Cyber Influence Operations

“Επιχειρήσεις Επιρροής στον
Κυβερνοχώρο”
(Cyber Influence Operations)
“… Ο Κυβερνοπόλεμος απειλεί εκ θεμελίων τη λειτουργία ενός
υπερδικτύου C4ISR και κατά συνέπεια και μια ολόκληρη φιλοσοφία
περί μάχεσθαι, η οποία βασίζεται στην πληροφοριακή κυριαρχία και
στη δικτυοκεντρική λειτουργία…”
Richard Clarke (Cyber War Analyst)
Παπαδάκης Κων/νος- Cyber Warfare Analyst
cos_pap@hotmail.com
linkedin.com/in/konstantinos-papadakis

Cyber Influence Operations
Temet Nosce
“…cyber warfare of the future may be less about hacking
electrical power grids and more about hacking minds by
shaping the environment in which political debate takes
place…”
Tim Stevens

Cyber Influence Operations-Objective of Influence Operations
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Doing
Do something that B
would not otherwise Do

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when does influencing the behavior of an audience
become the primary effect of a cyber operation…?
and
which cyber operations might qualify as such….?

Cyber Influence Operations-Definitions
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“…well over a decade after the topic of information
warfare broke out into the open, its conceptual
underpinnings remain weak and largely unsatisfa-
ctory, with fierce battles raging over neologisms and
definitions…”
2007 Martin C. Libicki

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Inform & Influence Operations (IIOs)
Efforts to inform, influence, or persuade selected audiences through
actions, utterances, signals, or messages’.
***Strategic communications (STRATCOM) and propaganda activities fall
under this category, as well as the deliberate dissemination of disinfo-
rmation to confuse audiences.
Isaac R. Porche III et.al
Influence Cyber Operations-ICOs
‘Operations which affect the logical layer of cyberspace with the intention of
influencing attitudes, behaviors, or decisions of target audiences.’
Brangetto-Veenendaal

Temet Nosce
Influence Operations
Coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of national
diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in
peacetime, crisis, conflict, and post-conflict to foster attitudes, behaviors, or
decisions by foreign target audiences that further [a nation’s] interests and
objectives’.
Larson-Darilek-Gibran-Nichiporuk-Richardson-Schwartz-Thurston
* ‘the use of non-military [non-kinetic], means to erode the adversary’s
willpower, confuse and constrain his decision-making, and undermine his public
support, so that victory can be attained without a shot being fired’

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Cyber Attack
‘[a]n act or action initiated in cyberspace to cause harm by compromising communication,
information or other electronic systems, or the information that is stored, processed or
transmitted in these systems.
NATO Report on Cyber Defence Taxonomy and Definitions, Enclosure 1 to 6200/TSC FCX 0010/TT-
10589/Ser: NU 0289
Harm in Information System
Direct or indirect harm to a communication and information system, such as com-promising the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the system and any information
exchanged or stored.
NATO Report on Cyber Defence Taxonomy and Definitions, Enclosure 1 to 6200/TSC FCX 0010/TT-
10589/Ser: NU 0289

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Information Operations
‘[t]he integrated employment, during military operations, of information-
related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations to influence,
disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential
adversaries while protecting [its] own’.
US Department of Defense, Directive 3600.01. May 2, 2013. p.12
Information
Operations

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‘apples’
of information content
Informational
Technical
‘apples carts’
of information systems
Informational
Psychological
Semantic or Cognitive
actions
Info on Info

Temet Nosce

Temet Nosce
Logical Net
Component
Logical Layer
Logical Connections between network nodes
Instructions and Rules (OS, Applications,…) which
control the function of the Information System and
the way it handles the data which are transfer
through this system
The core message of
every Information
(transferred, storage
in a system, etc) to the
receiver

Temet Nosce
Inform & Influence Operations (IIOs)
Efforts to inform, influence, or persuade selected
audiences through actions, utterances, signals, or
messages’.
Isaac R. Porche III et.al
***Strategic communications (STRATCOM) and propaganda activities
fall under this category, as well as the deliberate dissemination of
disinfo-rmation to confuse audiences.

Temet Nosce
Influence Cyber Operations-ICOs
‘Operations which affect the logical layer of cyberspace with the intention of
influencing attitudes, behaviors, or decisions of target audiences.’
* The ‘apple carts’ of Influence Operations concern the technical actions that
target the logical layer of cyberspace and are designed to influence the behavior
of a target audience. These actions are intrusive as they gain unauthorized
access to networks and systems in order to destroy, change or add information.

Temet Nosce

Cyber Influence Operations-Views
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* Integrate cyber operations into a strategy capable of achieving political
objectives.
* Conflicts between developed nations must remain below the threshold of an
armed conflict, or at least below the threshold where it is actually proclaimed
to be an armed conflict.
* Gerasimov doctrine (Russian nonlinear war)
‘[t]he role of non-military means of achieving political and
strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of
weapons in their effectiveness’.

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Peacetime, Prelude to war, Wartime
‘all the means and methods of impacting information, information-psychological,
and information-technological objects and information resources to achieve the
objectives of the attacking side’.
Intelligence, counterintelligence, deceit, disinformation, electronic warfare,
debilitation of communications, degradation of navigation support,
psychological pressure, degradation of information systems, and propaganda.
Use of intrusive ICOs as part of a broader Influence Operations strategy
distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS)
advanced exploitation techniques,
or RT television

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Use of ICOs to military operations (MILDEC, CNOs) or specific authorities
(primarily intelligence agencies) for very specific purposes.
Transparency, Objectivity, and Legality
Tell the Truth and act in a manner consistent with your principles
Weakness1: facts and messages supporting the narrative must be reliable and
consistent.
Weakness2: assumes critical thinking, reading ability and interest among the
audiences

Cyber Influence Operations-Types
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Unauthorized access to an information system
False Flag Cyberattacks
DDoS-Distributed Denial of Services Attacks
Website Defacements
Doxing

Cyber Influence Operations-Incidents
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Unauthorised access to an information system
Hacking, or gaining access to a computer system.
2015, Security breach- US Office of Personnel Management.
May 2014, “Cyber Berkut’s” attack in Central Election Committee
in Ukraine.
Damage the credibility of the Ukrainian government
in overseeing a fair election process
Major embarrassment for the US government giving the
impression that US authorities were not able to protect
sensitive information.

Temet Nosce
False flag cyberattacks
Use of specific techniques (IP Spoofing, fake code lines in a specific
language…)
Apr 2015, TV5 Monde attack.
Confusion and undermine trust in French institutions in a
period of national anxiety.

Temet Nosce
DDoS Attacks
Overwhelm the target’s resources (degradation) or stop its services
(disruption)
April 2007, Estonia.
Undermine Estonia’s Government credibility.
2014, 2015, NATO Websites attacks.
Embarrass and disseminate anti-NATO propaganda and
undermine NATO’s readiness to defend itself in cyberspace.
«Paintball Effect».

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Website Defacements
Alter the content of a website
2013, Hacking in Twitter account of the Associated Press.
Confusion and undermine trust in institutions by spreading
disinformation or embarrass the administrators for poor
network defense.

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Doxing
Revealing and publicizing information on an organization
Feb 2014, Victoria Nuland
This type of incident is embarrassing, but more importantly,
can create divisions among allies and jeopardize a common
policy to address a crisis situation

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Difficult to attribute
Their impact will generally be limited to harassing and annoying a target
audience.
The more target audiences and organizations become aware of the need for
adequate protection of their digital infrastructure and the limited long term
impact of cyberattacks, the less useful they will become.
ICOs will, however, remain a nuisance and be able to create a certain
amount of confusion
NATO members and other democracies, have limited use of ICOs outside of
an armed conflict situation.

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Increase transparency
Government officials and the public at large have a fundamental grasp of
the nature and impact of the multiple kinds of cyberattacks that are
possible.
Raise cyber awareness among the population at large as well as the bure-
aucratic and political elite.

Cyber Influence Operations

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Cyber Influence Operations