The UK’s Liberal Democrat–Conservative (Lib–Con) Coalition Government has been quickly dismantling New Labour’s policy framework since it gained political control in May 2010. Contemplating how this transition might play out and the impact upon regeneration policy, a preliminary map of the road from the incumbent English Regional Development Agencies to myriad Local Enterprise Partnerships is sketched out. The analytic interpretations are based on insights ‘in the field’ over the past decade and grounded in policy ‘chatter’. Reflecting on the importance of timing, resource availability and the policy vacuum arising between localities and national government, attention is drawn to countless questions that remain unanswered. Further, the Lib–Con’s sub-national economic policy architecture is demonstrated as remaining very much work in progress. The paper highlights that the current transitional period is likely to be disorderly and possibly ineffective: deconstruction is all well and good if the alternative reconstructions offer added value, but the potential to lose out is significant. While hope is expressed with a localism agenda which could potentially empower localities to devise unique policy solutions administered by tailored spatial configurations, it is cautioned that new spatio-institutional ‘fixes’ may open up new issues just as old ones are closed off. A policy story still being written, the analysis is of broader international appeal. Consequently, those plying their trade outside England can reflect on this and act accordingly the next time a new (and presumably better) policy innovation is proposed

1. Sub-national economic development: Where do we go from here?
Lee Pugalis, September 20101
Paper should be cited as:
Pugalis, L. (2011) 'Sub-national economic development: where do we go from here?', Journal
of Urban Regeneration and Renewal, 4 (3), pp. 255-268.
Abstract The UK‘s Liberal Democrat–Conservative (Lib–Con) Coalition Government has
been quickly dismantling New Labour‘s policy framework since it gained political control in
May 2010. Contemplating how this transition might play out and the impact upon
regeneration policy, a preliminary map of the road from the incumbent English Regional
Development Agencies to myriad Local Enterprise Partnerships is sketched out. The analytic
interpretations are based on insights ‗in the field‘ over the past decade and grounded in policy
‗chatter‘. Reflecting on the importance of timing, resource availability and the policy vacuum
arising between localities and national government, attention is drawn to countless questions
that remain unanswered. Further, the Lib–Con‘s sub-national economic policy architecture is
demonstrated as remaining very much work in progress. The paper highlights that the current
transitional period is likely to be disorderly and possibly ineffective: deconstruction is all
well and good if the alternative reconstructions offer added value, but the potential to lose out
is significant. While hope is expressed with a localism agenda which could potentially
empower localities to devise unique policy solutions administered by tailored spatial
configurations, it is cautioned that new spatio-institutional ‗fixes‘ may open up new issues
just as old ones are closed off. A policy story still being written, the analysis is of broader
international appeal. Consequently, those plying their trade outside England can reflect on
this and act accordingly the next time a new (and presumably better) policy innovation is
proposed.
Keywords: Sub-national governance, regeneration, economic policy, regional development
agencies and local enterprise partnerships
1
Dr Lee Pugalis
Senior Lecturer Urban Theory and Practice, Northumbria University
Visiting Fellow, Global Urban Research Unit, Newcastle University
lee.pugalis@northumbria.ac.uk
1

2. SETTING THE SCENE
Since the emergence of regional industrial policy in the 1930s, followed by an explicit urban
policy focus not long after, England has become a veritable laboratory for sub-national
economic policy innovations. Usually, this tends to involve reshuffling the pack of cards
resulting in variable spatial ‗fixes‘ and governance reworkings. It is therefore no surprise that
the UK‘s Liberal Democrat–Conservative (Lib–Con) Coalition Government has been quickly
dismantling New Labour‘s policy framework since David Cameron (Conservative Party
Leader and now Prime Minister) and Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrat Leader and now Deputy
Prime Minister) shook on a deal in May 2010. On 22nd June, 2010, George Osborne, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, set out his ‗Emergency‘ Budget with a five-year plan to rebuild
the British economy.1 The plan sets out tough action to tackle the public-sector budget deficit
and change the tax system, as well as measures to encourage enterprise and stimulate private-
sector-led economic prosperity. As a result, it is widely expected that regeneration over the
next decade will be more austere than it was under New Labour‘s stewardship during the
previous decade.2
While the details are lacking at the time of writing (September 2010), and what little
has been publicised by Ministers has often been contradictory, the Budget formalised the
Lib–Con‘s intent to replace the incumbent eight English Regional Development Agencies
(RDAs) outside London with myriad Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs).3 Paragraph 1.8 of
the Budget states that
‗[t]he Government will enable locally elected leaders, working with business, to lead local
economic development. As part of this change, [RDAs] will be abolished through the Public
Bodies Bill. A White Paper later in … 2010 will set out details of these proposals. As part of
this, the Government will: support the creation of strong [LEPs], particularly those based
around England‘s major cities and other natural economic areas, to enable improved
coordination of public and private investment in transport, housing, skills, regeneration and
other areas of economic development‘.1
This briefest of statements was followed by a letter from Government, dated 29th June 2010,
inviting ‗councils and business leaders to come together to consider how [they] wish to form
[LEPs] … enabling councils and business to replace the existing [RDAs]‘.4
2

3. Guided by the objective ‗to help strengthen local economies‘, LEPs are put forward
by the Coalition Government as the only key apparatus by which to reform sub-national
economic development. Penned by Vince Cable, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation
and Skills, and Eric Pickles, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, the
letter claims that Government is ‗working with the [RDAs] to enable this transition:
[Government] are reviewing all the functions of the RDAs‘, surmising that ‗some of these are
best led nationally, such as inward investment, sector leadership, responsibility for business
support, innovation, and access to finance‘. It can be contended, however, that, if all these
present RDA functions were centralised, this would significantly undermine the Coalition‘s
localism agenda, together with the ability of LEPs to influence their local economies.
In contemplating how the transition may play out, a preliminary map of the road from
RDAs to LEPs is sketched out. The analytic interpretations given are based on the author‘s
insights ‗in the field‘ over the past decade, including stints as a civil servant (at the then
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Government Office for London), quango employee
(representing One North East Regional Development Agency), researcher (based at
Newcastle University), and more recently a local government officer (serving Durham
County Council). Grounded in policy ‗chatter‘ influenced by and influencing blogs, news
stories and articles, alongside ‗official‘ — although often contradictory — ministerial
pronouncements and letters, departmental press releases and snippets of text in Government
publications, it is demonstrated that the Lib–Con‘s sub-national economic policy architecture
remains very much work in progress. Though the analytical focus of this paper is spatially
specific to England, the policy story unfolding of economic space in transition is of wider
appeal. It is hoped that the international community of researchers, practitioners, policy
makers and academics can draw on these insights to help inform the scale, scope and pace of
economic policy transitions in other spatial contexts.
The remainder of the paper analyses England‘s transitional sub-national economic
policy. In the next section, a brief background to the role and purpose of RDAs is provided as
their eventual downfall is analysed. The third section examines the intended function of
LEPs. In the fourth section, the previous analysis used to theorise the transition from RDAs
to LEPs is drawn upon. The paper concludes at a preliminary point with some final thoughts.
3

4. ONE-STOP SHOPS: THE ROLE OF ENGLISH REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
AGENCIES
Conceived under a Labour Government, RDAs are non-departmental public bodies, or
quangos, set up under the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998 to facilitate regional
economic development (see Figure 1). Intended as strategic drivers of regional economic
growth, under the Act, each Agency has five statutory purposes, which are:
1. to further economic development and regeneration
2. to promote business efficiency, investment and competitiveness
3. to promote employment
4. to enhance the development and application of skills relevant to employment
5. to contribute to sustainable development.
These five duties were encapsulated in Regional Economic Strategies, which RDAs were
charged to produce on behalf of their respective regions.5 According to the UK Department
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS)
‗The RDAs‘ agenda includes regeneration, taking forward regional competitiveness, taking
the lead on inward investment and, working with regional partners, ensuring the development
of a skills action plan to ensure that skills training matches the needs of the labour market.‘6
Whitehall responsibility for sponsorship of the RDAs moved from the former Department for
the Environment, Transport and the Regions to the then Department for Trade and Industry in
2001, then to what was the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform from
2007, and now rests with BIS.
The RDAs have received funding through a Single Programme budget (known as the
‗single pot‘) since April 2002, which includes contributions from BIS, the Department of
Communities and Local Government (CLG), the Department for the Environment and Rural
Affairs, UK Trade and Investment, and the Department for Culture Media and Sport. Funding
support totalled £2.3bn for the nine RDAs in 2007–08, which has reduced to approximately
£1.5bn per annum over the past couple of years and has been markedly eroded since the
Coalition entered power. The merry-go-round of departmental sponsors, together with a
diffuse collection of departmental funders — the largest being CLG — necessitated RDA
4

5. flexibility, as they have had to adapt to new responsibilities such as a statutory planning
function.
Figure 1: Map of the UK distinguishing each of the English regions
Indeed, as Lord Mandelson, the then Business Secretary, began to play a lead role in
the remit of RDAs towards the end of Labour‘s term in office through his ‗industrial
activism‘ brand of economic development,7 he declared:
5

6. ‗Industrial activism has to be built on precise regional knowledge of what is needed in terms
of infrastructure, investment and training. I see the RDAs taking a leading role in this. Indeed
I believe it should now be their defining role. Driving a jobs and growth agenda with regional
partners, regeneration and infrastructure bodies, and, importantly, local authorities.‘8
The Labour Government‘s 2007 ‗Review of sub-national economic development and
regeneration‘ (SNR)9–11 and national Regeneration Framework in 200812 recognised the need
for RDAs to ‗reprioritise their investments‘ so as ‗to maximise the impact of the single pot on
regional economies … [and] ensure that investment in physical regeneration and business
investment complement each other and support the RDAs‘ overarching economic growth
objective‘.13 One only has to take a glance at each of the nine RDAs‘ corporate plans,
investment priorities and plethora of strategies, to appreciate that they have an extensive
remit, but arguably of more interest is each RDA‘s spatially flavoured economic development
approach. Some have prioritised place quality enhancements and physical regeneration, while
others have looked to innovation or enterprise, which is reflected in the organisational
structures of each RDA, with some opting to use local delivery partners more than others.
But according to Vince Cable, a leading figure in the Coalition Government, RDA
performance has not only been unsatisfactory, but also ‗wasteful‘,14 which accords with
recent critiques of hyperactive, fragmented and congested sub-national economic
governance.15 Nevertheless, in 2006 the National Audit Office adjudged some RDAs to be
‗performing strongly overall‘,16 and independent evaluation (of sorts) in 200917 concluded
that, for every £1 of RDA investment, there has been a return of at least £4.50 for regional
economies, which increases to £6.40 when longer-term economic benefits are considered.18
Even so, the writing was on the wall for RDAs when David Cameron proclaimed in May
2008 that ‗[t]here‘s a very strong case, at least in parts of the country, that the RDAs should
go altogether‘, claiming many have been a ‗disaster‘.19 The Coalition Government have
confirmed their intent, subject to legislation, to abolish RDAs by no later than March 2012,
with many expected to be wound up much sooner. Views from the field show that many
RDA employees are sitting around twiddling their thumbs, as central Government have
effectively curtailed the development of new economic programmes and regeneration
initiatives. In addition, many sub-regional soft policy spaces — including city regions and
local economic partnerships — are well placed to hit the ground running, perhaps signalling
the demise of some RDAs well before 2012.
6

7. The Labour Government‘s national Regeneration Framework set out a revised role for
RDAs in 2009 including ‗work[ing] with national, regional and sub regional partners to
deliver economic plans and investment which raise the sustainable economic growth of the
region and provide economic opportunities to people throughout the region, helping to
connect areas of need with areas of opportunity‘.13 Further, they were expected to ‗identify
the functional economic areas within the region that are the priority areas for regeneration‘.13
Nevertheless, the downfall of RDAs, as perceptively anticipated by some commentators,20
can be attributed in part to their unaccountability to local government; operating in effect as
‗arms of central Government‘. New Labour‘s failure to implement elected Regional
Assemblies meant that the inception of business-led RDAs created a gaping democratic
deficit. Consequently, this new ‗hub of power‘ resting in the hands of a dozen or so private
sector individuals on the board of each RDA has often resulted in the marginalisation of local
priorities, viewpoints and needs. It can be argued that RDAs — following Labour‘s SNR
policy — have tended to back winners: focusing investment in areas of opportunity, including
‗employment hubs‘ and other choice places. Such an approach obviously has its benefits,
with supporters pointing towards economic competitiveness, while detractors draw attention
to social justice and environmental sustainability, for example.
Recently, and aligned with the demise of Labour and rise to power of the Lib–Cons,
the political rhetoric has sensationally changed to the point where players in the game are
adapting their language in a manner not too dissimilar to the way in which chameleons adapt
their colour to blend in with their environment. But, will the transition from RDAs to as-yet-
undefined LEPs be worth it? Will ongoing policy fixes enable an enterprise surge or will the
regeneration successes over the last decade quickly rescind? These questions and other
emerging issues are considered in the remainder of the paper.
ABOLISHING BUREAUCRACY? LOCAL ENTERPRISE PARTNERSHIPS
As the 2010 Cable–Pickles letter paves the way for ‗local businesses and councils to work
together to develop their proposals for local enterprise partnerships‘ before the set deadline of
6th September, 2010 — with additional policy guidance not expected to emerge from the
widely anticipated White Paper on sub-national economic growth until after the October 2010
Comprehensive Spending Review — Government ‗want to encourage a wide range of ideas‘
guided by some broad parameters covering:
7

8. — role
— governance
— size
(see Figure 2 for a detailed breakdown of Government parameters and criteria).
Figure 2: Government parameters and criteria
While the letter was co-signed by Cable and Pickles; providing the impression of a
united front, noises of a ‗turf war‘ between the two figureheads and their respective
departments, continue to grow louder. The former is thought to see the benefits of retaining a
regional economic presence in the North and Midlands, whereas the latter is antipathetic to
anything ‗regional‘ (or indeed ‗strategic‘, as many planners and developers would attest in
response to the hasty revocation of Regional Spatial Strategies).21,22 Despite the
Government‘s determination ‗that the transition from the existing RDAs be orderly, working
to a clear timetable‘, the Coalition‘s ad hoc policy pronouncements, to date, have arguably
been haphazard and ill-timed. Indeed, Pickles‘ infamous letters are causing consternation up
and down the country as he slavishly undoes CLG policy developed by the previous Labour
8

9. Government over more than a decade, with little consideration of legalities, practicalities and
consequences.
Following the revocation of regional strategic planning, and by implication housing
delivery targets in England, on 6th July, 2010, statutory planning has been left in a whirl of
confusion. Consequently, development uncertainty spirals as practitioners wait for the
appeals system to enter overdrive. Indeed, by 10th August, CALA Homes, a privately owned
house builder, made an application for a judicial review into Pickles‘ decision to scrap
Regional Spatial Strategies. Believing the revocation of the regional planning framework to
be ‗unlawful‘, CALA issued a statement asserting that as a
‗consequence of the Secretary of State‘s decision, whether intended or not, has been to curtail
development in many areas including those where there is a clear need … Without
consultation, transitional arrangements, or even a very clear idea of what the regime will look
like, there is now a policy vacuum. We are simply seeking to establish the legal framework
that we operate in.‘
From a practitioner‘s perspective, the regional tier of policy and governance is perhaps best
described as a necessary evil: bureaucratic, cumbersome and at times appearing irrelevant at
the local level, it nevertheless provides a space to negotiate strategic decisions that transcend
local administrative boundaries and thus provide development certainty.
THE TRANSITION FROM RDAS TO LEPS
Contending that the transition period is likely to be anything but orderly, the remainder of this
paper sets out a preliminary map to navigate the road from RDAs to LEPs.
First, timing is paramount. With most RDAs set to stay operational (to lesser or
greater degrees) until March 2012, it is crucial that LEPs are up and running well in advance.
In economic policy circles, it is a widely held view that the rollout of LEPs will take place at
variable speeds. Some areas will be fortunate enough to build on existing partnership
collectivities, such as Multi Area Agreements or City Development Companies (CDCs),23
and therefore be able to establish LEPs reasonably quickly. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, however, some areas may not have the same level of trust among partners or a
9

10. limited history of cross-boundary and cross-sector cooperation. In these cases, instituting
LEPs is likely to take much longer, and it may take several years until they are fully
operational in the sense of transforming local economies. Coordinating the rollout of one sub-
national economic entity with the rollback of another would provide the option for key skills
to be retained as RDA staff are transferred to LEPs or nationally ‗led‘ programmes. A
mismatch of timings would not only threaten the livelihood of thousands of regeneration
practitioners, but also put in severe jeopardy the economic future of those fragile
communities they are tasked with supporting.
Another key transfer would involve RDA assets — in the form of arm‘s-length
companies, joint venture arrangements, land holdings, property and development options —
to LEPs or alternative bodies, such as local authorities. As Osborne‘s Budget took an axe to
capital spending (with most departmental budgets anticipated to operate with at least 25 per
cent fewer resources over the medium-term financial planning period), an asset-led approach
to regeneration is likely to be one of the few deliverable options open to LEPs. ‗Sweating‘
local authority and other public-sector assets is a tactic that many English councils have
become accustomed to over the past few years. Yet this asset-driven approach has often
involved the expertise and resources of RDAs. Government pronouncements that the
transition will be smooth appear unlikely. If the Lib–Con Coalition decides to cash in on
RDA assets as a short-term strategy to ease the budget deficit, it may well result in significant
delays to long-term regeneration schemes underpinning the revival of depressed local
economies. With a dearth of investors, and development financing almost impossible to
obtain without pre-lets, the stalling and ‗mothballing‘ of complex urban regeneration projects
would struggle to regain development momentum. Against a background of fiscal austerity
and private-sector conservatism, it would not be so surprising if many of the flagship
regeneration initiatives championed (and financially backed) by RDAs fell off the delivery
cliff.
Despite the best wishes of the Coalition Government for an ‗orderly transition‘ which
maintains the momentum of delivery,6 it has been argued24 that this latest round of
institutional upheaval is an example of the untoward British vices of short-termism and
masking centralisation as decentralisation. Drawing on international exemplars, such as the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry in Japan, the German Fraunhofer Institutes and
Sitra, the Finnish innovation fund, it is asserted that institutions require time to develop and
make a positive impact. Perpetual restructuring, akin to ‗musical chairs‘, tends to paralyse the
10

11. whole system, by creating ‗uncertainty about who will be left standing when the game of
musical chairs comes to an end‘.24 As a result, time and resources are disproportionately
expended on navigating transitional spaces, different governance networks and grappling new
policies, procedures and institutional rules. It is further suggested that the only winners in this
perverse game are the ‗army of highly paid consultants‘, who in the authors experience often
‗ask you for your watch in order to tell you the time‘.
As new organisations are constituted, new forums convened, new relationships
negotiated, new skills acquired and new funding competed for, what will happen to the task
at hand? Continuous tinkering is an unwelcome distraction from the central task of
supporting businesses and regenerating communities. At the same time, ongoing institutional
upheavals can result in the loss of ‗tacit knowledge‘,25 local political nous,26 institutional
capacity and expertise. Consequently, ‗nine times out of ten the costs of transition outweigh
these modest gains‘.24 It could be suggested that the reconfiguration of sub-national economic
governance, thereby producing a transitional economic space, is an unwritten policy ploy of
the Lib–Cons. Focusing attention on governance aspects, strategies and process issues over
the next few years may be an ideal way of concealing the colossal reductions in regeneration
resources.
Secondly, the laudable role of LEPs must be supported with a reasonable level of
resources. Different versions of the Cable–Pickles letter relating to the matter of single
running costs have obscured the picture.27 Regardless, the issue of quotidian operational costs
will be incidental if the finance (including lending powers) is not in place to deliver economic
regeneration support initiatives. While aspects of the Lib–Con‘s ‗Big Society‘ and ‗localism‘
agendas — which seek to return responsibilities to localities and their communities — are
laudable, if perhaps a little impractical, new powers and responsibilities for councils via LEPs
will be almost futile without the financial resources and instruments to deliver. Likewise,
LEPs with limited financial muscle will struggle to maintain proactive private-sector
commitment. Interest and activity relate fundamentally to the supply of money: when the
stream of money dries up, the dynamic input of private-sector entrepreneurs can (sadly)
wane, as their attendance clearly tends to fall off when agendas lack actions. Resignation of
business members from LEPs is to be expected when ‗bureaucracy gets in the way of
business‘.
The fleetingly mentioned Regional Growth Fund (RGF), trailed as a £1.4bn pot of
cash available for private- and public-sector bodies to bid for funding, which will run initially
11

12. from 2011 to 2014, is a fraction of the resources that the previous Labour Government
committed to RDAs.28 Excluding separate funding arrangements for housing and transport,
the RGF is likely to be the principal means of accessing funds for sub-national economic
interventions.29 But, the extent to which a national economic fund, of less than £500m per
annum, is likely to achieve the Coalition‘s lofty objective of a rebalanced economy remains
an open question. Considering that Whitehall departments, local authorities and the quangos
that do survive — such as the Homes and Communities Agency — are bracing themselves
for severe budget reductions over the next four years (and possibly longer), it might be
cautioned that savage public service cuts together with devastated regeneration initiatives
may trigger what economists refer to as a ‗double dip‘ recession. If such a double dip does
not materialise, it remains probable that marginal places will suffer disproportionately.
Consequently, the present author would concur with other commentators, such as Coaffee,2
that regeneration interventions over the next decade will be more focused (and might be
added financially constrained), and hope that his conjecture that activities are likely to
concentrate ‗on areas of acute poverty with investment strategies following the path of
greatest need‘ rings true. It is doubtful, however, that social justice ideals will usurp
neoliberal opportunism: when it comes to the crunch, funding decisions are usually swayed
by the extent of private-sector ‗leverage‘.30
Lib–Con rhetoric that the public sector needs to retract from an interventionist role in
order to release the business community to lead an economic recovery may have some merit
in those places underpinned by a relatively buoyant private sector. For the rest of the country,
however, the areas of need and public-sector dependence, outlying the places of (investment)
choice and opportunity, including much of Northern England and the Midlands, there is a
danger that the progress made over the previous decade up until the credit crunch will rapidly
recoil.31,32 In its place may not be a flurry of private enterprise envisaged by the Coalition, but
instead, former public-sector workers (including regeneration practitioners) adding to the
nation‘s unemployment register, as talent is, in effect, wasted. Slavishly reducing
regeneration resources for those places most in need, and in turn where the private sector
refuses to invest, is akin to ‗robbing Peter to pay Paul‘: savings made through regeneration
funding cuts are likely to be soaked up by increased demand for health and welfare support. It
is probable that the rollout of this type of sub-national economic policy will exacerbate
‗unequal places‘ in cities,33 as well as between regions.
12

13. Thirdly, a cavernous policy vacuum is expanding between localities and the national
level. It appears that, with the Coalition‘s fixation on eradicating anything with the mere
name ‗regional‘ in its remit, they have become ideologically blinded to the reality that the
English regions provide a pragmatic spatial scale for bridging the national–local divide. To
demonstrate this point, an indicative map of how the geography of LEPs may look, based on
just fewer than 60 initial submissions to Government, is shown in Figure 3. Yet the map
shown here comes with the caveat that things have already changed in a number of areas and
are expected to change considerably over future months. Also, the map fails to demonstrate
adequately the complex picture relating to lower-tier district councils, some of which are
proposing to be members of LEPs that cover a unitary authority outside their own upper-tier
authority. There were also rival bids submitted to Government, with the spatial reach of some
propositions not correlating with their signatories or supporting organisations. A recent
‗structured review‘ of 50 of the outline proposals found that ‗approaching 70 [local authority
districts] were included within two submissions and four seemed to feature within three‘.34
While it remains highly unlikely that Government will endorse and seek to progress a high
proportion of these initial propositions, it would be reasonable to surmise that the geography
of sub-national economic policy, governance and delivery looks set for a radical
transformation. With a conservative estimate suggesting that 25–30 LEPs could eventually
replace the eight RDAs outside London, a key question is how London-based ministerial
departments could feasibly engage with each LEP on an individual basis?
Without some form of strategic economic body to negotiate the policy space in-
between, the spatial particularities of LEPs, outside the ‗big hitters‘ organised around a core
city, such as Birmingham or Manchester,35 may struggle to make their voices heard in
Whitehall policy circles. Notwithstanding the limitations of regional administrative areas in
providing the ideal spatial fix for the delivery of all sub-national policy, strategically focused
regional bodies would help in coordinating the activity of LEPs, facilitating cross-boundary
cooperation, the management of some programmes, including the intricate administration of
the European Regional Development Fund, and could even assume responsibility for
significant strategic projects (unworkable at smaller or larger spatial scales). Accordingly,
there is a case for retaining a small body of public-sector officers in regions to provide a
minimum of intelligent coordination for the areas further in travel time from London. If on
that basis the southern regions did not claim this need, the Government would be entitled to
implement a distinction between North and South.
13

14. Figure 3: An indicative map of the geography of LEPs
14

15. FINAL THOUGHTS AT A PRELIMINARY POINT
Since the Coalition Government‘s recent announcement to abolish democratically
unaccountable RDAs and establish joint local authority-business-led LEPs to promote
economic development, there has been a spate of activity as stakeholders, or perhaps more
precisely stakeholders frequently led by councils, decide which neighbours they would like to
collaborate with under the auspices of a LEP. As a means to navigate the road from RDAs to
LEPs, a preliminary map of how the space of transition may play out in policy and practice
has been provided. Based on ‗official‘ — although often contradictory — ministerial
pronouncements and letters, departmental press releases and snippets of text in publications
such as the Budget Report in June 2010,1 combined with blogs, news stories, articles and,
most importantly, policy chatter, it has been demonstrated that the transitional period is likely
to be disorderly and potentially chaotic. The paper has also illuminated how such policy
turmoil and governance reconfigurations may possibly be ineffective. Reflecting on the
importance of timing, resource availability and the policy vacuum arising between localities
and national government, to state that the English regeneration sector eagerly anticipates the
policy guidance due to be set out in the forthcoming White Paper on local growth is a
sizeable understatement.
Countless questions remain over the transitional process. Does the Government have a
specific blueprint for LEPs in mind, and what powers and flexibilities might LEPs be
granted? Will LEPs be ‗loose associations‘ of local authorities and businesses or will they
require a legal personality? Is it realistic for LEPs to reflect ‗natural‘ economic areas when
their geographical building blocks will be administrative districts? In addition, how long will
it take to set up LEPs and get them functioning as effective economic leadership vehicles?
When established, will the boards of LEPs be composed of the usual suspects? Alternatively,
is democratic accountability and business leadership a recipe for disaster? Might governance
issues and institutional reconfigurations distract attention from on the ground economic
interventions? On the aspect of funding, will the RDAs Single Programme be subsumed into
the RGF? Further, how will succession planning be carried forward and in what ways may
noteworthy RDA successes provide a positive legacy for successor bodies? In terms of multi-
level governance and coordination across multiple spatial scales, how will nationally ‗led‘
economic programmes interact with LEPs and other local initiatives? Indeed, does such an
approach run the risk of contradicting the localism agenda? Only time will tell. At this
juncture, however, there must be some scepticism that the Coalition Government possesses
15

16. the majority of the answers. While the Lib–Cons have been steadfast in denouncing the
effectiveness of New Labour‘s RDAs as part of their media savvy ‗bonfire of the quangos‘,
alternative sub-national economic policy architecture remains very much work in progress.
Deconstruction is all well and good if the alternative reconstructions offer added value.
Critics suggest, however, that a slight reshuffle of the same pack of cards is merely
‗economic development on the cheap … a no-frills version of the economic policy of the past
decade‘.36 If this is so, improvements remain ambiguous, but the potential to lose out is
significant. Not least for any place on the periphery of a LEP board‘s spatio-economic
priorities, or worse still, for any local authority left out of the LEP equation. As England is
immersed in this space of transition, against a backdrop of austerity measures, there is a
genuine threat that regeneration will fall off a cliff.
Let us hope that the Lib–Cons stay true to their localism philosophy, which would put
the onus on localities (including all those with a ‗stake‘ in their local economy) to devise
unique policy solutions administered by tailored spatial governance configurations. If this
proves to be the case, the ‗abolition‘ of RDAs may actually turn out to be a much more subtle
transformation in some regions, if local views determine that a strategic economic body at the
regional scale is still desired. Views on the ground in the North East of England,37 together
with other regions across the North and Midlands, would indicate that this is the case. It is
perhaps appropriate to end with a note of caution; suggesting that old wine in new bottles
may not necessarily result in economic improvements. Indeed, new spatial and institutional
‗fixes‘ may open up new issues just as old ones are closed off. Maybe those plying their trade
outside England can reflect on this and act accordingly the next time a new (and presumably
better) policy innovation is proposed.
Notes and References
1. HM Treasury (2010), ‗Budget 2010‘, The Stationery Office, London.
2. Coaffee, J. (2010), ‗Editorial: Learning from the successes and failures of regeneration
in the 2000s‘, Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal, Vol. 3, pp. 337–338.
3. Separate arrangements will apply in London, where discussions are currently under way
with the Mayor of London concerning decentralisation, particularly in the context of the
abolition of the Government Office for London.
16

17. 4. The letter is available at
http://www.parliament.uk/deposits/depositedpapers/2010/DEP2010–1363.pdf, last
accessed on 2nd July, 2010.
5. For a more detailed discussion of the role and remit of RDAs, see Pearce, G., and Ayres,
S. (2009), ‗Governance in the English Regions: The role of the Regional Development
Agencies‘, Urban Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 537–557, and Pugalis, L. (2010),
‗Looking back in order to move forward: the politics of evolving sub-national economic
policy architecture‘. Local Economy, Vol. 25, No. 5-6, pp. 462-471.
6. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2010), ‗England‘s Regional
Development Agencies‘, available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/regional-economic-
development/englands-regional-development-agencies, last accessed on 15th July, 2010.
7. Mandelson‘s ‗industrial activism‘ brand of economic development is focused on
developing sectoral strengths such as high-tech manufacturing, the automotive industry,
aerospace and biosciences.
8. Mandelson, P. (2009), ‗Putting regions at the heart of industrial activism‘, Journal of the
Institution of Economic Development, Vol. 108, May, p. 11.
9. HM Treasury (2007), ‗Review of sub-national economic development and regeneration‘,
HMSO, London.
10. Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and Department of
Communities and Local Government (2008), ‗Prosperous places: Taking forward the
review of Sub-National Economic Development and Regeneration‘, The Stationery
Office, London.
11. Hildreth, P. (2009), ‗Understanding ―new regional policy‖: What is behind the
government‘s sub-national economic development and regeneration policy for
England?‘, Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal, Vol. 2, pp. 318–336.
12. Department of Communities and Local Government (2008), ‗Transforming places;
changing lives: A framework for regeneration‘, The Stationery Office, London.
13. Department of Communities and Local Government (2009), ‗Transforming places;
changing lives: Taking forward the Regeneration Framework‘, The Stationery Office,
London.
14. Finch, D. (2010), ‗Vince Cable on RDAs‘, Centre for Cities Blog, available at
http://centreforcities.typepad.com/centre_for_cities/2010/06/page/2/, last accessed on
25th July, 2010.
17

18. 15. Catney, P. et al. (2008), ‗Hyperactive governance in the Thames Gateway‘, Journal of
Urban Regeneration and Renewal, Vol. 2, pp. 124–145.
16. National Audit Office (2006), ‗Independent performance assessment: One NorthEast
Development Agency‘, National Audit Office, London.
17. See, for example, Larkin, K. (2009), ‗Regional Development Agencies: The facts‘,
Centre for Cities, London, who suggests that some of the project evaluations that the
meta-evaluation used are unlikely to be objective and impartial.
18. PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008), ‗Impact of RDA spending — National report —
Volume 1 — Main Report‘, Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform, London.
19. Hayman, A. (2008), ‗Cameron: We would strip RDAs of their powers‘, Regeneration &
Renewal, 16th May.
20. Deas, I. and Ward, K.G. (1999), ‗The song has ended but the melody lingers: Regional
development agencies and the lessons of the Urban development corporation
―experiment‖‘, Local Economy, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 114–132.
21. Pugalis, L., and Townsend, A. (2010), ‗Can LEPs fill the strategic void?‘, Town &
Country Planning Vol. 79, No. 9, pp. 382–387.
22. The letter is available at
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/planningandbuilding/pdf/1631904.pdf, last
accessed 6th July, 2010.
23. See, for example, Gulliver, S. (2008), ‗The City Development Company model: The
implications for economic development‘, Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal
Vol. 1, pp. 286–296.
24. Mulgan, G. (2010), ‗RDA demise‘, Regeneration & Renewal, 12th July.
25. Peck, F., Bell, F. and Black, L. (2010), ‗Addressing the skills gap in regeneration and
economic development in Cumbria‘, Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal, Vol.
4, pp. 76–89.
26. Rowe, M. and Ashworth, C. (2010), ‗―Let a hundred flowers bloom‖: Enhancing
innovative practice in regeneration management‘, Journal of Urban Regeneration and
Renewal, Vol. 4, pp. 90–99.
27. The original Cable–Pickles letter indicated that no national government resources would
be available to support the day to day operation of LEPs, but a revised version suggests
that this may not necessarily be the case.
28. The RDAs‘ combined budget was £2.3bn in 2007–08 and just over £1.4bn in 2010–11.
18

19. 29. The labyrinth of New Labour‘s (relatively well resourced) economic regeneration
programmes, including the Local Enterprise Growth Initiative and Working
Neighbourhoods Fund, are expected to be abolished, cut or absorbed into the new
regional ‗super‘ fund.
30. See, for example, the criteria identified in Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills (2010), ‗Consultation on the Regional Growth Fund‘, The Stationery Office,
London.
31. Parkinson, M. et al. (2010), ‗The credit crunch, recession and regeneration in the North:
What‘s Happening, What‘s working, what‘s next?‘, The Northern Way, Newcastle.
32. Parkinson, M. (2009), ‗Guest Editorial: The credit crunch and regeneration‘, Journal of
Urban Regeneration and Renewal, Vol. 3, pp. 115–119.
33. Cooper, M. and Shaheen, F. (2008), ‗Winning the battles but losing the war?
Regeneration, renewal and the state of Britain‘s cities‘, Journal of Urban Regeneration
and Renewal, Vol. 2, pp. 146–151.
34. SQW (2010), ‗Local Enterprise Partnerships: A new era begins?‘, SQW, London.
35. Dermot Finch suggests that some LEPs, such as ‗Greater Manchester will no doubt be
front of the queue, asking (and getting) more than most other areas. That suggests LEPs
will proceed at different speeds — which is fine with us‘: Finch, D. (2010), ‗LEPs — a
new acronym is born‘, Centre for Cities Blog, 15th July.
36. Larkin, K. (2010), ‗Regions after RDAs‘, Public Finance Blog, 1st July.
37. The Association of North East Councils and the Northern Business Forum have been
collaborating to make a case for a regional strategic economic body, known as the North
East Economic Partnership.
19