5. EDUCATION FOR DISASTER
RESILIENCE
• TOPICAL BLUEPRINTS
• BLUEPRINTS FOR
LIVING WITH …
• BLUEPRINTS FOR
BUILDING TO
WITHSTAND…
• BLUEPRINTS FOR
LEARNING FROM…
• BLUEPRINTS FOR
IMPLEMENTATION...
• REGIONAL
BLUEPRINTS
• PACIFIC
• EUROPE
• ASIA
• LATIN AMERICA AND
CARIBBEAN
• SUB-SAHARA AFRICA
• MEDITERRANEAN
• NORTH AMERICA
6. EDUCATION FOR DISASTER
RESILIENCE
• EDUCATION
• INTEGRATED
CURRICULA
• GENERIC MODELS
• MODELS FOR
SPECIFIC LOCATIONS
• MODELS FOR
SPECIFIC HAZARDS
• TRAINING
• KNOWLEDGE
• MUNICH RE ANNUAL
REPORTS, “TOPICS”
• PROCEEDINGS OF
WCDR, JANUARY 2005
• PROCEEDINGS OF
INCEED, JULY 2005
• PROCEEDINGS OF
DAVOS, 2006, 2008,
2012
7. TOWARDS GLOBAL DISASTERTOWARDS GLOBAL DISASTER
RESILIENCERESILIENCE
GOAL: TO FIND THE COMMON AGENDAGOAL: TO FIND THE COMMON AGENDA
((CACA) OF TECHNICAL) OF TECHNICAL
AND POLITICAL SOLUTIONSAND POLITICAL SOLUTIONS
TECHNICALTECHNICAL
SOLUTIONSSOLUTIONS
POLITICALPOLITICAL
SOLUTIONSSOLUTIONS
CACA
8. TOWARDS GLOBAL DISASTERTOWARDS GLOBAL DISASTER
RESILIENCERESILIENCE
FACT: THE COMMON AGENDA IS BASEDFACT: THE COMMON AGENDA IS BASED
ON EACH COMMUNITY’SON EACH COMMUNITY’S STAPLESTAPLE FACTORSFACTORS
TECHNICALTECHNICAL
SOLUTIONSSOLUTIONS
POLITICALPOLITICAL
SOLUTIONSSOLUTIONS
STAPLESTAPLE
FACTORSFACTORS
PP
TT
SS
OO
CACA
9. HAZARDSHAZARDS
ELEMENTS OF RISK IN EVERYELEMENTS OF RISK IN EVERY
COMMUNITYCOMMUNITY
EXPOSUREEXPOSURE
VULNERABILITYVULNERABILITY LOCATIONLOCATION
RISKRISK
11. SO DO THE THE STAPLE
FACTORS, WHICH VARY WITH
• TIME
• PLACE
• CIRCUMSTANCES
12. SOCIAL (ARE THE PEOPLE AWARE
OF WHAT THEY NEED?)
COMMUNITYCOMMUNITY
TECHNICAL (IS THE STATE OF
KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE
BEING APPLIED?)
ADMINISTRATIVE (WHO IS
RESPONSIBLE AND
ACCOUNTABLE?)
POLITICAL (ARE PUBLIC POLICIES
RELEVANT IN TERMS OF THE
THREAT?)
LEGAL (ARE EXISTIN LEGAL
MANDATES ENFORCED?)
ECONOMIC (WILLINGNESS AND
CAPACITY TO PAY FOR SAFETY?)
GOAL: COMMUNITY DISASTER
RESILIENCE
SOCIAL
SYSTEMS
SOCIAL
SYSTEMS
STAPLE
FACTORS
STAPLE
FACTORS
13. TOWARDS GLOBAL DISASTERTOWARDS GLOBAL DISASTER
RESILIENCERESILIENCE
GOAL: TO UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCESGOAL: TO UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCES
IN TECHNICALIN TECHNICAL
AND POLITICAL THINKINGAND POLITICAL THINKING
TECHNICALTECHNICAL
SOLUTIONSSOLUTIONS
POLITICALPOLITICAL
SOLUTIONSSOLUTIONS
CACA
15. POLITICAL VERSUS TECHNICAL
• POLITICAL
• THE GUIDING
PRINCIPLE FOR
THE POLITICAL
DECISION IS TO
HAVE THE
“LEAST REGRETS”
• TECHNICAL
• THE GUIDING
PRINCIPLE FOR
THE TECHNICAL
DECISION IS TO
HAVE THE
“BEST SCIENCE”
16. POLITICAL VERSUS TECHNICAL
• POLITICAL
• THE DESIRED
OUTCOME IS
APPROVAL OF THE
DECISIONMAKER’S
CONSTITUENTS
(ELECTORATE,
STOCK HOLDERS)
• TECHNICAL
• THE DESIRED
OUTCOME IS
RESPECT OF THE
SCIENTIST’S OR
ENGINEER’S
PEERS
17. POLITICAL VERSUS TECHNICAL
• POLITICAL
• THE TIME
HORIZON IS
SHORT AND A
SOLUTION IS
WANTED NOW
• TECHNICAL
• THE TIME
HORIZON IS
LONG AND “THE
SOLUTION” TAKES
A LITTLE MORE
TIME
18. POLITICAL VERSUS TECHNICAL
• POLITICAL
• THE MOST
VALUED OUTCOME
IS A RELIABLE
SOLUTION WITH
UNCERTAINTIES
SUBMERGED
• TECHNICAL
• THE MOST
VALUED OUTCOME
IS SCIENTIFIC
INSIGHT WITH
UNCERTAINTIES
EMPHASIZED
19. MYTH VERSUS REALITY
• MYTH
• IN EVERY
COMMUNITY,
THERE IS A
GENERAL PUBLIC,
WHICH HAS A
COMMON
PERCEPTION OF
THE PROBLEM
• REALITY
• IN EVERY
COMMUNITY,
THERE ARE
MANY PUBLICS,
WHICH HAVE
DIFFERENT
PERCEPTIONS OF
THE PROBLEM
20. MYTH VERSUS REALITY
• MYTH
• E-MAILING A
REPORT IS
EFFECTIVE IN
INFLUENCING THE
COMMUNITY’S
PUBLICS AND THE
POLITICAL
PROCESS
• REALITY
• E-MAILING A
REPORT IS
INEFFECTIVE IN
INFLUENCING THE
COMMUNITY’S
PUBLICS AND THE
POLITICAL
PROCESS
21. MYTH VERSUS REALITY
• MYTH
• FOR A SCIENTIFIC
DECISION,
SCIENTIFIC
CONSENSUS IS
A NECESSARY AND
SUFFICIENT
CONSIDERATION
• REALITY
• FOR A POLITICAL
DECISION,
SCIENTIFIC
CONSENSUS IS
ONLY ONE OF AT
LEAST SIX
CONSIDERATIONS
23. RESULTS OF A COMMON AGENDA FOR
DISASTER RESILIENCE
• REDUCTION OF
VULNERABILITY
• REDUCTION OF
UNACCEPTABLE
RISK
• NO “KNOCK OUT
DISASTERS”
• POLITICAL
ENABLEMENT
• ENHANCED
TECHNICAL
CAPACITY