1. Framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP);
Analyzing Through Theoretical Approaches
ECE DINCASLAN

2. The Common Foreign and Security Policy came from in the formation of European
Political Cooperation in 1970. European Political Cooperation was an informal discourse
among members on foreign policy as the aiming of creation on common approach to foreign
policy issues and enhancing the EU's own interests. This encourage international cooperation,
democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Before the Maastricht Treaty came
into effect on 1 November 1993, the EU had no official role in foreign affairs and could not
speak a single voice. With the Maastricht Treaty, member states assigned to develop a foreign
policy and allowed to speak with one voice in this area. The Amsterdam Treaty created the
office of the High Representative which held by Javier Solana for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy to represent and coordinate the EU's foreign policy. The Treaty of Lisbon was
activated in December 2009 and brought an end to the pillar system.
There are several objectives which the European Union defines and implements a common
foreign and security policy that covers all areas of foreign and security policy according to the
Treaty on European Union. First of all, the objectives started with preserving the common
values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union. After that, it
continued as strengthening the security of the Union in all ways. Next, it was also to preserve
peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United
Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the
Paris Charter, including those on external borders. Finally, promoting international
cooperation, developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms were other aim for CFSP.
The Common Foreign and Security Policy have some elements which were types of policy,
the High Representative and bodies. For types of policy, The European Council identified the
principles and general statute for the CFSP. According to these principles, the Council of
Ministers adopts joint actions or common positions. Joint actions address specific situations
where operation action by the EU is considered essential and set up a rule for the objectives.
However, common position describe the approach that the EU takes on a certain matter and
describe in the abstract the general principles to which the national policies of Member states
must implement. For the High Representative, the Common Foreign and Security Policy
needs unanimity among the now 27 member states on the favorable policy to follow on any
specific policy. There was unusual fact ın Iraq issue which showed us disagreements in CFSP.
The tasks of the European Union Special Representatives were also coordinated by the High
Representative. The High Representative serves as the head of the European Defense Agency

3. and exercises the same functions over the Common Security and Defense Policy as the CFSP.
On 1 December 2009, Catherine Ashton took over Javier Solana's post as the High
Representative, who has held the post since 1999.1 In addition, there are several bodies to
coordinate within the context of the CFSP. Within the Council, there is the Foreign Affairs
Council formation, essentially a meeting of foreign ministers and the Political and Security
Committee which follows the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP and
promote by delivering ideas to the Council of Ministers.
The European Defence Agency promotes increase in defence capabilities, military research
and the establishment of a European internal market for military technology. Two bodies
obtained over from the Western European Union which the European Union Institute for
Security Studies and the European Union Satellite Centre which deal with security and
defence policy.
How does the CFSP work?
The High Representative for Foreign Affairs is responsible for coordinating the European
Union's foreign policy and provide consensus between member states. Although the High
Representative's specific powers are mostly undefined and likely to be shaped by Catherine
Ashton, member states are still made actual decisions on CFSP in the European Council. As a
result, it was agreement that involved the EU in peacekeeping in Macedonia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Congo in 2003, as well as observer missions in Gaza and Indonesia. In
2007, EU foreign ministers agreed on implementing sanctions against Iran. In 2008, sanctions
were imposed against Zimbabwe following a violent and undemocratic presidential election,
and the EU launched its first maritime operation to prevent hijacking of Somalia. In addition,
The European Council also issues 'common strategies' on issues about which members states
agree, many as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU has diplomatic duties in
several important countries under the authority of the High Representative. These involve
strategies on promoting democracy and peace in Russia, the eastern Mediterranean and the
Ukraine.
1 Smith, Michael E. (2004), Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

4. Although the using of QMV increased under the Lisbon Treaty in CFSP, right to veto was
maintained by member states in all EU foreign policy decisions and strategies. For example,
Poland blocked a new Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with Russia because of
ongoing Russian ban on Polish meat imports in 2005-07. Also Spain, Greece and Slovakia
opposed UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari's plan for Kosovo independence from Serbia was
however an EU mission was sent to Kosovo when it declared its independence in 2008.
Member states still have the freedom to resume their own foreign policy aims. For example,
Britain and some other members agreed on US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 despite the
opposition of other member states.
There are some arguments which are in favor and against for CFSP. Initially the CFSP is an
influential way of developing security around the EU by emphasizing shared aims and values.
Countries gain a louder voice with cooperating on foreign policy on the world stage. Also,
members have right to save money as pooling diplomatic and defence resources because they
can share know how and hardware. What about against? The EU should not 'go it alone', but it
should instead retain traditional links with the USA through NATO and the UN. In addition,
setting foreign policy is one of the most important tasks of a national government so unelected
European officials should not be given this power. The CFSP can only ever have limited
effectiveness because member states find it very difficult to agree on foreign and security
policy. CFSP allows some countries to do less about their security because they can ride on
the back of more powerful countries, like the UK or France.
The reasons for the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
To begin with, the European integration has improved an increasing common understanding
among member states and focus on their common interests. Both economic and trade interests
and the need to encourage the values that constitute the cornerstone of democratic Europe
were considered on a basis. Also, the consequence of the development of the European
community's external action emerged the need to coordinate the member states' foreign policy
and the improving interdependence between international affairs and economic and trade
issues. After, the following events of enlargement of the EU have extended of its external
relations which are Commonwealth, Latin America and Mediterranean. In addition, the EU
gains new way and responsibilities on the international scene with the end of cold war and of
the bi-polar international system. Therefore, the Balkan crisis created needing to improve the
CFSP in order to the EU not to be limited to a simple “free-trade area”. European public

5. opinion could not compromised by itself to the concept of “an economic giant but a political
dwarf”. It is now hoped that the launching of the euro will also promote the following
improvement of the CFSP.
The main stages of the construction of the CFSP
The Davignon report is the founding document of the European Political Cooperation, the
CFSP's predecessor. Its content was strengthened by the Copenhagen report in November
1973 (trimestral meetings of the Foreign Ministers and monthly meetings of the Political
Committee, creation of the COREU network and of the working groups), the Paris Summit
conclusions in December 1974 (introduction of the role of the Presidency in the development
of relations with third countries) and the London report in October 1981 (introduction of the
“troika” formula). Also, title of the Single European Act institutionalized in 1986 fifteen years
of “customary practice” and stipulates the creation of the Secretariat.2 After the Treaty on the
European Union adopted in Maastricht in December 1991, a single institutional framework
was created which the Common Foreign and Security Policy constitutes the second pillar. The
member state attitudes focus on strengthening the European identity on the international
scene, clearly through the implementation of the CFSP.
Also, the member states committed themselves to guarantying that their national foreign
policies apply with the EU's common positions and to coordinating their behavior in
international organizations and at international conferences. The next step was the adoption of
the treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 which altered the TEU and resumes in force while waiting
for the confirmation by member states of the Nice Treaty which was adopted in December
2000. Moreover, the Treaty of Amsterdam includes several new steps which firstly the
creation of the post of the CFSP High Representative, as well as of the Policy Unit in the
Secretariat. Than, Institutionalization of the “constructive abstention” mechanism in order to
facilitate the CFSP decision-making process. The final step was creation of a new instrument
called the “common strategy”.
After the Cologne European Council in 1999, the Common Security and Defence Policy had
become an important part of the CFSP. The European Union had limited military capability,
member states are responsible for their own territorial defence and a majority of EU members
2 http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=40&article=59

6. are also members of NATO which is responsible for the defence of Europe. The Kosovo war
in 1999, the European Council agreed that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous
action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness
to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO." 3
However, some enterprises were made to increase the EU's military capability, clearly the
Helsinki Headline Goal process. Following discussion, the most concrete result was the EU
Battlegroups initiative and planned to be able to mobilize about 1500 men quickly. EU forces
have been appointed on peacekeeping missions from Africa to the Balkans and the Middle
East. A number of bodies support EU military operations, including the European Defence
Agency, main centre and the military staff. Also, the European Union big member states have
variety ideas about NATO. Germany declared that NATO is still significant organization in
Europe security and it is the corner stone of Europe security and a new developing Europe
defense system must act together with NATO. However, France has been always against USA
from a historical point of view will not be wrong. Also, they argued that European defense
policy will be coordinated with NATO but as an independent. In addition, although England
acts show more closely to France behavior, they sometimes emphasized that Union must act
in coordination with USA in security policy.
Petersberg tasks/crisis management tasks
The ‘Petersberg tasks’ create a central part of the CFSP. These are crisis management tasks
named after the place where the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union. The
Petersberg tasks are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat
forces in crisis management, involving peacemaking. The European Council has stated that
the EU must ‘have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces,
the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international
crises without prejudice to actions by NATO’.4
The Helsinki European Council established the general aims for military capability in
December 1999. The objectives, which were to be distinguished by 2003, were that the EU
should be able to appoint, within 60 days and for at least one year, up to 60 000 persons
capable of performing the full range of Petersberg tasks. Although ıt did not involve the
3 Grant, Charles (2001), A Stronger European Foreign and Defence Policy, in: Bannerman, Edward et.al. (eds.),
Europe After September 11th, London: CER, 31-48
4 http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/95/

7. creation of a European army, decisions on recruitment and deployment of national troops are
taken at Member State level. In addition to that, although there were certain shortcomings to
deployment capability and speed a Council meeting of EU Ministers for Foreign Affairs
declared that the Helsinki objectives had been achieved in December 2003. The new
objectives adopted by the June 2004 European Council, ‘Headline Goal 2010’, is therefore on
quality and specific capacity requirements rather than quantity.
There are some distinctive features of Common Foreign and Security Policy. To begin with,
unlike EPC, CFSP for the first time brings a distinct political and military-defense processor
to the European project. Also, CFSP is officially one of the three 'pillars' of the European
Union while the other two being the European Community and Justice and Home Affairs. In
addition, unlike the EC, the CFSP will conduct chiefly through intergovernmental
cooperation. Moreover, while the CFSP is part of the EU, it will manage like EPC in a
manner mostly independent of the institutions of the Community. Afterward, CFSP officially
covers all issues related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a
common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.
THE CASES OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS AND THE IRAQ CRISIS
The EU has failed to developed coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor due
to different ideas among the EU Member States during the Yugoslav crisis and the Iraq crisis.
In both cases, not only different national interests among the EU Member States but also their
choice for national interests over mutual European interests prevented them from agreeing on
a coherent position. As a result, this fact led to a loss of effectiveness and international
credibility on the part of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor. After the failure in the
Yugoslav crisis, the CFSP was launched. In addition, during another Former Yugoslav crisis,
Kosovo crisis in late 1990s, the EU Member States once again failed to stop the conflict on
their own and they recognized the fact that civilian, persuasive diplomacy not supported by
credible military forces for crisis management and conflict prevention could not alone be
successful in preventing and managing conflicts. The EU Member States should act
collectively as a coherent actor within the framework of the CFSP in order to be an effective
foreign and security policy actor.

8. Evaluating CFSP in the sense of Neo-Institutionalism, Constructivism, and Neo- Realism
Nation States has no longer face common policy that would diverge significantly from their
national policy. Hence, common policy is better for national autonomy and common actions
are seen to be very good for sacrificing sovereignty and national identity is worth, or if their
national interest converge to the point that little loss of sovereignty is needed.
Disagreements about Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of EU can be analyzed
both descriptive and prescriptive statements. These are not really disagreement but basically
reflections of inefficacy, in order to agree on terms and state them clearly. CFSP it is a
progress and also underlies the creation of institutional, legal, or political mechanisms to
promote and implement common actions.
If the meaning of CFSP tried to be understood or questioned, there is no wrong or right
definition to everyone. These questions need to be evaluated: How integrated the CFSP? ,
How global it is? , How military capable it is? , How openly articulated or well defined it is? ,
How it can deal with immediate crisis? The possible answers will oppose to
intergovernmental view, then regional, to civilian… Besides, it reveals that, CFSP should
explained in a better sense and it conflict to pursue long term goals.
CFSP will have variety of trueness and precisions, also drawbacks. Integration of CFSP
may, for instance be in the interest of the European Union as an organization. What’s more,
small member states with little independence to loose but it could not be in the interest of
other states or outside the actors. This policy includes different ways of coordination and
integration. They would affect various actors in the political time. Thus affect the outcome of
negotiations, whether CFSP conducted in their interest and conflicting views will not
definitely be wrong. In the 2nd pillar CFSP remains almost intergovernmental. The
disagreement between the member states that backed foreign policy integration with European
community, despite this, it reflected unwillingness of a majority of member states, not only
Britain but also including French, to pool their national sovereignty and right of foreign policy
initiative to the commission.
The gains and profits of common foreign and security policy are not always accurately nor
obviously well suited. All members of the group, national interests or government preferences
have oriented to the point where the potential costs, minuses and risks of obligatory actions
are low. When constructivism has been evaluated as an explanation for further change and

9. transformation, it has stand on the behalf of liberal International Relations theory. It reaches
many of the same conclusions and in the same way.
Liberal institutionalism explained though the states which are primary actors that shapes
self-help a strategy for survival; in the sense of common interests exist, but are hard to
identify, absolute gains often enough and Collective action facilitated by institutions which
are; Institutions facilitate communication, Institutions provide agreed common rules,
Institutions facilitates monitoring and, Institutions provide mechanisms for sanctions. Thus,
the CFSP helps identify common interests. Because it can be understood within a dense
institutional structure and constant communication. For example, the CFSP generates trust
between the members (diffuse reciprocity), and also, CFSP facilitates a realization of common
interests, but national one.
Constructivists supported that states not necessarily most important actors and spill-over
occurred in integration for one area will incrementally lead to integration in other areas (but
not to high politics which supported by who cares most about national and international
security concerned issues. What’s more loyalty evaluated that; the actors involved will be
socialized into collective understanding. Besides, the common interests will be upgraded over
time in the constructivist view. CFSP has continued to develop over time despite the odds.
What’s more, foreign ministers and ambassadors meet more often in Brussels than they meet
with their national counterparts and it can be proved by converging policies on many foreign
policy issues where there were initially disagreements, For instance, in the areas of security
strategy and the Diplomatic Republic of Europe.
Constructivism sets forth a new debate perceiving the European Union as a power as far as
the external impact of the CFSP is concerned. Constructivist theory also, rejects the basic
assumption of neo-realist theory that the state of anarchy which lacks of a higher authority or
government is a structural condition inherent in the system of states. Within the rationalist
sense, the European Union cannot be considered as a security actor given the lack of its
military capability and military autonomy. At the most extreme, the European Union can be
conceptualized as a ‘soft security’ actor, but such a conception is not sufficient for rationalists
to describe the European Union as a security actor in the international sphere (Rieker, 8).
However, exogenous interest, neo liberal institutionalism depends on implicity on an identity
transformation in order to account for union’ cooperation maintenance. Moreover, clusters

10. theories which argue that international institutions play an important role in coordinating
international cooperation. Likewise, the preference between neo liberal institutionalism and
constructivism is not pragmatic and it is a kind of choice around explaining short term,
behavioral cooperation at the time, also it’s dependent on the communal cooperation in the
future. Yet, constructivists emphasize the normative power of the European Union with the
reasoning that the European Union has not only impacted the perception and agendas of the
national security actors and policies through the super state Brussels and Europeanization, but
also devised its security policy through which it addresses various internal and external threats
within the enhanced and multifaceted security agenda (Rieker, 1-18). CFSP is shared by
supranational institutions and member states, so it’s on the hands of bargaining powers of
member states. Furthermore, MSs preferences and identities diverge this concept. So, In
Normative institutionalism or so-called New Institutionalism MSs committed to ensuring the
Union’s political viability. Within the constructivist analyses, the ideational and normative
existence of the European Union, and the policies and actions of the Union have been
considered as tools that bring forth actor capability on behalf of the Union. Even CFSP is seen
as a dimension of federalism and it possess a drawing capacity on civilian and military assets.
As a matter of fact, Richard Young argues that the international presence of the European
Union has not only stemmed from the commitment of the European Union to normative
values, but the European Union has enshrined and implemented particular values and norms
in its external policy through promoting human rights, encouraging development in the Third
World with the principle of conditionality and exporting human rights and democracy through
membership perspective for the former Eastern European countries and humanitarian
assistance. Thus, he underlines that the sole focus shall not be the ideational/normative
presence of the European Union, but the social learning process in external relations in
discussing the international presence of the European Union (Richard Youngs, 415-35).
Given the variation in reacting to the external pressures by facing with international
conflicts, terrorist attacks or others related things the EU member states have different
interests in proceeding on the path to integrating their national foreign policies, which cannot
be properly explained by realism (Koenig-Archibugi 2004, M. E. Smith 2004: 20-21). These
differences and interests are cumulatively translated into the institutional built-up of the
CFSP. Clearly, although EU member states react to different international events in the way
they find appropriate and conform to their national interests respectively, this does not
automatically mean that the outcome is the smallest common denominator. What is true,

11. however, is that whatever the institutional outcome, this occurs as Liberal
Intergovernmentalism suggests according to the logic of asymmetric interdependence. This
‘simple logic of “asymmetrical interdependence” those who benefit the most from a policy
must sacrifice the most on the margin is the most profound factor shaping the negotiations’
(Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002: 3, Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003).
In short, constructivism brought up new concepts and a framework to security studies by
distancing themselves from the ‘materialist ontology’ and ‘rationalist explanations’. CFSP is
concerned through the constructivist way. Hence, it premises have been critical of the
rationalist approaches that have overlooked in the political, social and economic processes
framing the foreign and security policy and the impact of the it on member states’ identities,
interests and behaviors. From that like a perspective, the constructivist approach increases our
theoretical ability to grasp the incremental development of the CFSP and in deepening the
analysis of security and defense cooperation in Europe. ‘Open method of coordination’
(OMC) which means of, governance in the European Union, based on the voluntary
cooperation of its member states, and increasing sensitivity in many areas of EU internal
policy making to the implications of globalization, can be really seen as foreign and security
policy any longer as such a special area facing challenges and exogenous shocks. The
constructivist approach has also increased the understanding about not only the transformative
repercussions of the security policy on actors’ identity, preferences, incentives and interests
through socialization, communication social learning, as an ongoing process rather than a
static one, but also the widened security agenda.
If Neo Realist theories of IR try to evaluate CFSP, it needs to know firstly what Neo Realist
supported. The international system, at a particular way in time, may be characterized as
unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, developed by Kenneth Waltz. Waltz supported that,
‘balancing is not the aim of the state, balancing is a product of the aim to survive’. Thus,
states are considered as primary actors in an anarchic system and self-help a strategy for
survival. After that, the security for dilemma reveals that relative gains important and resulted
in a cooperation in high politics is unlikely, to form an alliances are temporary, and also,
balance of power will form in the international system. National interests will prevail that;
states will never trust each other enough to make the CFSP work. The EU members feel no
obligations which underlies that, CFSP is “unimportant”. It will be supported, around the

12. evidences of Iraq, UNSC, not existence of any European army. 5 Following a Neo-realist
thought, for example, the member states might wish to use the EU as their instrument to
balance the American power. This means that in a Rationalist view an EU foreign security
policy is likely to emerge only as long as it is in the member states interest to do so. However,
with references to the divisions over the Iraq war, as it mentioned the above, they would tend
to argue that the prospects for this to happen are weak. Moreover Neo- Realism rooted in
mistrusting relationship between nation states, which is a driving force of survival is the
primary factor influencing their behavior and in turn ensures to develop defensive or offensive
military capabilities. Because states can never be certain of other states' future intentions, to
be on guard against relative losses of power which could enable other states to threaten their
survival. This lack of trust, based on uncertainty, is called the security dilemma. (Culture
Relations: The Role of the State). Neo-realists also assume that states are rational, unitary
actors in their external behavior because when it comes to international relations and foreign
policy, all factions and organizations agree on the common goal of making the states as secure
as possible (Denny, Roy, 1998, China's Foreign Policy).
But according to Constructivists, it is not need to use a broader definition of security to
argue that the EU is a security actor. It will be examined these components a bit more in
detail. Some Constructivists thought that the European Union also has a significant military
capacity. Instead of comparing member states’ capacities to those of the US, they will look at
the EU as a different military power. They would, for example, argue that comparisons with
the US are of little value, and that what is interesting is rather to evaluate what the EU aims at
and what it is capable of doing (Ulriksen, 2004).
An EU security strategy was adopted identifying the main threats, the main strategic
objectives and also the policy implications for Europe. The basis for the EU’s common
foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains ‘soft’ power: the use of diplomacy - backed
where necessary by trade, aid and peacekeepers - to resolve conflicts and bring about
international understanding. It recognizes that the EU has made progress towards a coherent
foreign policy and effective crisis management, but it also stresses the need to make a
contribution that matches the EU’s potential. It argues that the EU needs to be more active,
more capable, and more coherent and be better at working with partners. It focuses on the
5
EUObserver.com, 1 December 2010

13. need for bringing together the various instruments and capabilities in order to meet the
identified threats. The approach presented in the strategy is one that fits the Constructivist
interest in comprehensive security.
Constructivist analysis of EU security policy will argue that the EU already has developed a
security policy. And they would argue that this has happened despite the fact that major
member states continue to have different positions in relation to some hot topics in
international politics. If compared Neo-realists and Constructivists views they both will argue
that the EU does not have any security policy. There are several units in this argument. First,
EU does not have much autonomy and EU is governed by the member states. Then, attempts
at building military capacities and to make more powerful security cooperation in the EU
have became unsuccessful and faced with failure. And finally, it is very difficult to perceive a
common threat that will promote the EU cooperation in the future.
Predict what will happen in the future. In fact, one is often surprised by the policy
developments. This means that it is important to avoid having too narrowed a theoretical
framework, which may prevent us from seeing developments that in the longer run might
transform European security.
To sum up, CFSP; a type of post- modern or extra- national foreign policy, lacking the key
control institutions and instruments characteristic of foreign policy based on statist or
modernist assumptions. What’s more, the boundary of CFSP is unclear and carries strong
unanswered questions of member states’ strong incentives whether it is a ‘governance without
governance’. Although a formal involvement of commission in the process, the CFSP
remained essentially constructivist in inspiration and dependent on divergent interests of
member states. It remains as a major force of the EU in the international arena, by taking
further possibility of QMV and also pulls budgetary stabilization. Besides, searching for
legitimacy, MSs preferences and desire for environmental stabilization are successively laired
or overlaid by reflecting the ideas institutions and policy. A number of interlinked ideas in the
CFSP is framing and reframing of the policy space. As a result, the outcome is a formal post-
modern foreign policy detached from modernist thoughts and think tanks of territoriality, of
central governmental control and of the deployment of hard policy tools. It is important to
clarify CFSP which includes policy areas dominated by the Member States that the paper
defines EU foreign policy as the set of policies adopted by the Union's Member States to

14. address issues and manage relationships beyond their collective external border. Hence it
requires unanimous support and subjected to veto by a single Member State. And because the
EU has adopted relatively few Common Strategies that opposed to the more frequent
Common Positions and Joint Actions, the vast majority of policies especially about security
and related issues are adopted by unanimous agreement of the Member States. Reciprocal
relationship between CFSP and national foreign policies and the transforming capacity of the
CFSP offers conclusion about vis-à-vis national foreign policies, and including their
‘Europeanization’ process.6
The expansion of common foreign and security policy has been started since early
1970s. However, this is totally different from other European Union policies which contain
sensitive issues for member states. All policies of European Union requires common attitudes
and also obligation between member states that emerge major challenge. Because of that
problem , the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) attempted to reorganize these
institutional forms into a compatible policy process. On the other hand , Common Foreign
and Security policy has not been yet a supranational issue for member state altough between
1970s and 1980s under the European political co-operation ( EPC ) has seen important
process toward multi-level governance of EU foreign policy however the issues are limited
because states do not want to transfer their sovereignty to multi- level governance as
intergovernmentalism assert that . The objectives of intergovernmentalism protect and
promote security and European integration should be driven by interest and actions of nation
– state. Hoffmen who is significant representative of intergovernmentalism criticise neo-
functionalism and according to him ‘spill over is not a proven fact ‘
‘In spite of a continuous support for the neofunctionalist tenet, recurrent crisis within the EC’s
summits, deadlocked meetings within the Council of Ministers and the discordant relation
between the UK and the rest of the Community had strongly shaken the neofunctionalist
arguments. (Laffan, Mazey 2006, 40) Stanley Hoffmann through his intergovernmentalist
6
Ben Tonra, Constructing the CFSP: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach, Vol.41

15. critique of the neofunctionalist approach emphasized the importance of the national
governments and their roles in shaping the EC’s structure. He underlined that national
governments would always endorse their interests within a broader system. In order to show
the limits of the functional method, Hoffman argued that, in fact, it was the logic of
diversity which prevailed and limited the spillover effects of the neofunctionalist theory.
Hoffmann clearly highlighted the dichotomy between low politics, which comprises areas
such the economic and welfare policies and the vital national interests or high politics such as
foreign policy, security and defense, where national governments are less willing to
transfer their authority to a supranational body. National governments would try to minimize
uncertainty and retain tight control over decision processes when vital interests are
involved.’(Smith, 2003) 7
‘in order to support the intergovernamentalist perspective it should be mentioned that state
representatives are the only legally recognized signatories of the treaties of the EU. “Treaty
making is the realm of negotiation among national leaders, the national veto, and side-
payments to bring recalcitrant national governments on board.” (Marks 1996, 352) To back up
the intergovernmentalist tenet it is interesting to notice how ardently the MS wished to
preserve their own cultural, political and constitutional features, a point clearly made in Art.
(1), Treaty of the European Union: “The Union shall respect the national identities of MS,
whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy”. (Chryssochoou,
Tsinisizelis 1999, 14) This “respect for the national identity” is very well preserved especially
in key moments when intergovernmental decisions are taken under unanimity, during the
treaty-amending negotiations or when dealing with decisions in the European Council. By and
large, these kinds of decision are relevant for the second and third pillar of the EU, the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and for fostering cooperation within the Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar. (Wiener, Diez, 2004: 83) With regards to CFSP, the
intergovernmentalist bargaining is more than obvious if we take into account that “there is a
usual great sensitivity among most governments about foreign policy as a special domain in
which national concerns dominate international or European interests” (Smith, 2000:
614). In comparison to the EU’s first pillar (European Communities pillar) where Brussels has
the capacity to impose explicit demands on its members in the form of treaty articles,
7
The framing of European foreign and security policy: towards a postmodern policy framework?- William Smith 2003

16. secondary legislation, court cases in different socio-economic areas of the integration project,
CFSP doesnot have the competence to impose change on MS foreign policies.’8
What ’ s more, according to intergovernmentalism , Common Foreign and Security
Policy will be last institutional form of European integration. The reason of this argument is
the key points of foreign and security ; information-sharing, norms, and organisations. In
deed, in intergovernmentlist perpective , common foreign and security policy is more than
integration which is also supported by Smith and he claim that "it is also clear that the specific
institutional reforms of EU foreign policy resulting from these events largely reflected
endogenous, path-dependent process"
Intergovernmental paradigm has been predominant since 1980s when the limits of neo
– functionalist became clear that emphisizes national interest, lowest – common –
denominator deals , bargaining and unwillingness of state. The different view of neo –
functionalist and intergovernmentalism seperated especially in the perspective which is
common foreign and security policy. According to neo – functionalist, the process will be step
by step (some kind of political spill over ) Neo functionalist expecte that custom union
emerge single market and single market led the pressure to monetary union which is
completed and monetary union evokes all member states to democratization process which
means common interest and common foreign and security policy became a major issue for
whole european to support common interest which is shared by each member state. Thus , EU
elites support this spillover in order to get more economic advantages which are one of the
key element of neo- functionalism. However, this is not acceptable each situation. For
instance, in 1960s France did not support streghtened European Commision rule or increasing
use of majority voting with claiming it is opposite according to their national interest. On the
other hand , in 1970s the idea of single market was promoted by states but oil crisis boomed
and in middle east wars started again, states started to criticise this integration for their
national interest that is to say development of common foreign and security policy sacrifizing
their national soverneigty or decision making process of all member states on security and
foreign policy could be achieved in really long term. However, in neo – functionalist
perpective , full integration shoul be for interfering all problems. For instance, while
economic crisis occurs , the attitude of member states can change altough normally they agree
8
The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European Integration
Process, Teodor Lucian Moga , 2009

17. on economic integration . Thus , non – developed common view on foreign and security
issues , states can renounce when a position emerged which is opposite to their interest.
The starting point of explaining member states , economic interdependence is
fundamental concept for neo – functionalist and liberal intergovermentalism. On the other
hand , the differences between intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism is
given importance of economic issues . Moreover, liberal intergovernmentalism predicts that
constitutional powers will remain with the member states, while neo-functionalism would
expect an ever increasing role for supranational institutions. The intergovernmentalism and
liberal intergovernmentalism have still been a effective on common foreign and security
policy. However , the perspectine of these approaches criticizes in some way.’ The European
divisions over the Iraq war only serve to highlight this point. Europe re-mains divided, while
the U.S. rules. Moreover and whatever the version of realism one adheres to, balancing is to
be expected as the standard behaviour of nation-states. Balancing in a one-super-power world,
however, requires pooling resources and building alliances. From this perspective, one would
expect the EU to get its act together in foreign and security affairs in order to build a counter-
weight to U.S. power. Second, it is wrong that European states are not prepared to give up
sovereignty in the realm of security and defense. Most EU member states are also members of
the NATO alliance. While NATO is an intergovernmental organization built on the consensus
rule when it comes to decision-making, it features a completely integrated military structure.
Once decisions have been made with regard to war and peace, German and other troops of
NATO members are prepared to die under the command of U.S., British, or French generals.
In the post-Cold War environment, this is no longer hypothetical, but routinely the case in
Bosnia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Moreover and perhaps more important, there is no
agreement among EU member states that giving up sovereignty in the realm of foreign and
defense affairs constitutes a bad idea. Rather, roughly two thirds of the current EU member
states – let alone their populations – would be more than willing to supranationalize and to
communitarize external security and national defense. Thus, intergovernmentalism only
seems to apply to some countries such as the United Kingdom. To put it differently: If we
want to account for the puzzle of European foreign and security policy, we must explain the
variation among EU member states with regard to their preparedness to communitarize
defense affairs. ‘9
9
Neo-functionalism , European Identity , and the Puzzles of European Integration , Thomas RISSE ,2004

18. In addition , the preferences of member states about common foreing and security
issues change according to their structure -constitutional preferences- , for instance , ’
Germany has been more than willing to give up national sovereignty in favor of strengthened
European integration , in contrast , The United Kingdom , inspite of all recent efforts at
regional devolution. With the one exception of Margret Thatcher’s endorsement of qualified
major-ity voting during the negotiations leading up to the Single European Act, British
leaders have con-sistently rejected strengthening supranational institutions of the EU. The
British dominant discourse – whether among the political elites or in the mass media –
strongly emphasizes intergovernmen-talism (Marcussen et al. 1999) ‘ 10 These examples
conclude that , federal and unitary states have different view on transfering sovereignty
because federal member states consistently favor federal solutions for the institutional make-
up of the EU, while unitary member states usually prefer strengthening the intergovernmental
pillar. Markus Jachtenfuchs explained in detail, there is a clear correlation between a member
state’s constitutional tradition and its preferences for institutional solutions at the EU level .
Federally organized member states which are used to share sovereignty among the various
levels of territorial governance are more than willing to give up sovereignty when it comes to
the EU.The responce of member state who had federal system is normal and generally support
federal institutionalism in EU . The Federal Republic of Germany is perhaps the most
significant example in this context. Its cooperative federalism is based on the principle of
shared sovereignty between the federal level and the Laender (Börzel, 2002)
New institutionalism reflect features of issue in European Union and important to
understand basic parts of it that are; historical institutionalism, rational choice
institutionalism and socioligical institutionalism. If the berief analysis of these new
institutionalisms examine, one could say about Historical Institutionalism, it pay less
attention to question that was how institutions affect the behavior, it focus on the step of
situation which means reflection of causal chain through which institution affect behavior. At
the same time rational choice institutonalism , refers that institutions and individuals are
significant concept in order to understand system. Because decision – making and outcomes is
crucial to obtain more benefit from relations which related with human motivation of action,
decision, preferences and choices. On the other hand, sociological institutionalism underlines
the impotance of ‘cognitive script, categories and models that are indispensible for action’ (
Hall & Taylor, 1996 ) As we think this theoratical approaches in common foreign and security
10
The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European Integration
Process, Teodor Lucian Moga , 2009

19. policy, it is not possible to divide theese three approaches in order to understand the system of
CFSP. Because it contains logical steps in there, on the other hand Hall and Taylor explain the
relation between instiution and individual ‘ highly – interactive and mutually – constitutive
character’. This issue cause a clash among states but also create ‘historical efficiency ‘
Because each step help people and they are learning from experience, the best example is Post
– Maastricht period as an evidence, new institutional structure is shaped by necessity, on the
other hand , it creates historical inefficiency because it could not answer which way should be
used for learning from experience. Moreover, it is necessary to mention that new
institutionalism is suitable in order to analysis CFSP which includes intergovernmentalism
(unanimity in decision – making ) transgovernmentalism ( formed through direct contacts
between foreign minister of member states ) and supranationalism. Following these features,
CFSP does not have own budget, office holder, bureucracy and also legal enforcement.
There are lots of debates on European Union when one start to explain . the common
explanation for the EU’s alleged incompetence is primarily its lack of military capabilities and
secondarily its insufficient institutional capacity. Some scholars argues that European Union
is good at especially ‘ soft power ‘ , however, they also claimed that European Union contain
possibility to achieve more than it which mentions security policy. ‘ This account implicitly
rests upon a widespread ‘actor-environment’ understanding of the international system: The
actors of global politics are primarily states, which are characterised by distinct properties,
such as the monopoly of legitimate force and the disposability of military power. The
environment of global politics is the anarchic international system. The corollary is that
security problems are primarily associated with the interaction of clearly separated
communities being organised in states. This ‘methodological nationalism’ (Beck 1997: 44-45)
reversely suggests that inter-state war and military interventions represent the essential threats
to peace and security.’ The quotation indicates us , European Union has not been an actor yet
in international system because of the lack of military capabilities and insufficient
institutional capacity , because each state has different wealth on military. Thus , effect of
enlargement became an significant debate for each therotical approach . The open disarray
over Iraq prompted many to write off the CFSP as an impossible dream. If 15 member states
could not agree, how could 25 possibly agree? What would be the common interests in a
Union stretching from Finland to Cyprus and from Portugal to Estonia? Some analysts
proposed that the EU should only concentrate on its immediate neighbourhood and forget

20. about a global role. Others suggested that reinforced cooperation was the only way forward.
( Frazer CAMERON, ANTOINETTE PRIMATAROVA: 1999 ) 11 Because of the
enlargement, member states ( especially 15 member states ) display considerable
heterogeneity in foreign and security policy who do not support long – term decision on
common foreign and security policy especially after Iraqi war. Therefore, European Union
could not speak one voice to became a significant power in international system .’ Therefore,
most of the large member states claimed the process and development of foreign and security
policy in intergovernmental basis, on the other hand, the US has traditionally been a
supporter of a more integrated Europe and pressured the EU to speak with one voice. But as
the EU has become a more active and vocal global player, the government in Washington has
seemed to have doubts about the benefits of a common EU voice, particularly when the voice
may be opposing the US! ‘. ( Frazer CAMERON, Antoinette PRIMATAROVA, 1999: 7-8 )
‘The accession countries have had several years of shadowing the CFSP and until the
Iraq crisis, there were no major difficulties. The International Criminal Court (ICC),
however, posed a problem as several accession states were subjected to pressure by the US to
sign bilateral agreements that exclude US service personnel from ICC jurisdiction. But this
problem was partly caused by the lack of a common position within the EU.
During the period of shadowing the CFSP, the accession states normally gave
unqualified and disinterested support to the Union. Their priorities were the accession
negotiations and the adoption of the acquis. Furthermore, what they were invited to do by the
Union was hardly onerous: align themselves with EU declarations and démarches; join EU
collaborative actions and common positions. In practice, the CFSP meant for the candidate
countries mainly rhetoric rather than action.
Some candidates had trouble with the bureaucratic changes required. Regarding the
positions of ‘political director’ and ‘European correspondent’ needed for participation in
different CFSP meetings and working groups, many candidate countries were slow to make
the necessary changes and appointments in their Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs). In
establishing new positions to deal with the CFSP structures, the candidates were
experiencing similar problems to the turf battles of previous years in the MFAs of member
states.’
11
ENLARGEMENT, CFSP AND THE CONVENTION THE ROLE OF THE ACCESSION STATES, Frazer CAMERON,
ANTOINETTE PRIMATAROVA: 1999 )

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23. LINKS
http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=40&article=
59
http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/95/
http://www.digilib.ui.ac.id/opac/themes/libri2/detail.jsp?id=89691