Building an Automated Behavioral Malware Analysis Environment using Free and Open-Source Software

Building an Automated Malware Behavioral Analysis Environment Using Free and Open-Source Tools Jim Clausing, PMTS, AT&T CSO 18 Jun 2009

Jim Clausing, GCIA, GCFA, GREM, GCIH, GCFW, GSIP, GSOC, SSP-MPA, CISSP GCIA (Gold) #64 – 2000 GCFA (Gold) #25 – 2002 GREM (Gold) #48 – 2005 And other certs along the way… SANS Mentor, StaySharp/STAR instructor, CommunitySANS instructor, Internet Storm Center handler since 2002 Instrument-rated private pilot – 2003/2004

The patches and scripts http://handlers.sans.org/jclausing/grem_gold/ http://www.giac.org/certified_professionals/practicals/grem/48.php Page 7

The Environment – A Little History

Motivation – The Environment

Unpacking may lead to surprises – like no results  Page 13

We’ve got malware, now what?

Truman (well, and Joe Stewart) FTW Page 15

Submission [jac@fltruman001 ~]$ for i in 090???-*.piz; do sudo submit.sh $i && mv $i old-malware/; sleep 10; done Archive: 090529-rnd_jpg.piz inflating: rnd.jpg *****Processing rnd.jpg - ONEBOOT****** interface: eth1 (4.0.0.0/255.0.0.0) filter: (ip) and ( not port 45612 and not port 45611 and not tcp port 6987 and not udp port 32785 ) tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode listening on eth1, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 96 bytes tcpdump: listening on eth1, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 1514 bytes Starting Faux FTP Server Emulation on port 21 Starting Faux MySQL Server Emulation on port 3306 Starting Faux SMTP Server Emulation on port 25 Starting Faux SMB Server Emulation on port 445 Starting Faux IRC Server Emulation on port 6667 Starting Faux DNS Server Emulation on port 53 Page 19

Monitoring [jac@fltruman001 ~]$ alias status alias status='cat /tmp/current.txt && echo "" && cat /tmp/sandnet*.log | tr -c "[:print:][:blank:]" "." ; tcpdump -nnr /tmp/sandnet.pcap -w - "not broadcast and (not src net 4.5.6 or not dst net 4.5.6)" | ipaudit -CST -r - -l 4.5.6.7 ; ngrep -I /tmp/sandnet.pcap "GET|POST|HEAD|OPTIONS|JOIN" "tcp port 80 and not host 4.5.6.1" | tr -c "[:print:][:blank:]" "."‘ Page 20

Monitoring, cont’d [jac@fltruman001 ~]$ status Server.exe request: name=ftp.sickbassline.com, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7 responseIP: 4.3.2.86 responseIP: 4.3.2.63 response: rcode=NOERROR, … …, auth=, add=, aa=1 request: name=time.windows.com, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7 responseIP: 4.5.6.1 response: rcode=NOERROR, ans=…, auth=, add=, aa=1 Connection from 4.5.6.7 USER 0wn@sickbassline.com PASS smokeweed TYPE A PORT 4,5,6,7,4,7 STOR User.mps reading from file /tmp/sandnet.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet) 4.5.6.7 4.3.2.86 6 1030 21 674 578 9 9 2009-06-04-11:24:02.2148 2009-06-04-11:24:03.3459 1 1 4.5.6.7 224.0.0.22 2 0 0 0 108 0 2 2009-06-04-11:24:09.5569 2009-06-04-11:24:10.4709 1 1 input: /tmp/sandnet.pcap filter: (ip) and ( tcp port 80 and not host 4.5.6.1 ) match: GET|POST|HEAD|OPTIONS|JOIN ##########exit Page 21

Original Truman Analysis Tools

The 4 Areas of Analysis

Identify the OS Summary report for xxx.xxx-XPSP2-files created at ……… OS info>>> kern - Determine OS from a Windows RAM Dump (v.0.1_20060914) Ex: kern <path_to_dump_file> File Description : NT Kernel & System File Version : 5.1.2600.2180 (xpsp_sp2_rtm.040803-2158) Internal Name : ntoskrnl.exe Original File Name : Product Name : Microsoft® Windows® Operating System Product Version : 5.1.2600.2180

Analyzing Network Traffic – fauxdns DNS>>> request: name=sslrapidshare.or.tp, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7 responseIP: 4.3.2.51 responseIP: 4.3.2.154 response: rcode=NOERROR, ans=… …, auth=, add=, aa=1 request: name=gfmd1.or.tp, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7 responseIP: 4.3.2.104 responseIP: 4.3.2.240 response: rcode=NOERROR, ans=… …, auth=, add=, aa=1 request: name=time.windows.com, class=IN, type=A, peer=4.5.6.7 responseIP: 4.5.6.1 response: rcode=NOERROR, ans=…, auth=, add=, aa=1

Analyzing Network Traffic – fauxftp Connection from 4.5.6.7 USER 0wn@sickbassline.com PASS smokeweed TYPE A PORT 4,5,6,7,4,7 STOR User.mps Page 27

Analyzing Network Traffic – fauxirc IRC>>> 2009-05-27-16:49:17: Connection from 4.5.6.7 2009-05-27-16:49:17: PASS lammers 2009-05-27-16:49:17: NICK [00|USA|296161] 2009-05-27-16:49:18: USER XP-8165 * 0 :ATT 2009-05-27-16:49:18: MODE [00|USA|296161] +iB-x 2009-05-27-16:49:18: JOIN #WiFi-a Crypt 2009-05-27-17:00:13: QUIT System shutting down. 2009-05-27-17:00:15: QUIT Leaving

Analyzing Network Traffic – ipaudit IP traffic>>> srcdst proto sp dp bytes pkts start end 1 / 2 4.5.6.7 4.3.2.516 1046 80 748 346 5 5 2009-05-27-16:49:17.1300 2009-05-27-16:49:17.1473 1 2 4.5.6.7 4.3.2.104 6 1047 4242 816 697 10 10 2009-05-27- 16:49:17.1613 2009-05-27-17:00:15.5921 1 2 4.5.6.7 239.255.255.250 17 1050 1900 0 525 0 3 2009-05-27-16:49:17.3746 2009-05-27-16:49:23.3815 1 1 4.5.6.7 224.0.0.22 2 0 0 0 108 0 2 2009-05-27-17:00:14.2087 2009-05-27-17:00:14.9690 1 1

Analyzing Network Traffic – tshark =================================================================== Protocol Hierarchy Statistics Filter: frame frame frames:602 bytes:733467 eth frames:602 bytes:733467 ip frames:573 bytes:731979 tcp frames:387 bytes:146779 http frames:30 bytes:22708 short frames:5 bytes:17790 data-text-lines frames:3 bytes:644 data frames:8 bytes:849 udp frames:57 bytes:10014 nbdgm frames:11 bytes:2511 smb frames:11 bytes:2511 mailslot frames:11 bytes:2511 browser frames:11 bytes:2511 nbns frames:27 bytes:2538 dns frames:6 bytes:532 http frames:3 bytes:525 ntp frames:2 bytes:180 bootp frames:8 bytes:3728 short frames:127 bytes:575066 igmp frames:2 bytes:120 arp frames:29 bytes:1488 ===================================================================

Analyzing Network Traffic – tcptrace HTTP>>> mod_http: Capturing HTTP traffic (port 80) 1 arg remaining, starting with '../small.pcap' Ostermann'stcptrace -- version 6.6.7 -- Thu Nov 4, 2004 10 packets seen, 10 TCP packets traced elapsed wallclock time: 0:00:00.002643, 3783 pkts/sec analyzed trace file elapsed time: 0:00:00.017257 Http module output: 4.5.6.7:1046 ==> 4.3.2.51:80 (a2b) Server Syn Time: Wed May 27 16:49:17.130145 2009 (1243457357.130) Client Syn Time: Wed May 27 16:49:17.130085 2009 (1243457357.130) Server Fin Time: Wed May 27 16:49:17.146947 2009 (1243457357.147) Client Fin Time: Wed May 27 16:49:17.147323 2009 (1243457357.147) GET /here2 HTTP/1.0 Response Code: 404 (Not Found) Request Length: 66 Reply Length: 468 Content Length: 289 Content Type : text/html; Time request sent: Wed May 27 16:49:17.130584 2009 (…) Time reply started: Wed May 27 16:49:17.146886 2009 (…) Time reply ACKed: Wed May 27 16:49:17.147077 2009 (…) Elapsed time: 16 ms (request to first byte sent) Elapsed time: 16 ms (request to content ACKed)

Analyzing Disk Image – AIDE --------------------------------------------------- Added files: --------------------------------------------------- added: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/avmont.exe added: /mnt/new/Documents and Settings/All Users/Application Data/TEMP --------------------------------------------------- Removed files: --------------------------------------------------- removed: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/system32/CatRoot2/tmp.edb --------------------------------------------------- Changed files: --------------------------------------------------- changed: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/system32/drivers/etc/hosts changed: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/WindowsUpdate.log changed: /mnt/new/WINDOWS/setupapi.log

Analyzing Disk Image – ADS Alternate Data Streams>>> /mnt/new/Documents and Settings/All Users/Application Data/TEMP -> 75443743 getfattr --absolute-names -n ntfs.streams.list -PR /mnt/new

Analyzing Disk Image – hosts file* Host file changes>>> + +127.0.0.1 www.symantec.com +127.0.0.1 securityresponse.symantec.com +127.0.0.1 symantec.com +127.0.0.1 www.sophos.com +127.0.0.1 sophos.com +127.0.0.1 www.mcafee.com +127.0.0.1 mcafee.com +127.0.0.1 liveupdate.symantecliveupdate.com +127.0.0.1 www.viruslist.com +127.0.0.1 viruslist.com +127.0.0.1 viruslist.com +127.0.0.1 f-secure.com +127.0.0.1 www.f-secure.com +127.0.0.1 kaspersky.com +127.0.0.1 kaspersky-labs.com +127.0.0.1 www.avp.com +127.0.0.1 www.kaspersky.com +127.0.0.1 avp.com

Memory Image Analysis – Volatility Page 36

Analyzing Memory Image – connections Open Ports>>> Local Address Remote Address Pid 4.5.6.7:1047 4.3.2.104:4242 1484 896 135 6 Wed May 27 20:39:59 2009 1032 1027 17 Wed May 27 20:40:13 2009 1096 1900 17 Wed May 27 20:40:14 2009 1484 1047 6 Wed May 27 20:49:18 2009 < 908 -> 135 TCP > 896 -> 135 TCP 9,11c9,11 < 992 -> 1032 TCP > 1484 avmont -> 1047 TCP C:INDOWSvmont.exe 14,15c14,16 < 992 -> 138 UDP < 908 -> 445 UDP > 1484 avmont -> 137 UDP C:INDOWSvmont.exe > 0 System -> 138 UDP > 896 -> 445 UDP

Memory/Static Binary Analysis – ssdeep ssdeep info>>> 1536:RVt4qqO5FjciL3KBupEAbAX/e9SP+IaiOW:eu5tciL3KApRbAz+Ia1W,"abod.exe" 768:ruBNNTLa973GMVkIZqqnO5FDvcTsvJesUJDSP+f4/cF1oGoiOWK:YVt4qqO5FjcSe9SP+JaiOW, "/data/forensics/abod.exe-XPSP2-files/0c596000-abod.exe“ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ssdeep info>>> 1536:0BlSTT+JwGgVXGsOkCMGVLwaQyafnSI0OYRr:0BYNlVXGsOtPwFtfm, "1b1e067fdb0f2a44a50d9e290022b9ed.exe" 1b1e067fdb0f2a44a50d9e290022b9ed.exe matches e933dbd16c9509418a2212c9d62c7976.exe (80) 3072:0zhQO2dw847UiImHkwebMPK4wRE4pRThKt/94:09QbViEwEM94TThKt14, "/data/forensics/1b1e067fdb0f2a44a50d9e290022b9ed.exe-XPSP2-files/0ca74000-sandnet.exe" /data/forensics/1b1e067fdb0f2a44a50d9e290022b9ed.exe-XPSP2-files/0ca74000-sandnet.exe matches /data/forensics/e933dbd16c9509418a2212 c9d62c7976.exe-XPSP2-files/007bc000-sandnet.exe (96)

Static Binary Analysis – binhash BinHash info>>> File: [/forensics/exes/abod.exe] b826d0f222242c1e48f4e1ebe778a534 PE Phdr: af86103672ba3bba2d21f2691465520f PE Opt Hdr: f8ea55a399eeec409874af01ca0cf01d Import [1] Offset: (f570) Size: (180): 93f613363a9cb87c3a20e3f2e1fc47b7 Import [12] Offset: (f000) Size: (608): eafa58275a218a26f92631bf75b10b8f [0] (.text) (VirtualAddress: 00001000) (PtrToData: 00001000) (SizeOfData: 0000e000) Shdr: aaa4cacbb1cc38713961cc2e5931b982 Shdr Data: f571948f8203e66d09c87b00ae748c8d [1] (.rdata) (VirtualAddress: 0000f000) (PtrToData: 0000f000) (SizeOfData: 00002000) Shdr: 46aa637bbc2c0335c427f6ca42021df9 Shdr Data: 3b10f3f4c6012e87d46686464575926c [2] (.data) (VirtualAddress: 00011000) (PtrToData: 00011000) (SizeOfData: 00003000) Shdr: cff63d398711731f58eee390a6ce8513 Shdr Data: 71cc6a0ff1c18b313d21f1f03229738e

Static Binary Analysis – packerid.py Packer info>>> [['Armadillo v1.71'], ['Microsoft Visual C++ v5.0/v6.0 (MFC)'], ['Microsoft Visual C++']]

Static Binary Analysis – Volatility malfind.py* # # lsass.exe (Pid: 676) # + VAD node @821bfb00 Start 00c60000 End 00c6ffff Tag VadS Flags 18 + VAD node @8236b208 Start 00c80000 End 00c96fff Tag VadS Flags 18 - Status: disassembling with pydasm... 0xc80000 call 0x567d 0xc80005 retn 0x8 0xc80008 push ecx 0xc80009 push esi 0xc8000a call 0x1582 Found 2 suspicious Vad entries

Questions? E-mail: jac@att.com or jclausing@isc.sans.org Page 45

SANS Mentor Class – SEC 508 (Forensics) For those of you from central OH (or folks you work with), I’ll be facilitating another mentor class in the fall. Thursday evenings from 6:30-8:30PM in Reynoldsburg, OH running 10 Sep-12 Nov. http://www.sans.org/mentor/details.php?nid=19458 Page 46

Building an Automated Behavioral Malware Analysis Environment using Free and Open-Source Software

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