I
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
Problem Statement
The intellectual impact of the so-called “globalization” undoubtedly affected the
mindsets of researchers and scholars in the field of Political Science to work within the
area of Comparative Politics and Government. This area offers a plethora of far-reaching,
albeit complex and mind-boggling, issues and events that in themselves make compelling
reasons for doing research. Under this area, a major electoral issue emerges, that is,
legislative electoral contestation in “incomplete” regimes2. The topic deals with the
most common features of a rival-motivated legislative electoral contestation, which are
electoral protest and electoral violence.
Statement of the Objective
The main question that the proposed research aims to answer or, at least, develop
a way of answering is “what causes legislative electoral contestation (i.e. electoral
protest and electoral violence) in new democratic or transitional states?” It implies an
explanatory research because the research would delve into the depths of electoral
violence and electoral protest and to prove that they are not simply caused by or
correlated with sociological and cultural factors such as warlordism, factionalism and
intra-elite conflict. To be wary of these somewhat “unalterable” factors, researchers
should try to find a cause, possibly the legislative electoral system (be it proportional or
non-proportional) that a country uses, that can be reformed or manipulated in order to
prevent these phenomena from occurring over and over again especially here in the
Philippines, assuming that they are “real” political pathologies.3 It is believed that the
mere existence of disputes indicates that something is wrong with a country’s institutions
and formal political practices.
2 “New democracies” and “transitional regimes” (in Figure 4) shall be collectively referred to in this paper as
“incomplete regimes” since scholars still find it hard to determine what exactly these regimes are consolidating into.
However, the researcher uses the three terms interchangeably especially in situations where writing a shorthand
label (and adjective) that denotes transitional countries that hold elections regardless oftheir quality is unavoidable.
3 There is yet a need to assume that electoral violence and electoral protest are “real” political pathologies because
not all people agree that they are so. Some would take these phenomena for granted and dismiss them as part of the
political game or culture and, thus,inevitable. However, as far as Mozaffar and Schedler (2002) are concerned,these
manifestations of electoral disputes point to the “uncertainty” or the ineffectiveness of electoral institutions and
governance.

7
In addition, it is important to observe whether the two features of contested
elections are related to each other. The attainment of this last goal would help ascertain
the nature of a country’s level of institutionalization (at the electoral level), which is the
degree to which its institutions and electoral governance effectively legitimize the
outcome of elections and quell the occurrence of informal and illegal practices or
behaviors.
Theoretical Framework
The research aims to establish a causal link, or at least a correlation, between
legislative electoral system and electoral contestation. Specifically, the paper theorizes
that legislative elections in new democracies and transitional regimes are characterized
by less robust institutions and electoral governance as well as an inappropriate
application of an electoral system compared to established democracies.4 These
institutional weaknesses make elections to their legislatures less honest, clean and
credible thus triggering multi-party (or two-party) and multi candidate disputes over
seats. The research thus seeks to verify the observation that proportional electoral
systems offer a less “zero-sum” or competitive means of electing legislators. Therefore,
countries that employ this system must have lower incidence of electoral violence and
electoral protest relative to those that make use of non-proportional systems.
Extending the theory even further, it is expected that states that have attained a relatively
high level of institutionalization would register fewer election-related violent incidents
because the candidates become more aware of institutional constraints and thus would
rather bring their election-related grievances, in the form of an electoral protest, to the
proper courts or tribunals instead of committing violent crimes. This relationship is yet
non-directional since the pattern that may emerge during the analysis could also suggest
that higher incidence of electoral protest relative to electoral violence indicates an
increasing level of institutionalization.
4 The phrase “inappropriate application of an electoral system” reveals the major policy implication of the research
proposal. It means that if the hypotheses were proven true, then an electoral reform would be needed, at least, to
address the problem of electoral contestation. Speaking of electoral reform, “in the circumstances of adopting
electoral rules in a newly democratizing country,Taagapera and Shugart (1989: 236) indicate a preference for small,
multi-member constituencies,with some kind of proportional electoral formula” and “stress the need to keep it
simple” (Farrell 1997: 166-167 quoting Taagapera and Shugart 1989).

8
In Figure 1, the box that depicts the effectiveness of electoral institutions and
governance represents the role of a country’s level of institutionalization in determining
the incidence of electoral contestation. Along with the degree of electoral competition
and regime type (in terms of civil liberties and freedom), it serves as a contextual or
control variable that ought to be taken into account in order to find out the significant
effects of a country’s electoral system on the incidence of electoral contestation.
The following causal models offer a simplified view of the relationships between
the aforesaid concepts:
legislative electoral system → electoral contestation
level of institutionalization → electoral contestation
electoral competition → electoral contestation
regime type → electoral contestation
Figure 1
New Democratic and Transitional Regimes
(Scope)
Electoral System Electoral Contestation
Proportional
System
Non-Proportional
System
Electoral
Violence
Electoral
Protest
Effectiveness
of Electoral
Institutions
and
Governance
Degree
Of
Electoral
Competition
Theoretical Framework

9
Definition of Terms
Election – a democratic institution that provides a means of filling government offices
(especially legislative and executive) by a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. It is also an
institutional arrangement which clearly determines who wins or loses a government seat, which
is subject to competition, based on the votes garnered by the candidates or political parties
Legislature – one of the three typical “branches” of a state, especially, a democratic one.
It is a symbol of political representation and considers public issues. Other words used to denote
this multi-member body include the following: “assembly”, “congress”, and “parliament”
Legislative electoral system – set of rules for converting votes into seats. There are at
least three broad types; proportional, non-proportional and mixed systems
Figure 2
Proportional electoral systems – offer a means of allocating seats based on the votes
gathered by a party relative to other parties. These can be either the list system or the single
transferable vote (STV)
Radial Category: Legislative Electoral System
Primary Category
Secondary Categories
Components
Category
Legislative Electoral
System
Non-Proportional
Proportional
A
B
C
B C
Note: In radial categories, the differentiating characteristics of secondary categories are
contained within the primary category (Collier, David and Mahon, James, Jr. December 1993.
“Conceptual ‘Stretching’ Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis.”
American Political Science Review Vol. 87 No. 4, pp. 845-855.: 848-850).
A = set of rules for converting votes into seats
B = winner-take-all, i.e. the winning candidates or parties are those which have obtained
either the majority (fifty percent plus one) or plurality (most number) of votes in every constituency
C = offers a means of allocating seats based on the votes gathered by a party relative to other
parties (e.g. 50% of the total votes = 50% of the legislative seats)
Mixed B C
A
A
A

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Non-proportional electoral systems – a.k.a., “winner-take-all” systems in that they do
not offer a method of allocating seats based on the votes garnered by a party relative to other
parties. These can take such forms as plurality, majority or two-ballot systems
Contested election – characterized by multiparty (or two-party), thus multi-candidate,
disputes over seats. Disputes arise when the outcome of an election is not accepted by the losing
candidate(s) or party or when the likelihood of winning is perceived to be very low by the
contesting candidates to the extent that they may endeavor to disqualify either a prospective or
already declared winner or worse kill or injure him severely.
Figure 3
Radial Category: Contested Election
Primary Category
Secondary Categories
Components
Category
Contested Election
Voter-motivated
State-motivated
A B
A
C
D
A
B
Rival-motivated
Third Party-motivated
C D E
A
A E
A = one whose outcome is disputed by certain state and social actors or is not acceptable
especially to the losing parties or candidates; and is characterized by either formal or informal actions
or processes (Fischer, 2002)
B = (voter-motivated) manifested by voters in conflict with the State and claiming
unfairness in the election process (Fischer, 2002)
C = (state-motivated) manifested by the State in conflict with voters who challenge the
election results or the electoral hegemony of the State (Fischer, 2002))
D = (rival-motivated) characterized by political rivals (e.g. electoral candidates) in conflict
with each other for political gain (Fischer, 2002)
E = (third party-motivated or “provocative”) induced by election-related “third parties” such
as terrorist, insurgent, and interest groups (derived from Wolters, 1983 and Linantud, 1998)
Note: The researcher intends to focus only on rival-motivated contested elections (i.e.
electoral protest and electoral violence)

11
New democracies - countries which Freedom House codes as free and which have
experienced a major change in regimes over the past twenty years (Mishler and Rose 2001).
Figure 4 displays the four types of regimes in terms of regime change and civil liberties and
freedom (Mishler and Rose 2001)
Transitional regimes – those which have also undergone regime change but are coded as
either “partly free” or “not free”
Figure 4: Typology of Regimes
Institutions – rules or set of rules that influence the strategies of state and social actors.
A distinction is made between formal (i.e. “written”) and informal (i.e. “unwritten”) rules.
Formal institutions are referred to as “parchment institutions” because they “are written down
somewhere as laws, regulations, constitutions, treaties, and so forth” (Pilapil, 2006: 90 citing
John Carey, 2000: 735). Informal rules “are constituted by values and norms [or deep-seated
beliefs and expectations reflected in the regularized pattern of doing particular life actions] that
either promote or constrain the formal rules” (Ibid. : 91)
Free (Freedom House ≤ 2.5) Partly free/unfree (Freedom House > 2.5)
N
o
C
h
a
n
g
e
W
i
t
h
C
h
a
n
g
e
Civil Liberty and Freedom
Regime
Change
Stable
Democracies
Stable
Non-democracies
New
Democracies
Transitional
Regimes
Source: Adapted from Mishler and Rose (2001: 307)

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Electoral governance – “the wider set of activities that creates and maintains the broad
institutional framework in which voting and electoral competition take place” (Mozaffar and
Schedler, 2002: 7). There are three levels (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002: 7-10)
a) rule-making – at this level, “electoral governance involves the design of institutions
that define the basic framework of democratic elections”
b) rule implementation – at this level, “electoral governance coordinates the tasks of
diverse personnel and organizes the execution of a complex array of interdependent activities to
establish the stable institutional basis for voting and electoral competition”
c) rule-adjudication – “at this level, electoral governance involves the mediation and
settlement of disputes arising out of the process and results of voting and electoral competition”
Electoral violence – (or electoral conflict) “any random or organized act that seeks to
determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation,
hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced ‘protection’, blackmail, destruction of
property, or assassination. The victims of electoral violence can be people, places, things or data.
Conflict and violence need not be inflicted on a national scale. In fact, victims can be resident in
target ethnic, gender, geographical, or political ‘hot spot’ communities. ‘Conflict’ and ‘violence’
are intentionally combined in this definition because their respective impacts on electoral
processes are similar although the magnitude of the victimization is not equal” (Fischer, 2002)
Electoral protest – “a proceeding in behalf of one who has failed of success in election
against right of one who has been declared or determined by proper authority to have been
successful” (Flores and Villanueva, citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 2000: 16). It employs a
petition or a case that is filed before electoral courts or tribunals. The parties involved in the
protests can be distinguished as protestant/contestant – those who file the petition of protest – or
protestee/contestee – the adverse party, either a newly installed congressman or an incumbent.
Level of institutionalization – the “alignment” of formal rules with informal rules or
norms (Pilapil 2006). It can also be seen as a continuous process of subjecting political events
and actions such as elections to formal rules. This process, along with electoral governance,
facilitates the so-called “substantive uncertainty” that serves to minimize, if not hinder, the
incidence of elections “going bad”, thus preventing electoral disputes. Substantive uncertainty is
described by Mozaffar and Schedler (2002) as a paradox since it implies the organization of the
uncertainty of electoral outcomes by providing institutional certainty. Two of the qualitative

13
indicators of institutionalization are a) the independence or impartiality of election management
bodies and other institutions and b) the effectiveness of electoral governance.
Axioms
1. Professor Gene Pilapil’s “Institutions as mediating mechanisms between state and society”
Symbolically: Institutions ↔ Society. This means that institutions provide the rules that
influence the strategies, actions, or behavior of social as well as state actors. Electoral violence
and electoral protest, when considered as strategies, actions or behavior of social as well as state
actors, can thus be seen as functions of institutions such as electoral systems.
2. Shaheen Mozaffar and Andreas Schedler’s “democratic or substantive uncertainty”
Symbolically: “Certain” or robust electoral institutions → “Uncertain” or unpredictable
electoral outcome. This paradox emphasizes the role of “institutionalization” and electoral
governance in legitimizing electoral outcomes thus preventing or, at least, reducing electoral
disputes.
Statement of the Hypotheses
In “incomplete regimes”:
Proportional legislative electoral systems → ↓ Electoral Contestation
Non-proportional legislative electoral systems → ↑ Electoral Contestation
Electoral protest > Electoral violence ↔ High level of institutionalization
Electoral protest < Electoral violence ↔ Low level of institutionalization
Controlling for the effects of the countries’ level of institutionalization, degree of
electoral competition, and regime type, this paper proposes that non-proportional electoral
systems lead to higher incidence of electoral contestation while proportional ones, lower
incidence of electoral contestation, regardless of whether electoral violence is lower or greater
than electoral protest.
As regards the indicator of a country’s level of institutionalization, the hypothesis is that
if a country’s incidence of electoral protest were greater than its incidence of electoral violence,
the level of institutionalization would be higher. The converse will also be taken as true. This
variable is expected to vary negatively with electoral contestation, that is, higher levels of
institutionalization would lead to lower incidence of electoral contestation, otherwise, higher
incidence of electoral contestation.

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SECTION II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
This review of related literature focuses primarily on the two features of
contested elections in new democratic and transitional states: electoral protests and
electoral violence. In addition, this would endeavor to find ways of analyzing these two,
which are still understudied despite their growing analytical and practical relevance. Most
studies, notably on Africa, deal with the implications of “election security”, which serves
as the positive flip side of electoral conflict. By trying to offer positive accounts of the
conduct of elections, they fail to delve deeper into the specific problems inherent in
contested elections. Such problems are rooted in different contexts and vary across
countries and elections. These contexts and other factors that lead to electoral protests
and election-related violence are what this review of literature would try to unfold.
Contested Elections
The ultimate question that leads to the analysis of contested elections would be: Is
a contested election a means to an end or an end in itself? At first glance, it may appear as
if it were just a chicken-and-egg question, that is, a discombobulating inquiry about
which really comes first: contested election or the presupposed factors that lead to it?
Few researchers have direct answers to this. For instance, after analyzing contested
election cases in the United States congress, Jeffrey Jenkins5 (undated) argues:
From the mid-1870s through the mid-1890s, contested elections were used as a
partisan tool to combat the Democratic-sanctioned fraud, corruption, and violence
that had become commonplace in southern electoral politics. Thus, for a time,
contested election cases and partisan ‘seat flips’ were a normal part of the
political process.
This implies that contested elections are characterized by multiparty (or two-party), thus
multi-candidate, disputes over seats. One aspect of this kind of election that Jenkins
considers as operational data is the set of electoral cases filed by legislative candidates
before electoral courts. These cases have certain grounds of which criminal action or
intent causes most number of cases to be filed. His statistical and historical treatment of
5 His draft article was removed from the dot-com source, from which the insights and quotations in this review were
taken. The published article is included in the bibliographical entries, just in case some scholars would want to
verify and locate the information upon the review of this research proposal.

15
the data leads to the conclusion that electoral contestation involves an explicit degree of
criminal action, to which electoral violence can be linked. Although this conclusion is not
advanced by Jenkins in his article, which concentrates on an established democratic
legislature, it is somewhat evident in new democracies as what this review would later
detail. Both electoral protest and electoral violence merit some examination that would
clear the way to a thorough analysis of contested elections.
Electoral Protest
“An election protest is a proceeding in behalf of one who has failed of success in
election against right of one who has been declared or determined by proper authority to
have been successful” (Flores and Villanueva, citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 2000: 16).
It employs a petition or a case that is filed before electoral courts or tribunals. This
feature of contested elections is said to fall under the category of “intra-elite conflict”
which “involves people who belong to the higher stratum of society” (Flores and
Villanueva 2000: 7), including the members of congress who form part of the political
elite. Flores and Villanueva (2000) conceptualize such a conflict as distinct from other
sets of conflicts that they have identified which involve the elites, the masses, and the
middle class. They argue that there are “inter” and “intra” conflicts, which occur between
and within, respectively, the different stratifications of society and manifest in different
ways such as the filing of electoral protests.
As noted above, there are grounds to an electoral protest. Jenkins (undated) lists
at least twelve of them in his analysis of contested elections in the United States House of
Representatives filed between 1789 and 2002. Thirty-four percent (34%) of the cases
resulted from criminal action or intent, such as fraud, corruption and/or bribery. No
account of murder or serious physical injuries inflicted upon candidates, supporters or
other “electoral characters” has been recorded that might have caused a case to be filed. It
is not so surprising because the United States is an established democracy that is coded as
“Free” by the Freedom House Civil Liberties Index and “ranked as having the best
overall public integrity environment” (Camerer 2006: 161).

16
Table 1: Grounds in Contested Election Cases
Grounds Number of Cases
Criminal Action/Intent (Fraud, Corruption, and/or Bribery)
Serious Election Irregularities Not Involving Criminal Action/Intent
Illegal Election
Improper Canvass/Counting of Ballots
Lack of Qualifications Established by Federal Constitution
Civil War and Reconstruction Readmittance Issues
Existence of a Vacancy
Incompatible Office
Improper Ballots
Defective Credentials
Constitutionality of the Office of Delegate
Lack of Qualifications Established by State Law
Not Ascertainable
Source: Jenkins, (undated Draft)
205
137
79
50
32
19
16
7
6
4
3
3
38
Table 1 shows the grounds in contested election cases and the corresponding
numbers of cases filed. For Jenkins, these grounds serve only as opportunities, which
political parties exploit to arrive at a more beneficial means: contested election cases.
Green (2006: 3), however, argues that “viewing contested elections as a means of
expanding majority party strength misses the more complex relationship between party
goals and election conditions that influenced contestation in the latter half of the
nineteenth century.” He also demonstrates that “the specific conditions of individual
elections also independently influenced the likelihood of contestation, particularly when
they were related to fundamental and genuine conflicts over voting rights for southern
blacks” (Green 2006: 3). This serves to modify Jenkins’ observation that “partisanship
has been a significant factor in contested election outcomes generally across time and
during the late nineteenth century in particular” (Jenkins, undated). As articulated by
Jenkins, it is important to know if this pattern in the House of Representatives elections
mirrors that of the Senate. Furthermore, a question arises whether this phenomenon also
applies to new democratic legislatures and parliaments.
Another issue with regard to electoral contestations is about the effectiveness of
electoral governance at the levels of rule-making, rule implementation and rule
adjudication. “First, at the level of rule-making, electoral governance involves the design
of institutions that define the basic framework of democratic elections” (Mozaffar and

17
Schedler 2002: 7). “Second, at the level of rule implementation, electoral governance
coordinates the tasks of diverse personnel and organizes the execution of a complex array
of interdependent activities to establish the stable institutional basis for voting and
electoral competition” (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002: 8). The institutional “certainty” that
these levels of electoral governance provide serves to minimize, if not hinder, the
incidence of elections “going bad”, thus preventing electoral disputes. It is theorized that
disputes “arise from ambiguities in complex election rules and operational problems in
their implementation” (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002: 10). In order for these disputes to
undergo the third level of electoral governance, that is, rule adjudication, they must be
transformed first into formal cases to be filed before electoral courts or tribunals.
In the aforesaid statements, the emphasis is on the effectiveness of electoral
institutions – the sets of rules that govern elections - and their implementation. Yet, the
rules do not speak for themselves in transitional states like the Philippines, where
“cheating is a normal part of elections, so is protesting election results” (Rocamora
1998). Human behavior becomes the focus of observation here. Aside from committing
other electoral irregularities, cheating their way out of the electoral process has become a
common practice among politicians. This observation is diluted however by the lack of
circumstantial evidence that would lead to the culprits. Thus, the resulting electoral
protests remain as grand accusations by losing or “cheated” candidates. “As a
consequence thereof, numerous electoral protests and counter-protests are being filed
before the appropriate tribunal, be it a regular court (RTC, MTC), COMELEC
[Commission on Elections], PET [Presidential Electoral Tribunal], SET [Senate Electoral
Tribunal] or HRET [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal]” (Flores and
Villanueva 2000: 30).
For purposes of simplicity and clarity, the intricate network of election
irregularities and manipulation is hereby referred to as electoral fraud. Characterizing
the types of electoral fraud in the country, Luzviminda Tancangco, a former COMELEC
Commissioner, stated that generally, there are two (2) types of fraud being committed
during elections, namely, wholesale fraud and retail fraud (Flores and Villanueva 2000).
Wholesale fraud may include dagdag-bawas (vote padding and shaving) while retail
fraud may include the art of vote-buying as well as the employment of “flying voters” -

18
those people who vote more than once in several precincts (Rocamora 1998). In addition,
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago identified the following as forms of electoral fraud:
Table 2: Forms of Electoral Fraud
- voter list padding
- ghost voters and flying voters
- vote addition and vote subtraction (dagdag-
bawas)
- precinct and name juggling
- manufactured ballots and election returns
- falsified election returns
Source: Adapted from Flores and Villanueva (2000: 31)
- tampering with the canvass certificate
- irregularities in the certificate of canvass
- cheating during canvassing
- centralized fraud
- overspending
- vote-buying
- corrupt political machinery
Despite having this exhaustive list, Flores and Villanueva (2000) were not able to
identify actual fraud-related grounds for filing an election protest before the legislative
electoral tribunals. These grounds would serve as the proof of electoral fraud as
experienced and recognized by those who filed the cases. The authors were more
concerned about who were involved in the case, what the decisions were and how the
tribunals arrived at these decisions.
The parties involved in the protests can be distinguished as protestant/contestant –
those who file the petition of protest – or protestee/contestee – the adverse party, either a
newly installed congressman or an incumbent.
Electoral Violence
The ongoing discussion deals principally with the articles that examine the
incidence and patterns of election-related violence in new democracies and transitional
regimes such as the Philippines, Mexico and some African states.6 A careful review of
the literature proves that, similar to the case of electoral protest, electoral violence
committed at the congressional level is understudied. “Past thinking on [sic] stemming
electoral conflict and violence has been deficient because of the lack of a common
framework for research and practice” (Fischer 2002: 2). It seems that the object of most
researchers and practitioners is election security. “Election security can be defined as the
6 Hague and Harrop (2004) define a new democracy as one that has not yet had time to consolidate; that is,
democracy has not become the ‘only game in town’. In practice, a new democracy is transitional and marked by a
peaceful transfer of power through “founding elections”, which characteristics distinguish it from a semi-democracy.

19
process of protecting electoral stakeholders such as voters, candidates, poll workers,
media, and observers; electoral information such as vote results, registration data, and
campaign material; electoral facilities such as polling stations and counting centers; and
electoral events such as campaign rallies against death, damage, or disruption” (Fischer
2002: 9).
So, what is electoral violence then according to the available literature? First, it is
helpful to state what electoral violence is not. Although violence is embedded in society,
electoral violence does not seem to be its ultimate form. In view of that, political as it
may be, this form of violence is not equated with the larger concept of political violence.
In other words, electoral violence is not synonymous with, and may just be a subset of,
either societal violence or political terrorism.
Using a survey of 57 electoral events from 2001 that was conducted in order to
assess the levels and forms of conflict that appeared, Fischer (2002) states:
Electoral conflict and violence can be defined as any random or organized
act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process
through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault,
forced “protection,” blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination. The
victims of electoral violence can be people, places, things or data. Conflict and
violence need not be inflicted on a national scale. In fact, victims can be resident
in target ethnic, gender, geographical, or political “hot spot” communities.
“Conflict” and “violence” are intentionally combined in this definition because
their respective impacts on electoral processes are similar although the magnitude
of the victimization is not equal.
He also provides some snapshots of selected parliamentary/legislative electoral
exercises. The following table presents his observations (with the help of news items
from the countries that he surveyed):
Table 3: Violent Incidents and Their “Superficial” Causes
in Selected Countries’ Legislative Elections
Country Violent Incidents Purpose/Root
Thailand
(January 6)
violent protests; police vehicles were set on fire; a riot
ensued involving 500 people and 15 injuries
To force a recount and a
revote
Philippines
(May 14)
toll in the Philippines electoral campaign rose to 64
when a hand grenade tore through a crowd of 2,000,
killing four supporters of an opposition mayoral
candidate in the southern town of Sultan Sa Barongis;
campaign violence involved the shooting of candidates
and clashes between armed supporters of political rivals
Communist rebels who
impose “permit to campaign
fees” in countryside areas
they control; Muslim rebels
and armed groups employed
by politicians were also
security threats during
elections

20
Uganda
(June 27)
At least seven people were shot and killed and 150
people were taken into
custody for alleged “election malpractice and violence”;
altercation between a crowd and the bodyguard of a
candidate
Voters accused a candidate
of distributing bribes for
votes and his bodyguard
Zambia
(July 17)
between rival supporters of the Movement for
Multiparty Democracy and the United National
Independent Party
The conduct and outcome of
the election
Fiji
(August 25)
The threat of violence was employed in these first post-
coup elections through the circulation of a pamphlet
warning that a vote for the former Prime Minister
Mahendra Chaudhry would be a vote for bloodshed
Intimidation
Bangladesh
(October 1)
Pre-polling day violence left at least 134 people dead
and over 2,000 injured in clashes between political
rivals and interventions by security forces
Intense rivalry among
political parties and their
supporters
Sri Lanka
(December 5)
The Center for Monitoring Election Violence reported
more than 2,000 incidents in the six-week campaign
period; Nationwide, around 61 people died and over 100
were wounded in election violence
To frighten opponents and
voters and make vote rigging
easier
Source: Adapted from Fischer (2002)
In analyzing electoral conflict and violence, Fischer (2002) considers the role of a
country’s level of civil liberty and freedom. This is an attempt to correlate socio-
political conflict with electoral violence knowing that some countries are rated as “Free”,
“Partly Free” or “Not Free”. With this in mind, the researcher would like to take into
consideration as well the function of regime change a country has undergone. This
consideration would classify the countries as stable democracies, new democracies,
transitional regimes and stable non-democracies.7 As noted earlier, this review of
literature would deal primarily with contested election features in new democracies and
transitional regimes. New democracies are those which Freedom House codes as “free”
and which have experienced a major change in regime over the past twenty years while
transitional regimes are those which have also undergone regime change but are coded as
either “partly free” or “not free” (Mishler and Rose 2001). These would include the
following countries with their respective codes based on Freedom House Civil Liberties
Index (1995-96):
7 This classification was used by Mishler and Rose (2001) in their analysis of political support for “incomplete”
democracies, i.e. new democracies and transitional regimes.

21
Table 4: New/Transitional Democracies according to Level of Freedom
Underwent
Regime
Change
New Democracies Transitional Regimes
Free
(Freedom House ≤ 2.5)
Partly/Not Free
(Freedom House > 2.5)
Argentina
Bulgaria
Chile
East Germany
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Uruguay
Armenia
Belarus
Brazil
Croatia
Georgia
Macedonia
Nigeria
Peru
Philippines
Russia
Serbia
Ukraine
Source: Adapted from Mishler and Rose (2001: 307)
The next table displays the results of a survey of fifty-seven (57) electoral events
in 2001 that was conducted in order to assess the levels and forms of conflict that
appeared. The data show that “Not Free” or “Partly Free” states register more instances
of election-related violence despite their smaller number (24) compared to that of “Free”
states (31).
Table 5: Selected Countries according to the Measure/Degree of Freedom and Conflict
Total
Select Countries Rated as Free Not/Partly Free Others
31 24 2 57
Instances of
Conflict/Violence
3
(21%)
11
(79%)
N/A 14
In addition, the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) identifies
three models of conflict and violence that emerged in the 2001 electoral events held in
selected countries (Fischer 2002). They are the following:

22
Table 6: Types of Conflict and Estimated Percentage of Cases
Type of Conflict/Violence Percentage of Cases
Voter-motivated
(Voters in conflict with the State and claiming unfairness in the election
process)
14%
State-motivated
(The State in conflict with voters who challenge the election results or
the electoral hegemony of the State)
14%
Rival-motivated
(Political rivals in conflict with each other for political gain) 72%
“However, not all scenarios conform to the models that have been defined”
(Fischer 2002: 5). In sum, the motives, nature, perpetrators and victims of election-related
violence vary not only from country to country but also from election to election. “This
mercurial character makes it difficult to properly frame the problem and tailor the
response” (Fischer 2002: 8). What has emerged so far is only a provisional strategy based
on surveys that can be used in shaping electoral security measures.
Talking about the observable as well as theoretical causes of electoral violence,
the researcher nevertheless acknowledges that anecdotal references add more color to the
phenomenon. The Philippines is rich in election-related violent incidents, which have
inspired not only local researchers but also foreign scholars to write about them. First on
the list is Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism’s Sheila Coronel. A graduate of
Political Science and later Journalism, Coronel has relevant contributions to the
journalistic accounts of political events, mostly adverse and controversial, in the country.
Feeding on “sex and violence”, the media to which she now belongs capture many
natural events of sociopolitical, including electoral, violence. For instance, in The
Rulemakers (2004), she and her co-authors identify no less than three celebrated violent
events in the country that involve political families/clans such as the Marcoses and the
Singsons. Analyzing a particular section of the book, the researcher figured out that
personal linkage, whether broken or hardened, could be an effective cradle for electoral
violence. Alfred McCoy even writes that “provincial families are forced to engage in
systematic political violence either as agents or opponents” and that “provincial politics
involves a zero-sum struggle for hegemony over an electoral or commercial territory that

23
encourages organized violence” (Coronel, et al, 2004: 80 citing McCoy 1994). Coronel
further reports:
In most rural municipalities and provinces, “the language of politics was
force and political families put up ‘private armies’ both to protect their logging
empires [among other things] and to muscle their way to electoral victory”. This
led McCoy to trace the violence and “warlordism” (i.e. the employment of guns
and goons for political and economic gains) in the Philippines to the proliferation
of loose firearms at the end of World War II (Coronel, et al, 2004: 80 quoting
McCoy 1994).
By contrast to the aforesaid classic accounts, Linantud (1998) proposes that non-
ideological factors such as “factionalism” - which include political families/clans and
patronage networks; a weak state; social disorder; and a confrontational (macho) political
subculture - have yielded to rebellion or insurgency as a primary source of poll violence
in the Philippines. The former have been declining while the latter still varies from time
to time. “Factional violence, election-related or not, has been blamed on political
"anarchy", an implicit metaphor for a realist conception of world politics where nation-
states answer to no higher law than their own power and interests” (Linantud 1998, pp.
303-304). Linantud (1998) further reports:
in this understanding, factional poll violence reflects the weakness of a state
unable to make or enforce laws over the objections of local, regional, or even
national factions and "bosses". The strongest deterrent to election terrorism is a
powerful boss, not a state able to execute the law. The Philippine state is in fact
dominated by clannish elites in national and local politics: in the 1992-95 House,
"political clans" held 145 of 200 seats.
The author agrees with the ideas of Flores and Villanueva (2000), who state that
intra-elite conflict determines electoral protests, and other scholars (such as Willem
Wolters, 1983) who suggest that factionalism leads to violence. However, he believes
that more electoral violence is now resulting from Communist insurgency and Muslim
separatism (see for instance Table 2). Both rebellions have disrupted elections through
the following (Linantud 1998: 300):
 strategic attacks on election activities to weaken the political system;
 targeting hostile candidates, allies, and subordinates;
 kidnapping or threatening candidates for ransom or for fees for safe
access to rebel territory;
 enabling state and private security forces to suppress actual or
presumed rebel sympathizers participating in the elections; and,
 abetting an atmosphere friendly to both rebel and factional terrorism,
often blamed on rebels

24
“In addition, changes to election rules, and the different paths of communist and
Muslim rebellions, blur patterns of election violence” (Linantud 1998: 299). This
revolutionary conceptualization and theorizing about electoral violence needs more
justification through the examination of concrete evidences, which are still unverified or
unrecorded. Nevertheless, Linantud’s observation overwhelms the classic narratives,
including even that of Willem Wolters (1983), which center mainly on non-ideological
factors like local factionalism and the electoral use of “guns and goons”. It can be
inferred that the ideological predisposition of certain sociopolitical groups, whether
religious or political, might serve as a factor that induces them to resort to violence.
Despite this powerful and recent theoretical development, other factors that lead
to violence are still worthy of recognition. And even at this time, electoral violence (at
congressional level) is distinguished from the larger concepts of social/societal violence
and political terrorism. The following are other theoretical causes of election-related
violence:
 a decentralized political structure
 social disorder
 confrontational or macho political subculture
 extent of electoral competition
 ethno-geographical issues
 electoral systems
Some of the factors overlap and were mentioned earlier. A decentralized
political structure is identified herein as a factor leading to electoral violence mainly
because of the observation that the rules that govern some provinces or districts are not
uniformly applied to or followed in others. Linantud (1998) identified it as a non-
ideological factor that leads to poll violence. Social disorder makes it to the list by
negating “social control”, which can be explained by what sociologists call “social
control theory” – a theory that puts emphasis on the role of social norms and law-
enforcement bodies in deterring social conflict (Villarreal 2002). This factor, however,
leads to the broader concept of societal violence and might be too extensive a topic for
this discussion. Confrontational political subculture is “a theory that argues that adult
males across the world are driven to procreate, protect, and provide for family whenever
there is competition for resources” (Linantud 1998: 308). This subculture diverges into
three overlapping norms: amoralism or amoral familism; an emphasis on reputation; and
a culture of honour. Again, this theory highlights the role of the family or personal

25
relationships in initiating electoral violence. The researcher believes that it is based on
highly theoretical interpretations of gender differences that are somewhat unreliable and
stereotypical. Even without the confrontational subculture, electoral violence may still
occur as long as elections are held. Thus, Villarreal (2002) argues that greater electoral
competition is associated with higher homicide rates (not necessarily election-related)
across municipalities in Mexico and overtime, even after controlling for standard
correlates of violent crime such as age structure, ethnic composition, family structure,
law enforcement and regional differences. The extent of competition is measured as the
proportion voting for candidates from parties other than the PRI [Partido Revolucionario
Institucional] (Villarreal 2002). “This indicator clearly reveals an overall loss of support
for the PRI in local elections during the decade [from 1990 to 2000]” (Villarreal 2002:
481). He also considers the existence of caciques and patronage networks (i.e.
factionalization) in Mexico that are also found here in the Philippines. Specifically,
This association between greater electoral competition and homicide in rural areas
is consistent with the hypothesis that the effect is due to a weakening of local
caciques…[T]he effect of electoral competition is mediated by the disruptive
effect it has on patronage networks…(Villarreal 2002: 488)
His hypothesis was tested using electoral results from a sample of 1,800 Mexican
municipalities. The number of homicides in each municipality was obtained from the
Mexican National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics, which compiles
basic information on all fatalities in the country based on death certificates in accordance
with the World Health Organization’s guidelines. Now, the question that can be asked is
about whether or not his analysis can be applied to electoral violence at the congressional
level. Nevertheless, his study serves as a model for quantitative investigation into the
effects of elections on societal violence.
Furthermore, Villarreal elaborates on the effects of the type and transition of
national political regimes on large-scale social conflicts. Trying to compare sociological
theories of conflict with political scientific ones, he suggests “a theoretical approach that
considers the way changes in political structures operate at the local level to produce an
increase in interpersonal violence” and “this increase in local electoral competition must
be understood in the context of a broader national democratic transition - a transition that
Mexico shares with other countries throughout the world” (Villarreal 2002: 495). He

26
posits that it is the transition to democracy, and not democracy itself, that produces a
disruption of patronage networks and a temporary increase in societal violence.
Ethno-geographical issues determine electoral violence in Africa where
ethnicity, as well as its spatial distribution, is very much diverse. This diversity normally
causes ethno-political conflict, which is at its height during elections, which ironically
serve to resolve it. “It is generally recognized that post-conflict elections can be held too
early and produce results that may extend the conflict rather than resolve it” (Fischer
2002: 2).
The last factor is included despite its lack of theoretical application as a
determinant of electoral violence. Yet, it can be derived from the inspection of some new
democracies that held electoral exercises. These countries, therefore, must have
employed some sort of electoral system, be it proportional, non-proportional or mixed. It
can be argued that most states that have been identified herein make use of non-
proportional methods of election to their legislatures. For instance, most members of the
Philippine Congress are elected directly through the plurality method or “first-past-the-
post” whether at national (for the upper house/senate) or district (for the lower
house/House of Representatives) level. This plurality system seems to affirm and prolong
the high degree of electoral rivalry because of its “winner-take-all” quality. Its
implications on electoral violence must therefore be evaluated.
Electoral Systems
If there would be one very important feature that a democratic political system
would have, it would be its electoral system. It essentially “define[s] how the political
system will function” (Farrell 1997: 2). As a formal political institution, an electoral
system is as important as the one that it governs. Therefore, no longer are scholars
focusing on the role of elections, especially in democratic as well as “democratizing”
countries, but also on the type of electoral system and other institutions that a country is
known to use (see for instance Farrell 1997; Hague and Harrop 2004, Chapter 9;
Heywood 2002, Chapter 11; Lindberg 2006; and Mozaffar and Schedler 2002).
An electoral system is an example of a political institution that has a periodic
managerial expression (Pilapil 2006). It can only function every time elections are held.
Farrell (1997) views it as only a part of a wider set of electoral laws and mechanisms,

27
which define political concepts such as district magnitude, suffrage, voting, campaigning,
and so on.
It is crucial to distinguish between at least two broad categories of an electoral
system in terms of which higher-ranking members of a state or government are elected.
They are the legislative electoral systems and the presidential electoral systems (Hague
and Harrop 2004, Chapter 9). Since this review focuses on the former, the ongoing
discussion will be limited to the consideration of its main functions, categories,
characteristics, and consequences.
“Apart from their primary function of ensuring the smooth running and accepted
legitimacy of the system, electoral systems are designed to fulfill a number of other –
often conflicting – functions, such as reflecting the wishes of voters, producing strong
and stable governments, electing qualified representatives and so on” (Farrell 1997: 3).
Albeit it serves ultimately as a mechanism of determining “who” the winners and losers
are, an electoral system ought to be evaluated not in terms of one function or a
combination of functions alone. There are other unfamiliar purposes, which an electoral
system serves that no single book or article can enumerate as of this time. An example
would be how “efficient” does an electoral system distribute legislative seats among the
victors, whether political parties or candidates, such that there would be less, if at all,
electoral contestation. However, an electoral system cannot be dismissed as entirely
flawed if it appears to be inefficient in performing this function. “The ‘electoral
engineers’ have to take important decisions about which function to stress most” to the
point that “no two countries have [exactly] the same electoral system” (Farrell 1997: 3).
Their systems may just have some common characteristics that are deemed important by
scholars in order to arrive at fruitful comparative analyses. One such characteristic is the
way these systems allocate seats based on the number or percentage of the overall votes
that a political party garners relative to other parties – i.e. whether they allow for a
“proportional” or a “non-proportional” means of converting votes into seats (Farrell
1997; Hague and Harrop 2004; and Heywood 2002).
On the basis of seat allocation, only two categories of a legislative electoral
system exist and they are the “proportional” and the “non-proportional” systems. Yet, “it
would be wrong to assume that any system labeled ‘proportional’ must be perfectly so”
(Hague and Harrop 2004: 15). The variants of these two can be classified according to a.)

28
the (minimum) number of votes that a party or a candidate for each constituency must
obtain to win; b.) the number of candidates who can be elected; c.) which or whom to
vote for, whether the parties or (their) candidates; d.) the manner of voting, whether
preferential or not; e.) the manner of counting votes, whether done once or more; and f.)
who chooses the candidates to be elected, whether the voters directly or the party (see for
instance Farrell 1997; Hague and Harrop 2004; and Heywood 2002). Table 7 presents the
most common variants.
In terms of “the percentage differences between votes and seats, the ranking
between the different systems appeared to tally with expectations, i.e. first past the post
(FPTP) and the majoritarian systems produced the largest percentage differences; single
transferable vote (STV), list and the two-votes systems produced the smallest” (Farrell
1997: 143). These differences indicate the extent of electoral gains, in terms of votes, that
unsuccessful political parties and candidates lose to their opponents as well as the amount
of seats that victorious parties could take as “bonus”. For instance, “[t]he crucial point
about the plurality method is the bonus in seats it offers to the party leading in votes”
(Hague and Harrop 2004: 149). This inherent bias of the method offers everything to the
winners and nothing to the losers within each district (Hague and Harrop 2004)
Non-proportional and proportional representation (PR) systems are usually
regarded as alternatives yet “mixed” systems, which seek to combine the best of both
worlds, have emerged (Hague and Harrop 2004 citing Shugart and Wattenberg 2000).
These hybrid forms reconcile the geographical or constituency-based method of
representation, inherent in the plurality and majority systems, with the “microcosm” or
party representation of PR (Farrell 1997; Hague and Harrop 2004).
The last aspect of the electoral systems debate revolves around the effects,
especially behavioral ones, of an electoral system. “[I]t can be expected that both the
politicians and the voters will operate differently under different electoral systems”
(Farrell: 161). Farrell (1997) distinguishes between macro-level and micro-level effects.
Whereas the former involves, among other things, a.) the trade-offs between
proportionality and stability of government; b.) the number of (effective) parties; c.)
representation of women and minorities; and d.) the role of representatives; the latter
considers “strategic” issues such as a.) pre-electoral campaigning; b.) prospects of
winning; b.) “war chests” or fundraising; c.) potential for voting; and (probably) d.)

29
electoral contestation. “In order to assess the strategic effects of electoral systems on
politicians it is useful to draw a distinction between party-based and candidate-based
electoral systems: the former personified by closed list systems like Spain, the latter
including FPTP, STV and open list systems” (Farrell 1997: 161). Unlike in strong party
systems, it can be inferred that independent candidates may well proliferate in candidate-
based electoral systems.
Table 7: Legislative Electoral Systems
Plurality and
Majority Systems
1. Simple plurality: ‘first past the post’
Procedure Leading candidate elected on first and only ballot
2. Absolute majority: alternative vote (‘preferential vote’)
Procedure Voters rank candidates. If no candidate wins a majority of
first preferences,the bottom candidate is eliminated and his or her votes are
redistributed according to second preferences. Repeat until a candidate has
a majority.
3. Two ballot systems
Procedure If no candidate wins a majority on the first ballot, the
leading candidates (usually the top two) face a second,run-off election
Proportional
Systems
4. List system
Procedure Votes are cast for a party’s list of candidates though in
many countries the elector can also express support for individual
candidates on the list.
5. Single transferable vote (STV)
Procedure Voters rank candidates in order of preference. Any
candidate needs to achieve a set number of votes (the quota) to be elected.
All candidates are elected who exceed this quota on the first preferences.
Their ‘surplus’ votes (that is, the number by which they exceeded the quota)
are then distributed to the second preferences shown on these ballot papers.
When no candidate has reached the quota, the bottom candidate is
eliminated and these votes are also transferred. Continue until all seats are
filled.
Mixed Systems 6. Mixed member majoritarian (MMM)
Procedure Some candidates are elected for electoral districts and
others through PR. Electors normally have two votes. One is for the district
election (which usually uses the plurality method) and the other for a PR
contest (usually party list). In MMM, these two tiers are separate,with no
mechanism to achieve a proportional result overall.
7. Mixed member proportional (MMP) or the ‘Additional member
system’ (AMS)
Procedure As for MMM, except that the two tiers are linked so as to
deliver a proportional outcome overall. The party vote determines the
number of seats to be won by each party. Elected candidates are drawn first
from the party’s winners in the district contests, topped up as required by
candidates from the party’s list.
Source: Adapted from Hague and Harrop (2004: 148)

30
As will be discussed later in this paper, formal political institutions like the
electoral systems “affect the political strategies of actors by, among others, influencing
(a) the actors’ time horizons and (b) the patterns of representation and contestation open
to [them]” (Pilapil 2006: 94). Indeed, the study of electoral systems, especially their
political and social consequences, can reveal a lot about the behavior of electoral parties
and candidates as well as the patterns of behavior common among them.
Institutions, Electoral Governance and Institutionalization
Inherent in the comparative study of politics and governments is the consideration
of the ‘political’ vis-à-vis the ‘social’ (Pennings, Keman, and Kleinnijenhuis 1999).
Cross-country assessments usually result from this consideration and involve the “choice
between three levels of analysis: the institutions of government, the social context of
politics and the state as a whole” (Hague and Harrop 2004: 75). Pennings et al. (1999)
propose that the “triad” of politics, policy and polity be considered when scholars try to
examine the workings of the political system. The entire array of formal institutions of
the state is what polity signifies.
Institutions occupy a considerable space in political science literature. But what
exactly are institutions? Working within the political science-inspired new institutional
approach to politics and government, Pilapil (2006: 90) defines institutions “as the rules
that influence the strategies of state and social actors.” He clearly delineates the nature of
such entities and distinguishes between formal (i.e. “written” or coded, enforceable or
binding) and informal (i.e. “unwritten”, customary or cultural) institutions. Formal
political institutions are referred to as “parchment institutions” because they “are written
down somewhere as laws, regulations, constitutions, treaties, and so forth” (Pilapil, 2006:
90 quoting John Carey, 2000: 735). Informal rules “are constituted by values and norms
[or deep-seated beliefs and expectations reflected in the regularized pattern of doing
particular life actions] that either promote or constrain the formal rules” (Pilapil, 2006:
91).8 Moreover, Pilapil argues that political institutions serve as mediating mechanisms
between the state and society, that is, they can be shaped or utilized by social and state
actors for their own interests but as time goes by, these institutions tend to persist. The
‘rules of the game’, once in place, are capable of affecting the behavior of actors in many
8 Political institutions should not be confused with social institutions (as recognized by sociologists),which include
the family, the economy, religion, education, and so on.

31
ways, for instance, if an institution no longer fits their whims, they may try hard to
change or, worse, abolish this institution.
The definition offered by Pilapil (2006) is consistent with the view held by
Pennings et al. (1997: 9, 35-36), among other “comparativists”, that institutions affect the
choices, incentives and constraints available to political actors. However, this definition
is just one of the myriad roles that political institutions play in both the theory and
practice of politics and government. Due to the warring factions within the new
institutionalist paradigm, institutions began to take on so many definitions and functions
(see for instance Lowndes 2002)9. The definition agreed upon by Pilapil (2006) and
Pennings et al. (1997) comes from the Rational Choice variant of new institutionalism
that puts emphasis on how rules shape the behavior of actors “by affecting ‘the structure
of a situation’ in which individuals select strategies for the pursuit of their preferences”
(Lowndes 2002: 95). Furthermore, “rational choice theorists argue that institutions are
purposeful human constructions designed to solve collective action problems” (Lowndes
2002: 95). Institutions, as political elements, nevertheless qualify as independent
variables “that we can change or shape” and “they stimulate us to think of strategies for
making improvements in our political systems” (White 1999: 160). Perhaps, curing
political and social pathologies serves as the raison d'être of new institutional analysts
and “political doctors” alike.
Shaheen Mozaffar and Andreas Schedler (2002), in their introduction to the
comparative study of electoral governance, provide a very convincing account of how
political, especially electoral, institutions secure the credibility of elections in emerging
democracies. Accordingly,
formal “institutions are seen as legitimate only when their substantive
outcomes are indeterminate”. Thus, “[p]olitical actors will accept the uncertainty
of outcomes in electoral competition to the extent that the rules that organize the
competition do not ex ante determine those outcomes” (Mozaffar and Schedler
2002: 11).
9 Other strains of new institutionalism include the following: historical, normative, empirical, international,
sociological, and network new institutionalism. Broad descriptions of these variants of new institutionalism are
available in the article written by Vivien Lowndes (2002), who elaborates on the revival of (new) institutionalist
thinking in Political Science. Albeit these are, to some extent, related to the approach that the researcher employs,
they are beyond the scope of this review of literature.

32
The analogy given is that of the court proceedings wherein the procedural
legitimacy or impartiality of the rules of court as well as the judges presupposes, at least
in theory, substantive unpredictability of the verdict. The uncertainty of electoral
outcome allows opposition candidates not only to compete with the incumbents but to
win as well (see for instance Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; Pilapil 2006; and Przeworski
1991). As long as political actors do not have psychic powers and institutions remain
“certain” (i.e. they are not biased or can easily be manipulated) the results, in terms of
who the winners would be, will be “uncertain”. This paradox defines the central task of
what Mozaffar and Schedler referred to as electoral governance.
In direct agreement with Lindberg (2006), who put forward the fact that the mere
holding of elections is not just an indicator of democratization but reinforces it instead,
Mozaffar and Schedler argue that the effective governance of electoral exercises has been
dismissed by other scholars as having too little, if any, significance in the comparative
study of democratization. The authors indicate that one of the upshots of this institutional
practice is the reduction of electoral disputes, especially those that occur right after the
proclamation of the winners. Even if disputes arise at the first two levels of electoral
governance, these “organizational failures may be ‘redeemed’ by judicial actions that
resolve complaints fairly and expediently” (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002: 12). The
authors suggest that the conduct of successive elections as well as their effective
governance be considered as a factor that enhances a country’s democratic values and
indicators, such as civil liberties and freedom, apart from the right to simply participate in
peaceful and competitive elections.
By applying at least two of the ten rules of formal or mathematical logic, anyone
can enhance the validity of the authors’ arguments. Symbolically, hypothetical syllogism
(i.e. transitivity) states that if A→B and if B→C, then A→C, where A means institutional
certainty; B, substantive uncertainty; and C, absence of electoral disputes. The inference
is “true” if the two premises are accepted as “true”. Since the authors provide some
justification as to the veracity of these premises, it is quite clear that A→C is true.
Furthermore, using modus tollens, if C is negated, that is, if disputes arise, and given as a
new premise, then the following conclusions can be arrived at: if A→B and B→C, and
A→C; ~C (C negated), then it is either ~A or ~B. This means that if there are electoral

33
disputes, then the institutions must be uncertain or biased such that the outcome of
elections are predetermined (e.g. in favor of the incumbents). Thus, aside from
“substantive uncertainty”, the existence of electoral disputes or conflicts is a (more)
reliable measure of the impartiality of electoral institutions.
Indeed, elections, electoral institutions and electoral governance are not only
related to democratization but to electoral contestation as well (see for instance Lindberg
2006; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; and Pilapil 2006).
It goes without saying that Mozaffar and Schedler favor the ‘institutionalization
of democratic uncertainty’. Accordingly, they want to secure the legitimacy of
democratic elections by working out A, B and C. Seen from their perspective,
institutionalization would be at its highest peak if there were no disputes at all. If
contestation is inevitable, having it done formally in ways that do not bypass the “rules of
the game” still indicates a high level of institutionalization. For instance, disputes can be
allowed if, and only if, the parties involved agree to settle such through electoral dispute
adjudication, which marks the third level of electoral governance.
Talking about the “alignment” of formal rules with informal rules, Pilapil (2006:
91) argues that when “a significant gap or an outright conflict” exists “between the
formal rules and the informal norms then, there is a low level of institutionalization.” For
instance, if electoral candidates prefer the violent way of contesting elections and
resolving conflicts, then the effectiveness or enforceability of institutions is lesser.
Institutionalization is thus indicated by the existence (or nonexistence) and effectiveness
of formal rules and behaviors relative to informal ones.

34
SECTION III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
ResearchDesign
The purpose of the proposed research is explanatory in that it endeavors to
explain the occurrence of a behavioral pattern within the context of a rival-motivated
contested election (i.e. electoral contestation). The main independent variable that has
been identified is the electoral system, which has two secondary categories:
“proportional” and “non-proportional.” As suggested by Pennings et al. (1997), an
explanatory or “testing”-oriented type of research aims at establishing causality.
Moreover, since the research question borders on the “general”, the method of research
design that is most appropriate to use is the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) or the
Method of Difference. It takes into account “a large or optimal number of cases/systems
that are contextually similar with only a few variables that differ amongst each other”
(Pennings et al. 1997; 45). The basic assumption is close to the econometricians’ ceteris
paribus clause. Thus, two problems may arise: one is because of the assumed control of
the context (too many cases and too few variables) and the other is because of the broad
definition of concepts that are understood to be applicable to many different political
systems (internal validity).
An explanatory research “is often used for policy analysis and focuses on
discerning the effects of the implementation process, and less on explaining what has
happened” (Pennings et al. 1997: 14). Pennings et al. further discuss that:
[I]f we aim at explanation, the primary goal of the research is then to understand
the working of a political and social system by means of modeling politics in a
comprehensive but parsimonious fashion (emphasis added)
It is apparent that the method of data collection is a marrying of the comparative
and statistical approaches to politics. Searching through already existing multiple data
sources and statistics is therefore inevitable when using this kind of method. For instance,
the sources of electoral contestation (rates), whether electoral protest or electoral
violence, do not only include electoral commissions, tribunals or police files but also
national statistics offices, media feeds or reports, death certificates, among others. Trying
to validate the claim that electoral systems affect the types and extent of electoral
contestation, the researcher aims at comparative analysis because an assessment of one

35
system alone cannot suffice a thorough explanation. This is important especially if one
wants to prove that the single-member district-based plurality electoral system that our
country is using prolongs the high degree of electoral rivalry, thus triggering the
proliferation of electoral cases and, worse, violence.
Time Dimension
As suggested by Pennings et al. (1999: 49-54), when the dimensions of a research
design deal with both space and time, the choice is between a pooled time-series or time
series via Qualitative Case Analysis (QCA). Since the researcher prefers to use a Most
Similar Systems Design (MSSD) or Method of Difference, which implies the inclusion of
a large number of cases and a reduction of “similar” contextual variables, the easier way
to study the cases is by means of a cross-sectional analysis, especially if the level of
analysis is only behavioral and not so much process-oriented. This comes with the
identification and isolation of a spatially constrained type of independent variable, which
is the electoral system. But if the available resources would warrant its use and if we
want to consider the developments over time (e.g. every electoral period) of the pattern of
behavior (e.g. electoral contestation) under scrutiny, a longitudinal (trend) type of
analysis is preferable to a cross-sectional one. Such a type of analysis could compare the
effects of the process of institutionalization over time and show if “incomplete regimes”
are capable of exhibiting a changing relative incidence of the two categories of electoral
contestation. The following hypothetical graphs would make the preceding ideas clearer.
In Figure 5, the objects of comparison are the cases (i.e. the “sets” of legislative electoral
candidates) and not the electoral periods (e.g. 1979-1989, 1990-2000, 2001-2011 and so
on). Figure 6 presents a hypothetical graph of a longitudinal (trend) form of data
presentation, where the objects of comparison are electoral periods. The researcher leaves
the longitudinal treatment of electoral contestation to other scholars who might bother
analyzing this pattern of behavior as it progresses…

36
Country-by-country graphs showing the intensity of institutionalization (at the
electoral level) as well as electoral contestation can also be furnished (by other scholars).
The objects of comparison are therefore the national legislative (or general) election
years. It should be noted that an “electoral period” (or a set of national election period) at
the cross-national comparative level of observation is distinct from an “election year” (or
a national election period). For purposes of comparison, an electoral period considers the
fact that not all national legislative elections are held simultaneously. For instance, the
Philippine Republic holds a general election every six (6) years while other countries
may do so every four (4), five (5) or more years. A cross-sectional type of analysis does
Figure 5: Cross-sectional Graph of Electoral
Contestation for the 1990-2000 Electoral Period
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cases
Rates
Electoral Protest
Electoral Violence
Figure 6: Longitudinal Graph of Electoral
Contestation for Four Electoral Periods (1979-1989,
1990-2000, 2001-2011, 2012-2022)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1 2 3 4
Electoral Period
Mean
rates
Electoral Protest
Electoral Violence

37
not necessarily mean that the time dimension of a cross-country comparison is fixed, i.e.
that the cases manifest the behavioral pattern simultaneously.
If a researcher is not yet content with the previously mentioned considerations and
analyses, he/she may venture into the analysis of electoral contestation at other levels of
the government. For instance, an analysis of electoral contestation, especially rival-
motivated, would be very fruitful and exciting at the gubernatorial, mayoral, and other
lower electoral levels! He/she may compare each level and find out which one is more or
less prone to electoral contestation.
Electoral contestation can occur before, during or after the national legislative
elections. It is thus important to differentiate one from the others.
 Pre-election stage – covers the period between the filing of certificates of
candidacy and the election day(s)
 Election stage – covers the period between the actual date(s) of elections and the
proclamation of winners (and losers)
 Post-election stage – covers the immediate period after the proclamation of
winners and can extend up to the last incident of electoral contestation
In addition, two types of contesting candidates exist depending on the period
within which they initiated the act as well as the prospects of winning. One is a potential
loser and the other is either an actual or a “cheated” loser. The former contests an
election before it takes place while the latter does so after the election.
Population and Cases
Defining the population and sampling are crucial, even more, in comparative
research, which usually considers more than one country, setting, phenomena, cases and
periods. This consideration concerns directly the “units of observation” or the cases,
which should be able to “travel” across both time and space. A distinction is made
between all relevant cases (in relevant periods) and all cases present in reality.
As advised by Pennings et al. (1997: 28) the closed universe type of identifying
the population is the one that is most appropriate for this proposed research. This means
that there is a need to include as many, if not all, relevant cases in relevant periods as
possible. This is apparent in the type of theory that is being proposed, i.e. a middle-range
theory, which “claim[s] to be explanatory for a certain class of cases…for which specific
hypotheses are developed and specified in terms of variables” (Pennings et al. 1997: 43).
This implies that sampling per se may not be needed since the relevant cases could

38
include the entire “population of discourse”. In this case, it is safe to make
generalizations about the whole collection of cases. Some of the criteria for the selection
include the following. The “sets” of candidates must belong to all of these.
 New democratic or transitional regime – one that has undergone a change
in regime, specifically from a “nondemocratic” to a democratic type, for
the past thirty (30) years (see Figure 4)
 Countries that have national legislative branches that are subject to
elections after several years
 Countries that make use of either a proportional or a non-proportional
electoral system. If the members of the legislature are elected via mixed or
different electoral systems, a refinement must be made such that only
those sets of candidates that are large enough to ‘represent’ the entire
population of a country are included. For instance, the senatorial (upper
house) and party-list (lower house) candidates running for the Philippine
Congress will not be included
 Countries that have comparable levels of institutionalization, that is, each
of them has, at least, an election management body, political institutions,
and rule-enforcing agencies to start with
 Countries that allow a safe access to various sources of information and
statistics, such as the number of candidates and parties, electoral deaths,
and electoral cases filed before electoral tribunals
The cases to which the response (electoral contestation) and explanatory (electoral
system) variables apply are both spatially and temporally constrained, that is, they are
available only when legislative electoral exercises are held in new democratic and
transitional regimes. There is therefore a limit with regard to whom the researcher wants
to draw conclusions about. Since he aims at a cross-country comparison, the population
cannot easily be taken as homogenous. It is thus necessary that he divide it into sets that
represent the cases for each country. A set is composed of the candidates who ran, run, or
will run for legislative offices in “incomplete regimes”. For purposes of this research
proposal, the universe of discourse consists only of the entire collection of the sets of
legislative electoral candidates in incomplete regimes. It is up to other scholars whether
or not they will extend the boundary of investigation and include all the sets of legislative
electoral candidates across the population of all “democratic” regimes.
Treating the proposed research as a pioneering work under the subject of electoral
contestation, the researcher admits that it will be difficult to include as many cases in
relevant periods as possible because there are no existing compiled data (such as electoral
violence and protest rates) yet. Unlike in the areas of economic growth, electoral cycles

39
and civil liberty, the area within which he wants to operate remains a neglected
dimension in the comparative study of both elections and democratization. That is why,
to avoid the difficulties of haphazard sampling, he also wants to recommend that each
country’s government or election management body have a record of its incidence of
electoral contestation. Or, if it hesitates to do so, an international election monitoring
organization like the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) can furnish its
own data sets. Similar to corruption perception, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross
National Product (GNP), and civil liberties and freedom, electoral contestation demands
an inter-organizational and expensive venture. Trying to minimize the costs of gathering
the necessary data, the researcher would have never been at a great disadvantage if the
data were available since he would not need to do the data gathering himself. Having the
data at hand could greatly facilitate the testing of the hypotheses.
Measurement
Pennings, et al. (1999) identify three relevant “units” which are important in
conducting a comparative-empirical analysis. These are the units of variation,
observation and measurement. Table 8 presents these classifications, their characteristics
and the anticipated “units”.
Table 8: Units of Variation, Observation and Measurement
Units of Variation = Variables (X, Y, Z1,
Z2, Z3)
Columns of data
matrix, indicating the
variation across the
units of observation
according to empirical
features derived from
theoretical concepts
Explanatory (X) and Response (Y)
Variables
X= Electoral system
Y= Electoral contestation (E. C.)
Y1= Electoral protest (E. P.)
Y2= Electoral violence (E.V.)
Control/Contextual Variables:
Z1=Level of Institutionalization
Z2=Electoral Competition
Z3=Regime type (in terms of Civil
Liberties and Freedom)
Units of Observation = Cases
Objects of comparison
with separate values
for each variable along
the row of the matrix
representing the
universe of discourse
The “sets” of legislative electoral
candidates in new democracies and
transitional regimes

40
Units of
Measurement
= Values
Operational features
(i.e. scores and rates) of
each variable presented
in the cells in the
matrix. The total
number of values, or
cells, represents the
statistical N.
Electoral Contestation Rates
# of candidates killed/severely injured
total # of candidates
# of protestants/contestants
(e.g. 25
250
= 0.1 or 10 %)
Source: Adapted from Pennings et al. (1999: 11)
Table 9 presents the main concepts, variables, operational definitions and the
corresponding measuring instruments. Here, the concepts also assume the characteristics
of variables. They are thus less vague than those concepts that climb up higher ladders of
generality and that need different sets of variables to explain their nature or occurrence.
For the dependent variable (electoral contestation), the level of observation or
analysis is not the behavior per se but the “behavioral pattern”, i.e. the tendency for each
“set” of individuals (e.g. the legislative electoral candidates) to contest elections, by
means of either electoral protest or electoral violence.
In terms of the quantitative dimension of the electoral contestation data, the
researcher opted to use a ratio level of measurement since ratios or rates are
mathematically convenient to use for comparative purposes because the denominators
can control immediately for the differences in the total number of legislative electoral
candidates that new democratic countries register during an electoral period. These rates
are akin to unemployment rates, crime rates, among other socioeconomic rates, because
the number of individuals observed to be manifesting a certain behavior (e.g. the
unemployed) is divided by a baseline or overall number of individuals expected to
manifest such a behavior for a certain period of time (e.g. the labor force). As for the
independent variable (the electoral system), the unit of analysis is the “institution”. The
researcher opted to take its two categories as qualitative or nominal variables. The
scheme of grouping new democratic countries is based on which countries have been
identified in the existing literature or data as using which type of electoral system. This
will enable him to code groups of countries, based on the type of system that they use,
using dummy variables: 1 for the observed group or those countries which employ
proportional electoral systems and 0 for the reference group or those countries which
make use of non-proportional electoral systems.

41
For the control variables Z1, Z2, and Z3, the first one will be analyzed at the
“process” level, the second, at the “behavioral pattern” level, and the third, at the
“institutional” level.
Due to the lack of previous empirical investigations into the concept of
institutionalization the way he wants to analyze it, the researcher would like to create a
“proxy” indicator for it. It is the incidence of electoral protest relative to electoral
violence. The underlying assumption is that institutions are supposed to be followed or
complied with in order for them to be regarded as effective, legitimate or robust. They are
irrelevant if social as well as state actors do not observe or follow them. Since in most
democratic countries, there are rules to start with, a good measure of its level of
institutionalization would be the degree to which such rules are enforced and binding. It
is thus logical to think that those countries that are able to enforce their formal rules (i.e.
they are followed) and are able to curb the practice or occurrence of informal, illegal and
non-institutional practices must have higher levels of institutionalization. At the electoral
level, this process can be observed in terms of the incidence of electoral protest relative to
electoral violence. Electoral violence is considered non-institutional, illegal, informal or
even criminal whereas electoral protest is not. Therefore, higher electoral protest rates
relative to electoral violence rates would mean a high level of institutionalization;
otherwise, a low level of institutionalization. This way, the use of the two rates is
maximized since they not just serve as the components of electoral contestation but could
also indicate the existence of another variable. These rates are assumed to have a
spurious negative correlation. Hence, the relationship between these two categories of
contestation indicates that a third variable is affecting their incidence. It is fair to assume
that this third variable must be the level of institutionalization.

42
Table 9: Concepts, Variables, Indicators and Measuring Instruments
Y=Electoral Contestation
(continuous variable)
Categories and
Values
Operational Definition/Indicators Measuring Instruments
Electoral protest
(E. P.) rates
Electoral violence
(E.V.) rates
Certificates of candidacy
Electoral tribunal and
police records
X=Electoral System
(discrete/nominal)
Categories and Values Operational
Definition/Indicators
Measuring Instruments
Proportional
Non-proportional
Conversion of votes into
seats
CIA World Factbook
Government agencies or websites
High level of
institutionalization
Low level of
institutionalization
The relative rates of
electoral contestation
Compiled electoral violence and
protest rates
Z1=Level of Institutionalization
Z2= Electoral Competition
Categories and Values Operational Definition/Indicators Measuring
Instruments
(total number of parties divided by the
number of wining parties) multiplied by
(total number of candidates divided by
the number of winning candidates)
Certificates of
candidacy
Electoral results
and records
Z3= Regime type (in terms of Civil Liberties and Freedom)
New democracy
Transitional regime
 Free (Freedom House ≤ 2.5)
 Partly free/unfree (Freedom
House > 2.5)
Freedom House Civil
Liberties Index
CIA World Factbook

43
The level of institutionalization is measurable at both the ordinal and interval
levels. A high level of institutionalization (for every country) can be coded as ordinal
category 2 while a low level of institutionalization, 1. However, if someone wants to have
a more precise measure so to account for the disparity in the rankings of different
countries in terms of their levels of institutionalization, he/she may subtract the electoral
violence rates from the electoral protest rates and add the resulting difference to a starting
point, e.g. 1. For instance, a 0.85 E. P. rate minus a 0.52 E. V. rate equals 0.33, which
number will then be added to 1. Thus, the level of institutionalization for a country would
then be 1 + 0.33 = 1.33. (See pages 51 to 54 for further discussion). Positive values
indicate higher additional points for a country’s initial level of institutionalization while
negative values, minus points. This is how the researcher interprets numerically the
proposition made by Pilapil (2006: 91), when writing about the “alignment” of formal
rules with informal rules, that when “a significant gap or an outright conflict” exists
“between the formal rules and the informal norms then, there is a low level of
institutionalization.” By doing this kind of scoring scheme, the “true” level of
institutionalization that a country has attained for a particular electoral period will be
approximated by first holding the other components of institutionalization as constant for
all countries, which in this case, numerically equal to 1. The proxy identity is thus:
Level of institutionalization = (other components of institutionalization) + (E. P. – E. V.)
Electoral competition can be modeled mathematically using the numbers of
parties and candidates who participate in elections and win seats. For example, those
“sets” of legislative electoral candidates, which are huge in number and belong to
numerous political parties, can be expected to register higher rates of electoral
contestation because they have a higher probability of contesting. To add more flavor to
this assertion, most economic/econometric models of competition emphasize the effect of
the number of participants (e.g. firms) and assert that the higher the number of
competitors, the greater is the degree of competition (e.g. in a market setting). The
adoption of this market-like analogy to explain the degree of electoral competition is
justified by the fact that elections are competitive and candidates as well as parties
struggle to win not only votes or seats, but sometimes, favors, privileges, power,

44
allowance, among other perks, as well. Thus, it is not only the number of participants that
is decisive in explaining the degree of electoral competition but the phenomena of
winning and losing too. It is logical to assume that an electoral game that offers a high
possibility for more parties and candidates to win seats would be less competitive
whereas another that allows for more candidates and parties to lose would be more zero-
sum. In the latter, the participants have more stakes in the electoral game because the
seats, as main objects of competition, appear to be scarcer. Imagine a party that obtains
just a plurality of the entire votes. It could obtain a huge “bonus” in terms of seats. This
bonus would have been allocated to other parties who also received a considerable
amount of votes. In such a case, many different strategies may proliferate in order for
political parties as well as candidates to secure their victory or, at least, “eliminate” their
opponents. These game-theoretic assumptions are modeled mathematically in Tables 9
and 10.
As noted above, the rankings or indicators of the contextual variable Z3 = Regime
type are based on Freedom House Civil Liberties Index. New democracies are those
which Freedom House codes as “free” and which have experienced a major change in
regime over the past twenty years while transitional regimes are those which have also
undergone regime change but are coded as either “partly free” or “not free” (Mishler and
Rose 2001).
Table 10: Variables and Indicators
Variables Indicators
X= Electoral system
X1= Proportional
X2= Non-proportional
(Nominal)
Dummy Variable 1
Dummy Variable 0
Y= Electoral contestation (E. C.)
Y1= Electoral protest (E. P.)
Y2= Electoral violence (E.V.)
Y1 + Y2
Z1= Level of Institutionalization The relative rates of electoral
contestation
 High level of institutionalization Electoral protest > Electoral violence

45
 Low level of institutionalization Electoral protest < Electoral violence
Z2= Electoral Competition (total number of parties divided by the
number of wining parties) multiplied by
(total number of candidates divided by
the number of winning candidates)
Z3= Regime type (in terms of Civil Liberties
and Freedom)
 New democracy
 Transitional regime
 Free (Freedom House ≤ 2.5)
 Partly free/unfree (Freedom House
> 2.5)
Conceptualization and Operationalization
Although the research proposal deals more with “quantities” rather than
“qualities”, it is still crucial that the researcher describe properly the concepts that he is
using. Accordingly, the term “contested election” (not to be confused with the term
“electoral contestation”) is best understood as a phenomenon or something that occurs in
the abstract world while “electoral contestation” is the behavioral pattern that individuals
or “sets” of individuals exhibit in reaction to or within the context of that phenomenon.
Both manifest in formal (i.e. legal or institutional) and informal (i.e. illegal, non-
institutional or even criminal) ways. Electoral protest is on one side of the coin while
electoral violence is on the other. The former deserves only a descriptive type of research
when taken singly because it has a precise definition provided by law dictionaries and
legal documents. The latter still lacks a precise description that is why more exploratory
research is needed to understand fully the phenomenon. In the researcher’s case, he still
stumbles around the problem of specifying who or what the proper units of observation
would be: whether the perpetrators or the victims. However, he believes that looking at
the victims would guarantee his security since studying the perpetrators of violence might
endanger both parties and, worse, himself. Besides, he intends to focus only on the
candidates and not on their hired killers (if they have), private armies or die-hard
supporters. Of course, a very unsafe assumption is inherent in this stance. How can he be
so sure that the legislative electoral candidates are the ones who killed, ordered to kill,
inflicted pain on, or threatened other candidates? Well, the basic assumption is that they
are the ones who would benefit more from the victims’ forced removal from the electoral
race. Furthermore, it is difficult to assume the task of a police investigator when the

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