La Direzione Regionale dei Vigili del fuoco per la Calabria e l' Università della Calabria hanno organizzato una giornata di studio sulla “Resistenza al fuoco delle strutture” che si terrà in data 6 febbraio, con inizio alle ore 10.00 presso l’Università della Calabria, Dipartimento Ingegneria Civile, in cui saranno trattati argomenti relativi alla progettazione strutturale antincendio. In particolare: La modellazione dell’incendio. Illustrazione dei metodi semplificati degli eurocodici per le verifiche analitiche di resistenza al fuoco. La progettazione antincendio nelle facciate degli edifici civili. L’approccio sistemico per la sicurezza delle gallerie in caso di incendio e problemi strutturali specifici. Analisi strutturale in caso di incendio: impostazione e applicazioni. http://www.vigilfuococalabria.com/territorio/direzione/291-unical-giornata-di-studio-resistenza-al-fuoco-delle-strutture-2.html

1. Approccio sistemico per la sicurezza
delle gallerie in caso di incendio
e problemi strutturali specifici
Prof. Dr. Ing. Franco Bontempi
Ordinario di Tecnica delle Costruzioni
Facolta’ di Ingegneria Civile e Industriale
Universita’ degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza
www.francobontempi.org
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3. Scopo della presentazione
•
Far vedere gli aspetti piu’ generali della
progettazione strutturale antincendio:
Complessita’ del problema;
Approccio sistemico;
Natura accidentale dell’azione incendio;
Progettazione prestazionale/prescrittiva;
Aspetti specifici delle gallerie stradali.
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OGGETTO
Caratteristiche delle gallerie
Geometrie
Impianti
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GEOMETRIE
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Tipo A - autostrade
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Tipo B – extraurbane principali
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Tipo C – extraurbane secondarie
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Sistema vs Struttura
Opera
Viva
Opera
Morta
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IMPIANTI VENTILAZIONE
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Piston effect
• Is the result of natural induced draft caused by
free-flowing traffic (> 50 km/h) in uni-directional
tunnel thus providing natural ventilation.
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Mechanical ventilation
• “forced” ventilation is required where piston
effect is not sufficient such as in
– congested traffic situations;
– bi-directional tunnels (piston effect is neutralized by
flow of traffic in two opposite directions);
– long tunnels with high traffic volumes.
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TUNNEL VENTILATION SYSTEMS
• Road Tunnel Ventilation Systems have two modes of
operation:
• Normal ventilation, for control of air quality inside tunnels
due to vehicle exhaust emissions:
– in any possible traffic situation, tunnel users and staff must not suffer
any damage to their health regardless the duration of their stay in the
tunnel;
– the necessary visual range must be maintained to allow for safe
stopping.
• Emergency ventilation in case of fire, for smoke control:
– the escape routes must be kept free from smoke to allow for selfrescue;
– the activities of emergency services must be supported by providing
the best possible conditions over a sufficient time period ;
– the extent of damage and injuries (to people, vehicles and the tunnel
structure itself) must be kept to a minimum.
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Longitudinal ventilation system
• employs jet fans suspended under tunnel roof; in
normal operation fresh air is introduced via
tunnel entering portal and polluted air is
discharged from tunnel leaving portal.
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Semi-transverse ventilation system
• employs ceiling plenum connected to central fan
room equipped with axial fans; in normal
operation fresh air is introduced along the tunnel
trough openings in the ventilation plenum while
polluted air is discharged via tunnel portals.
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Transverse ventilation system
• employs double supply and exhaust plenums
connected to central fan rooms equipped with
axial fans; in normal operation fresh air is
introduced and exhausted via openings in
double ventilation plenums.
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Attachments
• Dispersion stack and fan room combined with
longitudinal ventilation: may be required in order
to reduce adverse effect on environment of
discharge of polluted air from tunnel, where
buildings are located in proximity (< 100m) to
tunnel leaving portal.
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Ventilation unit
Air extraction
Ventilation unit
Supply of fresh air
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COMPLESSITA’
Approccio prestazionale
Modellazione
Sicurezza
36

37. System Complexity (Perrow)
couplings
TIGHT
LINEAR interactions NONLINEAR
LOOSE
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APPROCCIO PRESTAZIONALE
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Prescrittivo (1)
APPROCCIO
PRESCRITTIVO
APPROCCIO
PRESTAZIONALE
1) BASI DEL PROGETTO,
2) LIVELLI DI SCUREZZA,
3) PRESTAZIONI ATTESE
NON ESPLICITATI
OBIETTIVI
PRESTAZIONALI E
LIVELLI DI
SICUREZZA
ESPLICITATI
1) REGOLE DI
CALCOLO E
2) COMPONENTI
MATERIALI
SPECIFICATI E
DETTAGLIATI
QUALITA' ED AFFIDABILITA'
STRUTTURALI
ASSICURATI IN MODO
INDIRETTO
INSIEME DI
STRUMENTI
LOGICI E
MATERIALI #1
INSIEME DI
STRUMENTI
LOGICI E
MATERIALI #2
INSIEME DI
STRUMENTI
LOGICI E
MATERIALI #3
GARANZIA DIRETTA DELLE PRESTAZIONI
E DELLA SICUREZZA STRUTURALI
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Prescrittivo (2)
prescrittivo
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
Requisiti
Requisiti
prestazionale
Requisiti
Requisiti
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
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Prestazionale (1)
APPROCCIO
PRESCRITTIVO
APPROCCIO
PRESTAZIONALE
1) BASI DEL PROGETTO,
2) LIVELLI DI SCUREZZA,
3) PRESTAZIONI ATTESE
NON ESPLICITATI
OBIETTIVI
PRESTAZIONALI E
LIVELLI DI
SICUREZZA
ESPLICITATI
1) REGOLE DI
CALCOLO E
2) COMPONENTI
MATERIALI
SPECIFICATI E
DETTAGLIATI
QUALITA' ED AFFIDABILITA'
STRUTTURALI
ASSICURATI IN MODO
INDIRETTO
INSIEME DI
STRUMENTI
LOGICI E
MATERIALI #1
INSIEME DI
STRUMENTI
LOGICI E
MATERIALI #2
INSIEME DI
STRUMENTI
LOGICI E
MATERIALI #3
GARANZIA DIRETTA DELLE PRESTAZIONI
E DELLA SICUREZZA STRUTURALI
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Prestazionale (2)
prescrittivo
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
Requisiti
Requisiti
prestazionale
Requisiti
Requisiti
Elementi Costituenti
Elementi Costituenti
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START
DEFINIZIONE E DISANIMA
DEGLI OBIETTIVI
INDIVIDUAZIONE DELLE
SOLUZIONI ATTE A
RAGGIUNGERE GLI
OBIETTIVI
ATTIVITA' DI
MODELLAZIONE E MISURA
GIUDIZIO DELLE
PRESTAZIONI
RISULTANTI
No
Yes
END
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livello
1
OBIETTIVI
livello
2
ESPLICITAZIONE DEGLI
OBIETTIVI ATTRAVERSO
L'INDIVIDUAZIONE DI n
PRESTAZIONI;
ordinatamente, per ciascuna di
esse, i =1,..n:
C
DEFINIZIONE DELLA
PERFORMANCE i-esima
CRITERIO (QUANTITA')
CHE MISURA
LA PERFORMANCE i-esima
LIMITI DELLA
PERFORMANCE i-esima
B
livello
3
DEFINIZIONE
DELLA
SOLUZIONE
STRUTTURALE
livello
4
VERIFICA
DELLE
CAPACITA'
PRESTAZIONALI
RISPETTO DI
PRESCRIZIONI
MODELLI
NUMERICI
A
NO
ESITO
MODELLI
FISICI
47
SI'

48. livello
1
OBIETTIVI
livello
2
ESPLICITAZIONE DEGLI
OBIETTIVI ATTRAVERSO
L'INDIVIDUAZIONE DI n
PRESTAZIONI;
ordinatamente, per ciascuna di
esse, i =1,..n:
C
DEFINIZIONE DELLA
PERFORMANCE i-esima
CRITERIO (QUANTITA')
CHE MISURA
LA PERFORMANCE i-esima
LIMITI DELLA
PERFORMANCE i-esima
B
livello
3
DEFINIZIONE
DELLA
SOLUZIONE
STRUTTURALE
livello
4
VERIFICA
DELLE
CAPACITA'
PRESTAZIONALI
RISPETTO DI
PRESCRIZIONI
MODELLI
NUMERICI
A
NO
ESITO
MODELLI
FISICI
SI'
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MODELLAZIONE
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Analysis Strategy #1:
Sensitivity governance of priorities
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Analysis Strategy #2:
Bounding behavior governance
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Analysis Strategy #3:
Redundancy Governance
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NUMERICAL
MODELING
54

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Factors for Coupling
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time
tK
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
INFORMATION
FLOW DIRECTION
55

56. time
tK
time
tK
time
tK
time
tK
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
www.francobontempi.org
Fully Coupled Scheme
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MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
56

57. time
tK
time
tK
time
tK
time
tK
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
www.francobontempi.org
Staggered Coupled Scheme
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MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
57

58. time
tK
time
tK
time
tK
time
tK
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
www.francobontempi.org
Temperature Driven Scheme
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MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
58

59. time
tK
time
tK
time
tK
time
tK
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
TERMAL
STATE
(Temperature Field
and Termic Related
Properties)
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Scheme With No Memory
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MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
MECHANICAL
STATE
(Strain and Stress
Fields and
Mechanical related
Properties)
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SICUREZZA
64

65. RELIABILITY
A way to assess
the dependability of a system
ATTRIBUTES
AVAILABILITY
MAINTAINABILITY
SAFETY
the trustworthiness
of a system which allows
reliance to be justifiably placed
on the service it delivers
SECURITY
INTEGRITY
DEPENDABILITY
of
STRUCTURAL
SYSTEMS
www.francobontempi.org
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High level / active
performance
FAULT
THREATS
An understanding of the things
that can affect the dependability
of a system
ERROR
FAILURE
Low level / passive
performance
it is a defect and represents a
potential cause of error, active or dormant
the system is in an incorrect state:
it may or may not cause failure
permanent interruption of a system ability
to perform a required function
under specified operating conditions
FAULT TOLERANT
DESIGN
FAULT DETECTION
MEANS
FAULT DIAGNOSIS
ways to increase
the dependability of a system
Visions, I., Laprie, J.C., Randell,
B.,
Dependability and its threats:
a taxonomy,
18th IFIP
World Computer Congress,
65
FAULT MANAGING
Toulouse (France) 2004.

66. RELIABILITY
www.francobontempi.org
Structural Robustness (1)
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AVAILABILITY
ATTRIBUTE
S
MAINTAINABILITY
SAFETY
SECURITY
INTEGRITY
FAULT
THREATS
ERROR
FAILURE
it is a defect and represents a
potential cause of error, active or dormant
the system is in an incorrect state:
it may or may not cause failure
permanent interruption of a system ability
66
66
to perform a required function
under specified operating conditions

67. • Capacity of a construction to show a
regular decrease of its structural quality
due to negative causes. It implies:
a) some smoothness of the decrease of
structural performance due to
negative events (intensive feature);
b) some limited spatial spread of the
rupture (extensive feature).
67
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Structural Robustness (2)
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68. 1st level:
Material
Point
3rd level:
Structural
Element
4th level:
Structural
System
2nd level:
Element
Section
Structural Robustness
Assessment
Usual ULS & SLS
Verification Format
www.francobontempi.org
Levels of Structural Crisis
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69. STRUCTURE
& LOADS
Collapse
Mechanism
NO SWAY
SWAY
“IMPLOSION”
OF THE
STRUCTURE
www.francobontempi.org
Bad vs Good Collapses
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is a process in which
objects are destroyed by
collapsing on themselves
“EXPLOSION”
OF THE
STRUCTURE
is a process
69
NOT CONFINED

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Design Strategy #1: Continuity
70

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Design Strategy #2: Segmentation
71

72. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Esempio di valutazione
di roubustezza strutturale
72

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Esempio: edificio alto
73
73

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Analisi di un componente tipico
D0
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Scenari (1-2)
D1
D2
75

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Scenari (3-4)
D3
D4
76

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Modalità di collasso (1-2)
D1
D2
77

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Modalità di collasso (3-4)
D3
D4
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Sintesi dei risultati: elemento critico
0
4
Lo scenario D4
è quello più cattivo:
l’elemento strutturale
critico individuato è la
colonna più esterna!
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Modellazione edificio alto
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Scenari di danneggiamento
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
(1 asta
eliminata)
(3 aste
eliminate)
(5 aste
eliminate)
(7 aste
eliminate)
82

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Collasso secondo scenario 1
83

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Collasso secondo scenario 2
84

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Collasso secondo scenario 3
85

86. www.francobontempi.org
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Collasso secondo scenario 4
86

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Sintesi dei risultati
Moltiplicatore Ultimo e sua variazione
u
4,50
4,00
3,50
3,00
2,50
2,00
1,50
1,00
0,50
0,00
Delta u
Δ F
Fu
0,48
4,05
D0
3,57
D1
0,86
3,19
1,41
1,65
2,64
2,40
D3
D4
D2
Scenario di danneggiamento
87

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3
AZIONE
Natura dell’azione incendio
Carattere accidentale
Carattere estensivo
Carattere intensivo
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Aspetti caratteristici dell’incendio
• Carattere estensivo
(diffusione nello spazio):
1.wildfire
2.urbanfire
3.all’esterno di una costruzione
4.all’interno di una costruzione
• Carattere intensivo
(andamento nel tempo).
• Natura accidentale.
89

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Carattere intensivo
90

91. ISO 13387: Example of Design Fire
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92. Str
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Andamento nel tempo potenza termica
92

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94. Strategie
flashover
Temperatura T(t)
www.francobontempi.org
Str
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STRATEGIE
ATTIVE
(approccio
sistemico)
STRATEGIE
PASSIVE
(approccio
strutturale)
andamento di T(t) a
seguito del successo
delle strategie attive
94
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Fire Safety Strategies
prevention
protection
active




Limit ignition
sources
Limit hazardous
human behavior
Emergency
procedure and
evacuation


Detection measures
(smoke, heat, flame
detectors)
Suppression
measures (sprinklers,
fire extinguisher,
standpipes, firemen)
Smoke and heat
evacuation system
systemic
F
L
A
S
H
O
V
E
R
robustness
passive



Create fire
compartments
Prevent damage
in the elements
Prevent loss of
functionality in
the building

Prevent the
propagation of
collapse, once
local damages
occurred (e.g.
redundancy)
structural
95

96. Str
o N
GER
1
prevention
N
2
3
www.francobontempi.org
Fire Safety Strategies
4
doesn’t
trigger
Y
Y
extinguishes
active
protection
triggers
Y
N
no
failures
passive
protection
spreads
N
Y
damages
no
collapse
robustness
N
collapse
96

97. www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
97

98. www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
98

99. www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
SnakeFighter
99

100. www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
Carattere estensivo
100

101. www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
The Great Fire of Chicago, Oct. 7-10, 1871
101

102. www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
102

103. www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
103

104. www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
104

105. www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
105

106. www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
Windsor Hotel Madrid
106

107. www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
Natura accidentale
107

108. www.francobontempi.org
Situazioni HPLC
Str
o N
GER
High Probability Low Consequences
108

109. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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LPHC events
Low Probability High Consequences
109

110. HPLC vs LPHC events
HPLC
LPHC
High Probability Low Probability
Low
High
Consequences Consequences
release of energy
numbers of breakdown
people involved
nonlinearity
interactions
uncertainty
decomposability
course predictability
SMALL
SMALL
FEW
WEAK
WEAK
WEAK
LARGE
LARGE
MANY
STRONG
STRONG
STRONG
HIGH
HIGH
LOW
LOW
110

111. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Impostazione
del problema:
DETERMINISTICA
STOCASTICA
Approcci di analisi
HPLC
LPHC
Eventi Frequenti con
Conseguenze Limitate
Eventi Rari con
Conseguenze Elevate
ANALISI
PRAGMATICA
CON SCENARI
ANALISI
QUALITATIVA
DETERMINISTICA
ANALISI
QUANTITATIVA
PROBABILISTICA
Complessità:
Aspetti non lineari e
Meccanismi di interazioni
111

112. www.francobontempi.org
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Italian Code for Constructions
D.M. 14 settembre 2005
CAPITOLO 2:
SICUREZZA
E
PRESTAZONI
ATTESE
DOMANDA
PRODOTTO
CAPITOLO 5:
NORME
SULLE
COSTRUZIONI
CAPITOLO 3:
AZIONI
AMBIENTALI
QUALITA’
CAPITOLO 4:
AZIONI
ACCIDENTALI
CAPITOLO 6:
AZIONI
ANTROPICHE
CAPITOLO 7:
NORME PER LE
OPERE
INTERAGENTI
CON I TERRENI E
CON LE ROCCE,
PER GLI
INTERVENTI NEI
TERRENI E PER
LA SICUREZZA
DEI PENDII
CAPITOLO 9:
NORME
SULLE
COSTRUZIONI
ESISTENTI
CONTROLLO
CAPITOLO 11:
MATERIALI
E
PRODOTTI
PER USO
STRUTTURALE
CAPITOLO 8:
COLLAUDO
STATICO
CAPITOLO 10:
NORME PER LA
REDAZIONI DEI
PROGETTI
ESECUTIVI
112

113. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Scenari (D.M. 14 settembre 2005)
Il Progettista, a seguito della classificazione e della caratterizzazione delle azioni,
deve individuare le possibili situazioni contingenti in cui le azioni possono
cimentare l’opera stessa. A tal fine, è definito:

lo scenario: un insieme organizzato e realistico di situazioni in cui l’opera
potrà trovarsi durante la vita utile di progetto;

lo scenario di carico: un insieme organizzato e realistico di azioni che
cimentano la struttura;

lo scenario di contingenza: l’identificazione di uno stato plausibile e
coerente per l’opera, in cui un insieme di azioni (scenario di carico) è
applicato su una configurazione strutturale.
Per ciascuno stato limite considerato devono essere individuati scenari di carico
(ovvero insiemi organizzati e coerenti nello spazio e nel tempo di azioni) che
rappresentino le combinazioni delle azioni realisticamente possibili e
verosimilmente più restrittive.
113

114. Str
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Establish
performance
requirements
www.francobontempi.org
Determine geometry,
construction and
use of the building
Establish maximum likely
fuel loads
Buchanan, 2002
Estimate maximum likely
number of occupants
and their locations
Assume certain fire protection
features
Carry out fire engineering
analysis
Modify fire
protection
features
No
Acceptable
performance
Yes
Accept
design
114

115. www.francobontempi.org
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GER
115

116. www.francobontempi.org
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GER
4
SVILUPPO
Dinamica degli incendi in galleria
Effetti della ventilazione
116

117. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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FIRE DYNAMICS IN TUNNELS
117

118. Tunnel Fires vs Compartment Fires (0)
118

119. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
Tunnel Fires Progression (1)
119

120. www.francobontempi.org
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GER
120

121. www.francobontempi.org
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o N
GER
121

122. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
Tunnel Fires Progression (2)
122

123. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Effects of ventilation
123

124. www.francobontempi.org
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Temperature development
124

125. www.francobontempi.org
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Smoke development
• A smoke layer may be created in tunnels at the early stages
of a fire with essentially no longitudinal ventilation. However,
the smoke layer will gradually descend further from the fire.
• If the tunnel is very long, the smoke layer may descend to the
tunnel surface at a specific distance from the fire depending
on the fire size, tunnel type, and the perimeter and height of
the tunnel cross section.
• When the longitudinal ventilation is gradually increased, the
stratified layer will gradually dissolve.
• A backlayering of smoke is created on the upstream side of
the fire.
• Downstream from the fire there is a degree of stratification of
the smoke that is governed by the heat losses to the
surrounding walls and by the turbulent mixing between the
buoyant smoke layers and the normally opposite moving cold
layer.
125

126. www.francobontempi.org
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Backlayering
126

127. www.francobontempi.org
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GER
127

128. www.francobontempi.org
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Maximum gas temperatures in the ceiling area of
the tunnel during tests with road vehicles
128

129. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Maximum gas temperatures in the ceiling area of
the tunnel during tests with road vehicles
129

130. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
Maximum gas temperatures in the cross section
of the tunnel during tests with road vehicles
130

131. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
EMERGENCY VENTILATION
131

132. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Smoke stratification
132

133. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
Natural smoke venting
• It can be sufficient in short, level tunnels
where smoke stratification allows for
escape in clear/tenable conditions.
133

134. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
Smoke filling long tunnel
134

135. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Emergency ventilation with
longitudinal system
• It can be employed in unidirectional, medium length
tunnels, with free flowing traffic conditions. Smoke is
mechanically exhausted in direction of traffic circulation,
clear tenable conditions for escape are obtained on
upstream side of fire.
135

136. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
136

137. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
137

138. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
k size factor for HGV fire
138

139. www.francobontempi.org
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k size factor for small pool fire
139

140. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Emergency ventilation with semitransverse “point extraction” system
• Smoke is mechanically exhausted from single ceiling
opening (reverse mode) leaving clear tenable escape
conditions on both sides of fire.
140

141. www.francobontempi.org
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141

142. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Observation: goal
• The purpose of controlling the spread of smoke
is to keep people as long as possible in a
smoke-free environment.
• This means that the smoke stratification must be
kept intact, leaving a more or less clear and
breathable air underneath the smoke layer.
• The stratified smoke is taken out of the tunnel
through exhaust openings located in the ceiling
or at the top of the sidewalls.
142

143. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Observation: longitudinal velocity
• With practically zero longitudinal air velocity, the
smoke layer expands to both sides of the fire.
The smoke spreads in a stratified way for up to
10 min.
• After this initial phase, smoke begins to mix over
the entire cross section, unless by this time the
extraction is in full operation.
• The longitudinal velocity of the tunnel air must
be below 2 m/s in the vicinity of the fire
incidence zone. With higher velocities, the
vertical turbulence in the shear layer between
smoke and fresh air quickly cools the upper
layer and the smoke then mixes over the entire
143
cross section.

144. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Observations: turbulence
• With an air velocity of around 2 m/s, most of the
smoke of a medium-size fire spreads to one side
of the fire (limited backlayering) and starts
mixing over the whole cross section at a
distance of 400 to 600 m downstream of the fire
site. This mixing over the cross section can also
be prevented if the smoke extraction is activated
early enough.
• Vehicles standing in the longitudinal air flow
increase strongly the vertical turbulence and
encourage the vertical mixing of the smoke.
144

145. www.francobontempi.org
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Observation: fresh air
• In a transverse ventilation system, the fresh air
jets entering the tunnel at the floor level induce a
rotation of the longitudinal airflow, which tends to
bring the smoke layer down to the road.
• No fresh air is to be injected from the ceiling in a
zone with smoke because this increases the
amount of smoke and tends to suppress the
stratification.
145

146. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Observation: smoke extraction
• In reversible semi-transverse ventilation with the
duct at the ceiling, the fresh air is added through
ceiling openings in normal ventilation operation.
• If a fire occurs, as long as fresh air is supplied
through ceiling openings, the smoke quantity
increases by this amount and strong jets tend to
bring the smoke down to the road surface. The
conversion of the duct from supply to extraction
must be done as quickly as possible.
146

147. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Observation: traffic conditions
• For a tunnel with one-way traffic, designed for
queues (an urban area), the ventilation design
must take into consideration that cars can likely
stand to both sides of the fire because of the
traffic. In urban areas it is usual to find stop-andgo traffic situations.
• For a tunnel with two-way traffic, where the
vehicles run in both directions, it must be taken
into consideration that in the event of a fire
vehicles will generally be trapped on both sides
of the fire.
147

148. www.francobontempi.org
Strategies
Str
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GER
148

149. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Smoke extraction
• Continuous extraction into a return air duct is
needed to remove a stratified smoke layer out of
the tunnel without disturbing the stratification.
• The traditional way to extract smoke is to use
small ceiling openings distributed at short
intervals throughout the tunnel.
• Another efficient way to remove smoke quickly
out of the traffic space is to install large openings
with remotely controlled dampers. They are
normally in an open position where equal
extraction is taking place over the whole tunnel
length.
149

150. Tunnel with a single-point
extraction system
The usual way to control the longitudinal velocity is to provide several
independent ventilation sections.
When a tunnel has several ventilation sections, a certain longitudinal
velocity in the fire section can be maintained by a suitable operation of the
individual air ducts.
By reversing the fan operation in the exhaust air duct, this duct can be
150
used to supply air and vice versa.
www.francobontempi.org
Str
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151. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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FIRE MODELING
151

152. www.francobontempi.org
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GER
152

153. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Levels
153

154. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
1D
154

155. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
1D
155

156. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
2D (zone model)
156

157. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
2D (zone model)
157

158. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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158

159. 3D (ventilation)
www.francobontempi.org
FDS Simulation
Str
o N
GER
159

160. 3D (fire)
www.francobontempi.org
FDS Simulation
Str
o N
GER
160

161. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
3D (traffic)
161

162. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
162

163. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Multiscale
163

164. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Multiscale (ventilation)
164

165. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Multiscale (fire)
165

166. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Multiscale (structural)
166

167. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Multiscale (structural)
167

168. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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5
PROGETTO
Basis
Failure path
Risk
168

169. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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BASIS
169

170. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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3/22/2011
Design Process - ISO 13387
A. Design constraints and possibilities
(blue),
B. Action definition and development
(red),
C. Passive system and active response
(yellow),
D. Safety and performance
(purple).
170

171. DESIGN
ACTION
RESPONSE
FSE
SS0a
PRESCRIBED
DESIGN
PARAMETERS
SS0b
ESTIMATED
DESIGN
PARAMETERS
(1+2)
ACTION
DEFINITION
AND
DEVELOPMENT
(3+4)
SYSTEM
PASSIVE
AND ACTIVE
RESPONSE
SS5
life safety:
occupant behavior,
location and
condition
SS1
initiation and
development
of fire and
fire efluent
SS6
property
loss
SS2
movement of
fire effluent
SS7
business
interruption
SS3
structural response
and fire spread
beyond enclosure
of origin
SS8
contamination
of
environment
SS4
detection,
activitation and
suppression
SS9
destruction
of
heritage
SAFETY & PERFORMANCE
(0)
DESIGN
CONSTRAINTS
AND
POSSIBILITIES
BUS OF INFORMATION
www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
RESULTS
171

172. www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
Yes
threats
No
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
passive
structural
characteristics
Yes
threats
No
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
Yes
STRUCTURAL
SYSTEM
CHARACTERISTICS
threats
No
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
active
structural
characteristics
Yes
threats
STRUCTURAL
SYSTEM
WEAKNESS
No
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
Yes
threats
No
alive
structural
characteristics
MAINTENANCE
& USE
Yes
threats
No
172

173. STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
Yes
threats
No
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
passive
structural
char acteristics
www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
Yes
threats
No
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
Yes
threats
No
Yes
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
active
structural
char acteristics
threats
Yes
threats
No
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
Yes
No
threats
No
alive
structural
char acteristics
MAINTENANCE
& USE
Yes
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
threats
No
passive
structural
characteristics
Yes
threats
No
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
Yes
threats
No
173

174. No
www.francobontempi.org
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
Str
o N
GER
STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
Yes
threats
No
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
passive
structural
char acteristics
Yes
threats
No
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
active
structural
characteristics
Yes
threats
No
Yes
threats
No
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
active
structural
char acteristics
Yes
threats
No
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
Yes
threats
No
alive
structural
char acteristics
MAINTENANCE
& USE
Yes
threats
No
Yes
threats
No
alive
structural
characteristics
MAINTENANCE
& USE
Yes
threats
No
3/22/2011
PROGETTAZIONE STRUTTURALE
ANTINCENDIO
174
174

175. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Fire fighting timeline
175

176. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
MAINTENANCE
& USE
CRISIS
176

177. IN
-D
EP
TH
DE
FE
NC
E
www.francobontempi.org
Str
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FAILURE PATH
177

178. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Controlled vs. Uncontrolled Events
178

179. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Controlled vs. Uncontrolled Events
179

180. Fire safety concepts tree (NFPA)
1
1
Strategie per
la gestione
dell'incendio
2
2
3
Gestione
dell'evento
Prevenzione
4
Gestione
dell'incendio
3
15
Gestione delle
persone e
dei beni
16
Difesa sul posto
4
18
Disposibilità
delle vie
di fuga
5
6
7
8
9
17
Spostamento
5
Controllo
della quantità
di
combustibile
10
Soppressione
dell'incendio
11
Automatica
6
Controllo dei
materiali
presenti
13
Controllo
dell'incendio
attraverso il
progetto
19
Far avvenire
il deflusso
Buchanan, 2002
www.francobontempi.org
Str
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12
Manuale
7
Controllo
del movimento
dell'incendio
8
Ventilazione
14
Resistenza e
stabilità
strutturale
9
Contenimento
180

181. Fire safety concepts tree (NFPA)
1
1
Strategie per
la gestione
dell'incendio
2
2
3
Gestione
dell'evento
Prevenzione
4
Gestione
dell'incendio
3
15
Gestione delle
persone e
dei beni
16
Difesa sul posto
4
18
Disposibilità
delle vie
di fuga
5
6
7
8
9
17
Spostamento
5
Controllo
della quantità
di
combustibile
10
Soppressione
dell'incendio
11
Automatica
6
Controllo dei
materiali
presenti
13
Controllo
dell'incendio
attraverso il
progetto
19
Far avvenire
il deflusso
Buchanan, 2002
www.francobontempi.org
Str
o N
GER
12
Manuale
7
Controllo
del movimento
dell'incendio
8
Ventilazione
14
Resistenza e
stabilità
strutturale
9
Contenimento
181

182. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Basis of tunnel fire safety design
• The first priority identified in the literature for fire
design of all tunnels is to ensure:
1. Prevention of critical events that may endanger
human life, the environment, and the tunnel structure
and installations.
2. Self-rescue of people present in the tunnel at time of
the fire.
3. Effective action by the rescue forces.
4. Protection of the environment.
5. Limitation of the material and structural damage.
• Furthermore, part of the objective is to reduce
the consequences and minimize the economic
loss caused by fires.
182

183. www.francobontempi.org
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183

184. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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RISK CONCERN
184

185. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Risk treatment
START
100 %
Option 1 :
RISK
AVOIDANCE
50 %
No
50 %
Yes
Option 2 :
RISK
REDUCTION
20 %
No
30 %
Yes
Option 3 :
RISK
TRANSFER
No
25 %
Yes
5%
Option 4 :
RISK
ACCEPTANCE
No
STOP
185

186. Str
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GER
www.francobontempi.org
Option 1 Risk avoidance, which usually means not
proceeding to continue with the system; this is not
always a feasible option, but may be the only
course of action if the hazard or their probability of
occurrence or both are particularly serious;
Option 2 Risk reduction, either through (a) reducing the
probability of occurrence of some events, or (b)
through reduction in the severity of the
consequences, such as downsizing the system, or
(c) putting in place control measures;
Option 3 Risk transfer, where insurance or other financial
mechanisms can be put in place to share or
completely transfer the financial risk to other
parties; this is not a feasible option where the
primary consequences are not financial;
Option 4 Risk acceptance, even when it exceeds the criteria,
but perhaps only for a limited time until other
186
measures can be taken.

187. Quantitative Risk Analysis
Luur, 2002
www.francobontempi.org
Str
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GER
187

188. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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Risk Analysis, Assessment, Management
(IEC 1995)
188

189. www.francobontempi.org
RISK CONCERNS
Str
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GER
DEFINE CONTEXT
(social, individual,
political, organizational,
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS
(for the system are defined organization,
scenarios, and consequences of
occurences)
RISK
ANALYSIS
RISK
ASSESSMENT
RISK
MANAGEMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
MONITOR
AND
REVIEW
RISK TREATMENT
option 1 - avoidance
option 2 - reduction
option 3 - transfer
option 4 - acceptance
189

190. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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190

191. www.francobontempi.org
Str
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RISK
ANALYSIS
SCENARIOS
DEFINE SYSTEM
(the system is usually decomposed into
a number of smaller subsystems and/or
components)
HAZARD SCENARIO ANALYSIS
(what can go wrong?
how can it happen?
waht controls exist?)
ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES
(magnitude)
ESTIMATE
PROBABILITIES
(of occurrences)
DEFINE
RISK SCENARIOS
SENSITIVITY
ANALYSIS
FIRE
EVENT
191

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EVENT TREE
Triggering
event
Fire
ignition
Fire
location
1. Fire
extinguished
by personnel
2. Intrusion of
fire fighters
3. Fire
suppression
Scenario
A1
YES (P1)
AREA A
(PA)
NO (1-P1)
Arson
YES (P2)
A2
YES (P3)
NO (1-P3)
A3
NO (1-P2)
A4
YES (P3)
NO (1-P3)
A5
Short
circuit
B1
YES (P1)
Explosion
AREA B
(PB)
NO (1-P1)
Cigarette
fire
YES (P2)
B2
YES (P3)
NO (1-P3)
B3
NO (1-P2)
B4
YES (P3)
NO (1-P3)
B5
Other
C1
YES (P1)
AREA C
(PC)
PREPARAZIONE
NO (1-P1)
YES (P2)
C2
YES (P3)
NO (1-P3)
C3
EVOLUZIONE
NO (1-P2)
YES (P3)
NO (1-P3)
C4
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C5

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NUMERICAL
MODELING
SIMULATIONS
DEFINE SYSTEM
(the system is usually decomposed into
a number of smaller subsystems and/or
components)
HAZARD SCENARIO ANALYSIS
(what can go wrong?
how can it happen?
waht controls exist?)
ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES
(magnitude)
RISK
ANALYSIS
ESTIMATE
PROBABILITIES
(of occurrences)
DEFINE
RISK SCENARIOS
SENSITIVITY
ANALYSIS
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F (frequency) – N (number of fatalities) curve
• An F–N curve is an alternative way of describing
the risk associated with loss of lives.
• An F–N curve shows the frequency (i.e. the
expected number) of accident events with at
least N fatalities, where the axes normally are
logarithmic.
• The F–N curve describes risk related to largescale accidents, and is thus especially suited for
characterizing societal risk.
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FN-curves UK Road Rail Aviation Transport, 67-01
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Persson, M. Quantitative Risk Analysis Procedure for
the Fire Evacuation of a Road Tunnel - An Illustrative
Example. Lund, 2002
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Risk acceptance – ALARP (1)
RISK MAGNITUDE
INTOLERABLE
REGION
As
Low
As
Reasonably
Practicable
BROADLY ACCEPTABLE
REGION
Risk cannot be justified
in any circumstances
Tolerable only if risk
reduction is impracticable
or if its cost is greatly
disproportionate to the
improvement gained
Tolerable if cost of
reduction would exceed
the improvements gained
As
Low
As
Reasonably
Achievable
Necessary to maintain
assurance that the risk
remains at this level
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Risk acceptance – ALARP (2)
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Risk reduction by design
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Monetary values – cost of human life (!)
What is the maximum amount the society (or the
decisionmaker) is willing to pay to reduce
the expected number of fatalities by 1?
Typical numbers for the value of a statistical life used in
cost-benefit analysis are 1–10 million euros.
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6
RESISTENZA
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The burnt out interior
of the Mont Blanc Tunnel
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Curve temperatura - tempo
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Types of fire exposure
for tunnel analysis
Cellulosic
RABT-ZTV train
Hydrocarbon
RABT-ZTV car
Hydrocarbon modified
RWS
1400
1200
Temperature (°C)
1000
800
600
400
200
0
0
30
60
90
Time (min.)
120
150
180
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Cellulosic curve
• Defined in various national standards, e.g. ISO 834, BS 476: part 20, DIN
4102, AS 1530 etc.
• This curve is the lowest used in normal practice.
• It is based on the burning rate of the materials found in general building
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Hydrocarbon (HC) curve
• Although the cellulosic curve has been in use for many years, it soon became
apparent that the burning rates for certain materials e.g. petrol gas, chemicals
etc, were well in excess of the rate at which for instance, timber would burn.
• The hydrocarbon curve is applicable where small petroleum fires might occur,
i.e. car fuel tanks, petrol or oil tankers, certain chemical tankers etc.
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Hydrocarbon mod. (HCM) curve
• Increased version of the hydrocarbon curve, prescribed by the French
regulations.
• The maximum temperature of the HCM curve is 1300ºC instead of the
1100ºC, standard HC curve.
• However, the temperature gradient in the first few minutes of the HCM fire is
as severe as all hydrocarbon based fires possibly causing a temperature
shock to the surrounding concrete structure and concrete spalling as a result
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RABT ZTV curves
RABT-ZTV (train)
Time (minutes) T (°C)
0
15
5
1200
60
1200
170
15
RABT-ZTV (car)
Time (minutes) T (°C)
0
15
5
1200
30
1200
140
15
• The RABT curve was developed in Germany as a result of a series of test
programs such as the EUREKA project. In the RABT curve, the temperature
rise is very rapid up to 1200°C within 5 minutes.
• The failure criteria for specimens exposed to the RABT-ZTV time-temperature
curve is that the temperature of the reinforcement should not exceed 300°C.
There is no requirement for a maximum interface temperature.
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RWS (Rijkswaterstaat) curve
RWS,
RijksWaterStaat
Time
T
(minutes)
(°C)
0
20
3
890
5
1140
10
1200
30
1300
60
1350
90
1300
120
1200
180
1200
• The RWS curve was developed by the Ministry of Transport in the
Netherlands. This curve is based on the assumption that in a worst case
scenario, a 50 m³ fuel, oil or petrol, tanker fire with a fire load of 300MW could
occur, lasting up to 120 minutes.
• The failure criteria for specimens is that the temperature of the interface
between the concrete and the fire protective lining should not exceed 380°C
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and the temperature on the reinforcement should not exceed 250°C.

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Lönnermark, A. and Ingason, H., “Large Scale Fire Tests in the Runehamar
tunnel – gas temperature and Radiation”,
Proceedings of the International Seminar on Catastrophic Tunnel Fires,
Borås, Sweden, 20-21 November 2003.
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Fire Scenario Recommendation
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Verifiche
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Mechanical Analysis
• The mechanical analysis shall be performed for the
same duration as used in the temperature analysis.
• Verification of fire resistance should be in:
– in the strength domain:
Rfi,d,t ≥ Efi,requ,t
(resistance at time t ≥ load effects at time t);
– in the time domain:
tfi,d ≥ tfi,requ
(design value of time fire resistance ≥
time required)
– In the temperature domain:
Td ≤ Tcr
(design value of the material temperature ≤
critical material temperature);
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Verification of fire resistance (3D)
R = structural resistance
R=R(t,T)=R(t,T(t))=R(t)
t = time
T=T(t)
T = temperature
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Verification of fire resistance (R-safe)
R = structural resistance
Rfi,d,t
Efi,requ,t
t = time
T = temperature
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Verification of fire resistance (R-fail)
R = structural resistance
Failure !
Rfi,d,t
Efi,requ,t
t = time
T = temperature
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Verification of fire resistance (t)
R = structural resistance
Failure !
Efi,requ,t
Rfi,d,t
t = time
T = temperature
tfi,d ≥ tfi,requ
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Verification of fire resistance (T)
R = structural resistance
Failure !
Efi,requ,t
Rfi,d,t
t = time
Td ≤ Tcr
T = temperature
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Verification of fire resistance (T)
R = structural resistance
Failure !
Efi,requ,t
Rfi,d,t
t = time
Td ≤ Tcr
T = temperature
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Comportamenti termo-meccanici
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Trasformazione del calcestruzzo
alle alte temperature
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Parametri per la relazione tensioni-deformazioni
per il calcestruzzo ad elevate temperature.
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Calcestruzzo ad aggregato siliceo in condizioni di
compressione uniassiale ad elevate temperature
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Variazione del coefficiente di riduzione della
resistenza a compressione del calcestruzzo ad
aggregato siliceo con la temperatura
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Relazioni tensioni-deformazioni per acciai da
calcestruzzo armato ordinario
laminati a caldo ad elevate temperature
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Parametri per la relazione tensioni-deformazioni
per acciai da calcestruzzo armato ordinario
laminati a caldo, a temperature elevate
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237. Spalling
Spalling is an umbrella term, covering different damage phenomena
that may occur to a concrete structure during fire. These phenomena
are caused by different mechanisms:
•Pore pressure rises due to evaporating water when the temperature rises;
•Compression of the heated surface due to a thermal gradient in the cross
section;
•Internal cracking due to difference in thermal expansion between
aggregate and cement paste;
•Cracking due to difference in thermal expansion/deformation between
concrete and reinforcement bars;
•Strength loss due to chemical transitions during heating.
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237

238. Spalling criteria (literature review)
• Explosive spalling occurs during the first 20-30 minutes of the
standard cellulosic and hydrocarbon fire curves.
• After the 2nd minute of a typical hydrocarbon exposure, spalling can
occur in high strength concretes with polypropylene fibres and in
concretes with high moisture content independent of the type of
standard curve. Also, concretes with high moisture content can
suffer spalling after the 3rd minute of exposure.
• External temperature increments between 20-30ºC/min are typical
in the occurrence of explosive spalling.
• Temperature increments of more than 3ºC/min are enough for the
occurrence of explosive spalling.
• Concrete external layers can be released from concrete members
when these reach temperatures between 250 - 420ºC; 375 - 425ºC.
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7
CONCLUSIONI
Conceptual design
Resilience
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Conceptual Design
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Conceptual Design
DISASTER CHAIN
MULTI-HAZARD
BLACK-SWAN
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Forensic Engineering
Flow chart
Tabella dotazioni Frejùs
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Resilience
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Resilience
• Resilience is defined as
“the positive ability of a system or
company to adapt itself to the
consequences of a catastrophic failure
caused by power outage, a fire, a bomb
or similar event”
or as
"the ability of a system to cope with
change".
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RESILIENCE
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•
•
•
•
•
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Dr. Konstantinos GKOUMAS – Uniroma1
Dr. Francesco PETRINI – Uniroma1
Ing. Alessandra LO CANE – MIT
Dr. Filippo GENTILI – Coimbra (PT)
Mr. Tiziano BARONCELLI – Uniroma1
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www.stronger2012.com
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251

252. StroNGER S.r.l.
Research Spin-off for Structures of the Next Generation:
Energy Harvesting and Resilience
Roma – Milano – Terni – Atene - Nice Cote Azur
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www.stronger2012.com
Sede operativa: Via Giacomo Peroni 442-444, Tecnopolo Tiburtino,
00131 Roma (ITALY) - info@stronger2012.com
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