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The Bieber Project
Ad Tech and Fraud 101
Mark Ryan Talabis, zvelo
zvelo proprietary and confidential
Introduction
! Chief Security Scientist, zvelo
▫ Ad Tech Fraud Research
! Formerly, Cloud Email Threat Protection, Fireeye
!  Alumni Member, Honeynet Project
"  Honeypots/Honeynets
! Author, Elsevier-Syngress
"  Information Security Analytics/Risk Management
zvelo proprietary and confidential
Main Topics
! The Business and Currency of Digital Advertising
! Ad Tech: The Ecosystem
! The Ad Fraud Problem
! Publisher-based Ad Fraud
! Non Human Traffic and the Bieber Project
Total digital ad spend is estimated to be
$60 billion in 2015
The Business of Digital Advertising
The Currency of Digital Advertising
! Primary metric: the number of delivered, or served,
impressions
! Primary problem: Not all online ads delivered actually
have an opportunity to be seen
! Advertisers are obviously not interested in paying for
ads that were never seen
Viewable
Impressions
Clicks
Conversions
The Currency of Digital Advertising
$
The Business of Digital Advertising
Reference: ComScore
Supply and Demand
The Business of Digital Advertising
TV Online
Advertising
VS
Ad Tech: The Ecosystem
Well, it’s a bit
complicated…
Ad Tech: The Ecosystem
Let’s go
through the
101 version…
Advertiser Advertiser Advertiser Advertiser
Agency Agency
DSP
Ad
Networks
Agency
Trading
Desk
Ad Exchange / SSP
Publisher Publisher Publisher Publisher
Ad
Network
DMPs
Other
data /
analytics
companies
DMPs
DMPs
Other
data /
analytics
companies
Other
data /
analytics
companies
Other
data /
analytics
companies
DMPs
Process of Serving an Ad
Campaign
Mgmt.
System
User inputs
info into
Ad trafficker at DSP/Ad
Network, etc.
Campaign
criteria
defined
Right dates,
budget, CPM
rate
targeting
criteria
Creative
assets
IMG file
Video file
Javascript
tag
Other
3rd party
pixels
1st party
pixels
1. Campaign Setup 2. The Bidding Process
Additional custom fields
based on partners SSP
woks with (e.g. data
segments from DMP)
DSP / Ad
Network Bidder
General auction
information
Auction type, Bidfloor,
Currency
Banner
information
Width, Height, Position
Mobile app / site
information
Name, SSP ID, Bundle,
Domain, StoreURL, IAB cats,
Page cats, Section cats,
Content, Keywords
Device / user
information
Device OS, Device type, IP,
Device ID, Geo, User
registration data if
applicable (age, gender)
Auction
meets
campaign
criteria?
Bid (DSP bids via
following OpenRTB
bid request specs)
Bid won?
SSP sends
winning bidder
win notification
Bid Request –
OpenRTB format
Integrated into
SSP exchange to
bid on auctions
Auction is sent to
bidders in form of
Bid request
Yes
No: Bidder
considers new
bid request
Yes
No: Bidder
considers new
bid request
3. Ad Serving
Ad is served
(Buyer uses their own ad
server of choice, either in-
house, a vendor like
Sizmek, or they rely on
Publisher ad server. Less
common, both publisher
and buyer ad server is
used simultaneously)
Impression
pixel is fired
3rd party tags
fired, if
applicable
Ad creative
loads, along
with any
related
Javascript
associated
within tag
Mobile user
opens App
App where
ad is served
The Ad Fraud Problem
!  Deliberate practice of attempting to
serve ads that have no potential to
be viewed by a human user
!  Lots of varying statistics regarding
the extent of the problem.
!  Estimates range from 13% to as
high as 60% of impressions served
online were “suspicious”.
!  What are we doing about it?
Interactive Advertising Bureau
! What is the IAB?
! Doing good things but sometimes a
bit confusing to us people in security
! Released a Ad Fraud Taxonomy
!  Illegitimate and Non-Human Traffic Sources
▫  Hijacked device
▫  Crawler masquerading as a legitimate user
▫  Data-center traffic
!  Non-traditional / other traffic
▫  Proxy traffic
▫  Non-browser User-Agent header
▫  Browser pre-rendering
!  Hijacked Tags
▫  Ad Tag Hijacking
▫  Creative Hijacking
!  Site Impression Attributes
▫  Auto-Refresh
▫  Ad Density
▫  Hidden Ads
▫  Viewability
▫  Misappropriated Content
▫  Falsely Represented
▫  Non Brand Safe
▫  Contains Malware
!  Ad creative / other
▫  Cookie Stuffing
IABs Ad Fraud Taxonomy
101: What it Really Means
There are basically 3 main types of Ad Fraud:
1 Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count
2 Illegal or Malicious Content
3 Use of Non Human Traffic to Increase Impressions
Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count
! Various techniques that publishers use to make 1
impression look like more!
! Some prominent examples are:
▫ 1x1 Pixels
▫ Ad Stacking
▫ Gray Areas: Ad Clutter, Auto-play Videos
Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count
Typically
advertisers will
want to see this:
Normal0 0 0
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet,
consectetur adipiscing elit, sed
do eiusmod tempor incididunt
ut labore et dolore magna
aliqua. consectetur adipiscing
elit, sed do eiusmod tempor
incididunt ut labore et dolore
Ads
Ads
Ads
Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count
Hidden iFrames0 0 0
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur
adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt
ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad
minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco
laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.
1x1, nx1, 1xn, 0xn, nx0 iFrames
But some publishers
will do this
(Hidden Ads):
Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count
Or this (Ad Stacking):
Ad Stacking0 0 0
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur
adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt
ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad
minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco
laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.
Ads stacked on top of each other
AdsAdsAdsAds
Illegal or Malicious Content
! There are times when fraud doesn’t directly mean
increasing impressions (though it could end up that way)
! Some prominent examples are:
▫ Serving malware or adware
▫ Scams and Non Brand Safe
Illegal or Malicious Content
!  Next few slides are from an investigation of malware-infected traffic
exhibiting ad fraudish tendencies
!  The Ad Network itself was serving “dirty” inventory or at the very
least “low quality” content
Illegal or Malicious Content
Ad network was
serving malware!
Illegal or Malicious Content
Adware
Ads that will serve you more Ads
Illegal or Malicious Content
Scamvertising!
Use of Non Human Traffic to Increase Impressions
! Bots! This is probably the most common
thing that comes to mind.
! Non Human Traffic or NHT can be more
than bots though.
What is the best way to
investigate this?
Buying Internet Traffic
What is
Purchased
Internet Traffic
made of?
Can I buy
internet traffic
and get away
with it?
?
The Bieber Project
Honeypot
Fraudulent Impressions?
Collected Information
Bieber with a “Wire”
Bieber with A Wire
Data Stored for Analysis
Traffic Vendors
Traffic Vendors
Traffic Vendors
Traffic Vendors
What is Purchased Internet Traffic Made Of?
Well..obviously BOTS!
(partly)
Clues are in the
Impression…
How do we know?
What are the Clues…?
Browser has Suspicious User Agent…
What are the Clues…?
Lots of other suspicious information…
•  No Plugins
•  No Mime Types
•  Invisible Viewport Sizes
•  Zero Page and Mouse Coordinates
•  No Product Identifiers
It’s easy to catch “dumb” bots but
what about the smarter ones?
A Closer Look @ Smarter Bots
This is a video
demonstration of
a malware that
hijacks a user’s
browser.
A Closer Look @ Smarter Bots
This is a video
demonstration to
show a stealthier
ad fraud malware.
A Closer Look @ Smarter Bots
This is a video
demonstration
showing a smarter
malware that
reproduces user
events
What are the Clues…?
For hijacked machines, we need to
do some trends analysis…
Example: Frequency between visits are too fast
What are the Clues…?
You’ll need to look at broader patterns…
Example: Doesn’t help that almost
all of the traffic was coming from
one IP block from China…
User Events
Show video of
user event
collection…
BUT it’s also made of
HUMANS…
Who for all intents and purposes do
not know they are visiting your site
Traffic Vendor
Partner Site
Your Site
Traffic is delivered to you through:
! Pop-unders
! Pop-ups
! Frames
What are the Clues…?
70% of the viewports are 1 pixel!
Meaning the size of the browsers
viewing your site looks like this:
What are the Clues…?
The window is not the active window:
Your
site is
here
So…can I buy internet traffic
and get away with it?
! If an advertiser will audit the traffic and they know what
to look for, you will get caught.
! If they don’t or if they don’t know what to look for, you
won’t get caught.
! The “quality” of traffic is also directly proportional to
how much you pay for it.
▫ The lower prices, you’ll get bots.
▫ They higher prices, you’ll get frames, popups or pop-unders.
Depends.
If you liked my presentation
! Visit us at zvelo.com
! Check out my books: (available on Amazon)
www.zvelo.com
zvelo proprietary and confidential

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DEFCON 23 - Mark Ryan Talabis - The Bieber Project

  • 1. The Bieber Project Ad Tech and Fraud 101 Mark Ryan Talabis, zvelo zvelo proprietary and confidential
  • 2. Introduction ! Chief Security Scientist, zvelo ▫ Ad Tech Fraud Research ! Formerly, Cloud Email Threat Protection, Fireeye !  Alumni Member, Honeynet Project "  Honeypots/Honeynets ! Author, Elsevier-Syngress "  Information Security Analytics/Risk Management zvelo proprietary and confidential
  • 3. Main Topics ! The Business and Currency of Digital Advertising ! Ad Tech: The Ecosystem ! The Ad Fraud Problem ! Publisher-based Ad Fraud ! Non Human Traffic and the Bieber Project
  • 4. Total digital ad spend is estimated to be $60 billion in 2015 The Business of Digital Advertising
  • 5. The Currency of Digital Advertising ! Primary metric: the number of delivered, or served, impressions ! Primary problem: Not all online ads delivered actually have an opportunity to be seen ! Advertisers are obviously not interested in paying for ads that were never seen
  • 7. The Business of Digital Advertising Reference: ComScore Supply and Demand
  • 8. The Business of Digital Advertising TV Online Advertising VS
  • 9. Ad Tech: The Ecosystem Well, it’s a bit complicated…
  • 10. Ad Tech: The Ecosystem Let’s go through the 101 version… Advertiser Advertiser Advertiser Advertiser Agency Agency DSP Ad Networks Agency Trading Desk Ad Exchange / SSP Publisher Publisher Publisher Publisher Ad Network DMPs Other data / analytics companies DMPs DMPs Other data / analytics companies Other data / analytics companies Other data / analytics companies DMPs
  • 11. Process of Serving an Ad Campaign Mgmt. System User inputs info into Ad trafficker at DSP/Ad Network, etc. Campaign criteria defined Right dates, budget, CPM rate targeting criteria Creative assets IMG file Video file Javascript tag Other 3rd party pixels 1st party pixels 1. Campaign Setup 2. The Bidding Process Additional custom fields based on partners SSP woks with (e.g. data segments from DMP) DSP / Ad Network Bidder General auction information Auction type, Bidfloor, Currency Banner information Width, Height, Position Mobile app / site information Name, SSP ID, Bundle, Domain, StoreURL, IAB cats, Page cats, Section cats, Content, Keywords Device / user information Device OS, Device type, IP, Device ID, Geo, User registration data if applicable (age, gender) Auction meets campaign criteria? Bid (DSP bids via following OpenRTB bid request specs) Bid won? SSP sends winning bidder win notification Bid Request – OpenRTB format Integrated into SSP exchange to bid on auctions Auction is sent to bidders in form of Bid request Yes No: Bidder considers new bid request Yes No: Bidder considers new bid request 3. Ad Serving Ad is served (Buyer uses their own ad server of choice, either in- house, a vendor like Sizmek, or they rely on Publisher ad server. Less common, both publisher and buyer ad server is used simultaneously) Impression pixel is fired 3rd party tags fired, if applicable Ad creative loads, along with any related Javascript associated within tag Mobile user opens App App where ad is served
  • 12. The Ad Fraud Problem !  Deliberate practice of attempting to serve ads that have no potential to be viewed by a human user !  Lots of varying statistics regarding the extent of the problem. !  Estimates range from 13% to as high as 60% of impressions served online were “suspicious”. !  What are we doing about it?
  • 13. Interactive Advertising Bureau ! What is the IAB? ! Doing good things but sometimes a bit confusing to us people in security ! Released a Ad Fraud Taxonomy
  • 14. !  Illegitimate and Non-Human Traffic Sources ▫  Hijacked device ▫  Crawler masquerading as a legitimate user ▫  Data-center traffic !  Non-traditional / other traffic ▫  Proxy traffic ▫  Non-browser User-Agent header ▫  Browser pre-rendering !  Hijacked Tags ▫  Ad Tag Hijacking ▫  Creative Hijacking !  Site Impression Attributes ▫  Auto-Refresh ▫  Ad Density ▫  Hidden Ads ▫  Viewability ▫  Misappropriated Content ▫  Falsely Represented ▫  Non Brand Safe ▫  Contains Malware !  Ad creative / other ▫  Cookie Stuffing IABs Ad Fraud Taxonomy
  • 15. 101: What it Really Means There are basically 3 main types of Ad Fraud: 1 Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count 2 Illegal or Malicious Content 3 Use of Non Human Traffic to Increase Impressions
  • 16. Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count ! Various techniques that publishers use to make 1 impression look like more! ! Some prominent examples are: ▫ 1x1 Pixels ▫ Ad Stacking ▫ Gray Areas: Ad Clutter, Auto-play Videos
  • 17. Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count Typically advertisers will want to see this: Normal0 0 0 Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore Ads Ads Ads
  • 18. Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count Hidden iFrames0 0 0 Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. 1x1, nx1, 1xn, 0xn, nx0 iFrames But some publishers will do this (Hidden Ads):
  • 19. Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count Or this (Ad Stacking): Ad Stacking0 0 0 Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Ads stacked on top of each other AdsAdsAdsAds
  • 20. Illegal or Malicious Content ! There are times when fraud doesn’t directly mean increasing impressions (though it could end up that way) ! Some prominent examples are: ▫ Serving malware or adware ▫ Scams and Non Brand Safe
  • 21. Illegal or Malicious Content !  Next few slides are from an investigation of malware-infected traffic exhibiting ad fraudish tendencies !  The Ad Network itself was serving “dirty” inventory or at the very least “low quality” content
  • 22. Illegal or Malicious Content Ad network was serving malware!
  • 23. Illegal or Malicious Content Adware Ads that will serve you more Ads
  • 24. Illegal or Malicious Content Scamvertising!
  • 25. Use of Non Human Traffic to Increase Impressions ! Bots! This is probably the most common thing that comes to mind. ! Non Human Traffic or NHT can be more than bots though. What is the best way to investigate this?
  • 26. Buying Internet Traffic What is Purchased Internet Traffic made of? Can I buy internet traffic and get away with it? ?
  • 30. Data Stored for Analysis
  • 35. What is Purchased Internet Traffic Made Of?
  • 37. Clues are in the Impression… How do we know?
  • 38. What are the Clues…? Browser has Suspicious User Agent…
  • 39. What are the Clues…? Lots of other suspicious information… •  No Plugins •  No Mime Types •  Invisible Viewport Sizes •  Zero Page and Mouse Coordinates •  No Product Identifiers
  • 40. It’s easy to catch “dumb” bots but what about the smarter ones?
  • 41. A Closer Look @ Smarter Bots This is a video demonstration of a malware that hijacks a user’s browser.
  • 42. A Closer Look @ Smarter Bots This is a video demonstration to show a stealthier ad fraud malware.
  • 43. A Closer Look @ Smarter Bots This is a video demonstration showing a smarter malware that reproduces user events
  • 44. What are the Clues…? For hijacked machines, we need to do some trends analysis… Example: Frequency between visits are too fast
  • 45. What are the Clues…? You’ll need to look at broader patterns… Example: Doesn’t help that almost all of the traffic was coming from one IP block from China…
  • 46. User Events Show video of user event collection…
  • 47. BUT it’s also made of HUMANS… Who for all intents and purposes do not know they are visiting your site
  • 48. Traffic Vendor Partner Site Your Site Traffic is delivered to you through: ! Pop-unders ! Pop-ups ! Frames
  • 49. What are the Clues…? 70% of the viewports are 1 pixel! Meaning the size of the browsers viewing your site looks like this:
  • 50. What are the Clues…? The window is not the active window: Your site is here
  • 51. So…can I buy internet traffic and get away with it?
  • 52. ! If an advertiser will audit the traffic and they know what to look for, you will get caught. ! If they don’t or if they don’t know what to look for, you won’t get caught. ! The “quality” of traffic is also directly proportional to how much you pay for it. ▫ The lower prices, you’ll get bots. ▫ They higher prices, you’ll get frames, popups or pop-unders. Depends.
  • 53. If you liked my presentation ! Visit us at zvelo.com ! Check out my books: (available on Amazon)