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Exploiting hidden services to setup anonymous
         communication infrastructures




     21 October 2006           Fabio Pietrosanti
       Luxembourg              naif at s0ftpj.org
My goals
• Explain anonymity concept and different
  networks
• Explain the potential of exploiting
  anonymous networks in a different way
• Present the Laissez Faire Island Project and
  get interests and contributors
• Discuss on how to support the growth of
  anonymous communication systems with an
  a-commerce market
                       2
What’s this talk not
         about?

• Not go deeper in the technical details of
  anonymous protocols
• Do not make any promotion of commercial
  tools




                      3
Me

• Underground: member of the s0ftpj group,
  sikurezza.org italian mailing list, e-privacy and
  winston smith anonymous communities, and
  some advisories made for PIX firewalls
• Work: CTO of a swiss privacy provider
• Personally: love for anonymity research!

                       4
You
•   Who does personally require anonymity?

•   Who have ever used TOR?




                              5
Agenda
•                           Anonymity

•   Anonymity use and abuse

•   Anonymous Networks

•   TOR - The Onion Router

•   Anonymous Backbone Concept

•   Laissez Faire Island Project

•   LFI MAIL: unconventional approach to anonymous email




                                   6
Anonymity




7
What’s anonymity
• Anonymity is a state of not being identifiable
  within a set of subjects
• Big difference between anonymity and
  confidentiality:
  • Identity protection
  • Location protection
  • Deniability of actions (w.r.t. identity)
                        8
What to protect?
      The sender/receiver anonymity issues

•   Who you are                 •   Whom you communicate
                                    with
•   Where you are located
                                •   Where the recipient/
                                    server is located

Most of anon nets protects only the sender!

Good anonymity requires mutual protection

                            9
Anonymity require
      cooperation
• No organization would be ever able to stay
  anonymous by itself.
 • You can only get confidentiality yourself.
• Anonymous network require cooperation

                     10
Agenda
•   Anonymity

•                 Anonymity use and abuse

•   Anonymous Networks

•   TOR - The Onion Router

•   Anonymous Backbone Concept

•   Laissez Faire Island Project

•   LFI MAIL: unconventional approach to anonymous email




                               11
Anonymity use and
     abuse


        12
Personal use
• Discussion of sensible issues
 • sexual attitude
 • religious belief / vision
 • political inquiries
• Avoid tracking and profiling by isp’s /
  corporate / governments / google!


                      13
Corporate use
• Business Intelligence activity
• Stop competitive analysis (r&d,
  procurement)
• Legal discussions
• Communications from non democratic
  countries and war places
• Journalist communications
• Prevent price & information discrimination
                      14
Government use
• Diplomatic communications
 • Where is the ambassador staying?
• Anonymous requests by citizen to law
  enforcers
• Criminal investigation
 • Oh... FBI is looking at my website!!
• Stuff in the public interest...
                        15
Security Research
             USAGE
•   Security Researchers caught at security conferences

    •   Dmitry Sklyarov @ Defcon

    •   Stephen Rombom @ Hope

•   20 September 2006: Tron @ Toorcon 8

•                   First conference over TOR!

•   Ventrilo (2k/s voice streaming) + VNC (5-10k/s video
    streaming) = Alan Bradley & Kevin Flynns talked securely
    away from the USA/DMCA risks


                              16
Abuse (why limits?!?)
•   Do only terrorists need anonymity?

    •   Hotmail & drafts methods!
    •   http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/002871.php

•   Hey... also mafia, pedopornograph, cyber vandals
    use TOR!

•   So we should declare illegal internet, airplanes,
    child, knifes because it can be abused?

• Adversaries are much less skilled than what
    we ever thought!
                                 17
Agenda
•   Anonymity

•   Anonymity use and abuse

•                   Anonymous Networks

•   TOR - The Onion Router

•   Anonymous Backbone Concept

•   Laissez Faire Island Project

•   LFI MAIL: unconventional approach to anonymous email




                               18
Anonymous networks



        19
There’s too much
         garbage!
• There are tons of anonymous technologies
  out there:
  • Few projects got success
  • Few projects grow
• Limitations are mainly related with:
 • Risk context to be managed
 • Deployment & usability
                      20
High latency
•   Good for store & forward action -> Email

•   Anonymous Remailers:

    •   CypherPunk type I: old technology, old network)

    •   Mixmaster type II: around 35 servers, very stable networks

    •   Mixminion type III: experimental networks by freeheaven

    •   Nym servers: old school -> anon.penet.fi / nym.alias.net

•   Those networks are not email systems: need true, traceable
    email systems


                               21
Low latency
•   Good for interactive action -> Web Browsing / Chat

•   Onion Routing -> The Onion Router (c)

    •   The biggest anonymous network ever known

•   I2P (java)
  •    Free mixnet
  •    Fully distributed (p2p)
  •    Variable latency trough I2P API
•   FreeNET (java)
  •    P2P storage for mutual anonymous content publishing
       and access. Still too slow


                             22
Misc anon networks
•   AnoNET                              •   Marabunta
•   Crowds                              •   Morphmix
•   Invisible IRC                       •   Tarzan
•   WASTE                               •   AntsP2P
•   Entropy                             •   ....
•   Mute
•   GNUnet
•   Winny
•   Mnet
•   Infrastructure for resilient
    internet systems
•   Rodi


                                   23
Agenda
•   Anonymity

•   Anonymity use and abuse

•   Anonymous Networks

•                  TOR - The Onion Router

•   Anonymous Backbone Concept

•   Laissez Faire Island Project

•   LFI MAIL: unconventional approach to anonymous email




                               24
The Onion Router
     TOR


       25
Who did make it?


• USA Department of Defense
• Electronic Frontier Foundation


                     26
Goals
• Deployability for supporters and users
• Flexibility of the protocols
• Usability for the users
• Simple design of architecture
 • Directory Servers - RendezVous Servers -
    Users - Tor Servers (Middleman / Exit
    node)

                     27
NOT Goals
• Not peer to peer
• Not secure against end-to-end attacks
• No protocol normalization (Use privoxy!)
• It’s filterable
 • Block http request for /tor/* (dir server)
• It’s identifiable (TOR-bl, public list of nodes)
                       28
TOR network expansion




             last 24 months grow of tor routers
  http://www.noreply.org/tor-running-routers/totalLong.html

                      29
TOR network bandwidth




            last 24 months grow of tor bandwidth
http://www.noreply.org/tor-running-routers/totalTrafficLong.html


                           30
Vidalia




• http://vidalia-project.net
• Status - Stop/Start - Map - Logos -
  Configuration - Help - Translations - Monitor
                            31
TOR tipical use
•   Protect only the identity &    RECEIVER

    location of the sender
    accessing internet services           INTERNET




               SENDER




                              32
A look at exit nodes
         traffic
• Most http, messaging, pop3
• A lot of porn and googling!
• Automated web attacks
• Cinema like telnet! ;)
• EVERY EXIT NODE CAN INTERCEPT
  NON ENCRYPTED TRAFFIC!
• Paranoid but dumb: https://tor.unixgu.ru/
                      33
Agenda
•   Anonymity

•   Anonymity use and abuse

•   Anonymous Networks

•             Anonymous Backbone Concept

•   Laissez Faire Island Project

•   LFI MAIL: unconventional approach to anonymous email




                               34
Anonymous internet
    backbone




        35
Changing the rules
• Consider the Internet as a generic transport
  media
  • TOR as an anonymous backbone
   • do you know MPLS?
• Mutual anonymous protection
• High performance anonymity
• No more 3 trusted third party!!!
                     36
No more 3 trusted party
•   Protect the identity & location of the sender AND of the
    receiver (server) by accessing hidden services.

                                           INTERNET




       SENDER                                         RECEIVER




                             37
Onion LAND
• Hidden services are tcp redirects from the
  running tor client
• Hidden services can be exposed behind NAT
• Latency:
 • New connection: 80ms - 5 seconds
 • Established connection: 700ms - 2 seconds
• .onion TLD for each registered service
• No restriction policy as for Exit Node!
                       38
Usability issue
•   Make the .onion hostname easier

    •   Hidden wiki http://6sxoyfb3h2nvok2d.onion

    •   FreeNODE irc irc://mejokbp2brhw4omd.onion

•   Application level Internet redirection (not a good way!)

    •   http://anon1.xxx.com -> 302 -> http://odkdokdod.onion

•   2nd level TOR rendez vous services

    •   Easy hidden url



                              39
service limits

• High bandwidth services (video)
• Frequent connections (p2p file sharing)
• Low latency services (telephony)
 • Ok for Push To Talk
 • Serious troubles with full duplex!

                     40
Anonymous services
•   Develop an anonymous society

•   Start doing business with anonymous tools!

•   Promote Free and NON-Free anon services:
    •   Email hosting
    •   Server (physical or virtual) hosting: rayservers, me (free
        vps)
    •   Internet reverse proxy services (easy migration)
        •   es: http://serifos.eecs.harvard.edu/proxy/http://6sxoyfb3h2nvok2d.onion

    •   Payment provider (egold exchanger, prepaid visa cards)


                                       41
Thinking anon business
• There are many business to be build around
  anonymous networks!
• Main issues: availability(b2b) & payment(b2c)
 • Investing % of the income in the network
    would really improve availability
• Anonymous VPNs
• Anonymous Messaging
                      42
Anonymous VPNs (1)
• VPNs are not so private (identity & location)
  High risk context VPNs are useful in
  business and personal use
• The anonymous backbone is a nat proof
  transport media
• Good for email, instant messaging, file
  services (better webdav with keepalive!) and
  http resources

                      43
Anonymous VPNs (2)
• Example use: Journalism, Public safety, NAT
  bypass, non-democratic country branch




                     ANON VPN



        Embassy in
                                Ministry of
         foreign
                                 Interior
         country




                        44
Anonymous VPNs (3)
• Place privacy enforcement on the firewalls!




                     45
Anonymous Messaging

• Email messaging with anonymous network
  works really definitely well but...
• No hidden diffused email messaging services
 • xrek (62 users) http://4nc7xi5usjq6z7bc.onion/
 • Tormail down (onion.theme1.com)
• TOR block outgoing SMTP (for spam)!!!
                       46
Agenda
•   Anonymity

•   Anonymity use and abuse

•   Anonymous Networks

•   TOR - The Onion Router

•   Anonymous Backbone Concept

•               Laissez Faire Island Project

•   LFI MAIL: unconventional approach to anonymous email




                              47
Laissez Faire Island
      Project


         48
Laissez Faire City
•   Do you remember Laissez Faire City?

•   In ’95 a group of cyber/economist fanatic created a new
    sovereign international cyber city

•   Developed a privacy infrastructure to allow individual to
    operate in the freedom of cyberspace outside the confines
    of the traditional nation-state

•   Declaration of the independence of CyberSpace

    •   http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html

•   A mix between crypto-anarchism and anarcho-capitalism
                               49
Laissez Faire City
•   Mailvault - www.mailvault.com - YodelBank -

•   DMT - Digital Monetary Trust

    •   DMT ALTA - Asset Lodgement Trust Accounts

    •   DMT LESE - Laissez-Faire Electronic Stock Exchange

•   ICA - International Contract Registration

    •   http://ica.citystateinc.com/

•   CEP - Common Economic Protocol

    •   http://cep.metropipe.net/

                                 50
Laissez Faire Island
• Laissez Faire Island aims to became a small
  piece of land in the sea of anonymity
• We want to create and stimulate the
  creation of anonymous social environments
• TOR gives us the chance to do that!
• Laissez Faire Island is a baby!
 • We need a logo!
                      51
Laissez Faire Island
• Laissez Faire Island require infrastructures!
• Several islands are required to born before
  service network can be really effective!


• We provide free virtual private server for
  anonymous services!
  • Get one and setup free a service!
                       52
LFI Architecture (1)
• How to implement a Laissez Faire Island?
 • Be 100% sure that no one would be able
    to discover where it is!
 • Be 100% sure that incoming traffic follow
    a different path respect to outgoing traffic
 • Differentiate services and traffic routing!
 • Use virtualization technology (XEN)
                      53
LFI Architecture (2)
    TOR-IN                        TOR-OUT
   entry-node                     entry-node



                    Internet




                GW + FIREWALL                  SERVER FARM




           TOR-IN              TOR-OUT          Virtual Servers
                                DNS




• Carefully select TOR-IN / TOR-OUT
                                          54
LFI Architecture (3)
• TOR CVS simplify the setup
  •   TransPort 9040 + iptables/iproute2

• DNS servers
  •   tor-dns-proxy.py (dugsong)

  •   dns-proxy-tor (http://p56soo2ibjkx23xo.onion/)

• Iptables / iproute2 for network policy/redir
• Dynamic firewall script for tor-only traffic
• Dmcrypt-luks for disk encryption
                             55
We want your island!

• Setup your island!
• Came with us!
• Build a redundant and solid Anonymous
  Infrastructure!
• Availability & distribution are key features!

                       56
Agenda
•   Anonymity

•   Anonymity use and abuse

•   Anonymous Networks

•   TOR - The Onion Router

•   Anonymous Backbone Concept

•   Laissez Faire Island Project

•         LFI MAIL: unconventional approach to
                    anonymous email



                               57
Laissez Faire Island
  Email Platform


         58
An old need

• Before spam, people thought anonymous
  email was a good idea:
 • David Chaum. “Untraceable electronic
    email, return address and digital
    pseudonyms”. Communications of the
    ACM, 1981



                     59
LFI MAIL GOAL

• Provide anon email services through a
    network of redundant servers located in
    many islands of the sea of anonymity
• Escape from the net: stay in the islands!
•   internal communication (simple)

•   external outbound communication (complex!)

•   external inbound communication (very complex!)


                             60
Escape from TOR
• TOR exit nodes block outgoing SMTP but...
• SMTPS (465/tcp) is allowed!
• 19/35 Mixmaster anonymous
    remailer nodes support SMTPS !
 • http://www.noreply.org/tls/
• We mix the best we can get from different
  anonymous networks!

                     61
LFI MAIL: anonymix!
                RECIPIENT              MIXMASTER
               EMAIL SERVER             NETWORK
                                         5 CHAIN




  External outbound                                             MIXMASTER
                                                                  SMTPS
communications made
easy & more paranoid!                                INTERNET


                                              TOR
                                             (OUT)




                           TOR    LFI MAIL
                           (IN)




                   SENDER
               LFI EMAIL USER     62
LFI MAIL sw

• An email system quick to be setup)
  ( www.kolab.org )
• Mixmaster & smtp2mix
• Horde Webmail (+mod_security
  +mod_chroot)
• Simple signup system
• Upcoming: automatic encryption (anubis)
                      63
Still no internet inbound
• Having a unique inbound internet-to-TOR
  gateway would expose the system to
  interception
• Inbound connection would require an high
  number of information nodes around the
  world giving their IP
• Idea! Ask TOR-ops/Mixmaster-ops to
  redirect 25/TCP port to the network of
  islands!
• DNS MX Record: 900 results around the
                    64
future useful ideas
• Old school shell server
• Conference streaming platform
• Proxy middleware to avoid tor exit issues
• Free “Exit Node” pcap dump for all!
• TOR development
 • Hidden Service Round Robin
 • Easy 2nd level rendez vous services
                     65
Questions?

• Contribute and share your passion!
• wiki http://vbp22opdeypalsic.onion
• naif@vbp22opdeypalsic.onion (beta LFI mail)
• Internet: naif@s0ftpj.org
• Get TOR! http://vidalia-project.org

                     66

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2006: Hack.lu Luxembourg 2006: Anonymous Communication

  • 1. Exploiting hidden services to setup anonymous communication infrastructures 21 October 2006 Fabio Pietrosanti Luxembourg naif at s0ftpj.org
  • 2. My goals • Explain anonymity concept and different networks • Explain the potential of exploiting anonymous networks in a different way • Present the Laissez Faire Island Project and get interests and contributors • Discuss on how to support the growth of anonymous communication systems with an a-commerce market 2
  • 3. What’s this talk not about? • Not go deeper in the technical details of anonymous protocols • Do not make any promotion of commercial tools 3
  • 4. Me • Underground: member of the s0ftpj group, sikurezza.org italian mailing list, e-privacy and winston smith anonymous communities, and some advisories made for PIX firewalls • Work: CTO of a swiss privacy provider • Personally: love for anonymity research! 4
  • 5. You • Who does personally require anonymity? • Who have ever used TOR? 5
  • 6. Agenda • Anonymity • Anonymity use and abuse • Anonymous Networks • TOR - The Onion Router • Anonymous Backbone Concept • Laissez Faire Island Project • LFI MAIL: unconventional approach to anonymous email 6
  • 8. What’s anonymity • Anonymity is a state of not being identifiable within a set of subjects • Big difference between anonymity and confidentiality: • Identity protection • Location protection • Deniability of actions (w.r.t. identity) 8
  • 9. What to protect? The sender/receiver anonymity issues • Who you are • Whom you communicate with • Where you are located • Where the recipient/ server is located Most of anon nets protects only the sender! Good anonymity requires mutual protection 9
  • 10. Anonymity require cooperation • No organization would be ever able to stay anonymous by itself. • You can only get confidentiality yourself. • Anonymous network require cooperation 10
  • 11. Agenda • Anonymity • Anonymity use and abuse • Anonymous Networks • TOR - The Onion Router • Anonymous Backbone Concept • Laissez Faire Island Project • LFI MAIL: unconventional approach to anonymous email 11
  • 12. Anonymity use and abuse 12
  • 13. Personal use • Discussion of sensible issues • sexual attitude • religious belief / vision • political inquiries • Avoid tracking and profiling by isp’s / corporate / governments / google! 13
  • 14. Corporate use • Business Intelligence activity • Stop competitive analysis (r&d, procurement) • Legal discussions • Communications from non democratic countries and war places • Journalist communications • Prevent price & information discrimination 14
  • 15. Government use • Diplomatic communications • Where is the ambassador staying? • Anonymous requests by citizen to law enforcers • Criminal investigation • Oh... FBI is looking at my website!! • Stuff in the public interest... 15
  • 16. Security Research USAGE • Security Researchers caught at security conferences • Dmitry Sklyarov @ Defcon • Stephen Rombom @ Hope • 20 September 2006: Tron @ Toorcon 8 • First conference over TOR! • Ventrilo (2k/s voice streaming) + VNC (5-10k/s video streaming) = Alan Bradley & Kevin Flynns talked securely away from the USA/DMCA risks 16
  • 17. Abuse (why limits?!?) • Do only terrorists need anonymity? • Hotmail & drafts methods! • http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/002871.php • Hey... also mafia, pedopornograph, cyber vandals use TOR! • So we should declare illegal internet, airplanes, child, knifes because it can be abused? • Adversaries are much less skilled than what we ever thought! 17
  • 18. Agenda • Anonymity • Anonymity use and abuse • Anonymous Networks • TOR - The Onion Router • Anonymous Backbone Concept • Laissez Faire Island Project • LFI MAIL: unconventional approach to anonymous email 18
  • 20. There’s too much garbage! • There are tons of anonymous technologies out there: • Few projects got success • Few projects grow • Limitations are mainly related with: • Risk context to be managed • Deployment & usability 20
  • 21. High latency • Good for store & forward action -> Email • Anonymous Remailers: • CypherPunk type I: old technology, old network) • Mixmaster type II: around 35 servers, very stable networks • Mixminion type III: experimental networks by freeheaven • Nym servers: old school -> anon.penet.fi / nym.alias.net • Those networks are not email systems: need true, traceable email systems 21
  • 22. Low latency • Good for interactive action -> Web Browsing / Chat • Onion Routing -> The Onion Router (c) • The biggest anonymous network ever known • I2P (java) • Free mixnet • Fully distributed (p2p) • Variable latency trough I2P API • FreeNET (java) • P2P storage for mutual anonymous content publishing and access. Still too slow 22
  • 23. Misc anon networks • AnoNET • Marabunta • Crowds • Morphmix • Invisible IRC • Tarzan • WASTE • AntsP2P • Entropy • .... • Mute • GNUnet • Winny • Mnet • Infrastructure for resilient internet systems • Rodi 23
  • 24. Agenda • Anonymity • Anonymity use and abuse • Anonymous Networks • TOR - The Onion Router • Anonymous Backbone Concept • Laissez Faire Island Project • LFI MAIL: unconventional approach to anonymous email 24
  • 26. Who did make it? • USA Department of Defense • Electronic Frontier Foundation 26
  • 27. Goals • Deployability for supporters and users • Flexibility of the protocols • Usability for the users • Simple design of architecture • Directory Servers - RendezVous Servers - Users - Tor Servers (Middleman / Exit node) 27
  • 28. NOT Goals • Not peer to peer • Not secure against end-to-end attacks • No protocol normalization (Use privoxy!) • It’s filterable • Block http request for /tor/* (dir server) • It’s identifiable (TOR-bl, public list of nodes) 28
  • 29. TOR network expansion last 24 months grow of tor routers http://www.noreply.org/tor-running-routers/totalLong.html 29
  • 30. TOR network bandwidth last 24 months grow of tor bandwidth http://www.noreply.org/tor-running-routers/totalTrafficLong.html 30
  • 31. Vidalia • http://vidalia-project.net • Status - Stop/Start - Map - Logos - Configuration - Help - Translations - Monitor 31
  • 32. TOR tipical use • Protect only the identity & RECEIVER location of the sender accessing internet services INTERNET SENDER 32
  • 33. A look at exit nodes traffic • Most http, messaging, pop3 • A lot of porn and googling! • Automated web attacks • Cinema like telnet! ;) • EVERY EXIT NODE CAN INTERCEPT NON ENCRYPTED TRAFFIC! • Paranoid but dumb: https://tor.unixgu.ru/ 33
  • 34. Agenda • Anonymity • Anonymity use and abuse • Anonymous Networks • Anonymous Backbone Concept • Laissez Faire Island Project • LFI MAIL: unconventional approach to anonymous email 34
  • 35. Anonymous internet backbone 35
  • 36. Changing the rules • Consider the Internet as a generic transport media • TOR as an anonymous backbone • do you know MPLS? • Mutual anonymous protection • High performance anonymity • No more 3 trusted third party!!! 36
  • 37. No more 3 trusted party • Protect the identity & location of the sender AND of the receiver (server) by accessing hidden services. INTERNET SENDER RECEIVER 37
  • 38. Onion LAND • Hidden services are tcp redirects from the running tor client • Hidden services can be exposed behind NAT • Latency: • New connection: 80ms - 5 seconds • Established connection: 700ms - 2 seconds • .onion TLD for each registered service • No restriction policy as for Exit Node! 38
  • 39. Usability issue • Make the .onion hostname easier • Hidden wiki http://6sxoyfb3h2nvok2d.onion • FreeNODE irc irc://mejokbp2brhw4omd.onion • Application level Internet redirection (not a good way!) • http://anon1.xxx.com -> 302 -> http://odkdokdod.onion • 2nd level TOR rendez vous services • Easy hidden url 39
  • 40. service limits • High bandwidth services (video) • Frequent connections (p2p file sharing) • Low latency services (telephony) • Ok for Push To Talk • Serious troubles with full duplex! 40
  • 41. Anonymous services • Develop an anonymous society • Start doing business with anonymous tools! • Promote Free and NON-Free anon services: • Email hosting • Server (physical or virtual) hosting: rayservers, me (free vps) • Internet reverse proxy services (easy migration) • es: http://serifos.eecs.harvard.edu/proxy/http://6sxoyfb3h2nvok2d.onion • Payment provider (egold exchanger, prepaid visa cards) 41
  • 42. Thinking anon business • There are many business to be build around anonymous networks! • Main issues: availability(b2b) & payment(b2c) • Investing % of the income in the network would really improve availability • Anonymous VPNs • Anonymous Messaging 42
  • 43. Anonymous VPNs (1) • VPNs are not so private (identity & location) High risk context VPNs are useful in business and personal use • The anonymous backbone is a nat proof transport media • Good for email, instant messaging, file services (better webdav with keepalive!) and http resources 43
  • 44. Anonymous VPNs (2) • Example use: Journalism, Public safety, NAT bypass, non-democratic country branch ANON VPN Embassy in Ministry of foreign Interior country 44
  • 45. Anonymous VPNs (3) • Place privacy enforcement on the firewalls! 45
  • 46. Anonymous Messaging • Email messaging with anonymous network works really definitely well but... • No hidden diffused email messaging services • xrek (62 users) http://4nc7xi5usjq6z7bc.onion/ • Tormail down (onion.theme1.com) • TOR block outgoing SMTP (for spam)!!! 46
  • 47. Agenda • Anonymity • Anonymity use and abuse • Anonymous Networks • TOR - The Onion Router • Anonymous Backbone Concept • Laissez Faire Island Project • LFI MAIL: unconventional approach to anonymous email 47
  • 48. Laissez Faire Island Project 48
  • 49. Laissez Faire City • Do you remember Laissez Faire City? • In ’95 a group of cyber/economist fanatic created a new sovereign international cyber city • Developed a privacy infrastructure to allow individual to operate in the freedom of cyberspace outside the confines of the traditional nation-state • Declaration of the independence of CyberSpace • http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html • A mix between crypto-anarchism and anarcho-capitalism 49
  • 50. Laissez Faire City • Mailvault - www.mailvault.com - YodelBank - • DMT - Digital Monetary Trust • DMT ALTA - Asset Lodgement Trust Accounts • DMT LESE - Laissez-Faire Electronic Stock Exchange • ICA - International Contract Registration • http://ica.citystateinc.com/ • CEP - Common Economic Protocol • http://cep.metropipe.net/ 50
  • 51. Laissez Faire Island • Laissez Faire Island aims to became a small piece of land in the sea of anonymity • We want to create and stimulate the creation of anonymous social environments • TOR gives us the chance to do that! • Laissez Faire Island is a baby! • We need a logo! 51
  • 52. Laissez Faire Island • Laissez Faire Island require infrastructures! • Several islands are required to born before service network can be really effective! • We provide free virtual private server for anonymous services! • Get one and setup free a service! 52
  • 53. LFI Architecture (1) • How to implement a Laissez Faire Island? • Be 100% sure that no one would be able to discover where it is! • Be 100% sure that incoming traffic follow a different path respect to outgoing traffic • Differentiate services and traffic routing! • Use virtualization technology (XEN) 53
  • 54. LFI Architecture (2) TOR-IN TOR-OUT entry-node entry-node Internet GW + FIREWALL SERVER FARM TOR-IN TOR-OUT Virtual Servers DNS • Carefully select TOR-IN / TOR-OUT 54
  • 55. LFI Architecture (3) • TOR CVS simplify the setup • TransPort 9040 + iptables/iproute2 • DNS servers • tor-dns-proxy.py (dugsong) • dns-proxy-tor (http://p56soo2ibjkx23xo.onion/) • Iptables / iproute2 for network policy/redir • Dynamic firewall script for tor-only traffic • Dmcrypt-luks for disk encryption 55
  • 56. We want your island! • Setup your island! • Came with us! • Build a redundant and solid Anonymous Infrastructure! • Availability & distribution are key features! 56
  • 57. Agenda • Anonymity • Anonymity use and abuse • Anonymous Networks • TOR - The Onion Router • Anonymous Backbone Concept • Laissez Faire Island Project • LFI MAIL: unconventional approach to anonymous email 57
  • 58. Laissez Faire Island Email Platform 58
  • 59. An old need • Before spam, people thought anonymous email was a good idea: • David Chaum. “Untraceable electronic email, return address and digital pseudonyms”. Communications of the ACM, 1981 59
  • 60. LFI MAIL GOAL • Provide anon email services through a network of redundant servers located in many islands of the sea of anonymity • Escape from the net: stay in the islands! • internal communication (simple) • external outbound communication (complex!) • external inbound communication (very complex!) 60
  • 61. Escape from TOR • TOR exit nodes block outgoing SMTP but... • SMTPS (465/tcp) is allowed! • 19/35 Mixmaster anonymous remailer nodes support SMTPS ! • http://www.noreply.org/tls/ • We mix the best we can get from different anonymous networks! 61
  • 62. LFI MAIL: anonymix! RECIPIENT MIXMASTER EMAIL SERVER NETWORK 5 CHAIN External outbound MIXMASTER SMTPS communications made easy & more paranoid! INTERNET TOR (OUT) TOR LFI MAIL (IN) SENDER LFI EMAIL USER 62
  • 63. LFI MAIL sw • An email system quick to be setup) ( www.kolab.org ) • Mixmaster & smtp2mix • Horde Webmail (+mod_security +mod_chroot) • Simple signup system • Upcoming: automatic encryption (anubis) 63
  • 64. Still no internet inbound • Having a unique inbound internet-to-TOR gateway would expose the system to interception • Inbound connection would require an high number of information nodes around the world giving their IP • Idea! Ask TOR-ops/Mixmaster-ops to redirect 25/TCP port to the network of islands! • DNS MX Record: 900 results around the 64
  • 65. future useful ideas • Old school shell server • Conference streaming platform • Proxy middleware to avoid tor exit issues • Free “Exit Node” pcap dump for all! • TOR development • Hidden Service Round Robin • Easy 2nd level rendez vous services 65
  • 66. Questions? • Contribute and share your passion! • wiki http://vbp22opdeypalsic.onion • naif@vbp22opdeypalsic.onion (beta LFI mail) • Internet: naif@s0ftpj.org • Get TOR! http://vidalia-project.org 66