The document discusses various techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment, including Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and safety audits. It provides details on how to conduct HAZOPs, including composing the team, using guide words to identify deviations from the process's intentions, and documenting the results. The document also discusses how to apply these techniques at different stages of a project's lifecycle to identify hazards, their causes and consequences, and remedial actions needed to control risks.

1. APPLICATION
of
Various Techniques
for

2. HAZARD
 A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL
OR PHYSICAL AGENT THAT
IS REASONABLY LIKELY TO
CAUSE ILLNESS OR INJURY
IN THE ABSENCE OF ITS
CONTROL.

4. OBJECTIVES

5. OBJECTIVES

6. PROCESS HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION

8. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT PROCESS
SYSTEM
DESCRIPTION
HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION
SCENARIO
IDENTIFICATION
ACCIDENT
PROBABILITY
ACCIDENT
CONSEQUENCE
RISK
DETERMINATION
RISK
AND / OR
HAZARD
ACCEPTANCE
MODIFY
DESIGN
BUILD AND / OR
OPERATE SYSTEM

9. STEPS IN HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
PROCESS

10. CLASSIFICATION

11. PHI & PROJECT LIFE CYCLE

12. PHI & PROJECT LIFE CYCLE

13. SUITABILITY OF PHI TO DIFFERENT
PHASES
CONCEPT PROCESS DESIGN COMMISSIONING OPERATION MODIFICATION DECOMMISSIONING
HAZOP NS NS MS MS MS MS MS
WHAT IF S S MS MS MS MS MS
PHA MS MS NS NS NS NS S
FTA S S MS MS MS MS MS
Safety
Audit
MS MS MS MS MS MS MS
FMEA NS NS MS MS MS MS MS
NS – Not Suitable, MS – Most Suitable, S - Suitable

14. Tools for Process Hazard Identification
 What if Analysis?
 HAZOP
 FMEA
 ETA
 FTA
 Safety Audit
 Compliance Audit

15. STEPS IN PHA & RISK ANALYSIS
 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION :
I CHEMICAL IDENTITY
I LOCATION
I QUANTITY
I NATURE OF THE HAZARD
 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS :
I VULNERABILE ZONES
I HUMAN POPULATION
I CRITICAL FACILITIES
I ENVIRONMENT
 RISK ANALYSIS
I LIKELYHOOD OF THE HAZARDOUS EVENT OCCURING
I SEVIERITY OF THE CONSEQUENCES

16. ISSUES THAT PHA ADDRESS TO ARE :
 HAZARDS OF PROCESS
 PREVIOUS INCIDENTS AND NEAR- MISSES.
 ENGINEERING & ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS.
 CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE OF THESE CONTROLS.
 QUALITATIVE EVALUATION OF POSSIABLE EFFECTS ON
:
– EMPLOYEES.
– PUBLIC
– ENVIRONMENT
FACILITY & PLANT SITING
HUMAN FACTOR

17. WHAT IF ANALYSIS
 THE WHAT IF ANALYSIS IS AN UNCOMPLICATED
HAZARD EVALUATION PROCESS.
 IT REVIEWS THE COMPLETE PROCESS FROM RAW
MATERIAL TO FINISHED PRODUCT.
 IN THIS ANALYSIS THE QUESTIONS COVERING EVERY
MODE, COMPONENT OF THE PROCESS ARE ANSWERED
TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTS OF COMPONENT FAILURE
OR PROCEDURAL ERRORS.
 FOR MORE COMPLEX PROCESS THE WHAT IF ANALYSIS
CAN BE BEST ORGANISED THROUGH USE OF
CHECKLISTS.
 THIS METHOD IS VERY USEFULL IN TRAINING
OPERATING PERSONAL ON THE HAZARDS OF
PERTICULAR OPERATION.

18. THE TEAM COMPOSITION FOR WHAT IF
ANALYSIS
 THE TEAM FOR CONDUCTING THIS ANALYSIS COVERS A
WIDE RANGE OF DISCIPLINES THAT IS :
 PRODUCTION
 MECHANICAL
 CHEMICAL
 SAFETY
 THIS PACKAGE INCLUDES INFORMATIONS ON HAZARDS OF
:
 MATERIALS
 PROCESS
 TECHNOLOGY
 PROCEDURES
 EQUIPMENT DESIGN
 INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ETC.


19. THE IMPORTANT FEATURES of HAZOP
H AZAR D S O P ER ATIN G D IFFIC U LTIES
C O N S EQ U EN C ES
C AU S ES
D EV IATIO N
IN TEN TIO N

20. HAZOP - DEFINITION
HAZOP = HAZard and OPerability Study
 Method for identifying (and assessing) problems that
may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or
prevent efficient operation
 Systematic and qualitative method based on the use of
 Guide words
 Multi- disciplinary team effort

22. TYPES of HAZOPs
 Process HAZOP
– The HAZOP technique was originally developed to assess
plants and process systems
 Human HAZOP
– A family of more specialized HAZOPs
– More focused on Human Errors than technical failures
 Procedure HAZOP
– Review of procedures or operational sequences
– Sometimes denoted SAFOP - SAFe Operation Study
 Software HAZOP
– Identification of possible errors in the development of
software

23. PROCESS HAZOP
 Review of complete process through P& IDs and /
or flow diagrams
 Breakdown of the system into segments
 Standardized guide- words / parameters
 Application of guide - words to different process
parameters to identify possible deviations

25. Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to
buffer/settling tank
Guide word Deviation Possible causes Consequences Action required
NONE No flow (1)No hydrocarbon available
at intermediate storage.
(2)J1 pump fails (motor
fault, loss of drive,
impeller corroded away
etc.)
(3)Line blockage, isolation
valve closed in error, or
LCV fails shut.
(4)Line fracture
Loss of feed to reaction section
and reduced output.
Polymer formed in heat exchanger
under no flow conditions.
As for (1)
As for (1)
J1 pump overheats.
As for (1)
Hydrocarbon discharged into
area adjacent to public highway.
(a)Ensure good
communications with
intermediate storage
operator
(b)Install low level alarm
on settling tank LIC.
Covered by (b)
Covered by (b)
(c)Install kickback on J1
pump.
(d)Check design of J1
pump strainers.
Covered by (b)
(e)Institute regular
patrolling & inspection
of transfer line.

26. Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to
buffer/settling tank
Guide word Deviation Possible causes Consequences Action required
MORE OF More flow
More pressure
More
temperature
(5)LCV fails open or LCV
bypass open in error.
(6)Isolation valve closed in
error or LCV closes, with
J1 pump running.
(7)Thermal expansion in an
isolated valved section due
to fire or strong sunlight.
(8)High intermediate storage
temperature.
Settling tank overfills.
Incomplete separation of water
phase in tank, leading to
problems on reaction section.
Transfer line subjected to full
pump delivery or surge pressure.
Line fracture or flange leak.
Higher pressure in transfer line
and settling tank.
(f)Install high level alarm
on LIC and check
sizing of relief opposite
liquid overfilling.
(g)Institute locking off
procedure for LCV
bypass when not in use.
(h)Extend J2 pump suction
line to 12’’ above tank
base.
(j)Covered by (c) except
when kickback blocked
or isolated. Check line.
FQ and flange ratings
and reduce stroking
speed of LCV if
necessary. Install a PG
upstream of LCV and
an independent PG on
settling tank.
(k)Install thermal expansion
relief on valved section
(relief discharge route to
be decided later in study).
(l)Check whether there is
adequate warning of
high temperature at
intermediate storage. If
not, install.

27. Results of hazard and operability atudy of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to
buffer/settling tank
Guide word Deviation Possible causes Consequences Action required
LESS OF
PART OF
MORE
THAN
OTHER
Less flow
Less
temperature
High water
concentration
in stream.
High concen-
tration of lower
alkanes or
alkenes in stream.
Organic acids
present
Maintenance
(9)Leaking flange of valved
stub not blanked and
leaking.
(10)Winter conditions.
(11)High water level in
intermediate storage
tank.
(12)Disturbance on distillation
columns upstream of
intermediate storage.
(13)As for (12)
(14)Equipment failure, flange
leak, etc.
Material loss adjacent to public
highway.
Water sump and drain line
freeze up.
Water sump fills up more quickly.
Increased chance of water phase
passing to reaction section.
Higher system pressure.
Increased rate of corrosion of
tank base, sump and drain line.
Line cannot be completely
drained or purged.
Covered by (e) and the
checks in (j).
(m)Lag water sump down
to drain valve and steam
trace drain valve and
drain line downstream.
(n)Arrange for more frequent
draining off of water from
intermediate storage tank.
Install high interface level
alarm on sump.
(p)Check that design of
settling tank and associated
pipework, including relief
valve sizing, will cope with
sudden ingress of more
volatile hydrocarbons.
(q)Check suitability of
materials of construction.
(r)Install low-point drain and
N2 purge point down-
Stream of LCV. Also
N2 vent on settling tank.

28. HUMAN HAZOP
 Based on some form of task analysis
 Other input is procedures, workplace layout
schematics, man/ machine interface description
 Covers a ‘ family’ of specialized HAZOPs:
– Errors associated with design and use of computer-
based interfaces
– Errors associated with the use of interlocks
– Function allocation HAZOP: errors associated with
determining the role of the operator in the system.

29. PROCEDURE HAZOP
 Can be applied to all sequences of operations
 Focus on both human errors and failures of
technical systems
 Best suited for detailed assessments, but can also
be used for coarse preliminary assessments
 Flexible approach with respect to use of guide-
words

30. Procedure HAZOP Guide- words (I)
 Standard guide - words of Human HAZOP
can be applied to the steps in the procedure
 In addition a Procedure HAZOP should
highlight:
– TIMING/ SEQUENCE: The steps are not
performed in the correct sequence

31. Applications of Procedure HAZOP
 All operations that are potentially hazardous and that
are not identical to operations analyzed before should
be subject to a HAZOP
 Examples that should be HAZOPed:
– Start up and shut down procedures
– Purging operations
– Maintenance of critical equipments
– Complex lifting operations

32. Success Factors
 The `right’ composition of the HAZOP team
 Experienced and contributing team members
 Properly prepared procedures
– Possibly developed using task analysis
– Clear and unambiguous work description
 Experienced HAZOP leader/ chairman
– Familiar with the type of work being analyzed
– Sufficient authority to control the discussion
– Skills as ‘ catalyst’

33. Necessary documentation
 Description of operations (sequential
breakdown, procedure)
 Descriptions and drawings of equipment
involved in the operations,
 Critical data:
– Critical values of parameters
– Process conditions
– Critical controls.

34. Planning and preparation
 Ensure that necessary documentation is prepared
 Decide level of detail of the assessment
– Depending on documentation available
 Set time frame
– Depending on level of detail
– can be from a few hours to days and even weeks
 Compose the HAZOP team
 Send call for meeting, including:
– time and venue
– list of participants
– background documentation

35. HAZOP Team (I)
 HAZOP leader/ chairman:
– Independent (i. e., no responsibility for performance of the
operations)
– responsible (together with the HAZOP initiator) for planning
and preparation of the HAZOP
– Chairing the HAZOP meeting:
 trigger the discussion using the guide- words
 follow- up progress according to schedule/ agenda
 ensure completeness of the assessment
– Responsible for final reporting
 HAZOP secretary
– Preparing HAZOP work- sheets
– Recording the discussion in the HAZOP meeting
– Preparation of draft report

36. HAZOP Team (II)
 Representatives of all disciplines/ parties involved
in the operations
– give input based on their responsibility in the
performance of the operations
 Ideally, the HAZOP team should consist of 6- 10
persons in order to work effectively

37. How to be a good HAZOP participant
 Be active! Everyone’s contribution is
important
 Be to the point. Avoid endless
discussion of details
 Be critical in a positive way - not
negative, but constructive
 Be responsible. He who knows should
let the others know

38. HAZOP MEETING
 Proposed agenda:
– Introduction and presentation of participants
– Overall presentation of operations subject to
HAZOP
– Description of HAZOP method
– Presentation of first logical part of operations
– Analysis of first part of operations using the guide-
words
– Continue presentation and analysis
– Coarse summary of findings
 Focus should be on potential hazards as well as
potential operational problems
 Each session of the HAZOP meeting should not exceed
two hours

39. HAZOP RECORDING
 The HAZOP meeting is recorded by the HAZOP secretary
using work- sheets, either:
– Filling in paper copies of the work- sheets, or
– Using a PC connected to a projector
 HAZOP work- sheets may be somewhat different
depending on the scope of the study - generally the following
columns are included:
– Ref. no [Step no.]
– Guide- word
– Deviation
– Potential cause/ source
– Potential consequences
– Action/ recommendation
– Follow- up - responsibility

40. Parameter
Protection
Measures
System/ Equipment : Executed By:
REF. DIAGRAM / DRAWING NO : DATE:

41. HAZOP REPORTING
 There is no ‘ correct answer’
– depends on the experience of the participants
– depends on priorities
 Preliminary findings/ conclusions presented
at the end of the meeting
 Draft work- sheets are issued to all
participants for review and comments
 The HAZOP report is issued when all
corrections to the work- sheets have been
incorporated

42. HAZOP RESULTS
 Improvement of operations
– reduced risk - better contingency
– more efficient operations
 Improvement of procedures
– logical order
– completeness
 General awareness among involved parties
 Team building

43. FALURE MODE & EFFECT ANALYSIS
(FMEA)
 FMEA IS A DISCIPLINED DESIGN REVIEW TECHNIQUE
THAT FOCUSES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS
AND PROCESSES ON PRIORITIZED ACTIONS TO REDUCE
THE RISK OF PRODUCT FIELD FAILURES, AND
DOCUMENTS THOSE ACTIONS AND REVIEW PROCESS.
 IT :
 RECOGNIZE & EVALUATE THE POTENTIAL FAILURE OF A
PRODUCT/COMPONENT OR PROCESS AND ITS EFFECTS.
 IDENTIFY ACTIONS WHICH COULD ELIMINATE OR REDUCE
THE CHANCE OF POTENTIAL FAILURE OCCURING.
 DOCUMENT THE PROCESS.

44. THE FMEA PROCESS
Identify Elements of System
Identify Functions
Identify Failure Modes
Identify Possible Causes
Identify Effects on the System
Identify Effects on other System
Final Risk Assessment
Take Action to Reduce the Risk

45. Safety Audit
 Regulatory requirement
 System Review
 Physical Review
 Submission of Reports
 Implementation of Recommendations
 Follow up responsibilities

46. AUDIT
AN AUDIT IS A SYSTEMATIC
INDEPENDENT REVIEW TO VERIFY
CONFORMANCE WITH ESTABLISHED
GUIDE LINES OR STANDARDS. IT
EMPLOYS WELL DEFINED REVIEW
PROCESS TO ENSURE CONSISTENCE
AND TO ALLOW THE AUDITOR TO
REACH DEFENSIBLE CONCLUSIONS.

47. What is Safety Audit
Verifying the existence and implementation
of elements of occupational safety and
health system and for verifying the system’s
ability to achieve defined safety objectives

48. Why Safety Audit
 To know the compliance of health and
safety policy and management systems.
 To find out strengths and weaknesses
of safety program.
 To identify areas of high risk and
vulnerability and recommend for more
detailed risk analysis.
 To find out potential hazards present
in the existing plants.

49.  To ensure that operation and
maintenance are carried out according
to the plant manual without any
serious deviation.
 To rectify and bring forth any design
or process deficiency, which has come
up during modification.
 To ensure the compliance of important
statutory requirements.
 To check the existing fire fighting,
first-aid and training facilities.

50.  To know the status of emergency
preparedness and regular drills.
 To know the personal attitudes of
employees and public relation both
inside and outside the factory.
 To study the existing systems,
procedures and measures for
controlling the hazards besides the
provisions of Factories Act 1948 and
other legislation enforces the industrial
or process units for safety audits.

51. Manufacture, Storage and import of
Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989
 Safety Audit is required to be carried out by
by the occupiers of both the new and the
existing industrial activities with the help of
an expert not associated with such industrial
activities.
 This is required under Rule No.10-subrule
(4)
 This has come into effect from 3/10/94

52. SCOPE OF AUDIT
 FIRE AND EXPLOSION; PREVENTION,
PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT.
 WORK INJURY PREVENTION.
 HEALTH HAZARDS CONTROL.
 CONSEQUENCES OF EMERGENCIES.
 ON SITE EMERGENCY CONTROL

53.  It helps in safeguarding people,plant and the
environment from the effects of malfunctioning of
the plant.
 It ensures the compliance with local, regional and
national laws and regulations.
 It ensures independent verification, it identifies
matters needing attention and provides timely
warning to the organisation and management at
various levels of potential future problems.
Benefits of Safety Audit

54.  It helps in improving overall safety performance at
operating facilities.
 Accelerate the overall development of process safety
management and control systems.
 Improves the risk management system and develops
the basis for optimizing safety resources.
 Increase employees awareness of safety policies and
responsibilities.
 Identify potential cost savings by reducing lapses in
safety, quality and production.
 Provide an information base for use in emergencies and
evaluating the effectiveness of emergency response
arrangements.
 Enables management to give credit of good safety
performance.

55. MANAGEMENT CONCERNS
 QUANTITY PRODUCED IN RELATION
TO PRODUCTION SCHEDULE AND
MARKET REQUIREMENT
 PRODUCT QUALITY
 PRODUCTION COSTS
 INTEGRATING THE STAKEHOLDERS
CONCERNS
•Is Safety Important? Not always

56. TYPES OF AUDIT
 Electrical Audit
 Fire Safety Audit
 Pressure vessels Audit
 Lifting Tackles Audit
 Statutory Regulations Compliance Audit
 Emergency Communication Audit
 Pipe lines Audit

57. Elements of Occupational Safety
and Health System-IS14489
 Occupational Health and Safety Policy
 OS&H organizational set up
 Education and Training
 Employees participation in OS&H
Management
 Motivational and Promotional measures for
OS&H
 Safety Manual and Rules
 Compliance with Statutory Requirements
 New Equipment review and inspection

58. Elements contd..
 Accident reporting analysis investigation and
implementation and recommendations
 Risk Assessment including hazard identification
 Safety inspections
 Health and safety improvement plan/targets
 First aid facilities-Occupational health center
 Personal Protective Equipment
 housekeeping
 Machine and general area guarding
 Material handling equipment

59. Elements contd..
 Electrical and Personal safeguarding
 Work environment monitoring system
 Prevention of occupational diseases including
periodic medical examination
 Safe operating procedures
 Work Permit systems
 Fire Prevention, Protection and fighting
systems
 Emergency Preparedness plans(onsite/offsite)
 Process Plant modification procedure

60. Elements contd..
 Transportation of hazardous substances
 Hazardous waste treatment and disposal
 Safety in storage and warehousing
 Contractor safety systems
 Safety for customers(including MSDS)