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System Support for Rapid
     Recovery and Attack
             Resistance

          A Friday ATC-NY Talk by
                    Todd Deshane
Overview


  Motivation

  Goals

  Background

  Architecture

  Evaluation

  Plan of Work
Motivation


   Computers on the Internet are vulnerable
     Even with latest updates and virus definitions
        Zero day exploits
   Malware effects
     User data compromised
     System controlled by attacker
   Restoration of system and user data
     Time-consuming
     Difficult for users
     Not always possible (i.e. digital photos)
Motivation

"New methods are being invented, new tricks, and every year it gets
worse... We are losing the battle... Most companies don't know they
have been attacked."
- Bruce Schneier


"The average top executive doesn't understand security, but we have to
change that... Security is an imperative. It's no longer just a good idea."
- Allen Kerr


"Virus incidences had surged between 2003, when they detected just
over 10,000, and 2006, when they found 80,000. Criminal activity
accounted for most of that increase."
- Kaspersky Labs
Motivation

"Very sophisticated tools are commercially available in black markets...
This has made [the Internet] more attractive for organized crime:
[criminals] no longer have to be geeks."
- James Lewis

"Although security awareness continues to improve, hackers and
malicious code authors are releasing threats faster than ever before,
with approximately 200 per cent more malicious threats per day than two
years ago."
- Stuart McClure (2006)

"Over one third [of IT Companies] were hit by a denial-of-service attack
while over 44 percent had experienced either a pharming or cache
poisoning attack."
- 2007 Secure64 Survey
Motivation




                       Ooooh! I got some pics from my buddy
                                       Joe :)




John is a typical desktop user that uses his computer to
communicate with friends on IM and email, and surf the web.
Without the Rapid Recovery System


      010010000100000101000011010010110100010101


        Credit Card Numbers, Email Contacts, Passwords
With the Rapid Recovery System




John tries to load the pictures in his photo VM, but the action is
denied, since the “pics” are actually executables. An error
message is displayed to John.
With the Rapid Recovery System




John really wants to see the pics, so he ignores the error and
copies the “pics” to his Internet VM and clicks on them. The
executable runs and it instantly tries to run its built-in IRC server
and starts scanning for personal data.
With the Rapid Recovery System




Either of these actions cause the Internet VM to be reset. The
built-in firewall of the Rapid Recovery System disallows the
Internet VM to create a server. An error message appears when
the Internet VM restarts. John finds out that these were not pics.
THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE
Scenario: Open an attachment containing a mass emailing virus

                Without the Rapid Recovery System


    Notice a slow down of the machine, unsure of cause.
    Reboot machine, still slow.
    Look in process list, attempt to kill suspicious process,
    regenerates itself.
    Call tech support, make an appointment to take the computer to
    be fixed.
    Newest backup is 1 month old, some recent reports and
    pictures lost.
    3 weeks later get the machine back with the OS re-installed.
THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE
Scenario: Open an attachment containing a mass emailing virus

                With the Rapid Recovery System


    The attachment is written into the email log.
    The NET-VM flags a violation of the network contract and
    pauses the VM.
    The system asks the user if they want to rollback to the last
    known good image.
    Rollback and remount personal data store.
    Some system data (logs, etc.) in VM appliance is lost, but no
    personal data is lost.
    The machine is back in working order in less than 1 hour.
THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE
Scenario: Surf to the wrong website

              Without the Rapid Recovery System


    A malicious program scans the hard drive for credit card
    numbers.
    The user does not notice any sign of trouble.
    The program sends out a small amount of data containing the
    information discovered.
    The program installs a backdoor for later use by the attacker.
THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE
Scenario: Surf to the wrong website

                With the Rapid Recovery System


    The malicious programs begins to read the hard drive for credit
    card numbers.
    The FS-VM triggers a violation of the data access contract and
    pauses the VM.
    The system asks the user if they want to rollback to the last
    known good image.
    Rollback and remount personal data store.
    The scan is not completed, the information is not sent, the
    backdoor is prevented.
THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE
Scenario: Install a required software update

                 Without the Rapid Recovery System


    After the update, several applications cannot find some required
    components.
    The user calls tech support and they confirm the problems with
    the patch.
    The best recommendation is to completely uninstall and re-
    install the applications.
    It takes a few hours to assemble the installation media, to find
    the product keys, and to follow the instructions.
THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE
Scenario: Install a required software update

                 With the Rapid Recovery System


    After the update, several applications cannot find some required
    components.
    The user calls tech support and they confirm the problems with
    the patch.
    The user decides to rollback to the last known good image.
    The machine is back up in running in minutes.
Goals


  Provide attack resistance and rapid recovery

  Isolate and protect user data from attacks

  Provide automatic and user-triggered checkpoints

  Safe testing of system and application updates

  Facilitate forensic analysis
Background: Security


  Early Internet based on openness/trust
  First documented Internet worm – 1988
  Malware: large scale problem – late 1990s
  Criminal malware networks (botnets)
     DDOS, digital blackmail, account/credit info
  Attack defenses
     Antivirus software
     Firewalls
     Intrusion detection systems
Background: Virtualization


  Virtual Machine Monitor
     Pioneered by IBM
     Software/hardware co-evolution
  Intel VT and AMD-V
     Software/hardware co-evolution (again)
     Next generation virtualization hardware
  Xen hypervisor (VMM)
     Paravirtual guests (i.e. Linux, *BSD)
     HVM guests (i.e. Microsoft Windows)
Background: Virtualization+Security


  VMs used as sandboxes
  VMs can be monitored from below
  System security and fault tolerance
     Replicate system state to a backup VM
     Secure logging and replay
     Backtracking intrusions
     Safe testing/integration of untrusted code
     Protection against root kits
Background: System Reset Facilities


  DeepFreeze
     Restore to trusted checkpoint on each boot
  Windows System Restore
     Keep checkpoints of system state for rollback
  Both of these lack:
     User data protection/rollback
     Attack prevention/detection
System Architecture
                                                Isolated Network
      FS-VM




          Management
                                                 VMA 1          VMA 2      VMA N




                                  Management
                                               Internal Network



                       Domain 0                    Management     NET-VM

                            Xen Hypervisor
       Disk                   Hardware                                   NIC


                                                                        Internet
Benefits

  Intrusion detection and attack prevention

  Protection of user data

  Checkpoint and restart of virtual machine appliances

  Rapid first time installation

  Model for software distribution

  Complement and enhance backups
Evaluation

  Resistance/protection against attacks
     Categorize attacks
     Defense strategies against attacks

  Performance overhead
     Overhead of virtualization technology
     Overhead of file system virtual machine
Evaluation: Attacks

  Backdoor attacks
     Initiate/listen for connections
     Send and receive data
  Malicious attacks
     Copy infected executables to shared folders
     Attempt to destroy data
  Spyware attacks
     Harvest email addresses and other personal data
  Vulnerability attacks
     Exploit vulnerability in specific server software
Evaluation: Defenses


  Block unused ports
     Backdoor attacks can't access the Internet
     Vulnerable services are not running
  Restrictions on read, write, and/or append access
     Malicious attacks can't write/delete user data
     Spyware attacks can't read user data
  Detect unexpected behavior and rollback
     Anomalies raise errors/warnings
     Prompt user or automatic rollback
Evaluation: Performance
Plan of Work

  Construction and integration of a separate NET-VM
  component
  Tight integration of NET-VM and FS-VM into virtual
  machine support layer of Xen
  A comprehensive virtual machine appliance contract
  system
  Evaluation of system
     Performance
     Functionality
System Architecture
                                                Isolated Network
      FS-VM




          Management
                                                 VMA 1          VMA 2      VMA N




                                  Management
                                               Internal Network



                       Domain 0                    Management     NET-VM

                            Xen Hypervisor
       Disk                   Hardware                                   NIC


                                                                        Internet
Plan: Construct and Integrate NET-VM


  Network Intrusion Detection System (snort)
  Firewall (iptables)
  Xen driver domain
Plan: Xen Support for NET-VM/FS-VM

  NET-VM already possible (driver domain)
  FS-VM granted file system access/control
  Xen communicates rules to NET-VM and FS-VM
  when new domain created
  NET-VM and FS-VM detect violations
     Violations enforced/communicated to Xen
     Appropriate actions taken by Xen
       Shutdown
       Restart
       Restore guest
       Notify user
       Prepare guest for forensic analysis
Plan: Comprehensive Contract System


  Virtual machine appliance contracts
     Specify the behavior of appliances
       Network access
       File system access
  Use existing NIDS and firewall rules
  Build upon existing Xen configuration file
     Add file system and network rule support
Plan: Evaluation of Modified System

  Performance
     I/O: read, write
     Network: send, receive
     CPU overhead
  Functionality
     Resistance to attack
     Recovery from attack
  Construct virtual machine appliances
Related/Proposed Projects at Clarkson

  Log-Structured File System (LFS) for FS-VM
     Enable rollback of writes with LFS
  Isolation testing of virtualization systems
     Performance isolation testing methodology and results
  Power testing of virtualization systems
     Recommend/improve power-friendly VMMs
  Tools for forensic analysis
     Capture/export compromised VM
     Recommend defense strategies
  Tools for contract inspection
     Visualize access granted by contract
Questions/Comments?
Backup Slides




  This won't fit in the presentation, but if there are
    questions, some of these slides might help
Virtualization Motivation Backup Slides




     More virtualization basics and why to use
                   virtualization
Terminology


  Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM)
     Also know as: hypervisor
     Thin software layer between the hardware and “guest”
     operating system
     First to the hardware
  Examples of VMMs:
     VMware, Xen, Parallels, Z/vm, MS Viridian, Qemu,
     KVM, ...
VMM with a Picture
Virtualization Predictions


   9 of 10 enterprises will have virtualization by 2007 -
   Yankee Group (August 2007)
   Physical servers growth near zero within 2012 -
   Bernstein (August 2007)
   Over 50% physical servers will be virtualized in 2011 -
   IDC (July 2007)
   Virtualization services market to reach $11.7 billion by
   2011 - IDC (July 2007)
   Server market to hardly grow over 2% annually
   through 2011 because of virtualization - IDC (July
   2007)
Virtualization Predictions

   25% of enterprise data center servers to be virtual by
   2010 - Intel (July 2007)
   A Microsoft hypervisor for Vista expected in mid-2009
   - Gartner (July 2007)
   Virtualization will be part of nearly every aspect of IT
   by 2015 – Gartner (May 2007)
   3 million virtual machines expected in 2009 - Gartner
   (May 2007)
Virtualization Predictions

   Virtualization and multicore will cost $2.4 billion in
   customer spending between 2006 and 2010 - IDC
   (March 2007)
   OS Virtualization to become mainstream by 2010 -
   Gartner (December 2006)
   Virtualization market to grow to $15 billion worldwide
   by 2009 - IDC (October 2006)
Performance Backup Slides




          Xen vs. VMware performance
System Performance
Guest Configuration File Backup Slides




             More details of the syntax
Plan: File System Rule Language


 # Example file system rule set for an email client.

 fs_rule = [ 'id=1, read, 1024, 5' ]
 # read at most 1024 bytes of data in 5 seconds

 fs_rule = [ 'id=2, append, 1024, 3' ]
 # append at most 1024 bytes of data in 3 seconds.

 fs_rule = [ 'id=3, write, 320, 3' ]
 # write at most 320 bytes in 3 seconds

 # The email mount point is accessible to the email client, and fs_rules

 # with id=1 and id=2 are applied
 disk = [ 'fsvm:/mnt/email, /home/user/mail,fs_rule=1:2' ]

 # The email mount point is accessible to the email client, and fs_rules
 # with id=1 and id=3 are applied.
 disk = [ 'fsvm:/mnt/email, /home/user/attachments,fs_rule=1:3' ]
Plan: Network Rule Language




 #Email client example continued

 network_rule = ['id=1, iptables, file=/etc/iptables/email_client']

 network_rule = ['id=2, snort, file=/etc/snort/rules/email_client']

 vif = [ 'rate=2Mb/s, network_rule=1:2' ]
Attacks Backup Slides




      More details/example attacks looked at
Evaluation of Prototype: Attacks


  Category/Behavior: Backdoor attacks initiate and
  listen for connections to send and receive data
  Examples: W32.MyDoom, W32.Bagel
  Defenses:
     Block unused ports
     Detect unexpected behavior and rollback to trusted
     image
Evaluation of Prototype: Attacks

  Category/Behavior: Attacks that copy infected
  executables to shared folders or attempt to destroy
  data
  Examples: W32.Netsky, W32.Netad
  Defenses:
     Restrictions on write access to personal data
     Detect unexpected behavior and rollback to trusted
     image
Evaluation of Prototype: Attacks

  Category/Behavior: Attacks that harvest email
  addresses and other personal data
  Examples: W32.Zafi.D, PWSteal.Ldpinch.E
  Defenses:
     Restrictions on read access to personal data
     Detect unexpected behavior and rollback to trusted
     image
Evaluation of Prototype: Attacks

  Category/Behavior: Attacks that exploit vulnerability in
  specific server software
  Examples: MySQL UDF, Blaster, Slammer
  Defenses:
     Block unused ports (if not running the server software)
     Detect unexpected behavior and rollback to trusted
     image (if running the server software)
Atc ny friday-talk_slides_20080808

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Atc ny friday-talk_slides_20080808

  • 1. System Support for Rapid Recovery and Attack Resistance A Friday ATC-NY Talk by Todd Deshane
  • 2. Overview Motivation Goals Background Architecture Evaluation Plan of Work
  • 3. Motivation Computers on the Internet are vulnerable Even with latest updates and virus definitions Zero day exploits Malware effects User data compromised System controlled by attacker Restoration of system and user data Time-consuming Difficult for users Not always possible (i.e. digital photos)
  • 4. Motivation "New methods are being invented, new tricks, and every year it gets worse... We are losing the battle... Most companies don't know they have been attacked." - Bruce Schneier "The average top executive doesn't understand security, but we have to change that... Security is an imperative. It's no longer just a good idea." - Allen Kerr "Virus incidences had surged between 2003, when they detected just over 10,000, and 2006, when they found 80,000. Criminal activity accounted for most of that increase." - Kaspersky Labs
  • 5. Motivation "Very sophisticated tools are commercially available in black markets... This has made [the Internet] more attractive for organized crime: [criminals] no longer have to be geeks." - James Lewis "Although security awareness continues to improve, hackers and malicious code authors are releasing threats faster than ever before, with approximately 200 per cent more malicious threats per day than two years ago." - Stuart McClure (2006) "Over one third [of IT Companies] were hit by a denial-of-service attack while over 44 percent had experienced either a pharming or cache poisoning attack." - 2007 Secure64 Survey
  • 6. Motivation Ooooh! I got some pics from my buddy Joe :) John is a typical desktop user that uses his computer to communicate with friends on IM and email, and surf the web.
  • 7. Without the Rapid Recovery System 010010000100000101000011010010110100010101 Credit Card Numbers, Email Contacts, Passwords
  • 8. With the Rapid Recovery System John tries to load the pictures in his photo VM, but the action is denied, since the “pics” are actually executables. An error message is displayed to John.
  • 9. With the Rapid Recovery System John really wants to see the pics, so he ignores the error and copies the “pics” to his Internet VM and clicks on them. The executable runs and it instantly tries to run its built-in IRC server and starts scanning for personal data.
  • 10. With the Rapid Recovery System Either of these actions cause the Internet VM to be reset. The built-in firewall of the Rapid Recovery System disallows the Internet VM to create a server. An error message appears when the Internet VM restarts. John finds out that these were not pics.
  • 11. THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE Scenario: Open an attachment containing a mass emailing virus Without the Rapid Recovery System Notice a slow down of the machine, unsure of cause. Reboot machine, still slow. Look in process list, attempt to kill suspicious process, regenerates itself. Call tech support, make an appointment to take the computer to be fixed. Newest backup is 1 month old, some recent reports and pictures lost. 3 weeks later get the machine back with the OS re-installed.
  • 12. THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE Scenario: Open an attachment containing a mass emailing virus With the Rapid Recovery System The attachment is written into the email log. The NET-VM flags a violation of the network contract and pauses the VM. The system asks the user if they want to rollback to the last known good image. Rollback and remount personal data store. Some system data (logs, etc.) in VM appliance is lost, but no personal data is lost. The machine is back in working order in less than 1 hour.
  • 13. THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE Scenario: Surf to the wrong website Without the Rapid Recovery System A malicious program scans the hard drive for credit card numbers. The user does not notice any sign of trouble. The program sends out a small amount of data containing the information discovered. The program installs a backdoor for later use by the attacker.
  • 14. THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE Scenario: Surf to the wrong website With the Rapid Recovery System The malicious programs begins to read the hard drive for credit card numbers. The FS-VM triggers a violation of the data access contract and pauses the VM. The system asks the user if they want to rollback to the last known good image. Rollback and remount personal data store. The scan is not completed, the information is not sent, the backdoor is prevented.
  • 15. THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE Scenario: Install a required software update Without the Rapid Recovery System After the update, several applications cannot find some required components. The user calls tech support and they confirm the problems with the patch. The best recommendation is to completely uninstall and re- install the applications. It takes a few hours to assemble the installation media, to find the product keys, and to follow the instructions.
  • 16. THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE Scenario: Install a required software update With the Rapid Recovery System After the update, several applications cannot find some required components. The user calls tech support and they confirm the problems with the patch. The user decides to rollback to the last known good image. The machine is back up in running in minutes.
  • 17. Goals Provide attack resistance and rapid recovery Isolate and protect user data from attacks Provide automatic and user-triggered checkpoints Safe testing of system and application updates Facilitate forensic analysis
  • 18. Background: Security Early Internet based on openness/trust First documented Internet worm – 1988 Malware: large scale problem – late 1990s Criminal malware networks (botnets) DDOS, digital blackmail, account/credit info Attack defenses Antivirus software Firewalls Intrusion detection systems
  • 19. Background: Virtualization Virtual Machine Monitor Pioneered by IBM Software/hardware co-evolution Intel VT and AMD-V Software/hardware co-evolution (again) Next generation virtualization hardware Xen hypervisor (VMM) Paravirtual guests (i.e. Linux, *BSD) HVM guests (i.e. Microsoft Windows)
  • 20. Background: Virtualization+Security VMs used as sandboxes VMs can be monitored from below System security and fault tolerance Replicate system state to a backup VM Secure logging and replay Backtracking intrusions Safe testing/integration of untrusted code Protection against root kits
  • 21. Background: System Reset Facilities DeepFreeze Restore to trusted checkpoint on each boot Windows System Restore Keep checkpoints of system state for rollback Both of these lack: User data protection/rollback Attack prevention/detection
  • 22. System Architecture Isolated Network FS-VM Management VMA 1 VMA 2 VMA N Management Internal Network Domain 0 Management NET-VM Xen Hypervisor Disk Hardware NIC Internet
  • 23. Benefits Intrusion detection and attack prevention Protection of user data Checkpoint and restart of virtual machine appliances Rapid first time installation Model for software distribution Complement and enhance backups
  • 24. Evaluation Resistance/protection against attacks Categorize attacks Defense strategies against attacks Performance overhead Overhead of virtualization technology Overhead of file system virtual machine
  • 25. Evaluation: Attacks Backdoor attacks Initiate/listen for connections Send and receive data Malicious attacks Copy infected executables to shared folders Attempt to destroy data Spyware attacks Harvest email addresses and other personal data Vulnerability attacks Exploit vulnerability in specific server software
  • 26. Evaluation: Defenses Block unused ports Backdoor attacks can't access the Internet Vulnerable services are not running Restrictions on read, write, and/or append access Malicious attacks can't write/delete user data Spyware attacks can't read user data Detect unexpected behavior and rollback Anomalies raise errors/warnings Prompt user or automatic rollback
  • 28. Plan of Work Construction and integration of a separate NET-VM component Tight integration of NET-VM and FS-VM into virtual machine support layer of Xen A comprehensive virtual machine appliance contract system Evaluation of system Performance Functionality
  • 29. System Architecture Isolated Network FS-VM Management VMA 1 VMA 2 VMA N Management Internal Network Domain 0 Management NET-VM Xen Hypervisor Disk Hardware NIC Internet
  • 30. Plan: Construct and Integrate NET-VM Network Intrusion Detection System (snort) Firewall (iptables) Xen driver domain
  • 31. Plan: Xen Support for NET-VM/FS-VM NET-VM already possible (driver domain) FS-VM granted file system access/control Xen communicates rules to NET-VM and FS-VM when new domain created NET-VM and FS-VM detect violations Violations enforced/communicated to Xen Appropriate actions taken by Xen Shutdown Restart Restore guest Notify user Prepare guest for forensic analysis
  • 32. Plan: Comprehensive Contract System Virtual machine appliance contracts Specify the behavior of appliances Network access File system access Use existing NIDS and firewall rules Build upon existing Xen configuration file Add file system and network rule support
  • 33. Plan: Evaluation of Modified System Performance I/O: read, write Network: send, receive CPU overhead Functionality Resistance to attack Recovery from attack Construct virtual machine appliances
  • 34. Related/Proposed Projects at Clarkson Log-Structured File System (LFS) for FS-VM Enable rollback of writes with LFS Isolation testing of virtualization systems Performance isolation testing methodology and results Power testing of virtualization systems Recommend/improve power-friendly VMMs Tools for forensic analysis Capture/export compromised VM Recommend defense strategies Tools for contract inspection Visualize access granted by contract
  • 36.
  • 37. Backup Slides This won't fit in the presentation, but if there are questions, some of these slides might help
  • 38. Virtualization Motivation Backup Slides More virtualization basics and why to use virtualization
  • 39. Terminology Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) Also know as: hypervisor Thin software layer between the hardware and “guest” operating system First to the hardware Examples of VMMs: VMware, Xen, Parallels, Z/vm, MS Viridian, Qemu, KVM, ...
  • 40. VMM with a Picture
  • 41. Virtualization Predictions 9 of 10 enterprises will have virtualization by 2007 - Yankee Group (August 2007) Physical servers growth near zero within 2012 - Bernstein (August 2007) Over 50% physical servers will be virtualized in 2011 - IDC (July 2007) Virtualization services market to reach $11.7 billion by 2011 - IDC (July 2007) Server market to hardly grow over 2% annually through 2011 because of virtualization - IDC (July 2007)
  • 42. Virtualization Predictions 25% of enterprise data center servers to be virtual by 2010 - Intel (July 2007) A Microsoft hypervisor for Vista expected in mid-2009 - Gartner (July 2007) Virtualization will be part of nearly every aspect of IT by 2015 – Gartner (May 2007) 3 million virtual machines expected in 2009 - Gartner (May 2007)
  • 43. Virtualization Predictions Virtualization and multicore will cost $2.4 billion in customer spending between 2006 and 2010 - IDC (March 2007) OS Virtualization to become mainstream by 2010 - Gartner (December 2006) Virtualization market to grow to $15 billion worldwide by 2009 - IDC (October 2006)
  • 44. Performance Backup Slides Xen vs. VMware performance
  • 46. Guest Configuration File Backup Slides More details of the syntax
  • 47. Plan: File System Rule Language # Example file system rule set for an email client. fs_rule = [ 'id=1, read, 1024, 5' ] # read at most 1024 bytes of data in 5 seconds fs_rule = [ 'id=2, append, 1024, 3' ] # append at most 1024 bytes of data in 3 seconds. fs_rule = [ 'id=3, write, 320, 3' ] # write at most 320 bytes in 3 seconds # The email mount point is accessible to the email client, and fs_rules # with id=1 and id=2 are applied disk = [ 'fsvm:/mnt/email, /home/user/mail,fs_rule=1:2' ] # The email mount point is accessible to the email client, and fs_rules # with id=1 and id=3 are applied. disk = [ 'fsvm:/mnt/email, /home/user/attachments,fs_rule=1:3' ]
  • 48. Plan: Network Rule Language #Email client example continued network_rule = ['id=1, iptables, file=/etc/iptables/email_client'] network_rule = ['id=2, snort, file=/etc/snort/rules/email_client'] vif = [ 'rate=2Mb/s, network_rule=1:2' ]
  • 49. Attacks Backup Slides More details/example attacks looked at
  • 50. Evaluation of Prototype: Attacks Category/Behavior: Backdoor attacks initiate and listen for connections to send and receive data Examples: W32.MyDoom, W32.Bagel Defenses: Block unused ports Detect unexpected behavior and rollback to trusted image
  • 51. Evaluation of Prototype: Attacks Category/Behavior: Attacks that copy infected executables to shared folders or attempt to destroy data Examples: W32.Netsky, W32.Netad Defenses: Restrictions on write access to personal data Detect unexpected behavior and rollback to trusted image
  • 52. Evaluation of Prototype: Attacks Category/Behavior: Attacks that harvest email addresses and other personal data Examples: W32.Zafi.D, PWSteal.Ldpinch.E Defenses: Restrictions on read access to personal data Detect unexpected behavior and rollback to trusted image
  • 53. Evaluation of Prototype: Attacks Category/Behavior: Attacks that exploit vulnerability in specific server software Examples: MySQL UDF, Blaster, Slammer Defenses: Block unused ports (if not running the server software) Detect unexpected behavior and rollback to trusted image (if running the server software)